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INTRODUCTION 
The emerging Common Market of Western Europe calls for new 
organization planning by many American enterprises. Many who 
have never before maintained a European organization will now 
develop one; and those who have long had European organizations 
will have to re-examine and revise them. 
The subjects of planning-licenses to do business, liabilities of 
owners, taxation, management, finance-are the same in the Com-
mon Market as anywhere else. But there are many ways in which 
the European variables differ radically from those in the United 
States; there are others in which the variables in the Common Mar-
ket will be found to differ significantly from those which prevailed in 
compartmented Europe. 
In the following pages we will review some of the considerations 
which affect business organization in the European Economic Com-
munity, emphasizing the considerations which, on this new business 
frontier, are most different from corresponding considerations in 
the United States. 
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS 
I. DOING BUSINESS FROM THE OUTSIDE 
(WITHOUT "ESTABLISHMENT") 
3 
Most of the present essay will be concerned with the organiza-
tion of branches and subsidiaries in Europe. But branches and sub-
sidiaries are not the only means of doing business in Europe; some 
of the largest exporters and importers may get along without them. 
These traders may do business with no one at all representing them 
in Europe; or with agents of various kinds who fall short of the 
"branch" category-who do not create, in the European term, an 
"establishment" 1 of the American company. In the next few pages 
we will indicate the principal considerations which might lead an 
enterprise to avoid creating a European "establishment," although 
doing business with Europe; we will also indicate by what means the 
enterprise could do business without "establishment." 
A. FREEDOM OF ENTRY 
I. PROVISIONS DIRECTED ESPECIALLY AGAINST 
FOREIGNERS 
A good deal of attention is devoted in the Treaty of Rome and in 
current European discussion of it to the right of a national of one 
country to open a business establishment in another country on a 
plane of equality with the latter's own nationals. A good deal of 
this discussion is of very minor importance to Americans, because it 
concerns the right of individuals to live and work in the second 
country-a matter which Americans associate with the word "im-
migration." Among the European countries, the right of an individ-
ual Dutchman to operate a machine shop in Antwerp, or of an in-
dividual Italian to operate a tailor shop in Paris presents very im-
portant questions of economic and political policy. 
The interest of American enterprises in the Common Market is 
generally of a different kind. They do not seek primarily to employ 
American citizens in Europe, but to employ American processes, 
products, trade names, and money. Although they would often like 
1 Although this word is not common as a legal term in American domestic law, it 
has long been used in the English language version of treaties of "Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation." See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805 ( 1958). It appears in the title of the recently 
concluded "Convention on Establishment" with France, November 25, 1959, 41 DEP'T 
STATE BULL. 829. The corresponding European terms are etablissement, Niederlassung, 
stabilimento, and vestiging. . 
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to use a few Americans as resident executives or technicians in their 
foreign subsidiaries, they can usually manage without. 
We will notice briefly the rights of individual foreigners to con-
duct or work in a business in European countries, even though this 
is not a matter of primary concern. In France and Belgium foreign 
individuals must obtain a license to do business as permanent resi-
dents, called a carte de commer~ant hranger.2 These are said to be 
fairly easily obtained in France (although one must wait a few 
months and wheedle a few officials), but traditionally difficult to 
obtain in Belgium. In France, Americans can probably demand the 
eventual issue of the carte under the terms of the newly signed Con-
vention of Establishment between the two countries,3 but the right 
which this treaty creates will probably not cause the carte to pass 
through official channels any faster than it did before. 
The Convention of Establishment lists only the following lines of 
business, in which Americans. shall not have the same rights as 
Frenchmen to do business in France: 
Comm'' nica tions 
Air or water transport 
Banking involving depository or fiduciary functions 
Exploitation of the soil or other natural resources 
Production of electricity 4 
The Convention presumably supersedes the earlier French law 
which purported to admit Americans to exercise private rights to 
the same extent as the United States offers similar right to French-
men,5 with a limited number of exceptions.5a 
Three other countries of the Market-Germany, Italy, and the 
Nether lands, apparently have no rules affecting foreign individuals 
differently from nationals in the matter of access to commerce, 
• Le droit d'Etablissement dans le Marche Commun, [1958] JoURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANf:;;AISE 9991 1004-1007 ( 1959). 
•convention of Establishment with France, art. II, 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 8z9 (1959). 
The treaty was signed on November Z5, 1959, but has not been ratified at this writing. 
'I d. art V, para. z. There is also a provision reserving the right to special regulation 
of trade in gold and silver, fissionable materials, armaments, and anything else affect-
ing national security (art. XII). 
• France: C. Civ. art. II. There is a similar provision in Italy: CoDICE CIVILE, Dis-
posizioni sulla Legge in Generale art. 16. 
oa RIPERT, TRAITE ELllMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL (4th ed., 1959) II5, lists the 
following businesses from which foreigners are specifically excluded: ownership of 
French ships, of river boats, or of aircraft, hydro-electric power generation, public 
utilities, highway transport, sale of beverages, travel agencies, and munitions. There 
are also special restrictions on foreign activities in banking, brokerage, and itinerant 
merchandising. 
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except that Italy has a reciprocity provision.6 If these countries 
should adopt discriminatory provisions, they would be inapplicable 
to Americans because of the treaties of Commerce, Friendship and 
Navigation ( "C.F.N. treaties") subsisting between them and the 
United States.7 All three treaties, like the U.S.-French Convention 
of Establishment, guarantee American individuals the same rights 
as nationals to carry on businesses in the respective countries. The 
German and Netherlands treaties contain exceptions similar to those 
in France,8 but the Italian treaty makes no such exceptions. 
When we turn from the rights of individual Americans to live 
and work in European countries, and look at the rights of American 
corporations, we find that they have no less rights than individuals. 
The C.F.N. treaties give American companies as well as American 
individuals rights to establish branches and carry on commerce, with 
the same exceptions for key industries. With Belgium and Luxem-
bourg, the United States has no C.F N. treaties, but these countries 
do not attempt to discriminate against foreign enterprise. 
If the problem of a license to do business proves troublesome in 
spite of the rights conferred by treaties between the EufJpean Coun-
try involved and the United States, there are other treaties affect-
ing the right of establishment which may prove helpful. The three 
countries of the Benelux union are bound by treaty to admit the en-
terprises of each other. Therefore, if an American enterprise suc-
ceeds in establishing a bona fide subsidiary in one of those three 
countries, it is entitled to do business in the others. Further, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg have made treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation with France, so that an entry into France 
may serve as a means of entry to Belgium or Luxembourg, and vice 
versa, subject to enumerated exceptions of a few particular lines of 
business.9 
Further possibilities of entering one country through another 
0 Op. cit. supra, notes 2, 5· 
7 Germany: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Federal Re-
public of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S. Dep't of State, Treaties and Other International 
Agreements Series (hereinafter cited as T.I.A.S.) No. 3593· 
Italy: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Italian Republic, 
Feb. 2, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1965. 
Netherlands: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Netherlands, 
March 27, 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 3942· 
The press has reported that a treaty on the same subject is under negotiation with 
Belgium. 
8 One exception in the French treaty-production of electric energy-does not appear 
in the German and Netherlands treaties, but the others appear in Article VII of both 
treaties. 
0 Op. cit. srtpra note 2, at 1006. 
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arise from the terms of the Treaty of Rome, which created the 
Common Market. The Council of the Economic Community is en-
joined by the Treaty of Rome to "lay down a general program for 
the abolition of restrictions existing within the Community on free-
dom of establishment" before the end of the first transitory stage-
that is, before 1962.10 At the beginning of the second stage (sup-
posedly 1962) the Council will have power to order abolition by 
majority vote. 
The rights which the Council may grant, under the Rome Treaty, 
to companies of other Community countries cannot be denied merely 
because the companies are owned by Americans (or other out-
siders). A company which is organized under Belgian law, man-
aged in Belgium, and has its biggest plant there, must be treated 
by France as a Belgian national, for purposes of "establishment." 11 
A literal reading of the Treaty suggests that any one of these three 
features would give the company Belgian rights, but a leading French 
commentator has challenged this interpretation.12 Hence we do not 
think it is safe to assume that one can gain any formal advantage out 
of merely filing corporation papers in Luxembourg, as Americans 
do in DelawareY But a company with its true principal office and 
operational base in one country is sure of the right to set up an estab-
lishment in the others under the terms of the directives on establish-
ment which the Community Council may issue. 
We conclude that laws which discriminate against Americans in 
the matter of business licensing present a surmountable problem, or 
none at all, outside of a limited group of businesses in most of which 
American corporations are unlikely to be interested. This is not to 
say that Americans will not encounter discrimination, but merely 
that the important discrimination will not be in the form of a law 
requiring special permission for foreign business enterprises. One of 
the other obstacles may be, in France and Belgium, a law on the li-
censing of American individuals to be company executives.H More 
serious obstacles will be presented by the laws on exchange of cur-
10 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [hereinafter cited as the 
Treaty] art. 54(1). 
11 The Treaty art. 58. 
12 Loussouarn, Droit international du Commerce, 12 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
CoMMERCIAL 246, 250 (1959). 
13 Article 58 of the Treaty invites some speculation as to whether national rights 
can be obtained by maintaining a mere "registered office"; this question is examined 
by Mr. Thomas L. Nicholson in another chapter of this book. 
u Discussed later, in the sub-chapter on "Management." 
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rency; they do not discriminate against American companies, but 
only against American dollars.15 Although the victim of the discrimi-
nation may be the same, the means of dealing with the discrimina-
tion may be quite different. Finally, there is the obstacle of laws on 
business licensing which in terms apply equally to citizens and to 
foreigners, but which may be administered to discriminate in fact 
against foreigners. These non-discriminatory licensing laws will be 
next discussed. 
2. DOMESTIC LICENSING PROVISIONS 
When an American enterprise surmounts the hurdle of foreign 
nationality, it has only scratched the surface of the problem of es-
tablishing itself in Europe. It must still cut through the mass of 
licensing requirements which apply equally to locally owned enter-
prises. In Luxembourg and the Netherlands every business establish-
ment must be licensed, whether foreign or domestic. In Italy, a 
permit is required for every retail trade, but not for manufacturing 
or (apparently) wholesale commerce. In Germany, access to manu-
facturing and wholesale trades is free, but every retail establish-
ment requires a license. In France, entry into commerce is theoreti-
cally free, but there are a host of kinds of business for which licenses 
are required; a recent study reported the following list, which was 
not claimed to be complete, of products in which dealers must be 
licensed by one authority or another: 
Matches, arms, and explosives 
Drugs 
Gas generating equipment 
Transportation 
Amusements and spectacles 
Meat, milk, livestock, fish 
Bakery goods 
Wines 
In addition, the following enterprises must be licensed, regardless 
of products : 
General stores 
Single-price stores (comparable to "5 and 10 cent stores") 
Stores specializing in close-outs 
Brokerage of several kinds-e.g., stock, foreign exchange, 
and ships 
"'Discussed later, in the sub-chapter on "Financing," and also in the separate chapter 
by M. Fern and J eantet, under the title "Exchange Control Regulations in France." 
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Belgium is apparently the country with the greatest freedom of 
commerce; but licenses are required for dealing in transportation 
and in certain agricultural products/6 and a recent law requires 
proof of professional qualifications in all forms of "small business." 17 
Our information on how and why licenses are granted and refused 
in European countries is very indefinite-as it would be with respect 
to the United States, and for the same reasons. Lack of technical 
and financial qualifications will doubtless impede licensing, but they 
will rarely be the only impediments. Many of the French laws, at 
least, have added to technical requirements a condition that the 
proposed establishment should be in "the interest of the national or 
regional economy." Probably this question would be answered 
chiefly by reference to national and regional economic plans, either 
published or nascent. Our French collaborator, Professor Houin, 
warns that there is no effective judicial remedy against administra-
tive discretion in denying the license for a foreign "merchant" which· 
an American or other foreigner needs to serve as executive of a com-
pany or branch in France. 
In Italy, the existence of factors other than technical ones is sug-
gested by the membership of the committees which pass on retail li-
censes; they consist of the mayor, two local merchants, and two local 
laborers. Although an appeal from the committee's denial lies to an 
administrative court, the views of competing local interests are likely 
to color the final decisions. 
In the Netherlands, the licensing process involves the advice of 
nation-wide trade associations which might be expected to view 
dimly any competition with their own products. There are also re-
ported to be in the Nether lands very widespread "tying agree-
ments," whereby all kinds of concerns engage to buy from only cer-
tain sources, which in turn agree to sell only to certain outlets. Thus 
there is a closed merchandising circuit, in which a newcomer can 
penetrate only with the consent of the trade associations. 
From these fragmentary observations, it is evident that entry into 
the European market raises very complex problems. Entry is likely 
to prove extremely difficult in businesses, like the retail trade, in 
which a large number of local merchants fear new and powerful 
competition, but quite easy in certain manufacturing industries, 
16 This and most of the preceding statements on "domestic licensing provisions" are 
based on Le Droit d'Etablissement, op. cit. supra note 2, at 999, roo4. 
17 Loi permettant d'instituer des conditions d'exercice de Ia profession dans les 
entreprises de l'artisanat du petit et du moyen commerce et de Ia petite industrie, 2 4 
Dec. 1958, 1959 Recueil des Lois et Arrets Royaux de Belgique 108. 
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where the new products may be exported to compete elsewhere, or 
where they replace products which were primarily imported before. 
None of these impediments to market entry-which apply in 
theory to local enterprise as well as to American-will be automati-
cally eliminated by the Treaty of Rome, or by treaties of friend-
ship, commerce, and navigation with the United States. These 
treaties exclude only discrimination against foreigners. 
The exclusive agreements between manufacturers and distribu-
tors which obstruct entry of newcomers into the market may be 
contrary to the general principles enunciated in Article 8 5 of the 
TreatyY But these principles, like those of American antitrust law, 
are subject to widely varying interpretations. For the time being, 
their enforcement depends on the initiative of the Member States, 
none of which have much prior experience with "antitrust" law. In 
view of the persistence of trade restraints in the United States 70 
years after the Sherman Act, and the traditional stability of distribu-
tion patterns in Europe, we would guess that many years will pass 
before actual penetration of European distribution systems becomes 
easy. 
B. STAGES OF ENTRY 
To speak of doing business with Europe from the outside is, of 
course, a mere metaphor. An enterprise which does any business at 
all with Europe becomes in some degree involved in European legal 
problems. To examine our problem more closely we will look at the 
problem of entering Europe as a problem of a timid bather getting 
into the swim-he may stand on the shore throwing pebbles, he may 
dip in his toes, he may wade, he may swim with his head out, or 
he may take a deep dive. Each stage of immersion involves exposure 
to added risks, and so does each stage of entry in the European 
market. We will therefore look at the various degrees to which an 
18 The Treaty Article 8 5 condemns agreements and practices which consist in-
( a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading 
conditions; (b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development 
or investment; (c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply; (d) the ap-
plication to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or (e) the subjecting of the 
conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies which, 
either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contract. 
But the general condemnation is subject to an exception for agreement and practices 
which do not "eliminate competition in respect of a substantial proportion of the goods 
concerned," and which "contribute to the improvement of the production or distri-
bution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic progress while reserving 
to users an equitable share of the profits resulting therefrom." 
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American enterprise may enter the European Economic Commu-
nity, and note some of the legal involvements which attach to each 
stage of entry. 
The stages of entry must be carefully distinguished, because entry 
for one purpose may not be entry for another. "Establishment" is 
primarily a conception of commercial law; when an enterprise is 
"established" by commercial law standards, it is required to file and 
publish documents regarding its legal structure and its officers, and 
to enter its name in the commercial register. 
However, an enterprise which is "established" for purposes of 
commercial law is not necessarily established for purposes of tax 
law. The double-taxation treaties which bind most of the Common 
Market countries to the United States have greatly restricted the 
tax concept of establishment; it is now distinctly different from the 
commercial law concept. 
Because of these differences, we will consider the stages of entry 
into the European market from three different points of view-
commercial licensing and registration, tax liability, and liability to 
suits in European courts. These three incidents may serve to illus-
trate the host of others which time and space forbid us to examine. 
Some of the other incidents-involving labor relations, restraints 
of competition and exchange control-are examined by the authors 
of other chapters of this book. 
I. NO FOREIGN ASSETS 
To separate itself as completely as possible from European en-
tanglements an American enterprise may assure itself that it has no 
assets, tangible or intangible, in Europe. It may, that is, sell only 
by delivery at U.S. ports, and for payment in U.S. dollars on de-
livery. Clearly such a company need give no thought to European 
tax laws or European commercial status. European duties and ex-
change restrictions may worry the company's European customers, 
but not the company itself. 
Oddly enough, the company might even then be sued in some 
European courts. European courts do not generally condition juris-
diction on the "presence" of the defendant, as common law courts 
do. In France and Luxembourg, the codes expressly provide that 
suit may be brought against a non-resident defendant for contracts 
undertaken outside the country; all that is needed is that the plain-
tiff should be a local resident.19 Italy is only a little stricter, requiring 
19 France: C. Crv. art. 14 
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that the obligation sued on should have been made, or should be due 
to be performed, in the country.20 
Fortunately for American enterprises, suits maintained against 
a company under such circumstances may do it little harm. If there 
are no assets in the country where the judgment is rendered, the 
judgment cannot be executed there. If the plaintiff tries to sue on his 
judgment in America, he will find that American courts consider it 
unenforceable for lack of jurisdiction.21 Even in Europe, the very 
countries which grant such judgments refuse to give effect to similar 
judgments rendered in other countries with similar laws; such 
judgments are said to be nationally valid, but internationally in-
valid.22 
2. EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ASSETS 
The no-asset system may have merit for avoiding European en-
tanglements, but it is not the best way to build up foreign business. 
Most enterprises will find that, if they want to make money, they 
cannot help acquiring foreign assets such as accounts receivable and 
balances in the hands of agents. 
Assets abroad, whether tangible or intangible, large or small, 
will not subject the American owner to European income taxes. 
Neither do they involve commercial licensing and registration. But 
they expose the owner to effective suits in European courts. If the 
defendant has assets in the jurisdiction, he may be sued whether 
present or not, and the judgment may be executed on the assets that 
are present. This means that when a company acquires foreign as-
sets, it may be compelled to defend abroad suits arising out of its 
business, or else abandon the assets. 
This liability can be considerably reduced, if the company desires, 
by employing contract clauses providing for litigation at some other 
reasonable point, such as the state of the American company's home 
office. Such clauses are honored generally in Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, but not in Italy.23 Whether 
20 CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE art. 4(2). 
21 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 77, 429-430 ( 1934). 
22 As to France, see BATIFFOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 
836 (1955)· 
22 /d. at 763-64. 
Luxembourg: Our Luxembourg collaborator, Mr. Arendt, calls attention to an ex-
ception affecting patents and trademarks. The filing of a patent or trademark in Luxem-
bourg constitutes a consent to litigation affecting the patent or copyright. This consent 
will prevail over a contract providing for exclusive jurisdiction somewhere else. 
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they will scare away more business than they are worth we cannot 
say. 
In addition to the possibility of being sued in Europe, a company 
which has assets there must consider the possibility of having to 
bring suit there. If it has assets, it may have to protect them. Re-
ceivables in particular must sometimes be collected by suit; patents, 
processes, and trademarks require constant legal protection. Since 
European laws and procedures are quite different from American, 
American enterprise will have to rely on European legal counsel. 
The possibility of having to find and retain such counsel, if the assets 
are not to be lost, must be reckoned among the costs of owning them. 
3· EMPLOYEES IN EUROPE 
In the six countries of the European Community a distinction is 
drawn, much more sharply than in American law, between "salaried 
personnel" and "commission agents." As their names suggest, they 
are commonly differentiated by receiving (on the one hand) a regu-
lar weekly or monthly wage, or (on the other hand) a commission 
based purely on the amount of business transacted. But there are 
usually more fundamental differences. The salaried personnel are 
normally full-time employees of the enterprise, owing an undivided 
loyalty to it alone, and receiving instructions from its management; 
the "commission agent" is normally free to represent various clients, 
and chooses his own hours and his own ways of soliciting customers. 
We will not speculate on the legal status of representatives who fall 
between the stools; to employ such persons would be to invite juri-
dical uncertainty. We will explore the results of employing persons 
who fall clearly in one category or the other; and we will start with 
salaried personnel. 
a. Liability to Suit 
The mere presence of employees will make no difference in the 
suability of the employing company unless they hold general powers 
of attorney to make contracts in the company's name. This conclu-
sion, perhaps surprising to Americans, follows from the fact that 
European courts do not base their conceptions of jurisdiction on 
"presence" of the defendant. However, the presence of employees 
will probably result in increasing the probabilities of suit. Employees 
in Europe will probably make more contracts with Europeans, and 
commit more torts against Europeans, than employees in the United 
States; and so the probabilities of European litigation will increase. 
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b. Liability to Commercial Regulation 
The presence of employees will affect the incidence of commercial 
regulations in varying ways, depending on the permanence of the 
employees' stay, and the extent of their powers. We can say broadly 
that the temporary presence of employees, even though they come 
exclusively on business, will not in itself subject the company to Euro-
pean commercial licensing or registration. What is "temporary" is 
not easily defined, but the periods for which an American may reside 
as a tourist without visa-usually about three months-offer a gen-
eral guide. 
The consequence of employees' residing more permanently in 
Europe are viewed differently by our different informants. Professor 
Houin, speaking for France, observes, "It is hard to see how a com-
pany could have salaried personnel permanently in France and in 
charge of the company's affairs without having a French establish-
ment; a physical place of business is not the test of establishment." 
His conclusion is that a company with employees in France-beyond 
the duration of tourist visas-is obliged to register itself as "estab-
lished" in France. Our Belgian and German informants, on the 
other hand, do not see any commercial problem in the employees' 
presence if they do not have powers of contracting for the company. 
It would appear that in the latter countries permanent representa-
tives could furnish information on products, especially technical in-
formation, and could supply maintenance service (without remu-
neration from customers) without commercially registering the 
company. Probably they could do so even in France if the evidence 
were sufficiently clear that that was all they were doing. 
Commercial regulation becomes important when contractual ne-
gotiation-buying, selling, or licensing-is carried on by employees 
on a continuing basis. Our collaborators indicate that commercial 
qualification is definitely not required for casual and occasional rep-
resentation; but it may be when a continuous practice of dealing 
develops. 
What is "dealing," for this purpose? Professor Heenen advises 
that it does not include (in Belgium) giving and receiving informa-
tion, even though this may be done through a fixed office; but it does 
include signing of contracts, even though all agreements are subject 
to confirmation in New York. 
And when is it "continuous"? Professor Serick warns that trans-
14 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
actions in Germany may result in an "establishment" when they are 
designed to create an enduring source of income over a long period; 
this might include negotiations for patent licensing, even though no 
more transactions will take place in Germany after the initial one. 
In summary, we think that a company may safely send its em-
ployees to Europe for short visits and even let them sell or buy for it 
there in transactions having no long-term aspects. It may keep em-
ployees indefinitely in Europe to display wares and give technical 
information and advice on its products. But if it has employees re .. 
siding in Europe, and if they negotiate contracts, it probably needs 
to license and register itself (or a subsidiary) as the place where 
the employees maintain their center of activities. 
c. Liability to Taxes on Income and Capital 
For tax purposes, the question of what constitutes establishment 
is governed in five of the six countries of the Common Market by 
tax treaties with the United States.24 These treaties are very favor-
able, and take a much more tolerant view of what activities can be 
carried on without "establishment" than does the commercial law. 
The one country which has not ratified a U.S. tax treaty is Luxem-
bourg. The failure to ratify the treaty is not generally ascribed to 
any desire to tax American enterprises but to an unwillingness to ex-
change with the U.S. Treasury information on tax evaders. Luxem-
bourg's non-ratification is therefore due to an excess of cordiality to 
foreign enterprise, rather than to any tax-hunger. It is safe to as-
sume that Luxembourg will not impose taxes in circumstances in 
which neighboring countries would not. 
All the tax treaties contain specific language which preclude the 
levying of taxes on the enterprise merely because of the presence 
of agents. The Belgian treaty, which is fairly representative, pro-
"'Convention with Belgium for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention 
of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, (hereinafter cited as Treaty with 
Belgium) October 28, 1948, 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1647, 173 U.N. Treaty Series 67. 
Convention and protocol with the French Republic respecting double taxation, (here-
inafter cited as Treaty with France) July 25, 1939, 59 U.S. Stat. 893, 125 U.N.T.S. 259· 
Convention with the Federal Republic of Germany for the avoidance of double 
taxation (hereinafter cited as Treaty with Germany), July 22, 1954, 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 
2768. 
Convention with the Italian Republic for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income (hereinafter cited as 
Treaty with Italy), March 30, 1955, 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2999· 
Convention with the Kingdom of the Netherlands with respect to taxes on income 
and certain other taxes (hereinafter cited as Treaty with the Netherlands), April 
29, 1948, 62 U.S. Stat. I757· 
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vides that a "permanent establishment ... does not include an 
agency unless the agent has, and habitually exercises, a general au-
thority to negotiate and conclude contracts on behalf of such enter-
prise, or has a control over a stock of merchandise from which he 
regularly fulfills orders on behalf of such enterprise." 25 Thus it 
appears that an agency may fall short of being an establishment for 
tax purposes even though it would be deemed an establishment un-
der the laws relating to licensing of foreign enterprises and registra-
tion of all commercial businesses. 
Purchasing enjoys a special status under the tax treaties with five 
of the Common Market countries. All these treaties provide that 
an agency shall not be considered an establishment (for tax pur-
poses) if its activities consist only of purchasing. Of course this 
clause grants no exemption from the requirements of commercial 
licensing and registration. 
4· THE COMMISSION MERCHANT 
The six nations of the E.E.C. possess a well defined commercial 
institution which is remarkably adapted to the needs of a foreign 
enterprise which wants to do business in the community. This is the 
commission merchant or commission agent, known in various Euro-
pean languages as commissionnaire, Kommissionar, commissionario, 
and commissionnair. 
As his name suggests, the commission merchant is normally paid 
primarily in proportion to the business that he transacts. In addi-
tion-and this is perhaps the most important legal characteristic 
-he does business in his own name. For this reason, he is sometimes 
compared by legal writers with the American "agent for an undis-
closed principal." The comparison is valid, but must not be under-
stood as indicating that the commission merchant is concealing the 
person for whose account he buys and sells. The important point 
is that his letters and his invoices bear his own name, not the prin-
cipal's; and in his dealing with third persons, he says, "I will sell 
you," not, "My principal will sell you." In addition to these char-
acteristics, the commission merchant is described by European law-
yers as one who is in the business of representing several clients and 
conducting his business according to his own independent ideas, 
rather than under the direction and control of a single enterprise. 
With a European commission merchant an American enterprise 
25 Treaty with Belgium art. II (I). The law of Luxembourg, with which the U,S, 
has no tax treaty, is similar. Einkommensteuergesetz art. 49 (z). 
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can be continuously and conspicuously represented in Europe with-
out incurring any more legal burdens than the firm which sits in New 
York waiting for Europeans to come and buy. The American enter-
prise is not liable, under prevailing European legal doctrine, for 
the contracts which the commission merchant makes (in his own 
name) on the American concern's behalf. This is one of the cele-
brated contrasts between European and Anglo-American law re-
lating to undisclosed principals.26 A recent essay of Dean Hamel (of 
the Paris Law Faculty) casts some doubt on the future of this doc-
trine in France ;27 but in Germany and Italy the rule is firmly en-
trenched in an express provision of the Civil Code.28 
For purposes of commercial licensing and registration, it is clear 
that the commission merchant insulates the principal under Euro-
pean law. The commission merchant must be registered as a mer-
chant, but the principal need not be. Being a local resident, the com-
mission merchant will not need the special license which the foreign 
enterprise would require; but if any licenses are required, the com-
mission merchant is the one to hold them. For purposes of exchange 
control the commission merchant is local, the principal foreign. 
For tax purposes the status of the commission merchant and his 
principal are equally clear. Each of the five double-taxation trea-
ties 29 provides specifically that a "bona fide commission agent" 
shall not constitute an "establishment of the enterprise which em-
ploys him." 
There is one important danger in connection with the commission 
merchant. The employer may wish to switch from one commission 
merchant to another; or, becoming more deeply interested in the 
European market, may wish to supplant the commission merchant 
with a branch or subsidiary which will be under more complete con-
trol. Even though the commission merchant has been promised no 
specific tenure, the interruption of his profitable business, without 
•• Miiller-Freienfels, The Undisclosed Principal, 16 MoDERN LAW REVIEW 299 ( 1953) ; 
Id. Comparative Aspects of Undisclosed Agency, 18 MoDERN LAW REVIEW 33 (1955); 
Jambu-Merlin, Le Droit Compare et les Conflits de Lois en Matiere de Commission, 
in HAMEL ET AL., LE CoNTRAT DE COMMISSION 309 ( 1949). 
"'HAMEL, LE CONTRAT DE COMMISSION 16 (1949) . 
.. Germany: BGB § 164(2). 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 1705. Our Italian collaborator, Mr. Bruna, calls attention 
to a qualification which may also apply elsewhere. If the undisclosed agent is in 
charge of a business establishment that belongs to the undisclosed principal, he may 
be regarded not as a "commission merchant" but as an institore, and may render the 
principal liable even by a contract in the agent's name. CoDICE CIVILE art. 2208 . 
.. Note 24 supra. 
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good cause or reasonable notice, entitles him to be paid damages 
equal to his prospective profits. 
Fortunately, this danger can generally be excluded by contract; 
the initial contract may provide for termination of the representa-
tion without damages. This provision will be honored in all of the 
Common Market countries except France.30 In this respect, a com-
mission merchant differs from a salaried employee, whose right to 
severance benefits is generally a matter of public policy which can-
not be modified by private contract. 
5· A BUSINESS OFFICE 
Can an American enterprise maintain a business office in Europe, 
and still contend plausibly that it does not have a European estab-
lishment? The general answer must be "no." If there is a fixed place 
at which business activities are carried on on behalf of an enter-
prise, this is the very meaning of "establishment" in European law. 
The office must be licensed as a branch, or incorporated as a sub-
sidiary. 
For tax purposes, however, there are some possible exceptions to 
this generalization. The tax treaties with Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
and theN ether lands provide that a place of business used exclusively 
for purchasing shall not be considered an establishment. The tax 
treaty with France has a slightly different provision with similar 
effect. In Germany there is no permanent establishment for tax pur-
poses by virtue of activities which persist for less than twelve 
months. 
An interesting question suggests itself in relation to the current 
activities of various American companies in gathering information 
on possible investments, or obtaining information on the progress of 
existing investments. Must the company's representatives do their 
business from hotel rooms, using always a personal address? Or 
may they rent an office, hire a secretary, and write "New World 
Mfg. Co." over the door? We cannot find that this question has been 
the subject of either legislation or litigation in Europe. Our col-
laborators incline to the opinion that if the American company's 
representatives neither make nor receive offers to buy or sell-leav-
ing all such matters for direct correspondence between European 
prospects and the home office in the States-, such an office can be 
30 Decree No. 134-5 of Dec. 23, 1958, art. 3· Previously, French law recognized the 
validity of exculpatory clauses. 
I 8 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
maintained without fear of involving an "establishment" in commer-
cial or tax law. 
6. WITHDRAWING AN ESTABLISHMENT 
Today, all eyes are on the opening of establishments. American 
companies are hurrying to get sites and form business connections 
with European firms; European officials in many countries are lur-
ing foreign investors with cheap real estate, tax concessions, and 
low-interest loans. These are times for an investor to pinch himself 
and ask what will be the problems in case the establishment proves 
unwise and must be withdrawn. 
Officers of a well known American factory in one European coun-
try told us that they are thinking of moving to another country, but 
doubt if local officials will "let us." This is a figure of speech, since 
local officials have no power to force companies to keep operating. 
But all the ingenuity which they know how to use to induce a com-
pany to come in can be very effectively used to deter them from going 
out. Large amounts of income tax may be found to be due because 
of understated assets, overstated depreciation, and the realization 
through sale of previously unrealized appreciation of fixed assets. 
Friendly assessments of property may suddenly turn hostile; ex-
change licenses to withdraw the investment may be hard to get. Plant 
may prove unsaleable because buyers are not assured of permits to 
make alterations. Conceivably an easier means of withdrawal will 
eventually be supplied by new uniform laws or treaty provisions 
covering international mergers. The Member States have promised 
to "engage in negotiations" looking to this end.31 In the meantime, 
any withdrawal of an establishment is likely to involve a greater 
sacrifice of going-concern values than would usually be expected in 
the United States. 
C. SuMMARY ON EsTABLISHMENT 
If an enterprise wishes to avoid all European problems, the safest 
course is, of course, to do no business with Europeans. But it need not 
be quite so cautious; it may sell to Europeans for payment in the 
United States without serious involvement in European law. The 
important line of demarcation is that the enterprise must own no 
property in Europe and be owed no money by Europeans. 
Once the American enterprise has merchandise in Europe, or ac-
counts payable by Europeans, it is potentially concerned with Euro-
81 The Treaty art. 220. 
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pean law and procedure; it may have to hire a European lawyer 
to protect its interests. But this need is contingent on running into 
legal difficulties. If all debtors pay up, and there are no arguments 
about property, the American enterprise may coast along for years 
without a thought of European law or litigation. 
In this state of potential involvement, without actually feeling any 
pain, an American enterprise may own goods in Europe, own ac-
counts payable in Europe, license patents, and maintain personnel 
temporarily or even permanently in Europe so long as they do not 
buy or sell but perform only technical services. 
If, however, the American enterprise decides that it wants to 
keep people in Europe to sell for it, or solicit sales, during more than 
short and casual visits, it must make a choice. Either it must "estab-
lish" in the countries involved-by branch or subsidiary-or it 
must choose a registered European commission merchant to repre-
sent it. In the former case, the company's European activities be-
come fully subject to European commercial and tax laws; in the 
latter, they may remain completely immune. Companies which de-
sire only to purchase in Europe-without selling-are more fortu-
nate; in most countries, they can open an office without incurring 
European tax burdens on their income or capital, although they are 
required to conform to European commercial licensing and regis-
tration provisions. 
II. THE FORM OF ESTABLISHMENT 
We turn our attention now from the enterprise which is deciding 
whether or not to create a European establishment to the enterprise 
which has decided to establish itself on the continent. This it may do 
in two main ways-by setting up a European branch, or by incor-
porating a European subsidiary. 
The distinction between a branch and a subsidiary is a legal one. 
To production managers and sales managers it may seem unimpor-
tant. We have heard many executives refer to "our Swiss branch," 
or "our Italian branch," when further investigation reveals that 
the Swiss or Italian operation is not in legal terms a branch but a 
subsidiary. 
To lawyers, the distinction is fundamental, and its legal conse-
quences are great. A branch of an American company is an establish-
ment whose property is bought and sold in the name of the Ameri-
can corporation; its supreme authority lies in the American board 
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of directors, and its fundamental constitution is the articles of in-
corporation first filed in an American state. A European subsidiary 
is a company whose fundamental constitution was first filed in a 
European state; it has a name distinct from that of its American 
parent, and its property is bought and sold in the European name; 
its supreme authority in law (if not in practice) is exercised by the 
shareholders of the European company. 
The choice between branch and subsidiary presents itself at more 
than one level. There is first the question whether the American com-
pany should maintain European branches, or form European sub-
sidiaries. There is a further question whether one of the European 
subsidiaries should have branches in various European countries, or 
whether there should be a separate subsidiary for each country in 
which the American company wants to conduct business operations. 
We will take up these questions one at a time. 
A. BRANCH OR SUBSIDIARY 
In discussions of European trade, it is common to assume with-
out even discussing the matter that any European establishment 
should take the form of a subsidiary company. We do not challenge 
the correctness of this assumption in most cases, but there are cer-
tainly some situations in which it is inapplicable. For instance, Amer-
ican banks and transportation companies generally operate through 
branch offices. One of the reasons is economic, not legal; their cus-
tomers demand the responsibility of the entire enterprise, not of 
some fraction of it. A legal reason is that the transactions of trans-
ferring money or goods or people cannot be severed in mid-Atlantic 
so as to have a different corporation at each end. These examples 
are sufficient to show that experienced international organizations 
do not always choose the subsidiary form. We think that most law-
yers will want to determine for themselves whether their enterprises 
belong in the large class for which subsidiary organization is indi-
cated, or in the smaller group for which branches are appropriate. 
I. U.S. INCOME TAXES 
For most American enterprises, subsidiary organization rather 
than branch has been dictated by U.S. income tax considerations, 
and may continue to be. However, the tax factors merit re-examina-
tion in the light of the characteristics of the particular enterprise, 
and of possible legislative developments. Legislation which was pro-
posed to the 86th Congress would have gone far to eliminate the 
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U.S. tax disadvantages of a branch.32 Although most of the pro-
posed changes were deleted before the bill was passed, the facts 
that such legislation was proposed and that some remnants of it 
were enacted suggest that a re-evaluation of branch advantages may 
be appropriate for many companies. 
Even if there are no legislative changes, some kinds of enter-
prises do not get the same tax advantage from subsidiary organiza-
tion which others do. One principal advantage is the non-taxability 
of subsidiary earnings which are allowed to remain in the foreign 
subsidiary. If all the earnings of the foreign subsidiary are to be 
immediately repatriated, there is no advantage from this source. 
Consequently, enterprises which do not plan to reinvest abroad their 
foreign earnings should consider carefully whether the subsidiary 
arrangement has merits for them. 
Subsidiary organization should be regarded even more dubiously 
by enterprises which do not intend to earn net income abroad. In 
this category fall companies which use Europe chiefly as a place to 
buy supplies (like American watch merchants) or to perform serv-
ices which have been paid for in the United States (like travel and 
shipping companies). 
2. EUROPEAN TAXES 
The American enterprise will also want to consider what differ-
ences the choice between branch and subsidiary makes to European 
taxes. It will be particularly interested in provisions of the double 
taxation treaties which bind the United States to all of the Common 
Market countries except Luxembourg.33 For example, they all pro-
vide that American enterprises shall not be taxed on profits other 
than those allocable to the permanent establishment in the taxing 
country.34 They all provide that there shall be no tax at all on the 
profits of establishments whose only activities are purchasing.35 
•• H.R. 5, 86 Cong. (1959). See Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Report Bull., Mar. 3, 1960. 
33 Cited .rupra note 24. 
"'Treaty with Belgium art. III { 1) ; Treaty with France art. III; Treaty with 
t~ermany art. III{I); Treaty with Italy art. III{I); Treaty with the Netherland~ 
art. III(1). 
The Belgian, German, and Italian treaties have added a clause not found in the 
French and Dutch, providing that the local establishment shall be allowed taxable 
income deductions for its allocable share of general administrative overhead, which 
presumably refers to overhead incurred at the home office or parent company: Treaty 
with Belgium art. IV (4), as added by Treaty with Belgium, Sept. 9, 1952, T.I.A.S. 
2833; Treaty with Germany art. III (4) ; Treaty with Italy art. III ( 5). 
86 Treaty with Belgium art. Ill (2) ; Treaty with- J<'rance art. III; Treaty with Ger-
many art. III(z); Treaty with Italy art, II(1) c; Treaty with the Netherlands art. 
IJ(i), and art. III(a). 
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They all have an anti-siphoning clause, providing that the taxing 
country may "rectify the accounts" of the establishment, if it is pay-
ing its American affiliate more for goods than would be paid to an 
unrelated seller. 36 
The general effect of these provisions is apparently to eliminate 
any substantial advantage under European taxes which a subsidiary 
might have over a branch, or vice versa. However, the apparent ef-
fect of such legislative provisions is not always the same as the prac-
tical effect. We have heard suggestions from some experienced busi-
nessmen that in practice it is easier to agree with European tax 
assessors on the taxes due from a subsidiary than on those from a 
branch; the assessors are less likely to "rectify the accounts" of the 
former than of the latter. Other informants are dubious of this 
difference, and we are una.ble to evaluate the respective reports. For 
an analysis of European taxes on American-owned establishments 
in Europe, we refer the readers to Chapter XI infra by Mr. van 
Hoorn and Professor Wright. 
3· POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Close in importance to taxes are political and public relations. 
Some of our informants are extremely emphatic about the advantage 
of operating a "local" company in each country. In France, execu-
tives of a large American-owned French subsidiary explained how 
they must go to government officials for permission to expand the 
plant, or to make a wage adjustment, or to obtain foreign exchange 
for materials purchases, or for making a public offering of securi-
ties. Even borrowing money from a bank is in France a form of 
dealing with the government, since most of the banks are state-
owned; and the Credit National, which rediscounts intermediate 
term loans, is a bank specially formed by the government to promote 
national economic interests. 
All these agencies base their decisions on the national interests of 
France. Each decision depends on whether, in the officials' opinions, 
the company's activities will benefit the French economy; whether 
the long term gain outweighs the immediate inflationary effect of 
increasing construction, increasing wages, spending foreign ex-
change and expanding credit. Inevitably, the building up of a 
"French" company appeals more readily to these officials than the 
building up of an "American" corporation, even though the former 
is known to be American-owned. 
86 Treaty with Belgium art. IV (2) ; Treaty with France art. IV; Treaty with Ger-
many art. IV; Treaty with Italy art. IV; Treaty with Netherlands art. IV. 
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Localization also helps to recruit the best types of executive per-
sonnel. To be the general manager of a French company gives a 
sense of prestige and security which cannot be given to the manager 
of a French branch which is a very small fraction of the American 
company's entire operation. 
These differences between subsidiary organization and branch 
organization are more marked in some countries than others. Our 
French and Italian informants have been very emphatic about them; 
our Belgian and Luxembourg informants give them little weight. 
We suspect that this disparity of opinion reflects real differences in 
conditions in the various countries. So far as the differences relate 
to dealings with government officials, they will obviously vary with 
the extent of government intervention. France and Italy are coun-
tries in which government controls are extremely pervasive; Bel-
gium and Luxembourg are countries with a high degree of economic 
freedom. France and Italy have had a wall of protective tariffs and 
exchange controls; Belgium is traditionally free-trading, with a 
minimum of exchange regulation. 
Although comments on national psychology are to be treated with 
great reserve, we think there are genuine differences in the prevail-
ing attitudes in different European countries toward foreign enter-
prise. The inhabitants of Benelux recognize without embarrass-
ment the smallness of their economic sphere; association with for-
eign enterprise gives a sense of security, rather than insecurity. 
Frenchmen are much slower to accept the idea that a foreign enter-
prise may offer them something which a domestic enterprise could 
not. 
We therefore accept the view that there are reasons of a psycho-
logical character, quite aside from any legal rules, which make a 
subsidiary preferable to a branch, at least in France and Italy. In 
the Benelux countries, the psychological factor is of doubtful sig-
nificance, and the reasons for subsidiary organization (which pre-
vails there as elsewhere) have been chiefly U.S. tax reasons. Our 
German reports, although less explicit, are more like those from 
the Benelux countries. 
4· COMMERCIAL FILING AND REGISTRATION 
All the European countries require filing of the organic documents 
of a company in the Commercial Register, the Court of Commerce, 
or some combination of these.37 Four out of six countries also re-
37 Filing of documents: 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. w, as amended by Law of July 9, 1935. 
France: Decree No. 58-1355 of Dec. 27, 1958, [1959] JouRNAL OFF!CIEL DE LA RE-
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quire newspaper publication.38 In order to be filed the documents 
must first be translated into the local language. The documents to 
be filed vary somewhat from country to country. Universally they 
include the articles of incorporation and any subsequent amend-
ments. In Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg they also include annual 
financial statements, statements of profit or loss, and changes in 
directors and officers, so that re-filing and re-publication must be 
made at least annually.39 In France and the Netherlands the larger 
of the companies which are listed on stock exchanges, and some of 
their subsidiaries, must publish financial statements.39a 
These requirements apply in rather parallel fashion to branches 
of foreign companies, and to domestic companies.40 However, the 
same filing requirement may be quite different when it is applied to 
different forms of organization. If the parent company has a long 
PUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE 990 (requiring registration by domestic and foreign companies); 
Decree No. 54-37 of Jan. 6, 1954, [1954] JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA RfPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE 
565 (registration to cover name, business, address, and personal information on man-
ager or managers). 
Germany: GESETZ UBER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN UND KOMMANDIT-GESSELLSCHAFTEN 
AUF AKTIEN (AKTIENGESETZ) (hereinafter cited as AktG) §§ 2S-29 (registration of 
company), § 35 (registration of branch of stock company); GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE 
GESELLSCHAFTEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG (hereinafter cited as GmbHG) §§ 7-S 
(registration of limited liability company), § 12 (branch of limited liability company); 
HANDELSGESETZBUCH (hereinafter cited as HGB) § 13 (general provisions). 
Italy: ComcE CIVILE art. 2506 (requiring deposit in commercial register of articles 
of incorporation, financial statements, and names and signatures of managers). In 
practice, filings are made with clerk of Court of Commerce, since Commercial Register 
has never been set up. 
Luxembourg: CoMPANY LAw art. 160 (foreign companies to file and publish as if 
domestic). 
Netherlands: HANDELSREGISTER-WET art. S (name and address of company, and 
personal details on officers). 
38 Publication: 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. So (names, professions, and addresses of members of 
governing boards and auditors). 
France: Law of 1867, arts. 56-57, as amended by Decree-law of Oct. 30, 1935 (ex-
tract of articles to be published). 
Germany: HGB § 10 (commercial register entries to be published in official gazette 
and a newspaper). 
Luxembourg: CoMPANY LAW arts. S, 9, n, 48 (requiring publication in official journal 
of articles and of financial statements of stock companies). 
39 Repetition: 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. So. 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2506. 
Luxembourg: COMPANY LAW § 4S. 
••• France: Ordinance No. 59-247, Feb. 4, 1959; Journal Officiel, Feb. S, 1959, p. 1754; 
L'Actualite Juridique 1959. Ill. 62. 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 42 c. 
•• Italy is an exception. Amendments of charter need not be filed, nor changes in 
officers other than managers of the Italian branches. 
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charter, the burden of translating and filing it may be considerably 
greater than that of forming a subsidiary and filing its charter; the 
burden is perhaps more likely to be felt with respect to filing amend-
ments in the country of each establishment. When the Chase N a-
tiona! Bank merged with the Bank of Manhattan, new articles of 
incorporation had to be filed in Paris because of the Paris branch. 
If the Paris establishment had been a subsidiary (which is not 
practicable in the case of a bank), no such filing would have been 
necessary. 
Similar considerations may apply to publication of financial state-
ments where, as in Belgium, they are required. Branches and sub-
sidiaries are subject to the same requirement, but the branch must 
publish the statements of the whole company to which it belongs 
while the subsidiary needs to publish only its separate statement. 
5. THE FOREIGN MERCHANT'S IDENTITY CARD 
In addition to registering the establishment, the laws of Belgium 
and France require a permit for the general manager or president, 
if he is a foreigner. This executive must have a "foreign merchant's 
identity card" (carte d' identite de commerr,;ant itranger). In France 
the card is issued after the prefect has been satisfied that the pro-
posed commercial activity is useful to the economy and that the ap-
plicant has a good business record. The prefect satisfies himself on 
the former point by consulting the trade associations of the industry 
in which the applicant intends to be active. This might seem to give 
the local merchants a veto on new competition; presumably it does, 
as far as concerns businessmen like brokers, who pursue their occu-
pations as individuals. As to corporations, the competitors have the 
power only to force the company to have a local president, by re-
jecting the foreign one; the foreigner who is rejected as president 
may serve instead as technical director. Therefore the foreign mer-
chant's card is not likely to be denied on economic grounds. The 
"good business record" of the applicant is commonly determined by 
statements from chambers of commerce. 
The practical difficulty presented by the foreign merchant's card 
is only a matter of delay. Several months may elapse between appli-
cation and issue, but eventual denial has not been, we are told, a 
frequent problem for Americans. 
In Belgium, the foreign merchant's card is harder to come by; in 
practice, foreign concerns find it best to appoint Belgians as chief 
executives of their Belgian branches and subsidiaries. 
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In both countries, the "foreign merchant's card" is the same prob-
lem for a branch as it is for a subsidiary. 
6. LIABILITY FOR OBLIGATIONS OF BRANCHES AND 
SUBSIDIARIES 
In any vast commercial network, the responsibilities of one sector 
of the network for the obligations of other sectors present a com-
plex problem. We would like to divide the problem into two main 
parts. The first part of the problem arises when the sector in which 
the obligations were incurred becomes insolvent, and cannot pay its 
debts; the question arises whether the other sectors can be made to 
pay. Vve will call this the insolvency problem. 
The second problem is quite different. We assume that the sector 
in which the obligations were incurred is quite able to pay them, but 
for some reason the plaintiff elects to bring his suit in some other 
sector. A classic American illustration of this problem is the case in 
which an individual was injured by a street car in the Philippine Is-
lands, and elected to sue the parent company, which owned the street 
car operating company, at the parent company's home in Connecti-
cut; 41 one can imagine similar suits arising from subsidiaries in 
Europe. Suits of this sort have acquired in the United States the 
name of "migratory suits," and we will therefore refer in this con-
nection to the migratory suit problem. 
We do not think the insolvency problem will loom large in the 
plans of American enterprise; they will plan to pay the debts which 
their subsidiaries incur. But it is a hazard which merits some atten-
tion even though it is marginal. 
a. The Insolvency Problem: Branch Organization 
If a European branch of an American corporation proves unable 
to pay its debts, there is no doubt of the European creditors' right 
to sue the corporation in the United States, or wherever else it might 
be found. It is a single legal person, regardless of the number of 
its branches. If the suit had been first brought to judgment in Eu-
rope, any court in the United States would recognize its validity, 
since the establishment of a European branch would give the Eu-
ropean court "jurisdiction" by American standards. If the cause of 
action had never been sued on in Europe, an original suit on it could 
be begun in the United States. 
"Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24F. (2d) 383 (2d Cir. 1928). 
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b. The Insolvency Problem: Subsidiary Organization 
If an American corporation forms subsidiaries in Europe, rather 
than branches, a very different problem is presented. In Europe, 
as in America, different corporations are different persons. The fact 
that one owns stock in another is not enough to make both liable 
for the same debt. 
But sometimes stock ownership is not the whole story of the cor-
porate relationship. There may be IOo% ownership, or near it; 
there may be intermingled management and intermingled property; 
there may be such inadequate capitalization that insolvency should 
have been foreseen; there may even have been an intention to incur 
obligations which would never be discharged. Which, if any, of these 
circumstances will lead to a judgment that the American parent is 
liable for the European subsidiary's debts? 
A preliminary question, in considering this problem, is what law 
would govern. Since the European subsidiary is by hypothesis in-
solvent, the liability of the parent would most likely be litigated in 
an American federal court. If so, a federal court would decide which 
legal regime to apply. But the events which would determine the 
legal regime would almost inevitably be distributed between two 
continents, and a plausible ground could be found for applying the 
law either of the European country most involved, or of the United 
States. 
Readers are already familiar with American judicial reactions to 
the question of when a parent corporation should be made to pay 
the debts of an insolvent subsidiary. They know that American 
courts-especially federal courts-have held shareholders and af-
filiated corporations liable for debts contracted by a company which 
is formed largely to acquire assets for its owners, but which has no 
substantial independent existence, whether measured in terms of 
capital investment or of management structure.42 The court disre-
gards "the entity," or "the fiction"; it "pierces" or "draws aside" the 
corporate veil. 
Germany has experienced a very similar development of legal 
theory, in which Durchgriff der juristischen Persone, [piercing the 
artificial person] and Missachtung der Rechtsform [disregard of 
•• For authoritative summaries of American law, see BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS 
298-303, 3II-321 (1946); LAITIN, CORPORATIONS 66-72 (1959); STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 85-95 (1949). For a case suggestive of the type of 
problem which a foreign subsidiary might present, see Weisser v. Mursam Shoe 
Corporation, 127 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1942), involving a leasehold corporation. 
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legal form] take the place of the American magic words.43 Some 
of the factors which have been determinative in American cases are 
also influential in German cases; the mingling of personal and com-
pany assets is most prominent, but inadequate capitalization is also 
recognized.44 We cannot say whether German courts are generally 
more or less disposed to "pierce the veil"; the comparatists' obser-
vation that American case-law is far more developed on this sub-
ject 45 suggests that our courts may be more disposed to "pierce." 
In France, we encounter no theory of "piercing" or "disregard," 
but the same effects are achieved, and with a vengeance. The doc-
trinal basis is called "abuse of entity" [ abus de la personnalite], the 
idea being that the establishment of a corporation may be a mere 
pretense, designed to exploit unfairly (that is, to "abuse") the priv-
ilege of limited liability. When the courts detect the abuse, they 
search for the real principal (the commer(ant de fait), and hold 
him liable. This principle, which grew out of case law, is now a 
clause in the French bankruptcy act, which provides, 
When a company is declared bankrupt, the bankruptcy 
may be declared to include any other person who, dis-
guising his acts as those of the company, has carried on 
business for his personal benefit, and has dealt with the 
corporate assets as though they were his own.46 
Professor Houin offers the following comment on the application 
of this rule : 
If the subsidiary is a mere department of the parent 
company, if the majority of its shares are held by the 
parent company or its shareholders, if the governing 
board members are the same, if the accounting is more or 
less intermingled, if personnel pass freely from one com-
pany to the other,-then the court will say that the two 
companies are really only one entity and one fund; their 
debts are the same, and so the bankruptcy of either brings 
in its train the bankruptcy of the other. 
43 SERICK, REICHTSFORM UND REALITAT }URISTISCHER PERSONEN, (Beitriige zum Aus-
Jiindischen und Internationalen Privatrecht, No. 26, I955); SERICK, DuRCHGRIFFS-
PROBLEME BEl VERTRAGSSTORUNGEN (Juristische StudiengeselJschaft Karlsruhe, No. 42, 
I959); DROBNIG, flAFTUNGSDURCHGRIFF BE! KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN, (Arbeiten zur 
Rechtsvergleichung, No. 4, 1959). 
44 DROBNIG, op. cit., supra note 43, at 28, 47· 
45 ld. at 2S j cf. SERICK, RECHTSFORM UND REALITAT }URISTISCHER PERSONEN 65, 66. 
•• Decree No. 55-583 of May 20, 1955, art. IO, [1955] JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA Rf:-
PUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE 5086. Identical provisions were formerly part of C. CoM. art. 437, 
as amended by a decree-law of 1935· 
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Thus it appears that French and German courts are not unlikely 
to impose liability on parent companies (to the extent that parent 
companies are within their power) when subservient subsidiaries 
become bankrupt. A subsidiary will not be a good "insulator" 
against debts in those countries, unless it can be shown to be truly in-
dependent (within the varying standards of independence). 
In the other countries of Europe, the imposition of liability on 
these grounds is not yet a known peril. Our Belgian, Luxembourg, 
and Netherlands collaborators report that the "abuse of entity" 
and "disregard of entity" doctrines have not yet been used in their 
countries, although analogous effects may be attained in relation to 
enemy property. 
However, parent corporations may easily incur liability in Italy 
or in France because of failure to have the necessary number of 
shareholders. The Italian code declares that a sole owner is liable 
for debts contracted during his sole ownership.46a In France, one hun-
dred percent ownership of a subsidiary's stock would probably make 
the parent liable for all the subsidiary's obligations on the theory 
that the subsidiary cannot be a "company" if it has only one member. 
c. The Migratory Suit Problem: Branch Organization 
The migratory suit problem, unlike the insolvency problem, is 
one which may disturb an American company even though it is de-
termined to pay all the just debts incurred in its operations. In fact, 
the sounder the company, the more likely a victim it is for the 
migratory suitor. This is the danger that a plaintiff with a cause of 
action which arose in Honolulu will choose to sue in Frankfurt or 
Paris. 
The company's objection to such suits is not that it does not want 
to pay Honolulu plaintiffs, but that it does not like to litigate with 
them at a distance of several thousand miles from all the witnesses 
and the documents. 
This hazard may be viewed in two forms. One is the danger that 
the European branches will be the victims of suits arising in the 
United States (or in other continents where branches may be 
found) ; the other danger is that European branches will give rise 
to suits which may be prosecuted in the United States (or other 
continents). 
••• C. CIV. 2362 (stock companies). Experts disagree on the effectiveness of dummy 
"shareholders" in fulfiiling the legal requirement, 
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Taking first the problem of suits brought in Europe, it appears to 
us that there is no legal defense against such suits. If the defendent 
resides within the court's area, the court has jurisdiction, regardless 
of the place of origin of the cause of action; and establishment of a 
branch is regarded as equivalent to residence. European courts do 
not seem to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
On the other hand, we have not encountered any American com-
pany which has experienced serious inconvenience from this source. 
Three peculiarities of European practice offer possible explanations. 
One is that the contingent lawyer's fee is unknown in Europe; prob-
ably most of the migratory suits in the United States are filed by law-
yers on contingent fees. A second reason is that in European proce-
dure, the parties are not allowed to testify. Therefore a Honolulu 
plaintiff cannot transport his law-suit to Paris merely by transport-
ing himself; he must bring witnesses, too; and this makes the suit 
just as inconvenient for him as it is for the defendant. Third, the 
plaintiff must pay the defendant's counsel fees if he fails to win his 
case, and the foreign plaintiff must deposit security in advance to 
assure this payment. 
We take up next the problem of suits originating in Europe but 
prosecuted in the United States. For instance, a European might be 
injured by a defective machine manufactured by an American cor-
poration's German branch, and might sue inN ew York. Conceivably 
the court might refuse jurisdiction on the ground of forum non con-
veniens; otherwise the suit would lie. If the injured plaintiff were 
one of the hundreds of thousands of Americans who tour Europe 
each summer, the plea would probably be rejected. Thus branch 
organization increases a company's exposure to migratory suits. 
In practice, this problem has not been an acute one for American 
companies; but we do not find any explanation except that the branch 
form of organization has been very little used. We are inclined to 
think that migratory suits are a real danger for companies whose 
activities may occasion personal injuries. It is a valid reason for 
avoiding branch organization. 
d. The Migratory Suit Problem: Subsidiary 
Organization 
If an American company operates in Europe only through sub-
sidiaries, it appears to be relatively safe from migratory suits in 
Europe. The European subsidiaries are different legal persons from 
the parent, and there seems to be no danger that any of the Euro-
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pean doctrines would support the suit. These doctrines have some-
times visited the sins of the subsidiaries upon the parents, but never 
v1ce versa. 
A suit against the parent in the United States presents no great 
dangers, either. If we look to the relevant European doctrines, we 
find that they have never held the parent liable except when the 
subsidiary has proved insolvent or has only one shareholder; the 
migratory suit problem has not appeared. Thus the only danger lies 
in the application of United States doctrines on disregard of cor-
porate entity. Without fully exploring this engaging topic, we may 
say that if the parent rigorously separates the operations of the sub-
sidiary from its own, and the subsidiary avoids insolvency, danger 
should be avoided. 
7· CHANGE OF FORM: INCORPORATING A BRANCH 
In the United States, the choice between a branch and a sub-
sidiary form is far from irrevocable. If a branch is opened, but 
subsidiary organization later appears preferable, the branch may 
be incorporated without serious tax consequences; the exchange of 
stock for proprietorship is not regarded as a realization of taxable 
income. Further, the taxes incurred by transferring the assets (for 
example the documentary stamp tax on the deed of real estate) are 
negligible. 
In Europe, the opposite is true. The transfer of assets to a new 
corporation in exchange for stock is regarded as a realization of in-
come. If the stock is worth more than the incorporators' basis for 
the assets, augmented by any retained earnings on which income 
taxes have been paid, income is realized. European accounting com-
monly employs "hidden reserves" which understate annual income. 
This practice, although perhaps improper, is so generally followed 
that tax writers take for granted the appearance on liquidation of 
previously unreported earnings. As a result of the practice, a very 
large amount of income tax which had been postponed becomes 
payable when a branch is incorporated, as well as when a subsidiary 
is dissolved. 
There are also taxes in some European countries on the transfer 
of all kinds of assets to a company in exchange for stock. The Bel-
gian rate, for instance, is 1.6%. The combined effect of these taxes 
and the income taxes is to discourage formation of a branch with 
the intention of later incorporating it as a separate subsidiary. 
The deterrents to forming a subsidiary with the intention of turn-
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ing it later into a branch are even greater. The dissolution of a sub-
sidiary generally results in a "sale" of the fixed assets, incurring 
taxes reported as 8% in Italy, I I% in Belgium, and I 5% in France 
of the value of the assets. Rates on transfer of the inventory are 
lower-about 4 or s%. There are sometimes means of effecting a 
tax-free merger, but such avenues of escape are the exception rather 
than the rule in Europe. 
8. CLOSING OUT THE OPERATION 
We have spoken so far of the relative advantages of a branch or 
of a subsidiary in carrying on operations. But the investor must also 
give some attention to their relative advantages in closing out oper-
ations; that is, disposing of it to outsiders. If the operation proves 
unprofitable, it will have to be closed out. Even if it proves success-
ful, the operation in a neighboring country may be so much more 
successful that the investor will want to liquidate his German estab-
lishment (for instance) in order to concentrate his operations in 
France. The formation of the Community has already produced 
some such results, while the projected changes in tariffs and quotas 
are still in their infancy. 
One way to close out is to sell the assets for cash. This results in 
the same taxes already discussed in relation to a change of form 
from branch to subsidiary, or vice versa. There is a tax on previously 
unrealized or unreported income, and transfer taxes on the assets. 
The burden is the same for a branch as for a subsidiary. 
Another way is to sell the shares owned in the European enter-
prise. This involves no tax at all, or taxes in very small amounts; for 
instance, in Germany, less than one-fourth of one percent of the 
par value of the shares. 
Obviously the sale of shares is much more advantageous, at least 
to the seller. But this option is available only if the European opera-
tion has been cast in a subsidiary form; one cannot sell shares in a 
branch. This is one of many reasons why a subsidiary is so widely 
preferred for European operations. 
A third way to dispose of a European operation, which would 
suggest itself to an American tax or corporation lawyer, is to merge 
it with some outside company that wants to buy it. That is, the 
American subsidiary could be merged with some other European 
corporation which wished to acquire the assets. Our information on 
this point is incomplete, but it appears that a merger normally has 
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no tax advantages over a sale of assets. Heavy taxes on income and 
on transfer of property are usually incurred. 
There are limited exceptions to this rule. A merger between two 
Luxembourg companies which maintain adequate accounting rec-
ords is entirely tax-freeY In Belgium, there is a temporary excep-
tion, available to Belgian companies which merge during the "first 
stage" of the European Economic Community-that is, before the 
end of 196r. It is limited to mergers which "contribute to economic 
rationalization, higher productivity, or greater employment." 48 
France permits some taxes to be escaped in restricted types of 
mergers. There have been press reports of similar legislation in 
Italy. It is possible that further tax concessions to merger will re-
sult from the negotiations which the Member States have agreed to 
undertake with regard to international merger.49 
Where merger has these advantages, they are advantages only 
for those investors who have put their investment in subsidiary 
form: there is no way to merge a branch. 
9· SUMMARY ON BRANCHES OR SUBSIDIARIES 
For a few enterprises-chiefly banks-the choice of a branch 
rather than a subsidiary is clearly dictated by the economic needs 
of the business. For most enterprises, either form is equally func-
tional, and the choice will be dictated by other factors. Among these, 
U.S. income taxation is likely to prove dominant, and to favor 
subsidiary organization; but it will have less significance for some 
types of enterprise-notably purchasing organizations. European 
taxes on current income are neutral for most enterprises, while the 
establishment continues; but if the American investor finds it neces-
sary to dispose of his European venture, a subsidiary is likely to 
offer a much more economical means of getting out. Political rela-
tionships will dictate subsidiary organization for many enterprises, 
especially those which encounter pervasive state regulation. Public 
filing and registration rules seem fairly neutral, but favor the sub-
sidiary in some cases. If there is a desire to avoid becoming involved 
in the debts which may be incurred by the foreign operation, sub-
sidiary operation is clearly indicated; but it may fail in its purpose 
unless the subsidiary is truly independent in its financing and man-
" Loi sur l'impot sur les collectivites (Kiirperschaftssteuergesetz) art. 15. 
48 Law of July 15, 1959, as reported by Belgian Industrial Information Service, 
August 1959, p. I. 
49 The Treaty art. 41. 
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agement. Where the migratory law suit is a problem, subsidiary or-
ganization is clearly preferable. 
In conclusion, subsidiary organization offers substantial advan-
tages in a majority of situations, but not in all. The factors which 
have been listed above may prove helpful in making the choice for a 
particular venture. 
B. How MANY SuBsiDIARIEs? 
We leave behind us now the problems of those enterprises which 
will operate in Europe by means of branch offices of the American 
company; we turn to the problems of those who have decided to 
conduct their operations in Europe through one or more subsid-
iaries. The next question is, how many subsidiaries? There are six 
sovereign nations in the Common Market; does an American enter-
prise need a separate subsidiary for each country in which it has de-
cided to create an establishment? Or may it, for example, form a 
subsidiary in Belgium which can operate as a single European com-
pany in Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy? 
In the following pages we will discuss the possibility of such a Bel-
gian company, as an illustration of the problems which would be 
met by a single European company established in any one of the 
Common Market countries, and operating through branches in the 
others. 
The question which we ask is somewhat like the one we have al-
ready asked about a U.S. company with branches in Europe. For-
eign branches of a Belgian company present many of the same prob-
lems presented by foreign branches of a U.S. company. But the 
problems are not quite the same, and we think the question of 
branches versus subsidiaries should be re-examined with the hypothe-
sis of a European home office. This we will do, with our Belgian 
illustration. 
I. ADVANTAGES OF A SINGLE EUROPEAN COMPANY 
The potential advantages of having a single European company 
are obviously great. Geography alone demands that an enterprise 
be able to fill its orders indiscriminately from warehouses in Amster-
dam or Aachen, Milan or Marseilles. The enterprise needs to be 
able to use the same executives and technicians in Liege as in Verdun. 
These advantages will appeal particularly to American business-
men, who are accustomed to plan their operations on a continental 
scale. Indeed, experience in this sort of operation is one of the prin-
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cipal advantages which Americans may hope to bring to the Euro-
pean market, where they are in most other respects less experienced 
than local businessmen. Attaining these advantages is one of the 
very reasons for which the Common Market has been formed; if 
they cannot be realized, the Market may be an illusion and a dis-
appointment to many of the American enterprises which plan to 
enter it. 
To be sure, it is possible to operate a single enterprise through a 
half dozen corporations which are separate only in form. But empty 
forms are expensive at best, and they lead to more serious problems, 
to which we will refer later. 
2. THE PROSPECTIVE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNITY 
A further impetus toward the single European company may be 
found in the planned evolution of the European Economic Commu-
nity under the Treaty of Rome. All of its provisions are designed to 
make of Western Europe an area without barriers, and in which, 
therefore, a single company can operate. Article 52 declares that 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals 
of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State shall be progressively abolished in the course of 
the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall 
also extend to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, 
branches or subsidiaries by the nationals of any Member 
State established in the territory of any Member State. 
Many intra-Market impediments are to be substantially abolished 
within the transitory period which should terminate in I 970 (with 
possible extensions). In addition to restrictions on freedom of estab-
lishment, these include tariffs (Article I 3), quotas (Article 30), and 
obstacles to movement of workers (Article 48), and the supply of 
services (Article 59). In addition the members have promised to 
coordinate their exchange controls (Article 70) and to "approxi-
mate" any other laws which directly affect the workings of the 
market ( Arti de 100) • 
Moreover, the reduction of these obstacles is expected to begin 
well before I970. In the first few years rapid progress is likely to be 
impeded by the requirements of unanimous agreement (establish-
ment, Article 54; diplomas and certificates, Article 57; services, 
Article 63; capital movements, Article 67). But directives by ma-
jority action of the council may be issued even in the first stage 
(I 9 58- I 96 I) with regard to movement of workers; and in the sec-
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ond stage (r962-r965) with regard to establishment, diplomas or 
certificates, services and laws which distort competition. Restrictions 
on capital movements are subjected to majority rule in the third 
stage (r966-r969). 
J. OBSTACLES TU A SINGLE EUROPEAN COMPANY 
While the attractions of a single European company are great, 
and will become greater as the Economic Community evolves, the 
practical lawyer cannot overlook the obstacles which exist today, 
some of which may continue to exist for a long time. We have al-
ready had occasion to examine the principal obstacles to use of 
European branches of an American company in Europe; we must 
look to see whether the same obstacles oppose themselves to the use 
of branches of a Belgian company (for instance) in other European 
countries. 
We may start with taxation. This was found to be a principal ob-
stacle to the operation of branch operation by an American corpora-
tion, and may prove to impede operation of branches by European 
companies too. Without analyzing the tax structures of the various 
Community countries, which are the subject of a separate study by 
Messrs. van Hoorn and Wright, we can say that some discrepan-
cies and overlaps are to be expected, and that they are not necessarily 
eliminated by the "double taxation" treaties existing among several 
of the Common Market countries, nor by the provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome. Specific mention of taxation is found only in Arti-
cles 95-99 and 220. Articles 95-99 contain strong provisions, but 
they apply only to "turnover" and similar taxes on goods. Article 
220 is much broader1; it refers to "elimination of double taxation," 
with presumed reference to income taxes. But it does not even give 
directive powers to the Community Council. It merely pledges Mem-
ber States to "engage in negotiations." 
A third possible avenue of attack on tax obstacles to Community-
wide operation may be found in Articles roo and IOI. Article roo 
empowers the Council to issue directives with respect to "such legis-
lative and administrative provisions as have a direct incidence on 
the establishment or functioning of the Common Market." Article 
r or gives a directive power over provisions which "distort the con-
ditions of competition in the Common Market, and thereby cause 
a state of affairs which must be eliminated." 
Tax deterrents to Community-wide corporate organization would 
seem to be "indirect" rather than "direct" impediments to the 
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Market; if they impede progress in all countries equally, they can 
hardly be said to "distort" competition, although they may retard it 
a good deal. Thus we would not hold high hopes for the elimination 
of tax barriers which may presently enforce a policy of separate 
subsidiaries in separate countries. 
A second reason mentioned for setting up subsidiaries rather than 
branches of the American corporation was to obtain a sympathetic 
approach from government officials who may pass on the application 
of an enterprise for a license to build a new plant, to adjust wage 
rates, to exchange foreign currency, to obtain an import quota al-
location, to make a public securities offering. These matters will con-
tinue for the forseeable future to be administered by national, not 
by international officials. The Community will affect this problem 
only insofar as the Community reduces the need for dealing with 
government agencies (by increasing economic freedom), and inso-
far as the Community diminishes the nationalism of national of-
ficials. It may indeed have such effects, but they will be indirect, and 
may be long delayed. 
A final reason for preferring a European subsidiary, rather than 
a European branch, of an American company was the desire to be 
insulated from migratory suits, and from debts in case of insolvency 
of the European enterprise. Both of these objectives are satisfied as 
well by having one European subsidiary as by having six. As to 
migratory suits, migration within Europe-for instance from Rome 
to Brussels-has never been a problem. As to insolvency, the fea-
tures of inadequate capitalization and domination of subsidiary af-
fairs, which inspire the "piercing of the veil," are more likely to 
appear in a number of small national subsidiaries than in a larger 
market-wide subsidiary. 
In summary, there are no strong legal obstacles to establishing a 
single European subsidiary with branches in the other countries. By 
I 970, this course may be clearly indicated. But in the meantime there 
are likely to be many inconveniences-difficulties with taxes and with 
all sorts of administrative regulations-which a single European 
subsidiary will feel more sharply than separate national subsidiaries 
would. 
4· HARMONIZING SUBSIDIARY OPERATIONS 
One special problem of operating through multiple subsidiaries is 
the necessity of harmonizing their policies to achieve the practical 
benefits of unified operation. American lawyers are, of course, fa-
3 8 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
miliar with means of operating subsidiaries as if they were mere 
departments of the parent company. In American practice, the par-
ent company holds all the stock of all the subsidiaries, and the par-
ent's board frequently makes all major decisions for subsidiary 
companies; the boards of the various subsidiaries carry out these 
decisions. But several complications will be encountered in applying 
this pattern in the Common Market. 
On the purely technical plane, there is the rule against the sole 
ownership of any company's stock by a single individual or com-
pany. This can be solved without much difficulty by issuing single 
shares to chosen persons who will make up the necessary comple-
ment of two, five, or seven shareholders. 
A more serious problem is involved in getting the most out of the 
local directors. The parent company needs keen and devoted local 
directors in each subsidiary, to solve distinctive local problems. Nor-
mally it will install such directors, and award them salaries from the 
subsidiary's treasury, plus bonuses based on the subsidiary's profits. 
They may be expected to devote themselves to the building up of 
their company. 
Unfortunately, the devotion of this group of local directors is 
likely to collide with the objectives of the European operation seen 
as a whole. It may become advantageous to transfer operations from 
the French subsidiary (for instance) to the Italian subsidiary. The 
change may cut the bonuses and imperil the salaries of the French 
directors. Under these conditions, or the threat of these conditions, 
it may be difficult to attract and hold French directors; or they may 
lose the initiative and the sense of responsibility which would have 
resulted from a truly independent French operation. 
An ingenious solution to this problem has been suggested. The 
American parent needs a European policy board, to which the top 
executives of all the subsidiaries will belong. Part of their bonuses 
might be based on profits of the subsidiaries as a group, rather than 
solely on those of their own national subsidiaries. At the least, they 
should meet together, and acquire a Common Market perspective, 
and they should be made to feel that their futures depend not only 
on the success of their national segment of the enterprise, but on 
the success of the whole. This feeling can be given reality by moving 
executives from one subsidiary to another. Language differences will 
impose some limits on this shifting, but it will not be hard to find 
French-speaking Italians who can work in France, Belgium, or Lux-
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embourg and German-speaking Dutchmen or Luxembourgers who 
can work in Germany. 
A European policy board will do more than develop European 
thinking for the parent company. Western Europe now has a twelve 
year plan for the evolution of its commercial institutions and its 
economic life. If advantage is to be taken of the burgeoning opportu-
nities which present themselves, there must be continuous thinking 
about European operations by people who are close to them; de-
cisions cannot be left for peripheral attention by an American board. 
Various legal structures for the European board may be imagined. 
There might simply be meetings among the directors of the various 
European subsidiaries; this arrangement would probably fail to 
supply the needed authority and cohesion. An outstanding solution 
which has come to our attention is the one announced in the summer 
of 1958 by the Ford Motor Company, which opened a European 
office of its International Division. Such a branch would not need to 
buy or sell, and could therefore escape all the legal effects of "estab-
lishment"; at the same time, it could furnish a center of harmoniza-
tion, and a pole of loyalty. 
Whatever structure is adopted, one peril of harmonization must 
be noticed. It may involve violation of European laws on "restraint 
of trade." Article 8 5 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits agreements 
which result in " (a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or sell-
ing prices or of any other trading conditions; (b) the limitation or 
control of production, markets, technical development or invest-
ment; [or] (c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply." 
These provisions purport to be self-operating but will have to be 
enforced by Member States until implemented by action of the 
Council. 
What should be expected from these provisions is not yet known; 
another chapter of this book, by Professor Riesenfeld, discusses the 
problem. Obviously there is some possibility that the harmonization 
of subsidiaries' policies may run afoul of the Common Market's 
"antitrust" laws. If this should occur, an enterprise might be better 
off operating as a single company with branches; a single company 
cannot make an illegal "agreement" with itself. 
A single European company might also violate the competition 
rules of the Treaty. Under Article 86, a single enterprise with a 
dominant position in the Common Market is forbidden to limit 
"production, markets or technical developments to the prejudice of 
40 AMERICA,N ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
consumers." But this article does not outlaw a single company's 
market-wide price policy, or marketing plan, as Article 8 5 outlaws 
them for a combination of different companies. 
5· A EUROPEAN HOLDING COMPANY 
Many writers in the past year or two have advocated the forma-
tion by an American enterprise of a European holding company to 
possess the enterprise's shares in foreign operating companies in 
European countries. 
One function of such a holding company is to serve as coordinating 
agency for the policies of the various operating subsidiaries. But 
this can be done by establishing a European policy board without 
the added complication of a holding company. 
A second function of some European holding companies has been 
to conceal the identity or nationality of the investor. This factor has 
been of great importance in a continent which has been twice in the 
last half-century tormented by wars, and parts of which have suf-
fered political or racial purges. But concealment is quite impossible 
for most of the investors whose problems are considered in this 
paper-that is, American manufacturers who want to exploit in 
Europe their well known products, processes, or trademarks. 
This leaves as the principal function of a European holding com-
pany the supplying of a financial conduit, through which the profits 
of one European subsidiary can be passed to another without pass-
ing through any U.S. company. For if the profits pass through an 
American company, they emerge minus taxes. Such a conduit will 
be of special interest in the Common Market, because of the pos-
sibility that operations now conducted in several of the Market 
countries may later be concentrated in one of them. 
However, a holding company is not the only conceivable means 
of passing funds from one company to another. Where all the oper-
ating subsidiaries are wholly owned, the funds can perhaps just as 
well be loaned from one to the other. The need of a holding company 
for European subsidiaries is likely to arise chiefly when the Euro-
pean nationals hold a substantial minority, or a majority, of the 
company in which the American enterprise has invested. In such 
cases, the European shareholders will not share the Americans' en-
thusiasm for transferring the company's resources to an affiliated 
company in another country. 
Three European countries have been widely mentioned as sites 
for European holding companies-Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and 
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Luxembourg. 50 We are advised that arrangements can be made 
with the Nether lands government to exempt from tax income re-
ceived from subsidiaries in other countries, although there is no ex-
press statutory exemption.51 
Although all these four countries may serve equally well as tax 
havens, they are not likely to serve equally well as profit conduits, 
because of differences in their positions with regard to exchange 
restrictions. If European currencies become soft again, there will 
be a tendency for countries to protect themselves by restricting with-
drawals, or restricting the terms on which new investments may be 
made. Within the Common Market, the countries have committed 
themselves to maintaining a high degree of liberality, and their re-
strictive measures can be reviewed and overruled by the Commu-
nity Council.52 The commitments on exchange control between Swit-
zerland and the Common Market countries are much less effective. 
Hence a holding company located in Luxembourg or Netherlands 
has a probability of being able to invest and disinvest in other Com-
mon Market countries with a good deal more assurance than a 
holding company in Switzerland or Liechtenstein. 
6. MERGING SUBSIDIARIES 
The momentary advantages in having several subsidiaries within 
the Market, and the prospective later advantages of having a single 
Common Market subsidiary suggest to an American that subsidi-
aries should be formed now and merged later with other European 
companies. There are many obstacles to this course, and it should 
not be planned. 
Merger between companies of different countries is presently im-
practicable. One cannot merge a French company with a German 
one as he can merge a Delaware corporation with a Pennsylvania 
one. There are some prospects for future legislation which will per-
mit international mergers; this is one of the subjects on which the 
Community members promise to "engage in negotiations." 53 But 
one cannot be certain of it. 
50 Luxembourg: Law of July 31, 1929, "sur le regime fiscal des societes de participa-
tions financieres"; see DELVAUX AND REIFFERS, LES SOCIETES "HoLDING" AU GRAND-
DUCHE DE LUXEMBOURG (1953). 
51 See Chapter XI infra. 
52 Treaty, arts. 67-73. By its first directive under this article, the Council has ordered 
all member states to grant a general licenses for purchases of securities traded on the 
stock exchanges of member states, and to grant all licenses that may be required to per-
mit direct investment, and offerings of new securities, among member states. See 
Directive No. I under Article 67, May II, 1960. 
53 The Treaty, art. 220. 
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There are also some temporary exemptions from the income taxes 
which would normally be incurred on merger, in order to permit 
companies to adjust themselves to the Common Market. But these 
exemptions are not sure to persist to the time when merger may be 
desired, and when international agreements may have made it pos-
sible. 
7· SUGGESTED CONCLUSIONS 
We have offered a host of considerations for examination in the 
light of the circumstances of each individual enterprise. What con-
clusions should be drawn? We will offer a few. 
In the Benelux group of three countries, a single company operat-
ing across national lines is already practical. For some years Gen-
eral Motors has been operating a Belgian company (General Mo-
tors Continental) with a branch factory in Netherlands; their officers 
report complete satisfaction with the arrangement. They feel that 
Dutch officials give their branch just as favorable treatment as could 
have been expected for a purely Dutch company. Most companies 
appear to be still operating with separate subsidiaries in these na-
tions (Ford Motor has separate subsidiaries for its Dutch and Bel-
gian plants), but we discovered no opinion that this offers any great 
advantage today. 
Outside of Benelux, we know of no instance of international 
branch operation of factories, although there are many branch 
banks, transportation offices, and purchasing agencies. We are pre-
pared to accept the conclusion reached by most enterprises that the 
time has not yet come when it is most convenient to operate an 
Italian or German factory as a branch of a Belgian company. 
On the other hand, we think that the time will come, and very 
probably within the transitional period of the Common Market. It 
may be accelerated not only by the abolition of restrictions and by 
the harmonization of laws, but also by "antitrust" laws which im-
pede the harmonization of policies of separate companies. 
The one thing certain is that the best form of organization today 
may not be the best form tomorrow. This means that in deciding to 
establish in any country the cost estimates should include the ex-
penses of a probable reorganization within a few years. If the com-
bined costs are too. high, the decision should be to defer establish-
ment in the countries where it can most practicably be dispensed 
with. The market in those countries may be exploited through the 
use of commission agents, or merely by exports from a foreign base. 
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We will hazard one more opinion. As the Common Market 
evolves, conditions will become progressively more favorable to 
operations of a single European company, and less favorable to 
operations of a number of European subsidiaries. If the choice be-
tween one subsidiary and many is a close decision under today's 
condition, the single subsidiary should be favored; the future is 
more likely to increase than to decrease its advantage. 
III. FORMING A EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY 
A. THE EuROPEAN CoMPANY LAws 
I. FAMILY RESEMBLANCES (AND DIVERGENCIES) 
When we make the decision to form a European company, we 
find ourselves face to face with the European company laws. For 
the six countries of the Community, there are six systems of com-
pany law-ail different. And there are not six, but eight sets of legal 
texts, since two of the countries present their laws in two official 
languages (Belgium in French and Flemish; Luxembourg in French 
and German) . 
That is taking the worst possible view of the matter. On the 
brighter side, we may notice that four languages cover all eight of 
the legal texts (French, German, Italian, and Dutch). Furthermore, 
a knowledge of the French language will permit the reader to ex-
amine official texts of three countries (France, Belgium, and Lux-
embourg), and to examine the translated texts, with latest amend-
ments, of the other three nations. 54 Texts of the relevant laws of all 
six countries will probably soon be available in German, also. 55 
Moreover, all of the six company law systems reveal strong 
mutual resemblances, as seen from an American perspective. One 
discovers again and again concepts which are common to the six 
countries but unfamiliar in any of the fifty American states. All of 
the legal systems share basic concepts which were enunciated in the 
"'A Paris publisher, Editions Jupiter, prints a loose-leaf service containing the com-
pany laws of the six countries, together with analysis and practical suggestions, under 
the title RECUEILS PRATIOUES DU DROIT DES AFFAIRES DANS LES PAYS DU MARCHE COM-
MUN. (Hereinafter Rec. Prat. du M.C.) In this collection everything not originally in 
French is translated into that language; Italian and German legal texts in their origi-
nal languages are also included . 
.. The publishers of the Rec. Prat. du M.C. have advised us that they will shortly 
issue a German language edition. German language translations of company laws of 
foreign countries are also published by the Gesellschaft fur Rechtsvergleichung at 
Frankfurt, Germany. 
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Napoleonic Civil and Commercial Codes.56 The company laws of 
Luxembourg, Belgium and Italy also reflect a strong influence of 
the French Company Law of 1867, which is still in effect in France 
although considerably amended. German company law contains 
more radical differences from the French pattern, reflecting in part 
its independent historical development. While all the European 
company laws will strike an American lawyer as rather rigid, per-
haps even old-fashioned, he will come closest in the Netherlands to 
discovering the liberty of organization and finance to which he may 
have been accustomed within the hospital boundaries of Delaware. 
Some day, perhaps, there will be uniform company laws through-
out the Common Market. A committee in France, and perhaps 
others elsewhere, are studying the possibility. But the Common 
Market members are not committed, even in theory, to uniformity 
in this area. So the six regimes of company law are likely to be with 
us for some years to, come. 
2. WHERE TO FIND THE LAWS 
Few of the European company laws can conveniently be studied 
in English.56a Most of the English translations which have been 
made are hopelessly out of date; only the Netherlands 57 law and 
Italian 58 laws have recent translations which have come to our at-
tention. For neither is there any service in English to keep it up to 
date. 
When we turn to the original sources, we find a confusing variety 
of arrangements. The famed "codification" of European law, 
whereby all laws are integrated in a single, compact, consecutively 
numbered collection, applies to business company laws in only three 
of the six countries-Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. In Bel-
gium and the Netherlands the principal company laws are cited as a 
part of the Code of Commerce.59 In Italy, surprisingly, they are 
66 For a short discussion of the evolution of Dutch commercial and company law, see 
Correa, La Pratique des Societes aux Pays-Bas, r Rec. Prat. du M.C., Pays-Bas, Part r. 
66
' For a bibliography of sources which can be studied in English, see Szladits, Inter-
national and Foreign Law Sources for the Business Lawyer, 15 Bus. LAW. 575 ( 1960). 
57 Internationaal Juridisch Instituut, Netherlands legal provisions of companies lim-
ited by shares (Netherlands 1957); VANDERMEER, DUTCH CORPORATION LAW (1959). 
68 An English translation of Italian company law was published in 1957 by Medio-
banca, under the title THE AMERICAN INVESTORS' DIGEST OF ITALIAN CoRPORATE LAW . 
.. Belgium: CoDE DE CoMMERCE, Liv. I, Tit. IX; WETBOEK VAN KoOPHANDEL, Boek I, 
Tit. IX. 
Netherlands: WETBOEK VAN KooPHANDEL, art. 15-56h. There are, of course, gen-
eral principles applicable to companies in many parts of the Civil Codes, especially in 
the parts on contracts of associations. There are also special corporation acts, like 
the Netherlands Act on cooperative associations, which are not integrated. The state-
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cited as a part of the Civil Code,60 because of the achievement in 
I942 of a long-sought-after unification of civil and commercial law. 
Even more surprisingly, they are found in the division of the civil 
law dedicated to labor law ;61 this oddity reflects the "corporative 
state" concepts of fascism which were in vogue in the Italy of I 942, 
.but it has no significant bearing on the content of the company law 
nor on the system of citing it. 
In the other three countries the principal laws 'applying to com-
panies have become quite separate from the commercial codes, as 
economic change has forced radical revisions of company laws 
while other portions of the commercial code retained more ancient 
dress. Of all the countries France has the most uncodified collection 
of company laws, reflecting the vicissitudes of national history al-
most as picturesquely as the architectural face of Paris.62 Some of 
the principles which underlie company law are still to be found in 
the Civil Code (Articles I832-I873), although they yield, in com-
mercial matters, to other general rules found in the Code of Com-
merce (Articles I 8-46) . For specific questions of French company 
law one must usually turn to particular laws which we will call the 
"Stock Company Law" and the "Limited Liability Company Law." 
But the French have no such handy names for them; they call them 
(respectively) the Law of July 24, I867, and the Law of March 7, 
I925. 
The Stock Company Law has been greatly amended, so that not 
much more than its skeleton remains to witness the will of the I 867 
legislator. The later legislators have sometimes despaired of hang-
ing any more on the old skeleton, so we have further laws which 
certainly modify the effects of the law of I 867, but which are not 
framed as amendments to it, and must be separately cited. Notable 
examples are the laws of November I6, I940, and March 4, I943 
-both products of the "collaborationist" government at Vichy. 
Although neither the Stock Company Law nor the Limited Liability 
Company Law are formally parts of the Commercial Code, they 
are always contained as annotations in popular editions of the Code, 
along with the Vichy overlays and other supplementary legislation. 
ment in the text applies to a set of rules on business corporations which is approximately 
as comprehensive as, for instance, the American "Model Business Corporation Act." 
60 ComcE CIVILE arts. 2247-2510 . 
., Libro V "Del Lavoro." 
62 See Houin, Reform of the French Civil Code and the Code of Commerce, 4 AMERI-
CAN JoURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 48 5 (1955). Professor Houin advises that a new 
codification of French company law is in an advanced stage of preparation, and might 
even be promulgated in 1960. 
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The legal situation in Germany and Luxembourg is somewhat 
less confusing. Both have relatively modern and comprehensive 
company laws which are entirely separate from the Civil and Com-
mercial Codes. Germany has a Stock Company Law, dating from 
I937, and a separate Limited Liability Company Law dating from 
I 892. Luxembourg has a single Companies Law, separate from 
its codes, containing provisions on stock companies, limited liability 
companies, and other types of business association. The German 
company laws are contained in popular editions of the German 
Code of Commerce (Handelsgesetzbuch or H.G.B.), but the Lux-
embourg laws are available only in a separate booklet.63 
The principal company laws to which we will refer repeatedly 
are shown on page 47 with the usual term of citation in the country 
of origin, and the abbreviated citations which we will use here. 
B. THE CHOICE OF COMPANY FORM 
I. THE KINDS TO CHOOSE FROM-AND THEIR NAMES 
In five of the six Community countries-all but the Netherlands 
-the American lawyer who has decided to form a "corporation" 
will confront an initial puzzle. Each of these countries has not one, 
but two forms of business organization which may fairly be called 
corporations. Both are widely used, both are legal entities, both are 
taxed in essentially the same way, and both insulate their share-
holders from liability for company debts. 
These two forms bear witness to the European legislators' desire 
to provide separate legal structures for the entities which Amer-
icans call "publicly held corporations," and those which we call 
"close corporations." One type of European company is empowered 
to offer its shares to the public, and list them on stock exchanges 
and is obliged to endure the glare of publicity on its financial affairs. 
The other type of European company is confined to offering its 
shares to a select few, has shares unsuitable for trading, and en-
joys relative privacy. In these respects the European dichotomy 
appears much like the American. 
But the American dichotomy is a differentiation of fact-a differ-
ence in how the shares are actually held and traded. Legally both 
kinds of companies (close corporations and publicly held corpora-
tions) belong to the same category ("business corporation," or 
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Law 
Code of Com-
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"corporations for profit"), they add the same distinguishing words 
or letters to their corporate name (Co., Corp., Inc. and the like), 
and they are formed under provisions of the same statute (for ex-
ample, the Delaware General Corporation Law, or the Illinois 
Business Corporation Act). To pass from the "close" form to the 
"publicly held" form requires, at most, minor charter amendments, 
and the filing of securities registration statements.6 fi 
.. The provisions governing limited liability companies, although not adopted until 
1933, are framed as an amendment of the law of 1915. Hence, we cite the "Law of 
191 5" for provisions which were not in effect until many years after that date. 
""The distinctions between the American close corporation and the European limited 
liability company have been brought out in a series of articles advocating that Ameri-
can states should adopt separate close corporation laws; see the following (in historical 
order): Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MICH. L. REv. 273 
( 1928-29) ; Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WAsH. 
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In Europe, on the other hand, these two kinds of company signify 
different legal categories, add different words or initials to their 
corporate names and are formed under different statutes.66 To pass 
from one legal form to the other requires the adoption of a com-
pletely new charter, through a procedure called "transformation." 
American and English writers have used many different transla-
tions for these.kinds of companies, frequently varying according to 
which European country is involved.67 For simplicity we will use the 
U.L.Q. 305, 338-339 (1937); Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the 
One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (1938); Winer, Proposing A New 
York· "Close Corporation Law," 28 CoRNELL L.Q. 313 ( 1943) ; O'Neal, A Plea For 
Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 700 (1958). 
66 An English language introduction to the limited liability company in various Euro-
pean countries may be found in the following articles: Eder, Limited Liability Firms 
Abroad, 13 U. of PITT. L. REV. 193 (1952); Israels and Taubenblatt, The Close Cor-
poration in Foreign Law, (1948) STATE OF NEW YoRK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION 
CoMMISSION 416; Schneider, The American Close Corporation and its German Equiva-
lent, 14 Bus. LAw. 228 (1958); Treillard, The Close Corporation in French and Con-
tinental Law, 18 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 546 ( 1953). 
"'I have chosen the term "stock company" for the A ktiengesellschaft or societe 
anonyme, and the term "limited liability company" for the Gesellschaft mit beschrdnkter 
H a/tung, or societe a responsabilite limitee. The affirmative reasons for these choices 
are the following: (1) Neither term has a strong positive connotation in American law, 
such as to imply a greater parallelism than the laws justify. (2) Both terms are literal 
translations of the European terms in use in some or most of the countries surveyed. 
"Stock company" translates the German and Italian terms; "limited liability company" 
translates the French, German, Italian, Luxembourg, and Dutch terms, and barely 
misses the Belgian. ( 3) The two terms, both using the word "company," emphasize 
that they designate species of a single genus. 
More compelling, however, than these affirmative reasons, are my objections to alter-
native terminologies which have been occasionaJly used or suggested: (1) "Anonymous 
company" or "nameless company" as a translation for "societe anonyme" is the nadir 
of namesmanship. It connotes nothing. (2) "Corporation" as a translation for "Aktien-
gesellschaft" or "societe anonyme" leads into a trap. If the SA-AG is also calJed cor-
poration, we have got nowhere. If the SARL-GmbH is called some kind of "company," 
while the SA-AG remains a "corporation," the difference in terminology implies a 
greater difference in kind than really exists. The use of the term "corporation" leads 
into endless other difficulties. On the American side, the term properly includes such 
entities as municipal corporations, which are never signified by the corresponding 
European terms of societe and Gesellschaft. On the European side, the "corporation" 
has cognates (corporation, corporazione, Korperschaft, corPoratie) with quite different 
denotations. (3) "Close corporation" as a translation of GmbH or SARL is bad be-
cause the question whether a corporation is "close" or not is a matter of fact; whether 
it is a GmbH or an AG is a matter of law. An AG or SA can be closely held in fact, 
so that it corresponds functionally to an American "close corporation." (4) "Public 
company" and "private company" are perfectly usable terms with which to describe 
the European SA-AG and SARL-GmbH, respectively. They have disadvantages in 
suggesting an exaggerated parallelism between British and continental institutions. 
Further, the word "public" strongly suggests "governmental" to the American reader. 
The following incomplete bibliography on others' usages may be of some interest: 
"Limited Liability Company" (for SARL-GmbH): FRIEDMANN et a!., LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF FoREIGN INVESTMENT (1959). 
"Stock company" (for SA-AG): Eder, Spain: New Law of Stock Companies, 1 AM. 
J. CoMP. LAW 117 ( 1952) ; Eder, Spain: Law of Stock Companies, 2 AM. J. COMP. LAW 
234 (1953)· 
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same two translations, regardless of country. Our terminology is 
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societa per azioni 
(SpA) 
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
Haftung (GmbH) 
societa a responsabilita limi-
tata (SARL) 
Luxembourg: societe anonyme (SA) societe a responsabilite limitee 
(SARL) 
anonyme Gesellschaft Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
(AG) Haftung(GmbH) 
The Netherlands is like the United States, and unlike the rest of 
Europe, in having only one statute under which both closely held 
and publicly held companies are formed. Companies of both types 
are legally called "naamloze vennootschap," just as both are legally 
called "corporation" in the United States. The initials "N.V." ap-
pear before or after the company name. If the company happens to 
be closely held, it may be described by bankers as "besloten," which 
means "closed." But the appellation of "besloten naamloze ven-
nootschap" (like "close corporation") denotes a factual distinction, 
rather than a legal one. There is no widely used Dutch term for a 
"publicly held corporation." 
Of course there are many other kinds of business associations, be-
side the stock company and limited liability company. In every coun-
try there are partnerships and limited partnerships, just as in the 
"Limited Liability Firm" (for SARL-GmbH): Eder, op. cit. supra note 66; Eder, 
Colombia: Control of Limited Liability Firms, 2 AM. ]. CoMP. LAw 70 (1953); Eder, 
J! enezuela: Commercial Code, 5 AM. ]. CoMP. LAw 628 ( 1956). 
"Close corporation" (for SARL-GmbH): Reverdin and Hamburger, The American 
Close Corporation and Its Swiss Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAw. 263 (1958); Israels and 
Taubenblatt, op. cit. supra note 66 at 416. 
"Corporation" (for SA-AG): FRIEDMANN et al., op. cit. supra; but cf. FRIEDMANN 
rt al., THE PUBLIC CORPORATION ( 1954). 
"Public companies and private companies" (for SA-AG and SARL-GmbH, respec-
tively): Treillard, op. cit. supra note 66, at 546. 
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United States.68 There is also in most of the European countries a 
"limited partnership with shares," 69 and there are a number of 
special purpose companies such as mutual insurance companies, co-
operative associa.tions, and credit unions. 
None of these business associations seem likely to be of much 
interest to American traders and investors. Cooperatives and credit 
unions are inherently local. The limited partnership with shares is a 
survival of the slow evolution from partnership to stock company, 
comparable in its role to the American "joint stock company." To-
day it seems to offer no advantages which are not exceeded by those 
of the more usual stock company or limited liability company. The 
general partnership seems to be excludable as an avenue of Amer-
ican investment, since the participants become fully exposed to all 
the financial risks of a European businessman. 
68 Partnerships: 
Belgium: societe en nom collectif (vennootschap onder gemeenschappelijken naam), 
CODE DE COMMERCE (hereinafter cited as C. CoM.) Livre I, Titre IX, §§ 15-17. 
Germany: Offene Handelsgesellschaft, Handelsgesetzbuch (hereinafter cited as 
HGB) §§ 105-160. 
France: Societe en nom collectif, CoDE DE CoMMERCE (hereinafter cited as C. CoM.) 
§§ 2o-22. 
Italy: Societa in nome collettivo, ComcE CIVILE §§ 2291-2312. 
Luxembourg: Societe en nom collectif-offene Handelsgesellschaft, loi du 10 aout 1915 
concernant les societes commerciales (hereinafter cited as Company Law) §§ 14-15. 
Netherlands: Vennootschap onder eene firma, WETBOEK VAN KooPHANDEL (herein-
after cited as W.K.) §§ 16-18. 
Limited Partnerships: 
Belgium: Societe en commandite simple-vennootschap bij wijze van enkele geld-
schieting, C. CoM. I-IX, arts. 18-25. 
Germany: Kommanditgesellschaft, HGB §§ 161-177. 
France: Societe en commandite simple, C. CoM. §§ 23-28. 
Italy: Societa in accomandita semplice, CoDICE CIVILE §§ 2313-2324. 
Luxembourg: Societe en commandite simple-einfache Kommanditgesellschaft, Com-
pany Law §§ 16-22. 
Netherlands: Vennootschap bij wijze van geldschieting, or vennootschap en com-
mandite, W.K. §§ 19-35. 
60 The organizations referred to resemble limited partnerships in that some members 
are liable for firm debts, while others are not, but they differ from limited partnerships 
in their power to issue transferable shares. They have had a historical role as pre-
cursors of the modern stock company and limited liability company, somewhat like 
the role of the "joint stock company" in American Ia w; but it would be quite mislead-
ing to call them "joint stock companies." 
The following table indicates their various national names, and the laws applicable: 
Belgium: Societe en commandite par actions-Vennootschap bij wijze van geld-
schieting op aandelen, C. CoM. I-IX, §§ 105-115. 
France: Societe en commandite par actions, Law of 1867, §§ 1-20. 
Germany: Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, Aktiengesetz (hereinafter cited as 
AktG) §§ 219-232. 
Italy: Societa in accomandita per azioni, ComcE CIVILE §§ 2462-2471. 
Luxembourg: Societe en commandite par actions-Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, 
Company Law §§ 102-112. 
Netherlands: Commanditaire vennootschap op aandelen. 
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The limited partnership may deserve some consideration from a 
few American investors. Conceivably an American company could 
be a limited partner, while an individual (American or European) 
might be the general partner in Europe. European limited partner-
ships are very much like American limited partnerships under the 
Uniform Partnership Act, for the simple reason that the Anglo-
American limited partnership is a business form which was directly 
and consciously copied from a European modeP0 However, the 
number of American enterprises which would wish to particip-ate in 
a European limited partnership would be very small, and we will 
not, in this paper, give further attention to this form. 
The "holding company" has also received a good deal of atten-
tion in recent years from European writers and American observers. 
It is not, however, a distinctive form of organization; it is rather, 
as in the United States, the adaptation of one of the other forms of 
company (usually stock company or limited liability company) to a 
particular purpose. 71 
2. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY-ITS PROS AND CONS 
Most American corporations seem to have cast their European 
subsidiaries, except in Germany, in the mold of stock companies.72 
On the other hand, European businessmen choose the limited li-
ability much more often than the stock company; the ratio of pref-
erence in France was recently about 3 Y2 to I and was apparently 
even higher in Germany.73 Although many of the reasons why Eu-
70 See Crane, Are Limited Partnerships Necessary? 17 MINN. L. REV. 351 (1933). 
71 The only European country of the Six which has a special holding-company statute 
is Luxembourg: 
Loi du 3 r juillet 1929 sur le regime fiscal des societes de participations financieres 
(holding companies), reprinted in Recueil des lois concernant les societes cpmmer-
ciales (1956); Gesetz vom 31 Juli 1929 iiber die Besteuerung der Holdinggesell-
schaften, reprinted in "Gesetze betreffend die Handels, Holding-, und andere Gesell-
schaften" ( 1956). 
However, the holding company is widely used in the Netherlands and other coun-
tries of the Common Market, without benefit of special legislative provisions. 
""A casual survey of well-known American subsidiaries in Europe has revealed no 
limited liability companies except in Germany. General Motors and Standard of New 
Jersey both have German sub-subsidiaries which are limited liability companies: 
Frigidaire GmbH, which is a subsidiary of Adam Opel AG (sub of General Motors); 
and Vereinigte Asphalt-und Teerproduktion Fabriken GmbH, which is a subsidiary 
of Esso AG (sub of Jersey Standard). Moody's Industrial Manual (1959) 1648, 2734· 
But Mr. Dieter Schneider, a lawyer of Cologne, states that "foreign subsidiaries in 
Germany are generally established in the form of a GmbH." The American Close 
Corporation and its German Equivalent, 14 Bus. LAW. 228, 249 ( 1958). 
'"I Rec. Prat. du M.C., sub. tit. Indications pratiques for France states that in 1957, 
3270 SARL were formed, compared with 952 SA. The ratio of total companies in ex-
istence favors the SARL even more strongly. 
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ropeans might prefer the limited liability company do not apply to 
Americans, we believe that this form deserves more consideration 
than it has commonly received. We suspect that its unpopularity 
among Americans results partly from the fact that it looks strange 
and unfamiliar. We will, therefore, try to outline some of its dis-
tinctive features in various countries, starting with its disadvantages, 
and proceeding to some bases for preferring it. 
:• 
a. Non-Negotiability of Shares 
One feature of limited liability companies which will probably 
deter some investors is the non-negotiability of their shares. Stock 
companies in all the countries but Italy normally issue bearer cer-
tificates, which are transferred from one investor to another with-
out any entry on the corporate books; 74 the bona fide purchaser 
prevails over all prior claimants. In Italy stock companies no longer 
issue bearer shares, but registered shares are considered "negoti-
able" just as in the United States. 75 Limited liability companies 
shares are never considered negotiable; they must always be trans-
ferred on the books of the company; in Germany the transfers must 
even be notarized; 76 in Italy no certificates of ownership are issued. 
The buyer of a limited liability company share (with or without a 
certificate) takes it subject to any adverse claims of title, any claim 
of the company for unpaid share subscriptions, and any restriction 
on transfer, to which the transferor was subject. 
In some, but not all, countries, there are further impediments to 
In Western Germany, figures of companies in existence in 1955 showed 34,254 GmbH 
against 3,060 AG. Rec. Prat. du M.C., Indications pratiques for Germany. 
74 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 45· 
France: C. CoM. art. 35· 
Germany: AktG § 10. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37· 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 38c. 
75 Company Law (C. CIV. 2355) permits bearer shares as in other countries, but royal 
decrees have suspended the permission since 1941 (decrees of Oct. 25, 1941, and Mar. 
29, 1942). Hence, all share transfers must be registered and are governed by C. Civ. 
arts. 2021-2027. But there is no provision, as in the limited liability company law, 
that transfers are ineffective even between the parties until registered. 
7
" Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 125 (share transfer not effective until registered). 
France: Law of 1925, arts. 21 (shares not negotiable), 23 (transfer incomplete until 
the company is formally notified). 
Germany: Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung (herein-
after cited as GmbHG) § 15. (requiring that all tranllfers be made with judicial or 
notarial formality). 
Italy: CooicE CIVILE art. 2479 (transfer ineffective until registered). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 190 (transfer incomplete until the company is for-
mally notified). 
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free trading in shares. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg shares 
in a limited liability company cannot be sold to non-members with-
out the consent of a specified majority of the other shareholders.77 
This provision puts a minority shareholder at the mercy of the con-
trolling group. It has been found so burdensome that Frenchmen 
often form a stock company in preference to a limited liability, even 
though they intend the company to be closely held. 
This rule requiring consent to transfer does not apply in Ger-
many and Italy, unless it is voluntarily inserted in the corporate 
charter.78 
b. Exclusion from Financial Markets 
A second disadvantage of the limited liability company is the fact 
that it cannot raise money by public issue of stocks and bonds, nor 
can its securities be traded on the securities markets. Some of the 
countries have a specific prohibition against public issue or trading.70 
In others the same effect is achieved by prohibitions against issuing 
the kinds of securities which outside investors would want to buy. 
One of these prohibitions is the one on issuing negotiable shares, 
explained in a preceding paragraph. A further prohibition, effec-
tive in Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg, prohibits the issue 
of bonds-that is, debt securities in forms designed for sale to 
small investors.80 
These prohibitions do not prevent limited liability companies 
from financing themselves from private sources. The rules about 
stock would be no impediment to shareholding by a select group of 
individuals nor, except in Belgium, by a parent or a consortium of 
investing companies; only the general public are excluded. Likewise 
loans can be "privately placed" with banks and insurance companies. 
Since public issues of bonds are relatively less important in Europe 
than in the United States, the inhibition on public bond issues will 
probably not make much practical difference to a company until it 
becomes very large and well-known. 
77 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 126. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 22. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 189. 
78 Germany: GmbHG § 15(5). 
Italy: C. Civ. art. 2479· 
79 Luxembourg: Company Law. art. 188. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 37· 
so Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 131. 
France: Rec. Prat. du M.C., France, Expose juridique no. 14.33. 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art 2486. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 188. 
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c. Other Disadvantages 
A few other special features of the limited liability company 
which may deter its use at particular times and places must be men-
tioned. Belgium has a peculiar rule requiring that all shareholders 
be natural persons and not corporations.81 Our Belgian collaborator 
regards this as a rule of substance, not form. Hence the limited 
liability comp~ny must be written off as a form of corporate sub-
sidiary in Belgium; but it might make a good affiliate for an Amer-
ican close corporation, whose principal shareholders could also 
hold shares in the Belgian limited liability company. 
France has a rule of income taxation whereby the salaries paid to 
majority shareholders of a limited liability company are regarded 
as profit distributions, rather than as wages, and incur a 22% basic 
tax (before the progressive surtax) instead of the 5% payroll tax 
which falls on salaries of stock company officers. This has driven 
many French businessmen to desert the limited liability company in 
favor of a stock company; but it will not be any problem to Amer-
ican-owned limited liability companies, since it is unlikely that their 
salaried officers will be majority shareholders. We presume that 
shares will be held by corporations rather than individuals. 
Italy has a set of unfavorable tax rulings which have been ap-
plied to the limited liability company. On the one hand, its profits 
are subjected to the corporation income tax, which partnerships and 
individual enterprises escape; on the other hand, its share transfers 
are subjected to a business transfer tax which corporation shares 
escape. Thus it has double disadvantages. Until one of these in-
consistent rulings is abandoned, the limited liability company must 
be avoided in Italy; but our collaborators view this problem as tem-
porary. When it is solved, the Italian limited liability company may 
be a relatively attractive form of enterprise. 
Most of our collaborators report that the limited liability com-
pany is viewed with suspicion by creditors, because it has been so 
often used for under-capitalized enterprises which eventually failed; 
the stock company on the other hand enjoys a presumption of finan-
cial responsibility. We suppose, however, that the presumption 
against the limited liability company is readily rebutted by evidence 
of adequate capitalization, or by the parent company's willingness 
to guarantee particular undertakings. 
81 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. II9. 
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d. Restrictability of Share Transfers 
We referred above to restrictions on transfer as possible disad-
vantages in the limited liability company. Restrictions are a disad-
vantage to a capitalist who wants to induce maximum financial par-
ticipation in his company by outside investors. 
But we have found that many American corporations, contem-
plating investments in foreign countries, are much more concerned 
with keeping investors out than with getting them in. Such corpora-
tions issue a very minimum of shares to others than the parent 
corporation itself, and require each recipient to agree in writing to 
make no disposition without consent. 
Where the desire is to minimize public participation in the com-
pany's equity, the limited liability company offers definite attrac-
tions. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg the shares are auto-
matically non-transferable unless a specified majority of the other 
shareholders consents.82 In Italy and Germany the law does not im-
pose this restriction, but permits its insertion in the company 
charter. 83 
It is true that some degree of non-negotiability is also attainable 
in stock company shares. Professor Houin believes that the numer-
ical majority of French stock companies would be found to have 
rules restricting stock transfer. But restrictions on transfer are not 
expressly authorized by the stock company laws of most countries,84 
and the extent to which transfers may be validly restricted is not 
clearly defined either by case law or by legal theory. 85 
82 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 126. 
France: Law of 1925 art. 22. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 189. 
83 Germany: GmbHG § 15 (expressly stating that transfers may be restricted by 
charter provisions). 
Italy: C. Civ. art. 2479 (stating that shares are transferable in the absence of con-
trary provisions in the articles of incorporation) (salvo contraria dispozione dell'atto 
constitutivo) . 
.. Germany expressly authorizes charter restrictions on transfer: AktG § 61 ( 3). But 
many desired forms of restriction are beyond the statutory authorization: See ScHLEGEL-
BERGER-QUASSOWSKI, KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 71, Anmerkung 9 (1939). 
85 An interesting exchange of views of the subject in Belgium is contained in a pair 
of comments by Coppens, 64 JouRNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 215 (Belgium 1949), and de 
Rouvreux, 55 REVUE PRATIQUE DES SoCIETES CIVILES ET COMMERCIALES 54 (Belgium 
1956); cf. VAN RYN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL, Part I, at 364 ( 1954); for Ger-
many see Schneider, op. cit. supra note 66, at 233. 
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e. Number of Shareholders 
A second feature of the limited liability company which may at-
tract some Americans is the smaller number of shareholders re-
quired. In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg a stock company 
requires seven sha:reholders,86 while a limited liability company re-
quires only two.87 According to the prevailing view of lawyers in 
these countries, the shareholders must be bona fide in that they 
must pay their own money for their shares. But they need not hold 
more than one share a piece; and they may be bound by contract to 
assign the share to someone else on demand of the parent company.8x 
European lawyers generally do not consider shareholder require-
ments as a weighty consideration. Even if they are violated, the 
principal consequence (in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg) is 
liability to an annulment proceeding, which in France can be ar-
rested by restoring the number of shareholders to seven (provided 
they have never dropped below two). 89 Since a shareholder's deriva-
tive suit cannot be brought by less than five percent of the share-
holders, European lawyers have no such fear of small shareholders 
as American lawyers generally do. 
Whatever the merits of this European view may be, we believe 
that most American parent companies in fact will be extremely 
cautious in the selection of the other six shareholders, and in main-
taining amicable relations with them. The time and trouble involved 
in finding six such shareholders and keeping them happy can be cut 
down by using the limited liability company form, which requires 
only one shareholder in addition to the parent company. 
The difference in required number of shareholders has less sig-
nificance in the other countries. In Italy two shareholders are enough 
for either type of company.90 Even if there is only one, the company 
does not cease to exist; it merely ceases to insulate the sole share-
holder from personal liability for debts of the company.91 In Ger-
many there is a difference in the number of incorporators required 
"'Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 29. 
France: C. CoM. art. 23. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 26. 
87 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 119. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 5· 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 183. 
88 Cf. Lepaulle and Jeantet in FRIEDMANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
( 1959) at 214, 22o-221. 
80 Ibid. 
00 Italy: C. CIV. art. 2247· 
01 /d. art. 2362. 
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(five against two) ,92 but there is no objection to IOO% ownership 
by a single shareholder after the company is once formed. 93 Hence 
the selection of the extra incorporators does not demand much at-
tention in either Germany or Italy. The Netherlands has no limited 
liability companies, but two incorporators are enough to form a 
stock company, and the number of shareholders after incorporation 
does not need to be more than one. 
f. Number of Officers and Directors 
A third attractive feature of the limited liability company is the 
simplicity of management structure permitted by law. A small 
limited liability company can operate with no board of directors, 
no president, no auditors and only a single manager. 94 It is not even 
necessary to hold a shareholders' meeting to elect the manager; he 
may be named in the articles, and hold office indefinitely without the 
necessity for annual elections.95 
This simple arrangement is not recommended as a permanent 
structure in any company; but it may be extremely convenient in 
the early years of a foreign venture. The parent company may not 
know to whom it can wisely entrust the decision-making power in a 
European country; it will hope to avoid naming board members 
whom it may later wish to remove and replace. 
In contrast, the stock company is required by law to provide itself 
with a panoply of officialdom which is sometimes quite premature. 
The requirements are most elaborate in Germany, where every 
92 AktG §:~:Five members; GmbHG §:~:Specifying no number, but implying plural-
ity. 
93 HAUMBACH-HUECK, AKTIENGESETZ § 30 (9 ed. 1956). 
"'Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129. But a board of auditors must be named, if there 
are more than five shareholders. ld., art. 134. The single manager is called a glrant, 
or beheerder. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 24. But if there are more than 20 shareholders, a board 
of supervision (counseil de surveillance) must be named, id. art. 32. The single man-
ager is called gerant. 
Germany: GmbHG § 6. But there must be a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) if there 
are over 500 employees, by the terms of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of Nov. 10, 1952, 
§ 77· The single manager is called a Geschiiftsfiihrer. 
Italy: C. Civ. art. 2487. But an auditing committee (colle{lio sindacale) is required if 
the capital is over 1,ooo,ooo lire (about $1500). Id., art. 2488. The single manager is 
called an amministratore unico .. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191. There is no limit on the size of the company 
which may be governed by a single manager, called gerant or Geschiiftsfiihrer. 
""Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 24-
Germany: GmbHG § 6. 
Italy: C. Crv. arts, 2487 and 2383. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191. 
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stock company must have a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) of 
three or more members, none of whom are either executives or em-
ployees of the company, and who must hire one or more executives 
( Direktoren). 96 In other words, the investor in a stock company 
must find three policy-makers whom he trusts enough to put them in 
charge of his business, but who are not employed in it, plus one full-
time executive. In a limited liability company he needs to find only 
the executive. 
A similar number of persons must be found in Italy-at least 
three auditors ( sindaci) who are neither employees of the company 
nor relatives of the manager, and at least one manager ( ammini-
stratore) .97 But the choice is a little less momentous, since the three 
auditors do not have the extensive powers of the German super-
visory board. 
In France and Belgium, four persons must also be found to fill the 
necessary positions-three managers ( administrateurs) and at least 
one auditor ( commissaire) .98 The directors may be employees of 
the company, but the auditors must be strictly independent-not 
employed by the directors or by the company, and not related by 
blood or marriage to the directors.99 The requirements are the same 
in Luxembourg, except that there are no express prohibitions of 
other relations between the auditor and the company or its direc-
tors.100 
The privilege of operating a limited liability company with a 
single manager is available only to ''smaller" enterprises, but the 
criteria of smallness vary greatly. In Italy, the line is drawn at the 
meager capital of I million lire (about $ r ,soo) ; above that, audi-
tors are required.101 In Germany, the line is drawn at soo employees; 
with more, a 3-man supervisory board is required.102 In Belgium and 
France, the line is drawn in terms of number of shareholders; such 
a line need never be crossed by a typical corporate subsidiary. The 
penalty for crossing is a three-man board of auditors.103 Only Lux-
.. AktG §§ 70, 86, 90. 
97 C. Crv. arts. 2380, 2397, 2399· 
98 France: Law of Nov. I6, I940, art. 1 (administrateur); Law of 1867, art. 32 (com-
missaires). 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, arts. 55 and 64. 
09 France: Law of I867, art. 33· 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64 quater (as amended by law of Dec. I, 1953). 
100 Luxembourg: Company Law art. 61. 
101 Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2488. 
"""Betriebsverfassungsgesetz § 77 (Hereinafter cited as Betr VerfG). 
108 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. I 34· 
France: Law of I925, art. 32· 
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embourg sets no statutory size limit to the companies which may 
use the single-manager system: perhaps size limits in Luxembourg 
are imposed by geography. 
The weight which should be given to these personnel requirements 
varies somewhat among the countries. A few officers, like the execu-
tives (Direktoren) in a German stock company, cannot be removed 
from their position without proof of unfitness for the office. Most 
officers-including the members of the highest governing boards in 
France and Germany (conseil d'administration, conseil de surveil-
lance, Aufsichtsrat) are removable at the pleasure of the share-
holders.104 As to officers of the latter type, the investor can if neces-
sary authorize his European counsel to fill the positions with docile 
individuals who will vote as instructed, and resign when requested; 
that is, with "dummy directors." Certainly the difficulty of filling 
positions should not stand in the way of selecting a form of organ-
ization which is strongly indicated by the financial requirements of 
the enterprise. But, other things being equal, useless cogs in the 
administrative machinery are to be avoided for the same reason as 
are useless parts in the power plant. 
g. Labor Representation 
In Germany a unique factor favoring the limited liability com-
pany is encountered. In every stock company, regardless of size, one-
third of the supervisory board members (who choose the execu-
tives) must be labor representatives. This requirement does not 
affect limited liability companies until they have 500 or more em-
ployees.105 
h. Privacy 
A few American investors may also be attracted to the limited 
liability company by1:he greater financial privacy permitted in some 
countries. In Germany and Luxembourg stock companies must pub-
lish their annual financial statements, 106 while limited liability com-
panies do not have to. But the resulting disclosure is no greater, and 
usually less, than unlisted American corporations' statements in 
Moody's or Standard and Poor's. 
""For a fuller discussion of "governing boards" see the next part of this chapter, 
under the title "Management of a European Subsidiary." 
""' Betr VerfG § 77· 
106 Germany: AktG § 143. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 75· In France, the duty to publish financial state-
ments falls only on those stock companies which are listed on a stock exchange. Ord. 
59-247, Feb. 4, 1957; J.O. Feb. 8, 1959, p. 1754; L'AcTUALITE JuRIDIQUE 1959, III. 62. 
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i. Other Advantages 
There are other advantages in the limited liability company form 
which contribute to its popularity among small businessmen in Eu-
rope. One of these is a smaller minimum capital; in Germany a 
stock company mu~~ have minimum capital of about $25 ,ooo, while 
$5,000 will do for a limited liability company.107 Another is the 
simplicity of the papers to be filled out; they are such that a Eu-
ropean businessman may feel safe in preparing them without a 
lawyer. Some laws permit publishing an extract of limited liability 
company articles, while stock company articles must be published in 
full at greater expense. These advantages will not be of much in-
terest to American investors in Europe; they are pin-prick in rela-
tion to the major expenses and difficulties inherent in a trans-Atlantic 
plunge. 
3. TRANSFORMATION 
The choice between stock company and limited liability company, 
once made, is not irreversible. In each country which offers the 
choice, there is also a procedure for changing from one to another, 
called "transformation." 108 Like incorporation, it involves drawing 
up new articles, and depositing and publishing various copies or 
extracts; the expenses are probably about the same as for incor-
poration. 
However, transformation is not necessarily a "tax-free reorgan-
ization," in the American sense. In Belgium and Germany, at least, 
it is viewed under tax laws as a sale of assets unless it comes within 
certain strict limitations. If it is not within these limits, it incurs 
transfer taxes based on the value of the assets transferred, and in-
come tax on previously unrealized or unreported gains. In Germany, 
the limits are fairly wide; it is sufficient that both companies (the 
submerging, and the emerging) are German, that 100% of the 
assets pass in exchange for stock in the new company and that the 
107 AktG § 7 (1oo,ooo DM minimum for a stock company), GmbHG § 5 (zo,ooo DM 
minimum for a limited liability company). 
The minima are even lower in other countries; Italy requires 1,ooo,ooo lire (about 
$1500) for a stock company and 50,000 lire (about $75.00) for a limited liability 
company. C. Civ. art. 2327, 2474. 
108 Belgium: The procedure is nonstatutory. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 21 (Transformation). 
Germany: AktG §§ 26}-277 (Umrwand/ung). 
Italy: CODICE CIVILE arl:. 2498 ( Trasformazione). 
Luxembourg: Procedur'e is nonstatutory. 
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book entries be such as to negative any concealment of tax liability. 
In Belgium there is no statutory exemption, but only a practice of 
the treasury not to claim taxes in those cases in which both the mem-
bers and the assets of the company remain the same after the trans-
formation as before. In France, on the other hand, transformation 
seems to be tax-free by general rule. 
We understand that the burdens and risks of transformation are 
enough to deter the ordinary incorporator from forming a limited 
liability company with the intention of transforming it to a stock 
company a few years later, or vice versa. The form is chosen for 
"keeps," although Ia ter events sometimes lead the choosers to re-
verse their original choice. The situation is not like that of England 
or the United States, where every company is born as a "private 
company" or "close corporation," and becomes a "public company" 
or corporation of "public issue" by virtue of later acts. In Europe, 
it is usual for the lawyer to attempt to foresee the ultimate character 
of the enterprise, and to incorporate in the form which is appro-
priate to that ultimate character. 
C. THE CHOICE OF A STATE OF INCORPORATION 
I. THE DETERMINING FACTORS 
One of the features of European incorporation which differ-
entiates it most sharply from incorporation in the United States is 
the absence of freedom of choice of the state of incorporation. The 
European lawyer who is forming an operating company does not 
incorporate in the country whose tax or corporation laws are most 
favorable, without regard to where the company's headquarters 
are going to be. His choice is already made by the client who has 
decided, for other reasons, where he wants to locate the "central 
office" of the business.109 
The reasons for this absence of freedom are connected with two 
rules of law. One of these is a rule found in the corporation statute 
for each country, which provides that the articles must designate a 
central office (siege, Sitz, sede, zetel) which must be, at least in-
ferentially, in that country.110 In this respect they differ from the 
109 I adopt for use in comparative law the term employed by RABEL, 2 CoNFLICT OF 
LAWS 31 ff. (1947). Since this concept is not used in Anglo-American law, there is no 
precise legal parallel, although it is much like the "home office" of an insurance com-
pany. 
110 All the laws require that the articles of incorporation be filed at the commercial 
court or commercial registry, or both, of the district in which the company has its 
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Delaware act, which requires designation only of "the principal 
office . . . within this state," 111 or the Illinois act, which calls for 
"the address . . . of its initial registered office in this State." 112 
A classic view among European theorists is that if the actual central 
office is in a country other than that of the office designated in the 
articles, the COll}pany is in violation of its charter, and is exposed to 
various undesirable (if unspecified) consequences.U3 A few con-
temporary writers have questioned whether there are really any 
serious consequences to be feared, 114 and a Dutch authority declares 
that the Dutch Minister of Justice often ignores known violations 
of the rule.115 The Italian law specifically permits a company to 
adopt, by amendment, of its charter, a foreign central office.116 But 
in companies other than the Netherlands and Italy, an American-
owned enterprise would be unwise to make a deliberate test of the 
rule. 
The second rule which inhibits freedom of choice of place of in-
corporation is a rule of conflicts of laws. According to prevailing 
European opinion, a corporation's internal affairs and its legal 
existence are governed by the law of the place where the central 
office is locatedY7 This seems to mean the actual central office, not a 
"central office," in terms which leave no doubt that a court or registry in the country 
of the legislator is intended. See, for instance: 
France: Law of 1867 art. 55· 
Germany: AktG § 28. 
The Netherlands law specifically states that the central office (plaats van vestiging) 
must be within the Netherlands. W. K. art. 36c. There are exceptions in the Netherlands 
and elsewhere, enacted in contemplation of enemy occupation, which permit temporary 
removal of the central office for emergency reasons which will not enter into the plan-
ning of American investors. 
111 General Corporation Law of the state of Delaware§ 102(g) (2). The wording 
admits the possibility of other "principal offices" in any number of other states. 
m Illinois Business Corporation Act. § 47b, ILL. STAT. ANN. § 157-47 (b) (Smith-Hurd, 
1954). 
118 RIPERT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 268 (France 1954). 
VoN GoDIN-WILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ § 5, Anmerkung 6 (Germany). 
KOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, No. 3 Bilateral Studies 
in Private International Law 16 (1955). Kollewijn is somewhat sceptical of this view, 
but recognizes it as "prevailing." 
m See BEITZKE, }URISTISCHE PERSON EN IM INTERNATIONAL PRIVATRECHT UND FREMDEN-
RECHT 104 (Germany 1938). 
115 See Kollewijn, op. cit. supra note 54, at 16. 
116 C. C1v. art. 2437· 
117 RABEL, 2 CoNFLICT oF LAws 33-37 (1947). 
BATIFFOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 232, 453 (France 
1955). 
WOLFF, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT DEUTSCHLANDS 115 (Germany 1954). Kol-
lewijn op. cit. supra note 113, at 16. 
This view was crystallized in a uniform law contained in a treaty signed by the 
Benelux countries, but which never came into effect because it was never ratified by 
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fictitious one stated in the articles. This contrasts with the prevailing 
American rule that the corporation's existence and internal affairs 
are governed by the state of incorporation, wherever it may estab-
lish its central office.U8 Following this theory it is said that a com-
pany which is organized under the laws of one country, and then 
sets up a central office in another, is invalid at the situs of its central 
office, because it has not organized in accordance with the laws pre-
vailing there.119 
Professor Ernst Rabel, discussing this question in terms of a 
Delaware corporation doing business in Europe, declared: 
A corporation constituted in Delaware with head-
quarters in Amsterdam will be considered subject to 
Dutch law on the whole European continent, and there-
fore on principle as non-existent. . . . 
While the essence of the rules has often been misunder-
stood especially in the English literature and by German 
writers too, the policy behind the rules has not always 
been appreciated. The most important viewpoint from 
which to consider the rule is of a state that does not want 
an organization to establish its principal office in its terri-
tory and yet derive its existence and legal character from 
a foreign state. Thus, in the oldest decisions of the Ger-
man Supreme Court on this matter, a company incorpo-
rated in the state of Washington, United States, for the 
purpose of exploiting Mexican mines, but which was con-
trolled by a board of directors in Hamburg, Germany, 
the Netherlands, as the Hague Treaty of May II, 1951. It stated in Article 3, "The 
existence of a legal person and its organs or representation shall be determined by the 
country of its seat .... For the purposes of this Article, an artificial person shall be 
considered to have its seat at the place where its central control is located." 
These provisions, which have no legal force, are regretted by Kollewijn. According 
to our informants, these provisions are a major obstacle to ratification, and may be 
dropped. 
The rule that the company is governed by the law of its central office is apparently 
codified by the laws of Belgium and Luxembourg, both of which provide in identical 
terms that "every company whose principal establishment is in Belgium (in the 
Grand Duchy) is subject to the Belgian (Luxembourg) law, even if the incorporation 
took place in a foreign country." Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX art. 197; 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 159. This seems to be understood as referring to 
the central office, rather than to the site of exploitation. 
Italy: The code declares that all companies are subject to Italian company law if 
they have their central office or principal activity in Italy (C. Cxv. 2505), although 
inconsistently declaring that Italian law applies to companies formed in Italy, but 
active principally abroad (C. Crv. 2509). See also Loussouarn, Droit International du 
Commerce, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 246, 2 50 ( 1959), commenting 
on art. 58 of the Treaty of Rome. 
118 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 155, 182 ff. j RABEL, op. cit. supra note 109, at 
31. 
no Wolff, op. cit. supra note n7, at ns-n6. 
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was denied recognition as an American legal entity; hav-
ing failed to fulfill the German requirements for incor-
poration, it was treated as a German non-corporate asso-
ciation. When a domestic company transfers its domicil to 
a foreign country, it loses its personality. 120 
In the view of our Dutch collaborator, Professor Rabel's choice 
of Amsterdam as a hypothetical site was unfortunate. Mr. Deelen 
concurs in Kollewijn's view with respect to a corporation formed 
under foreign law but having its actual central office in Holland, that 
It is out of the question that a Dutch judge would ever, 
on this sole ground (there being no fraud or public policy 
considerations) declare a corporation null and void, and 
no decision to that effect has ever been rendered.121 
Conversely, he b.elieves that corporations could be formed in the 
Netherlands, and operate their affairs from headquarters in Ger-
many or France without objection from the Dutch government or 
courts. 
However, an investor cannot safely take advantage of this Dutch 
liberalism unless he is assured of equally tolerant views in the 
neighboring countries in which the other part of the play would have 
to be acted. Despite intimations of similar tolerance by occasional 
writers in other countries, 122 the weight of authority (and of our 
collaborators) cautions against experimenting with these rules of 
law. The safe course is to organize where the central office is to be, 
and to centralize management unambiguously at that office. 
Although there is no freedom to choose a state of incorporation 
which is different from the state of the central office, there is no 
prohibition against choosing a central office location which is out-
side the country of the principal business operations.123 For instance, 
a company could establish its main office in Luxembourg, although 
its principal business consisted of exploiting coal mines in the N eth-
erlands or operating steel mills in France. The "central" office is 
1
'"' RABEL, op. cit. supra note II7, at 37-39. 
121 Kollewijn, op. cit. supra note II3, at 16. 
The result seems to be precluded also by the Netherlands-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation, which provides in Article XXIII, § 3, that <~Companies 
constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either 
party ~hall be deemed companies thereof, and shall have their juridicial status recog-
nized within the territories of the other party." T.I.A.S. 3942. 
122 E.g., Beitzke, op. cit. supra note II4. 
123 Ripert, op. cit. supra note II3, at 396. 
Battifol, op. cit. supra note II7, at 232. 
Wolf, op. cit. supra note 117, at 115. 
Rabel, op. cit. supra note II7, at 40. 
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identified by reference to activities of management and supervision, 
rather than activities of manufacture and sale.124 
According to our information, little use is made, and little should 
be made, of this technical freedom. It is quite unlike operating a 
Hoboken refinery from a Manhattan executive office, because there 
are between any two European countries a flock of actual or po-
tential barriers which have not existed since 1865 between Amer-
ican states. There are passport clearances impeding travel from 
one to the other, differences of currency, possible exchange restric-
tions, and customs (until 1972). All these barriers impede the 
intimate contact between management and operations which is just 
as essential to optimum efficiency in Europe as it is in the United 
States. 
There is another reason for not separating management from 
operations which is peculiarly European. European managers with 
whom we have spoken emphasize the necessity of constant con-
tacts with government, since price changes, wage changes, and 
major building programs must frequently be approved by an official 
of a national ministry. It is reliably reported that the notoriously 
uneconomic concentration of French industry in the Paris area is 
influenced by the need of managements to be simultaneously near 
their plants and near their ministers. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that a company organized to mine or 
manufacture solely in France would locate its central office in Ger-
many or vice versa. However, if a single company were formed to 
mine and manufacture in both France and Germany, it might lo-
cate its central office in either of the countries, and would not need 
to move because the activities in the foreign country grew larger 
than those in the country of the central office. Or it might choose a 
central office in Luxembourg, which is between the major countries. 
2. THE "DELAWARES OF EUROPE" 
If we may judge from our conversational contacts, the views ex-
pressed in the preceding paragraphs will surprise many American 
lawyers, who have been told that Lichtenstein or Switzerland or 
Luxembourg is the "Delaware of Europe." 
Such metaphors convey more falsity than truth. In so far as they 
suggest that these countries furnish a convenient place for incor-
wLoussouarn, in Les Conflits de Lois en Matiere de Societes 135 (1949) contends that 
a central office which did not coincide with any important operations would be pre-
sumptively fraudulent, 
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porating a company which will have its central office and principal 
operations in other countries, they are false both in law and in prac-
tice. None of these countries is commonly used, or could be advan-
tageously used, for such purposes, for the reasons already given. 
A second connotation of such a metaphor might be that the laws 
of these countries permit great freedom in financial operations, for 
instance, the payment of "nimble dividends" when capital is im-
paired, or the assignment of most of the share consideration to 
surplus which can be freely paid out as dividends. These supposi-
tions would also be baseless, at least as to Switzerland and Lux-
embourg. ·· 
Or it might be supposed that these countries have lower incor-
poration fees than neighboring countries, as Delaware's franchise 
tax is lower than that of most industrial states. We do not have 
complete information on the incorporation fees in these countries, 
but we understand that incorporators are not drawn to them by cost 
advantages of this kind. 
However, it is true that certain investors have sought out these 
countries as places in which to incorporate and manage their com-
panies, in preference to neighboring countries; but the companies so 
formed have been, in almost all cases, holding companies, not oper-
ating companies. They have been truly localized in the country of 
incorporation, because their securities are kept there. 
D. THE EuROPEAN LAWYER's RoLE IN INCORPORATION 
The procedures of incorporating in the countries of the European 
Common Market are basically like procedures in the United States. 
They start with some rather mechanical documents, filled with the 
proper number of names and addresses, indications of the corporate 
purposes, statements of kinds and amounts of capital stock, and a 
good many paragraphs about directors and officers, their powers and 
their pay. The papers must be filed, some sort of publication made, 
fees paid, organization meetings held, and certificates of completion 
of one or another formality carefully executed. 
In Europe, as in the United States, these formalities are for the 
local practitioner. There is no point in the American investor's 
learning their details, because he cannot perform them anyway. 
Hence, we do not present checklists of incorporation steps. 
\Vhat the American investor can do is to make an intelligent selec-
tion of a European practitioner, explain his general objectives, and 
review the documents which the practitioner proposes to file and 
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publish. The following observations explain some of the differences 
in European practice which an American investor will encounter in 
his dealings with European legal representatives. 
I. THE ADVOCATE 
The American who looks around the Common Market for a 
"corporation lawyer" encounters a puzzling situation. It is difficult 
to find any expression in. any of the four languages involved which 
would accurately translate the term "lawyer," 125 much less the term 
"corporation lawyer." 
The American may, however, ask for a "member of the bar," and 
be led without hesitation to an "advocate" (avo cat, A nwalt, av-
vowto, advocaat). The advocate is primarily a courtroom lawyer 
and is often compared to the English barrister.126 But, unlike the 
barrister, he does not have to be approached through a solicitor, 
nor does he expect the facts to be gathered and the case appraised 
before it comes to him. Perhaps the advocate is best explained by 
saying that he is like one of the great general practitioners of 
America's nineteenth century, who could try a tort case, argue a 
constitutional law appeal, and advise a corporation on its tax liabil-
ity, all without partners or junior associates. 
Many European advocates, including some of the very best, are 
solo practitioners, except. as they may have apprenticed assistants. 
In France group practice among advocates was forbidden until 
I 9 5 4.127 Since solo practitioners are not likely to be highly special-
125 See BURDICK, THE BENCH AND BAR OF MANY LANDS (1939), for genera) observa-
tions on the legal professions in Germany, France, and Italy. For France, see Lepaulle, 
Law Practice in France, so CoLUM. L. REv. 945 (1950); Brown, The Office of Notary 
in France, 2 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 6o ( 1953); Tunc, 
Modern Developments in Preparation for the Bar in France, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71 
( 1949-50) ; Simmons, French Lawyers' Special Fields, 30 TuLANE L. REV. 101 ( 1955). 
For Germany, see Weniger, The Profession of the Bar in Germany, 34 ILL. L. REV. 
85 (1939-40). For Italy, see Sereni, The Legal Profession in Italy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 
1000 ( 1950). 
The plurality of possible interpretations is illustrated by the fact that Frenchman 
Tunc (above) treats avocats and avouh as the only classes of French lawyers, while 
Frenchman Lepaulle (above) described avocats, avouis, notaires, and agents d'affaires 
as varieties of "lawyers." 
108 For instance, by Brown and by Tunc (see note 125 supra). With respect to France, 
there is some point in the barrister-advocate comparison because neither has power 
to "represent" (i.e., make binding agreements for) his client; that belongs to the 
solicitor in England and the avoue in France. But the comparison may prove mislead-
ing, since the French advocate does not have to be briefed by a solicitor (as the Eng-
lish barrister does), and cannot file written pleadings (as the English barrister can). 
In other countries, the advocate may bind his client. 
127 HAMELIN, ABREGE DES REGLES DE LA PROFESSION D'AVOCAT art. 207 (1954), citing 
decree of April 10, 1954, art. 49· 
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ized, in corporate matters, many advocates will not draft the in-
corporation papers in their own offices. Some, of course, will do so. 
Others may accept the responsibility, but delegate the work to an 
outside office to prepare the documents-especially if the American 
client seems to expect that the advocate should himself produce the 
papers. An equally normal procedure, in most of the Common 
Market countries, is for the advocate to discuss the principal prob-
lems, advise the client on some of the preliminary questions (what 
form of company, where to incorporate, what kind of management 
structure) and then send the client on to a notary to get the drafting 
done. In some of the German states (Lander) the offices of ad-
vocate and notary are combined; in these states it is most probable 
that an advocate will be found who is both a counselor on corporate 
matters and a draftsman of corporate documents. 
2. THE "ATTORNEYS-OF-RECORD" 
In France there is a special kind of lawyer called an "avow?'-a 
title whose etymological connotations recall the English "attorney." 
We mention the avoue only because the identification of French 
"advocates" with English "barristers" leads so easily to the iden-
tification of French avouis with English "solicitors." 128 Since a 
prospective American investor in England would properly consult 
an English solicitor, the conclusion might be drawn that an Amer-
ican investor in France should consult a French avoue. 
Nothing could be further from the mark. The job of the avoue 
is to appear of record for a litigant, to file written pleadings, to 
receive notices, and to make on behalf of the client any commit-
ments and elections which are incident to the procedure of litigation. 
The pleadings which are filed by the avoue may be drawn either by 
himself or by the advocate, but oral advocacy is the job of the ad-
vocate. An American translation for this peculiar intermediary 
might be "attorney-of-record." 
These functions of this "attorney-of-record" are much like some 
of those performed by an English solicitor. But the French "at-
torney-of-record" performs none of the functions of business coun-
seling, property management, and drafting of non-litigious docu-
ments, which probably occupy the larger part of an English solicitor's 
128 The distinguished comparatist Tunc compares them for certain purposes. Op. cit. 
supra note 125, at 71, n. r. Tunc emphasized that the French avoue, like the English 
solicitor, has the power to "represent" his client. 
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time, and which qualify him to advise an American investor. Most 
of these functions are performed in France chiefly by notaries. 129 
The "attorney-of-record" is a professional who is peculiar to 
France, and is not even found in all districts of that Country. There 
is some recognition in other countries of the attorney-of-record's 
distinct functions, but they are generally performed by a person who 
bears the title of "advocate." 129~ 
3· THE NOTARY 
The European notary is also a lawyer. 130 That is, he is a man 
who has a university law degree, or who has at least passed profes-
sional examinations for his position, and who makes his living 
strictly by professional work. But he generally does not appear in 
court, except when, as in some German states, he is also an advocate. 
Since notaries handle almost all aspects of the administration of 
decedents' estates, marriage settlements, and conveyances of real 
estate, they might remind an Englishman of a family solicitor; an 
American colleague might call them "office lawyers." But the Eu-
ropean notary has a dignity which distinguishes him from either an 
English solicitor or an American lawyer. Like an American justice 
of the peace, he exercises a public trust, even though his income de-
pends on private fees. He holds an "office" which he has either in-
herited from an ancestor or purchased at a high price, and he is a 
custodian of records of property ownership. When he takes ac-
knowledgments of documents, he is not satisfied by knowing that 
the signature is genuine; he will read or explain the entire document 
to the client, and refuse to take the acknowledgment unless he is 
quite sure that the client understands every line. In fact, the notary 
is normally the draftsman of documents whose acknowledgments 
he takes.131 
Urban notaries frequently become specialists in corporate prac-
uo Cf., Brown, op. cit. supra. note 125, at 6o. 
uoa In Italy, a young lawyer is first admitted to practice only as an attorney-of-
record (procurazione), but later becomes an advocate (avvocato), and thereafter 
performs both functions. See Sereni, supra note 125. 
In Luxembourg, most lawyers describe themselves as being both advocates and at-
torneys, using the hyphenated title, avocat-avoue. 
130 See Schlesinger, The Notary and the Formal Contract in Civil La<u-', NEw YoRK 
STATE, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION 403 ( 1941) (observations on France, 
Germany, and Switzerland). 
Brown, op. cit. supra note 125, at 6o. 
131 Our Netherlands collaborator says that in his country the notary invariably drafts 
any instrument which is required to be notarized. 
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tice. It is no accident that some of the best French treatises on com-
pany law have been written by the editor of the "Notaries' Jour-
nal." 1s2 
4· UNLICENSED LA WYERS 
Various classes of people who are not members of any legal pro-
fession, and perhaps not of any licensed profession, also participate 
actively, competently, and lawfully in advising on incorporation 
problems. Frequently tax problems are important, and these will 
probably be referred by lawyers or notaries to tax specialists, who 
are not usually lawyers; they are sometimes, but not necessarily, 
accountants. 
Accountants may also assume the main work of planning the 
corporate organization and drawing the papers; an Italian advocate 
has advised us that his accountant competitors are perfectly com-
petent in corporate matters, while another doubts it. 
There are also, at least in France, wholly unlicensed business 
agents (agents d'affaires or conseillers commerciaux) who will un-
dertake to arrange an incorporation, acting partly as advisers and 
partly as intermediaries for notaries and tax specialists who may be 
needed.133 
Some of these unlicensed advisers have organized themselves into 
an association of "company legal advisers" ( conseils juridiques de 
socihes). The existence of these unlicensed operatives in a semi-
legal field seems to be an indirect result of the fractionation of the 
French legal profession in terms of formal procedures-formal 
appearance and filing of written pleadings (by the avoue) ,134 oral 
argument (by the avo cat), and drafting of nonlitigious documents 
(by the notaire). As an incident of this fractionation, counseling has 
become nobody's profession. 
This interesting lacuna in French professional regulation ex-
plains the role of the many American lawyers in Paris who have no 
license for any kind of practice in France. So long as they only give 
advice, referring formal procedures to licensed attorneys-of-record, 
'""'Moreau, Editor-in-chief of the JOURNAL DES NOT AIRES, is the author of LES 
Socnhfs CIVILES (France, 1954), LA SOCIETE ANONYME (France, 1948), LA SOCIETE 
A RESPONSABILITE LIMITER (France, 1952). 
133 See Lepaulle, op. cit. supra note 125, at 947; Simmons, op. cit. supra note 125. 
,... In discussing French procedure (in English) one must distinguish between the 
written contentions, technically called "pleadings" in Anglo-American law (see BoUVIER, 
LAw DICTIONARY, tit. "Pleading"), and oral persuasion, colloquially called "pleading." 
Confusion is promoted by the cognation of the English word "pleading" (with its two 
meanings) and the French Plaidoirie (whose technical meaning is oral advocacy). 
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advocates, and notaries, they may lawfully carry on activities which 
would be considered the "practice of law" if carried on in the 
United States.135 
There is no doubt that some of these unlicensed counsellors are 
thoroughly competent, nor that there are some who are not. One 
can only say that the care which should always be used in selecting 
a professional adviser is even more vital if an unlicensed one is 
chosen. 
5· WHICH KIND OF LAWYER? 
The only professionals whose participation is required by law for 
a European incorporation are the notaries. They are needed for the 
execution of articles of a stock company in every country but 
France; 136 and they are necessary in France to complete the com-
pany organization.137 In the formation of limited liability companies 
they are required in Belgium, Germany, and Italy/38 but not in 
France and Luxembourg. 
Experienced European businessmen frequently use no more out-
side professional service than the law requires. They incorporate 
without the advice of an advocate, and use a notary only in the 
situations where the law requires it. They do not consult an ad-
vocate, an accountant, or a tax specialist, unless the incorporation 
presents unusual technical problems. 
American investors, on the other hand, have generally consulted 
European advocates, and obtained through them such services as 
might be needed from notaries, accountants, and tax specialists. 
Perhaps this has frequently been done under a belief that an ad-
vocate, like an American lawyer, is the only qualified adviser on 
""'An English solicitor and law teacher, Mr. L. Neville Brown, informs us that in 
England also "the lawyers' monopoly ... has been eaten away as far as counseling 
in tax and corporation matters is concerned by the professional accountant and various 
business consultants .... " 
180 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, arts. 29, 3 I, 33· 
Germany: AktG § I6. The law requires notarial or judicial execution; but notarial 
is the practical choice. 
Luxembourg: Company Law arts. 26 and 30. 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 36. 
'
37 The cash subscriptions must be originally paid in either to the N a tiona) Deposit 
Bank (Caisse de depots et consignations), or to a notary; when the required fraction 
of subscriptions has been paid in, the proceeds can be released to the company officers 
only on a notarial affidavit that the conditions have been fulfilled. Law of 1867, art. I. 
We are advised that the simpler and most preferred procedure is to use a notary for 
both functions. 
138 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX art. 4· 
Germany: GmbHG § 2. 
Italy: CoDicE CIVILE art. 2475. 
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corporate matters. Although such a belief would be false, the 
practice of consulting an advocate is probably sound. It is safe to 
say that a European investment by an American enterprise always 
involves problems which are unfamiliar to the investor. It seems to 
be the European consensus that the advocate is the professional 
most likely to have a sound perspective concerning the ensemble of 
problems likely to arise, and the one best qualified to draw in others' 
talents. 
With this comment we would like to pass on two warnings from 
our European informants. The American investor should not expect 
his advocate to produce in his own office all the expertise and the 
documentation'·required; he should be prepared to have the advocate 
draw on other professionals or to send the American to them. 
It should also be clear that the American does not always need a 
European advocate. If he is reliably referred to a French or German 
notary, it is probable that the notary is just as competent as any 
advocate to decide when other professional collaboration is called 
for. Likewise, an American lawyer practising in Europe (without a 
European license) may be perfectly competent to supply the per-
spective which is commonly obtained from a European advocate, 
and to call on the other professionals (notaries, tax specialists) 
who may be useful. 
E. THE ORGANIC DocUMENTs 
I. DRAW THEM IN EUROPE! 
The late Professor Ascarelli once remarked that it is of second-
ary importance whether the American investor asks an advocate, an 
accountant, or a notary to draw his European articles of incorpora-
tion. The thing of primary importance, he said, is this: don't draw 
the articles in New York and send them to Rome or Hamburg. 
Not only are such articles invariably far from the demands of local 
law and practice, but they impose on a European lawyer an im-
possible job of explaining to the American client why they must be 
changed. What the American client should send to Rome or 
Hamburg is a statement of what activities he wants to conduct, 
where he expects to get his money, whom he expects to employ as 
managers, and other information on operational plans; the drafting 
he should leave to the European adviser. 
In the light of this advice-which appears to us to be very sound 
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-there is not much to say on this side of the water about the organic 
documents. We will offer a few observations designed chiefly to im-
prove communications between transatlantic and cisatlantic lawyers. 
2. ARTICLES ANO RY-LAWS 
One does not, of course, ask a Europe"an lawyer to prepare a set 
of articles and by-laws. The Europeans do not use these two sets of 
organic documents; their functions are combined in one document. 
Telling him to draw a set of "articles" may also contain elements 
of confusion; the more English he knows, the more likely he is to 
be confused. For instance, he may know that the basic document in 
Delaware and New York is called the "certificate of incorpora-
tion," and in England (from which many Europeans surprisingly 
take their English), "memorandum of association." What then are 
"articles of incorporation?" It may be helpful to have at hand some 
European names of the formative documents-acte constitutif, 
Griindungsvertrag, atto constitutivo, akte van oprichting. 
These European names are not the end of the matter, either. We 
have in America one set of names for the basic document, when we 
think of it as something signed and filed during the formative 
process of the corporation; these are "certificate of incorporation" 
or "articles of incorporation" (varying by jurisdiction). We have 
another set which we use after the corporation has been fully organ-
ized, to refer to the contents of the docume11t, and to include amend-
ments to it; thus we speak of the limitations of the "charter." 
Likewise Europeans have a set of names which signify the organic 
law of the company, as derived from the articles and amendments. 
The principal terms are statuts, Satzung or Gesellschaftsvertrag, 
statuti, and statuten.139 
Many of the elements found in European articles of incorpora-
tion are the same as those in American articles. They indicate the 
statutory type of company (stock or limited liability), the purpose, 
the name, the duration, and the amount of capital.140 In all limited 
139 Gesellschaftsvertrag is generally applicable to all commercial companies, includ-
ing stock companies, limited liability companies, and partnerships. Satzung is a special 
name for the Gesellsclzaftsvertrag of a stock company (used also for the partnership 
limited by shares, Kommanditgesellschaft auf II ktien). See, for instance, usage in 
HUECK, GESELLSCHAFfSRECHT 24, II6 (1958). 
""For the principal statutory sections on contents of the articles of incorporation see 
the following: 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 30 (stock companies); arts. I2Q-I2I (limited liability 
companies). 
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liability companies, and in stock companies except in France, the 
incorporators are named in the articles. To the practiced American 
eye, nothing essential is lacking except that the purpose clause is 
much shorter. 
J. PURPOSE CLAUSES 
There are considerable variations in the laws and practices of 
the various countries with respect to purpose clauses. The law and 
practice in France is liberal. A popular form book advises the incor-
porator, after stating the objects which he has in mind, to add as 
additional object.s, 
Investment by the company, by any form or means, in 
any business and any company now existing or which may 
come into existence. 
And all industrial operations in general.141 
Professor Houin considers this bad practice, but notes that it is 
widely followed, and that the undesirable consequences are un-
certain. 
While this approach will remind an American lawyer of some of 
the clauses seen in Delaware and other American charters, there is 
an important difference. One never encounters the three-page list 
of purposes and powers which are customary in Delaware, and often 
used in other American states, and any European lawyer would 
probably resist any suggestion that he imitate it. There are at least 
two reasons. One is that the law authorizes the articles to state 
purposes, not powers. The other is that the ultra vires doctrine, 
whose ravages in the United States brought forth the inflated Amer-
ican purpose clauses, never received such extreme applications in 
countries of Europe. 
Broad purposes clauses are apparently tolerated also in Germany, 
Italy, and Luxembourg, so long as some real purpose exists.142 In 
two nations-Belgium and the Netherlands-vague or omnibus 
purpose clauses are inadmissible. The Belgian company law was 
France: Law of 1867 art. I (S.A.), Law of 1925 art. 14 (SARL). 
Germany: AktG § 16, GmbHG § 3· 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2328 (S.p.A.), art. 2475 (SARL). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 27 (S.A.), art. 184 (SARL). 
Netherlands: W.K. arts. 36b, 36c, 36d. 
ul LEMEUN!ER, POURQUOI ET COMMENT CONSTITUER UNE SOCillTE ANONYME p. I-7 
(19<8). 
1 
.. Our German collaborator warns that a company might be successfully attacked 
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amended in I 9 58 to require a "precise designation of the purpose 
of the enterprise." 143 In the Netherlands the Ministry of Justice is 
likely to refuse a permit to incorporate if the declared objects go be-
yond the potential of the company's capital. 
4· RULES OF INTERNAL GOVERNMENT 
Any brevity which European articles acquire through the short-
ness of their purpose clauses is soon lost by the length of their 
provisions for internal government. The articles contain innumer-
able details on shareholders' meetings-when they are held, how 
they are called, who may be admitted, how the agenda is made up, 
how minutes are kept, how votes are counted. Many of these provi-
sions will be found to restate propositions of the company law of the 
particular country. These portions of the articles are much like the 
by-laws of a typical American corporation. 
It is obviously inconvenient to have to include all this material in 
the formally filed articles; it is of no interest to the state, or the 
creditors, or anyone other than the shareholders. But since there is 
only one organic document in European company law, these neces-
sary provisions must be put in it. 
The burden of including these internal matters in the articles is 
recognized by some of the publication laws. In France and Germany 
publication is required only of an extract of the articles; the extract 
corresponds roughly to American articles, and excludes most of the 
"by-law" items.l44 In Belgium the extract procedure is used for 
limited liability companies, 145 hut not, unfortunately, for stock 
if it were formed without any specific purpose in mind, but merely to serve some 
later need which might appear; that is Gesellscha/t auf Vorrat. 
1 
.. C. CoM. I-IX, art. 30 (r), as amended by Law of January 6, 1958. 
144 France: The extract for the societe anonyme requires: ( r) type of company (e.g., 
stock company or limited partnership with shares); (2) name; (3) purpose; (4,) cen-
tral office; (5) names and addresses of members; (6) names of managers and auditors; 
(7) amount of capital, value of shares, and description of property (if any) exchanged 
for shares; . • • ( 9) provisions (if any) for special reserves; ( ro) whether there are 
any shares with double vote, or any founders' shares; (II) when the company begins 
and expires; ( 12) the court in which the complete articles and other documents were 
filed. Law of r867, art. 57· The extract for the SARL is substantially the same. Law 
of 1925, arts. 13 and 14. 
Germany: The extract for the stock company must contain the company name, cen-
tral office, purpose, date of organization, names of managers, and also (if applicable) 
any provisions which may exist limiting the duration of the company, or limiting the 
agency powers of the managers or liquidator, or limiting the "authorized" capital. 
AktG. § 32. The limited liability company extract is similar. GmbHG § ro. The cited 
sections refer. to the entries in the Commercial Register, but these entries must be pub-
lished by the court, by virtue of HGB § ro. 
""C. CoM. I-IX, art. 7(b). The Belgian publication requirement includes two items 
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companies.146 Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands require publi-
cation of complete articles in all cases.147 
F. INCORPORATORS 
One of the striking peculiarities of European incorporation, from 
an American viewpoint, is the insistence on numerous incorporators. 
The laws do not generally state a minimum number of signers of 
the formative documents, but they do specify the minimum number 
of shareholders, and European lawyers generally conclude that 
the full benefits of incorporation are not attained until that number 
of shareholders exists. For stock companies, the minimum number 
is seven in Belgium, France and Luxembourg,148 and five in Ger-
many.149 In Italy and the Nether lands two will suffice for a stock 
company/50 and two will do for a limited liability company in all the 
countries where such a company may be formed. 151 But no member 
of the Common Market has followed the example of a few Ameri-
can states which permit a single investor to incorporate. 152 
Requirements of this sort give little difficulty to an American 
lawyer on his home grounds; any group of clerks will do for in-
corporators, and shares can be subscribed and paid for in their 
names. But many European lawyers will object to this kind of 
practice. Our Belgian, French, and Dutch collaborators all warn 
against the unpleasant legal consequences which might result from 
procedures of this sort; only the German colleague sees no problem. 
which would probably be found in American by-laws-the fiscal year, and the date of 
the annual shareholders' meeting. 
""C. CoM. I-IX, art. 9· 
mLuxembourg: Company Laws art. 8. 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 367. 
148 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 29. 
France: Law of 1867, art. 23. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. z6. 
149 AktG § z. 
150 Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. ZZ47· 
Netherlands: No statutory provision requires more than one member; but all sections 
speak of the members in plural terms, and Dutch legal theory regards incorporation as 
a group action (our Dutch collaborator uses the German term Gesamtakt) which re-
quires more than one participant. 
""Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 119. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 5· 
Germany: GmbHG § z. 
Italy: C. CIV. art. ZZ47· 
Luxembourg: Company Law art 183. 
"'"IowA ConE § 491.z ( 1958). 
KENTUCKY REV. STAT. § 271.025 (Baldwin's, 1955). 
MICH. CoMp, L. § 450.3 (1948), MICH. STAT. ANN,§ ZI.3 (1937). 
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Our Luxembourg collaborator, while disapproving the use of straw 
incorporators, reports that this is the usual thing in foreign-owned 
companies, especially holding companies. 
The precise nature of the dangers incurred by using straw incor-
porators are not very clear. One of the consequences is said to be 
liability for losses occasioned by the pretense; but if the straw man's 
subscription is actually paid, there would seem to be no loss. In 
Belgium a statute provides that shareholders are liable for debts 
of the company until the required complement is reached.153 Our 
Belgian collaborator warns that the straw man commits a crime by 
falsely representing himself to be a subscriber, which he is not; 154 
but admits that the probability of prosecution is slight. 
The most serious probable consequence applies only to the situa-
tion in which the various incorporators are all nominees of one 
investor, so that the new company is in reality a one-man company, 
or a wholly-owned subsidiary from its very inception. In this 
situation European theorists (unlike American) are inclined to 
regard the company as having no legal existence. One theory behind 
this view is the classic principle of continental law that a company 
is the result of a contract; and a contract with only one party is 
just as impossible in European law as in American. 
Contemporary European jurists are well aware that the modern 
company is much more an institutional entity than it is a contract, 
and a few of them would be willing to discard entirely the contrac-
tual view.155 But the contractual theory is deeply ingrained in the 
statutory system, and jurists cannot disregard it just because they 
are tired of it. In the law of France, the law of "associations" 
( s ocihes), which include all kinds of business corporations, as well 
as partnerships and non-profit organizations, appears in the Civil 
Code as a subdivision of the law of contract; the French Civil 
Code's first words on company law are, "An association is a con-
tract. . . . " 156 
Many Europeans also adhere to the view, not unheard of in 
158 Belgium: ConE CoM. art. 35· 
1
"' To the same effect, see van Ryn, op. cit. supra note 85, at 496. 
,.. For a comparison of contractual and institutional concepts, see Hamel and Lagarde, 
I TRAITE DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 468-469 (France 1954). 
156 C. Crv. art. 1832: "La societe est un contrat par lequel deux ou plusieurs per-
sonnes conviennent de mettre quelque chose en commun dans Ia vue de partager Ie 
benefice qui pourra en resulter." This is the first section of Title IX-"of the Contract 
of Association" (du contrat de societe). This title follows titles on sale, exchange, and 
bailment, and the title on loans. The same conceptual arrangement is met in the civil 
codes of Belgium and Luxembourg. It is only slightly different in Germany, where 
we need only substitute the word "obligation" (Schuldverhiiltnis) for "contract." 
78 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
America, that the debt-escaping functions of a corporation can be 
justified only if the corporation also promotes true group activity. 
For these and other reasons, European theorists are accustomed 
to say that a company in which there was only one bona fide investor 
at its inception is a nullity. The theory has been put into effect in 
various ways. In the Netherlands a series of tax cases attributed 
company income directly to the company's real owner, whose fellow-
incorporator had been a mere nominee for himY'; In France heirs 
were allowed to claim the property of a bank incorporated by their 
ancestor in league with straw co-investors. 158 In Italy a statute 
which makes a sole shareholder liable for the company debts in-
curred while he is sole stockholder 159 might be applied to one who 
holds some of the shares through straw men.160 
The burden .. of procuring incorporators who meet European 
standards will probably not prove very heavy. For ordinary in-
corporations there is no requirement that the incorporators be 
Europeans; 161 they can be Americans. Neither do they have to be 
present; they can act by attorney-in-fact. Finally, they do not have 
to be natural persons; except in a Belgian limited liability company 
and a French stock company, all the incorporators can be corpora-
tions. Hence, an American corporation and one of its American 
subsidiaries could be the incorporators of a limited liability company 
in France, Germany, Luxembourg, or Italy, or of a stock company 
in Italy or the Netherlands. Seven American corporations, or seven 
corporations and individuals in any combination, could incorporate 
a stock company in Belgium or Luxembourg. Six American corpora-
tions and one individual could form a French stock company. 
The test of bona fide investment is also easily met. One of our 
French informants, who is most positive about the danger of straw 
men, assures us that there is no danger in taking from each of the 
other incorporators a written agreement to sell his shares of stock 
at par on demand. A Dutch decision has held that a company was 
157 Decision of the Hooge Raad of Nov. 30, 1927, 3067 Weekblad vor Privaatrecht, 
Notaris-ambt en Registratie (hereinafter W.P.N.R.) 645 (Netherlands 1928). 
Decision of Jan. 12, 1927, 3023 W.P.N.R. 8so. 
Decision of May 30, 1928, Beslissingen in Belasting Zaken (hereinafter B.) 4279. 
Decision of April 15, 1931, B.4965. 
158 Court of Cassation, decision of May 19, 1926, Dalloz, Recueil Periodique et Cri-
tique, I at 25 (France 1929). 
159 C. ClVIL art. 2362. 
100 Mr. Bruna, one of our Italian collaborators, states that prevailing Italian opinion 
permits holding through strawmen, unless there were a subjective intent to escape 
obligations. 
101 There are very few exceptions, such as, in France, petroleum extraction companies, 
newspaper publishing companies, travel agencies, which must have a majority of 
French shareholders. 
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not proved to be invalid merely by evidence that one of the two in-
corporators sold his shares to the other on the very day of incor-
poration.162 
We do not pretend to appraise the importance of having bona fide 
incorporators, or the risks of not doing so. We think, however, that 
the American investor should be prepared for the request that he, 
not his European lawyer, produce incorporators in the required 
number, and that each of these incorporators should pay separately 
his original subscription for shares. We have the impression that 
most American companies comply with this request, when made; 
and we think that it is wiser to comply than to become a party to a 
test case on an unsettled point of European law. 
G. CAPITAL AND ITS pAYMENT 
I. STATEMENT IN THE ARTICLES 
In five of the six Common Market nations the amount of "cap-
ital" stated in the articles is quite a different thing from the "author-
ized capital" which is stated by the articles in most American states. 
"Authorized capital" means, in America, the amount which may be 
issued before amending the charter; some of it may not be sub-
scribed for some time to come, and some may never be subscribed. 
Americans like to have a "cushion" of uncommitted stock to meet 
unforeseen needs. 
In the Common Market (outside the Netherlands) the capital 
contains no uncommitted cushion. The "capital" means the sub-
scribed capital, and the corporation is not fully organized until the 
stated amount is 100% subscribed. Some of the statutes say ex-
pressly that the company is not perfected until it reaches this 
point; 163 even when the statutes are silent, the law is probably the 
same. 
In consequence, the stated capital should be set at an amount for 
which present subscribers are readily available. 
If the incorporators foresee that future capital demands will ex-
ceed the amount for which present subscriptions are available, they 
can sometimes make charter provisions for future increases by 
"''Decision of the Hooge Raad of Dec. 14. 1932, B.5339. 
163 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 29 (2) (stock companies). 
France: Law of 1925 art. 7 (limited liability company). 
Germany: AktG § 22 (I) (stock companies). 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2329 (1) (stock companies). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 26 (stock companies), art. 183 (limited liability 
companies). 
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means simpler than getting a shareholder's vote on a charter amend-
ment. Italy and Germany permit stock companies to adopt charter 
clauses which authorize the managers to increase the capital. 164 
But the authorized increase must also be fully subscribed within a 
limited time-five years in Germany, one in Italy. In this respect, 
it is quite unlike American "authorized capital." 165 France also has 
some statutory provisions permitting "variable capital," but they 
are somewhat inconvenient, and are little used.166 Other kinds of 
companies can increase their initial capital only by charter amend-
ment; this applies to limited liability companies in all five countries, 
and to stock companies in Belgium and Luxembourg. 
The requirement that all capital be subscribed when the company 
is formed does not imply that it must all be paid in at that time. All 
the stock company laws specify some minor fraction of the stock 
which must be paid in; the fraction is 20% in Belgium and Luxem-
bourg, 25% in France and Germany, and 30% in Italy. 167 The 
limited liability laws in France and Luxembourg require payment of 
100% of the amount subscribed,168 but elsewhere permit the same 
fractional payments as in stock companies.169 
The fractional payment provisions are primarily directed at pay-
ments made in money. When shares are to be paid for in property, 
different rules may apply. French law specifically provides that 
payment in property must be made in full at the formation of the 
company,170 and the Belgian law is the same.171 Elsewhere, the rules 
, .. Germany: AktG § I69; The increase is limited to so% of the stock before the 
increase. 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2443· 
'""Law of I867 arts. 48-52. 
, .. Some of the inconveniences are that the stock cannot be made negotiable, either in 
bearer or registered form (art. so}, and that members can resign and withdraw their 
share, or be expelled (art. 52). 
w Belgium: C CoM. I-IX, art. 32. 
France: Law of I867 art. I, para. 2. The balance must be paid within five years. 
Law of March 4, I943 art. I. 
Germany: AktG § 28 (2). 
Italy: C. C1v. 2329. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 26. 
108 France: Law of I867, art. 3, § 4· 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. I83. 
1 .. Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 120. However, at least so,ooo francs (about $1000) 
must be paid in, whatever fraction of the whole it may be. 
Germany: GmbHG § 7· 
Italy: C. CIV. art. 2476 (cross-referring to stock company requirements). 
1
"' Law of I867, art. 4-
tn As to limited liability companies, full payment of property contributions is ex-
pressly required by C. CoM. I-IX, art. Izo. 
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for payments in property are no stricter than for payment in mOtley, 
and perhaps less so. 172 
The result of these requirements is that the capital to be stated 
in the articles should be determined in this way: 
in a French, Italian or Luxembourg limited liability company, it 
should be an amount which known persons are willing immediately 
to subscribe and pay in full; 
in a Belgian, French, German, Italian, or Luxembourg stock com-
pany, and in a Belgian or German limited liability company, it 
should be an amount which known persons are willing immediately 
to subscribe in full, and pay to the extent of 20 to 30 percent. 
In stating the matter in this way, we are greatly oversimplify-
ing the theory. In theory it is possible to have an incorporation "by 
stages," 173 in which incorporators subscribe for part of the capital 
in the first stage, and then sell the rest of the shares through a 
public offering; the incorporation is complete at the end of the public 
offering stage. But this procedure exposes the whole venture to the 
danger that the public will not subscribe to 100% of the offered 
shares; in that event, the incorporation would collapse unless the 
subscribers consented to a charter amendment. As a practical mat-
ter, well advised investors seldom if ever would launch a company 
in this way. They might seek to avoid the risk by obtaining an in-
vestment banker to subscribe for the shares not taken by incorpora-
tors; but this stratagem is hardly practicable in a newly formed 
company. It may well be used in a later increase of capital. 
The situation in the Netherlands is quite different. Only one fifth 
of the capital stated in the articles needs to be subscribed forthwith, 
and there is no time limit on subscriptions to the remainder.174 Of 
the fifth subscribed, only one tenth needs to be paid on each sub-
scribed share; 175 a company could properly carry on business with as 
As to stock companies, the requirement of full payment rests on the opinion!t of com-
mentators. See van Ryn and Heenen, 2 DROIT CoMMERCIAL II (1957). 
172 See GODIN-WILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ § 28, Anmerkung II ( 1950). 
173 Known to French commentators as fondation successive and to Germans as 
Stufengriindung. Special statutory provisions to deal with the phenomenon are found 
in the French Law of x867 art. 4, and in the German AktG § 30. 
174 Netherlands: W.K. art. 36c. The subscriptions are a prerequisite to issuance of 
the Certificate of Incorporation, without which companies are forbidden to do business. 
175 W.K. art. 36g. If the amount has not been paid in, the board members are indi-
vidually and jointly liable for all the debts of the enterprise. However, the company 
can lawfully do business without the payment if the board members are prepared to 
bear the risk. 
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little as a fiftieth of the declared capital paid in. The declared capi-
tal thus appears to be nearly as flexible as the "authorized capital" 
of a typical American corporation. 
The minimum amounts of declared capital which are required 
by some of the European company statutes are not likely to deter 
investors who are prepared to cross the ocean to open a business; the 
highest are Germany's-about $25,000 for a stock company, and 
$5000 for a limited liability company.176 
2. SHARES OF STOCK; PAR VALUE 
Some difficulty in talking about shares in European companies is 
occasioned by the'" fact that all the European countries have two 
terms, where we have only one. While we may speak indifferently 
of a man's "share" in a partnership, or his "share" in a corporation, 
the Europeans have one set of terms for a share in a partnership 
(part, Teil, parte, deelbewijs) and another set (action, A ktie, 
azione, aandeel) for a share in a stock company. This difference has 
to be noticed because in connection with the limited liability com-
pany Europeans always use the partnership term rather than the 
stock company term. Hence, the American investor will get a 
share called a Teil if he invests in a German limited liability com-
pany but will get a share called an A ktie if he invests in a German 
stock company. 
This is the European jurists' way of emphasizing that the limited 
liability company share is non-negotiable, while the stock company 
share may be negotiable. For purposes of the incorporation process, 
the two kinds of shares are much alike. Both are normally stated in 
units of identical value, and the investor acquires a given number 
of such shares, as in an American corporation, rather than an un-
divided fraction of the equity, as in an American partnership. He 
buys 200 out of 1000 shares, not merely a "2o% interest." 
176 Belgium: No minimum for a stock company; Bfr 5o,ooo (about $10oo) for SPRL, 
C. CoM. I-IX, art. 120. 
France: No minimum for stock company. 
I,ooo,ooo (old) Ffr (about $2,ooo) for SARL, Law of 1925 art. 6. 
Germany: IOo,ooo DM for stock company. AktG. § 7· 
2o,ooo DM for GmbH. GmbHG § 5· 
Italy: I,ooo,ooo IL (about $1500) for a stock company. ConiCE CIVILE art. 2327; 
reported due to be increased to 25,00o,ooo IL (about $4o,ooo). 5o,ooo IL (about $75) 
for an SARL. CoDICE CIVILE art. 2474; reported due to be increased to 1,5oo,ooo IL 
(about $2500). 
Luxembourg: No minimum for stock company. 
r,ooo,ooo Lfr (about $zooo) for SARL. Company Law art. 182. 
Netherlands: No minimum. 
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The shares are stated in money values, such as 500 francs or 100 
marks, 177 except that Belgium and Luxembourg permit stock com-
panies to issue shares without par value.178 The other countries do 
not authorize no-par shares. 
In Europe, as in America, shares cannot be issued for less than 
par, 179 but there is no law against issuing them above par, p·erhaps 
ten or twenty times above par. 180 Many European minimum par 
values are fairly low-for limited liability company shares about 
$1.50 in Italy, and $10 in France; for stock company shares only 
$x.oo in Luxembourg.181 Hence it would be theoretically possible 
to introduce the "low-par" system in vogue in the United States. 
However, no one has done so, and we doubt that it would result 
(as in Delaware) in creating a large "surplus" which would be 
free of the restriction placed on capital.182 
3· PAYMENT FOR SHARES-MONEY OR PROPERTY 
The Common Market countries have a curious collection of 
provisions regarding the payment of consideration for shares. They 
are rather different from any regulations known in the United 
States, but their origin is not hard to guess. It is evident that the 
free-booting promoters of the late nineteenth century, there as here, 
issued themselves shares for which they never paid at all, or for 
which they paid in property taken at gross over-valuations, with 
disastrous results for innocent investors and creditors. 
177 There are minimum share values in some countries: 
France: sooo Ffr (about $1o) for SARL, Law of 1925 art. 6. 
Germany: 100 DM (about $25) for AG. AktG § 8. 
500 DM (about $125) for GmbH. GmbHG § 35· 
Italy: rooo IL (about $z.5o) for SARL. Comes CIVILE art. 2474· 
Luxembourg: 50 Lfr (about $1.00) for SA. Company Law art. 37· 500 Lfr (about $1o) 
for SARL. CoMPANY LAW art. 182. 
178 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 41. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37· 
179 In the Netherlands, this is expressly provided, subject to the exception that the 
underwriter may receive a discount of 6%; W.K. art. 38a. In other countries, this rule 
is not expressly stated, as in many American corporation laws, but results from the 
requirement that the stated capital must be 100% subscribed. See note 163, supra. 
'""Liberty to sell for more than par is specifically granted in German stock com-
panies. See AktG §9 (2 ). 
181 See note 177 supra. 
182 German stock company law requires that any premium over par value be stated 
in the publicly filed documents of organization (AktG. §§ 16(2) and 28(2) ), and that 
the premium should form part of a legal reserve which is not available for dividends 
(AktG § 130). 
Italian law requires that premiums should not be disbursed until a reserve equal to 
one-fifth of the stated capital is accumulated from earnings (C. Crv. 2430), but ap-
parently permits disbursement after that time. 
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To these evils American courts responded, as we know, with 
doctrines making subscribers liable for any deficiency in the value of 
consideration received for their shares.183 Later, legislatures reacted 
with Blue Sky laws, designed to enable government officials to deter-
mine whether the initial investments in the company had been duly 
made.184 European courts responded in different ways, and their 
responses explain some of the regulations on payment for shares. 
For cash payments there are regulations of special interest in French, 
German, and Italian stock companies, which concern the 25 or 30 
percent of the stock subscriptions which must be paid in at or be-
fore the completion of incorporation. In France and Italy they must 
be deposited in a bank, or with a notary, where they are not avail-
able to the company and its promoters until the incorporation is 
complete in every respect.185 Presumably these safeguards are de-
signed to guarantee to creditors that the minimum capital has 
actually been paid in; or perhaps to guarantee to shareholders that 
their fellow shareholders have also made a proportionate contribu-
tion. In Germany they do not have to be banked, but if they are, 
the bank must certify that the deposits are unrestricted.186 
For the payment of subscriptions in property, the special regula-
tions are more complicated and more widespread. In the first place, 
payments in property may have to be roo% paid in the course of in-
corporation; in France and Belgium the payments on account which 
are sometimes permissible for cash subscriptions are inadmissible 
for subscriptions payable in property.187 
Second, the property which is to be exchanged for stock must, in 
many instances, be stated in the articles, so that every other in-
corporator knows about it, and every creditor can learn about it. 
This is the rule in Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg both for 
stock companies and for limited liability companies. 188 It is the rule 
188 Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 26 L. Ed. 968 (1881); STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 183 ( 1949); BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS §§ 343 ff. 
(1947)· 
1B< Loss and CowETT, BLuE SKY LAw r-xo ( 1958); Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 7-16 
(1951). 
lB5 France: Law of 1867, art. 1; the funds must be deposited in the official national 
depositary-Caisse des Depots et Consignations-or with a notary. 
Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. 2329; the payments must be made to a special account in 
any bank. 
180 AktG §§ 28(2), 29(1). 
187 See note II4. Supra. 
188 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 30 (stock company), art. 121 (limited liability com-
pany). 
Germany: AktG § 20; GmbHG § 5 (4). 
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for limited liability companies in France/89 and for stock companies 
in the N etherlands.190 
A third regulation sometimes encountered is a requirement of 
appraisal, the most complicated plan for which is met in the French 
stock company.191 After the stock has been subscribed, a first meet-
ing of subscribers is held, at which auditors are appointed. The 
meeting is adjourned, the auditors appraise the property, and a 
second subscribers' meeting is held to hear and to accept or reject 
the auditors' report. At this meeting, if the property transfer is ap-
proved, permanent officers may be elected, and the incorporation 
completed. In German stock companies, there is no second organ-
ization meeting, but independent auditors must be appointed to 
value the property, and the company must not do business until after 
the appraisal is made and reported to the court.192 In I tali an com-
panies of both types, a court-appointed auditor makes the appraisal 
which is attached to the incorporation papers; after the company is 
organized, the elected directors and auditors must review the 
appraisal.193 
A fourth precaution of the legislator is to impede transfer of the 
shares received for property. In French stock companies such shares 
cannot be represented by certificates, and hence are non-negotiable 
for two years after incorporation; 194 in Belgium and Luxembourg 
they are not freely negotiable for approximately two years; 195 in 
Italy they are non-transferable until the directors and auditors have 
made the post-incorporation appraisal.196 
A fifth hazard is reserved for the property-subscribers in a 
French limited liability company.197 Instead of having an appraisal 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 27 (stock company), art. 184 (limited liability 
company). 
189 Law of 1925, art. 8. 
11
" W.K. art. 40a. Netherlands, of course, has no limited liability companies. 
191 Law of 1867, art. 4· 
100 AktG §§ 25, 26, 34· 
""ComeR CIVILE art. 2343 (stock companies), art. 2426 (limited liability companies). 
Deficiency in the value of the assets does not avoid the formation of the company, but 
merely requires a reduction in the stock allotted to the subscriber, and consequent re-
duction of the company's stated capital, unless the subscriber pays up the deficiency in 
money. The subscriber may elect to withdraw entirely, resulting in a still greater re-
duction in the stated capital. 
, .. Law of 1867, art. 3(5). 
"'"Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 47· The shares can be transferred, but only if they 
are in registered form, and the transfer is made with specified formalities. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 44-
196 ComcE CIVILE art. 2343; the code declares the shares inalienable (inalienabili) 
during this period. 
""Law of 1925, art. 8. 
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at the incorporation stage, the subscribers are made jointly liable 
to the company's creditors for any deficiency which may later appear 
to have existed between the value of the contributed property and 
the par value of the shares. Only when ten years have passed is this 
threat lifted. 
These various regulations are not only burdensome; they are also 
rather fearsome beartraps, since any failure to comply may result 
in some sort of invalidity of the corporation, or liability of the 
incorporators, or both. The French legislator, in particular, seems 
to have prepared ambuscades for any little businessman who might 
think of turning his business over to a corporation in exchange for a 
portion of the sh~res. 
This situation calls for careful study by the American corporation 
which plans to establish subsidiaries in Europe. If the subsidiary 
has been preceded by any sort of operations in the area, the parent 
will be expecting to contribute money and property which was used 
in the pre-incorporation business. And if no thought were given to 
the matter, these assets would naturally be transferred in exchange 
for stock. 
If the resulting formalities are found, on investigation, to be 
insufferable, there is sometimes a way of avoiding them. Imagine, 
for instance, an American corporation which was planning to trans-
fer its stock of goods and intangibles, with its current bank account, 
to a forthcoming French subsidiary. Imagine further that the parent 
corporation planned to loan the subsidiary additional funds which 
might be useful in further development. 
The parent can greatly simplify its problem by reversing the roles 
of property and cash. Instead of contributing property and loan-
ing cash, it can contribute cash and loan property. That is, it may 
buy shares for cash, and transfer the property on a deferred pay-
ment plan. The financial risk is the same (assuming the amounts are 
equal), but the juridical risks which result from the special incor-
poration formalities are escaped. There may be some new formali-
ties to be observed in regard to interested directors; but these are 
less burdensome. 
In Germany this simple reversal of roles would not help much. 
There the special formalities which apply to exchanges of stock 
for property also apply to property purchases contemplated at the 
time of incorporation, 198 or made within two years thereafter. 199 
108 AktG § zo. See also § 45-purchases of property amounting to one-tenth of the 
corporate capital. 
199 AktG. § 45· 
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H. FILING AND APPROVAL 
The procedures do not usually involve long waits for administra-
tive action. In all the Common Market countries except the Nether-
lands, the ancient theory that incorporation is a privilege to be 
granted at the sovereign's discretion was discarded decades ago. 
For local citizens, incorporation is a matter of right; when the cor-
rect formalities have been executed, the papers deposited, there is 
nothing to wait for. 
Even for foreigners, there are no administrative waits in con-
nection with ordinary incorporations.200 Under international law 
they can lawfully be excluded from incorporation if they are not the 
beneficiaries of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation; 
but in fact they are not excluded. They do indeed encounter adminis-
trative obstacles in getting licenses to be merchants or corporate 
executives, or in getting licenses to exchange money for the purpose 
of investment, or in getting licenses to enter certain trades. But 
these obstacles are not connected with incorporation procedure. 
In the Netherlands incorporation is not a matter of right, either 
for citizens or for foreigners. It is a privilege granted at the dis-
cretion of the Ministry of Justice. In considering whether to grant 
an application, the Ministry will consider all kinds of factors-
whether the industry will further complicate an over-supply of 
goods or services, whether it will hurt or help the Netherlands' 
foreign exchange position, whether the proposed capital is adequate, 
and whether the financing plans offer any threat to the investment 
market. Presumably, a wise investor will explore all these matters 
before preparing incorporation papers. If major policy questions 
have been cleared in advance, less than a month will usually be re-
quired to obtain approval of the application to incorporate. 
IV. MANAGEMENT OF A EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY 
The most elusive problem in all companies everywhere is probably 
management. If the right men can be given the right powers, they 
will solve the other problems. In foreign subsidiaries the problem 
is naturally complicated by different languages and different con-
ceptions of teamwork, as well as by the special ambiguities of a 
subsidiary position. 
200 The principal exceptions are (I) specially regulated types of enterprise, such as 
banks and insurance companies; (2) enterprises in which foreign participation is 
limited, such as (in France) petroleum extraction and newspaper publication. 
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In attacking these problems an American lawyer will need some 
conception of the legal structures of management in European 
countries, and some appreciation of how they differ from American 
legal structures. 
A. THE PARALLEL ORGANS OF MANAGEMENT 
The European corporate scene presents a surprising variety of 
organs of management. None of the organs corresponds exactly to 
American institutions, and the similarities in names are often more 
misleading than enlightening. Before we can discuss (in the English 
language) the European institutions, we will have to explain the 
European institutions which we are designating by our English 
terms. 
I. SHAREHOLDERS 
In Europe, as in the United States, we start logically with the 
holders of ultimate power-the shareholders. In Europe a sharp 
distinction is often drawn between holders of the normally nego-
tiable shares of stock companies (who are called actionnaires, 
A ktionare, soci or aandelhouders) and holders of the non-negotiable 
shares of limited liability companies and partnerships (who are 
called associes, Gesellschafter, soci, or vennooten). Since we have 
no such choice of terms in America, we will have to use the word 
"shareholders" to designate the holders of both types of European 
shares. 
2. GOVERNING BOARD 
After the "shareholders," the most important title in the Ameri-
can corporate hierarchy is the "directors," 201 and one is naturally 
tempted to search for the European institution which can be fairly 
translated by the same term. 
The search is doomed to failure. The first problem is a linguistic 
one. The Europeans have corporate officials called by a name which 
looks like "director,"-directeur, Direktor, or dirretore-but they 
are in many ways the opposites of American directors. While the 
ordinary American "director" is almost always elected by the share-
holders, the European directeur, Direktor, or dirretore, is never so 
elected. While the American title implies a deliberative, part-time 
'm Typical of the provisions indicated is the Delaware provision, "The business of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by a board of directors, except as hereinafter 
or in its certificate of incorporation otherwise provided." 8 DEL. ConE§ 141 (1953). 
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position, the European title implies an executive, full-time position. 
While the American title implies a position on the highest hierarchi-
cal level (after the shareholders) the European title implies sub-
jection to a superior board. Consequently, it is best to avoid entirely 
the word "director" in referring to European corporate officials. 
When we turn from names to substance, the problem is still 
baffiing. There are commonly not one, but two, boards which divide 
the functions of management and control. In the face of this duality, 
we can speak collectively of European boards only by making an 
arbitrary classification which achieves consistency on one plane at 
the price of inconsistency on another. 
In the discussion which follows, we will adopt the name of 
"governing board" for that board which resembles the American 
board of directors in that (I) it is chosen by the shareholders and 
( 2) it chooses other executives and managers to perform subor-
dinate functions. This is the conseil d' administration in France and 
in French-speaking Belgium and Luxembourg, the Aufsichtsrat in 
Germany, the consiglio d' amministratione in Italy, the Verwaltung 
in German-speaking Luxembourg, the raad van bestuur in Nether-
lands, and the raad van beheer in Flemish-speaking Belgium. The 
members of this board are variously known as administrateurs, 
Aufsichtsradmitglieder, amministratori, V erwalter, bestuurder, and 
beheerder. 
This board is not the only group chosen directly by the share-
holders, for the same is true of the auditors ( commissaires aux 
comptes, Bilanzpriifer, sindaci, commisarissen). Neither is it the 
only group which may name subordinate executives; in Germany, at 
least, this may be done by another board, the Vorstand. But it is 
the only group which is both chosen by the shareholders, and in-
vested with authority to name managerial officers. 
3· EXECUTIVES 
Successful European companies, like their American counterparts, 
generally have a chief executive in whom all reins of authority are 
concentrated. We need not pause over a rare exception like the great 
Italian Montecatini Company, which concentrates executive power 
in two men of equal authority, like the ancient Roman consuls. 
However, we must avoid assuming that the executive power is 
held by the presiding officer of the governing board, as it usually is 
in the United States. Although a European governing board usually 
elects a president, the presidency of that board signifies something 
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more like being an American "chairman of the board" than being 
an American "president." There are other titles which we will trans-
late as "general manager" ( directeur general, direttore generale, 
algemen bestuurder, algemen beheerder, and occasionally General-
direktor) and "managing director" (administrateur deligue) which 
signify the concentration of executive power. Even in France, where 
the president is re'quired by law to assume responsibility for the 
company's management, he has the choice of delegating the author-
ity to a subordinate general manager, or exercising it himself under 
the compound title of "president and general manager" (prisident-
directeur-general). 
In Germany, the president of the "governing board" (that is, the 
board elected by the shareholders) is forbidden to be an executive; 
the executive power must be wielded by a subordinate board (the 
J7 or stand), or its president (German stock companies having two 
boards and possibly two presidents) . 
There is also the possibility of having an executive officer elected 
· directly by the shareholders, with no intervention of any board at 
all; this is possible in limited liability companies in all countries, and 
in stock companies of Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg. 
Hence we will speak of "executives" to designate those function-
aries who hold the reins of authority under any of a great variety of 
titles, and by any of a great variety of methods of appointment. 
4· AUDITORS 
While American corporation laws leave directors free to choose 
the auditors of their books, European laws commonly provide 
formally for the election of officials to review the accounts and the 
performance of the management. The titles of most of these 
officials would be literally translated as "commissar"-commissaire, 
Kommissar (in Luxembourg), commissaris.202 Since this word 
would probably evoke in most American readers visions of Stalinist 
agents, we will call these officials "auditors." 
5· CONTROL 
One other word which we cannot help using requires a little ex-
planation. We will use "control" in the sense which has become 
fairly standard in America through Berle and Means' Modern 
Corporation 203 and the rules of the Securities and Exchange Com-
202 The German and Italian terms-Bilanzpriifer and sindaci-are less misleading. 
203 BERLE and MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY especially 
at 69 ff. (1933). 
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mission; 204 we use it to mean the ability to exercise a decisive in-
fluence on the management of the company-the relation which the 
U.S. government contended (and the companies denied) existed 
between General Motors and duPont de Nemours.205 
We mention this only because the cognate European words (con-
trole, Kontrolle, controllo) are usually used in the more limited 
sense of the power to inspect accounts and review operations.206 
This meaning is reflected in the American office of "controller," and 
is sometimes met in English-language discussions of foreign com-
pany law; it will not be used here. 
For convenience of reference, on pages 92-93 we offer a table of 
English terms which we will use, and the indigenous names of the 
various institutions to which we will be referring. 
B. MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN EuROPEAN 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
The difficulty of naming the officials in European management 
reflects much deeper differences in their roles. We will sketch some 
of the more obvious differences, and show how an American investor 
may take advantage of these differences or, at least, minimize their . . 
mconvemences. 
I. SUPREMACY OF THE SHAREHOLDERS 
A striking peculiarity of European management structures is the 
power of the shareholders in the statutory plan. The legislator has 
not designed them to be a mere electoral college, to choose the 
leadership to which the company shall be entrusted. The share-
holders are generally the supreme governing body, and the govern-
ing board is merely their agent, responsive to their will. Even in 
Germany, where the reforms of 1937 were intended to give in-
creased independence to the executive board, 207 the shareholders 
have distinctly greater powers than are usual in the United States. 
This conception expresses itself in many ways, such as the rule that 
dividends must be declared or at least confirmed by the share-
holders 208 rather than by the governing board alone, as in America. 
""'See Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 453 ff. (1951). 
:mcf. Berle, Jr., Control in Corporation Law, 58 CoLuM. L. REV. 1212 (1958); 
"Control may be defined as the abili!y to choose directors." 
206 Cf. van Ryn who equates controle with "a mission to determine the necessary 
facts (about the management) and report the results to the shareholders." (This 
author's translation.) I PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 416 (Belgium 1954). 
207 HUECK, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, 125, 126 (Germany 1958). 
208 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 79 (right to adopt financial statement in stock com-
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The most important aspect of shareholder supremacy is the power 
to remove top management, which may be stated as a general prin-
ciple of European company law, subject to some qualifications. Even 
in French limited liability companies, where the statute declares 
that the managers are never removable without cause during their 
terms,209 case law sanctions reservation in the articles of a power of 
removal. A qualification must be noted in Germany, where the 
shareholders' removal power affects the highest board (Aufsicht-
srat) but not the subordinate executive board ( J7 or stand) .210 In 
some limited liability companies, managers who are named in the 
articles of incorporation are removable only for cause or as pro-
vided in the articles (or an amendment of them) .211 Subject to these 
limited exceptions, European shareholders have the power to re-
move the board members without cause.212 
Another kind of qualification must be noted in Belgian and Lux-
embourg stock companies. Although the shareholders as a group 
are supreme, no one shareholder is allowed to vote more than two-
fifths of the votes cast at any meeting, nor more than one-fifth of 
the outstanding shares. 213 An American parent company owning 
99% of a Belgian subsidiary's stock might therefore find itself un-
able to oust a management, if the other 1% were held by the man-
agers to be ousted. This eventuality should be foreseen and side-
stepped by dividing the 99% between the parent and two other 
subsidiaries. 
The shareholders' supremacy means a great deal to American 
France; HAMEL, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL no. 720 ( 1954) j in limited liability 
companies, the manager may determine the dividends himself; id., no. 812. 
Germany: AktG § 126; GmbHG § 46 ( 1). 
Italy: ComcE CIVILE art. 2433 (stock companies) ; art. 2492 (limited liability com-
panies). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 75 (stock companies); Cf. art. 197, para. 5 (limited 
liability companies). 
200 Law of 1925, art. 24, para. 3· 
210 AktG. §§ 75(3), 87(3). A commentator suggests that a shareholders' vote of no 
confidence in the executive board might be "cause" for removing them. GoDIN-
WILHELMI, AKTIENGESETZ § 75, Anmerkung 7· But the decision would lie with the Auf-
sichtsrat. 
211 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129. Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191. 
212 Belgium: C. CIV. I-IX, art. 53 (stock companies). 
France: Law of 1867, art. 22 (stock companies). 
Germany: AktG § 87(3); GmbHG § 38 (limited liability companies). 
Italy: ComcE CIVILE art. 2383 (stock companies; removal subject to member's right 
to damages); art. 2487 (limited liability companies same as stock companies). 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 48b. 
213 Luxembourg: Company Law art. 71(2). 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 76. 
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parents of European subsidiaries and offers an escape from a pre-
vailing dilemma. On their first entry into Europe, American parent 
companies are faced with the alternative of staffing the subsidiary 
with Americans, who do not know much about Europe, or with Eu-
ropeans whom the parent company does not know much about. 
The parents are understandably apprehensive of the possibility of 
runaway policies of European managers, because they do not know 
the Europeans' personal qualities so well, and they sense that their 
European employees are not so tightly tied as Americans would be 
to the parent company. In consequence, one finds many European 
governing boards in which a majority of seats has been reserved 
for Americans who can make only short and fleeting visits to 
Europe. 
This reservation of a safe majority would be quite essential in an 
American corporation, where removal of directors is seldom pro-
vided for by statute and is generally presumed to be permissible 
only for cause. It is generally unnecessary in Europe, where the 
governing board of managers can be removed without any cause as 
quickly as a shareholders' meeting can be called. The hasty trans-
Atlantic flights of American board members to make up a European 
company quorum are largely unnecessary. A single proxy-holder for 
a majority of the stock, living in Europe and keeping himself in-
formed of the actions of the European board, could assure the board 
of immediate dismissal if they should disregard parent company 
wishes. This device is used successfully by at least one experienced 
American corporation in Europe. 
Shareholder supremacy is also important to an American com-
pany which is buying control of a European company. When making 
a similar purchase of an American subsidiary, it would possibly 
bargain for resignations of the incumbent directors, so that it could 
make its newly acquired control effective. Such bargaining is un-
known and unnecessary in most European companies because the 
power to dismiss the governing board or managers comes auto-
matically with the ownership of shares. 
2. ONE-MAN MANAGEMENT 
A second major distinction of European management is the 
legality of one-man management, as opposed to the three-man 
board which comprises the usual minimum tolerated by American 
corporation statutes. Although one-man managements sometimes 
exist in U.S. practice, they exist only because no one bothers to en-
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force the law requiring the election of additional directors, and 
their participation in management. 
In Europe, on the other hand, one-man management is specifically 
authorized for limited liability companies in all countries,214 and 
impliedly permitted even in the stock companies of Italy and the 
Netherlands. 215 
The sole manager option was doubtless designed, at least in 
limited liability companies, to permit the incorporation of business 
enterprises which formerly had been sole proprietorships, and where 
the investors concurred in a desire to keep the same man at the 
helm. This may also be the reason why some laws facilitate the ir-
removability of the manager.216 
The convenience of one-man management for a company which 
is new in Europe is evident. An American investor may enter the 
European market with very slight acquaintance among European 
businessmen. If he does not have more than one American em-
ployee whom he wishes to keep in Europe, or no more than one 
European whom he trusts to run his business, he would have dif-
ficulty in naming a three-man board. Fortunately, he does not need 
three men. He can give all powers to the one man he trusts, until 
longer acquaintance enables him to broaden the managerial base 
with confidence. 
The investor who takes this option must, of course, watch out 
for other risks. The one-man management may be irremovable ex-
cept on proof of misconduct or incompetence unless proper reserva-
tions have been made in the articles of incorporation.217• 218 In addi-
tion to this, there are legal provisions which give the manager al-
most unlimited authority to bind the company.219 Finally, there is 
the human danger that one head will make mistakes which three 
heads would have avoided. 
21
' Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 129. 
France: Law of 1925, art. 24. 
Germany: GmbHG § 6. 
Italy: CoorCE CIVILE art. 2487. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 19r. 
215 No number is specified by these stock company statutes: 
Italy: COD!CE CIVILE art. 2380. 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 47a. 
In one sense, one-man management is permitted by the German stock company law, 
since the executive board ( f7 or stand) may have only one member. But since there must 
be a three-man supervisory board (Aujsichtsrat) above him, this is not the kind of one-
man management which simplifies a parent company's personnel problems. 
216 See notes 209, 210, 2II supra. 
217
' 
218 See notes 209, 210, and 211 supra. 
219 In Belgium, France, and Luxembourg, the manager of a limited liability com-
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3· ONE-COMPANY MANAGEMENT 
Even more surprising from the American point of view is the 
rule which permits one company to occupy a position as manager, or 
governing board member, in another. Statutes forbid a company's 
filling certain positions, such as president of a French stock com-
pany, 220 or any managerial office in a German company; 221 the in-
terpretation of prevailing legal opinion is to a similar effect in Italy. 
European lawyers believe that managerial positions in the Benelux 
countries, and positions other than president in France can be filled 
by an artificial person as well as by a natural one. 
Hence, the possibility arises of appointing another European 
company-perhaps an affiliated one-as sole manager of a Eu-
ropean subsidiary. Of course, such an arrangement should be only 
temporary. As a matter of practical psychology, it is a good idea to 
have a board of living men with a lively interest in the company and 
sense of responsibility toward it. But the use of an incorporated 
manager may bridge difficult initial gaps. Since the corporate man-
ager can appoint anyone it wishes to act as its human agent, the 
problem of managerial tenure is side-stepped. 
4· GOVERNING BOARDS AND EXECUTIVES 
We have already mentioned two peculiarities of European gov-
erning boards-the fact that in some kinds of companies there need 
not be a board and that, if there is one, its members can be removed 
at the unfettered will of the shareholders. A third peculiarity of 
European boards is that, with a few exceptions, the board members 
may act as a joint executive. They do not need to act through of-
ficers; they may, by virtue of their positions, act to negotiate and 
sign contracts. In short, most of the European laws make no pro-
visions for the separation of policy-making and executive functions 
which are basic to American thinking about management structure. 
In small enterprises this may be all to the good. Many American 
writers have been suggesting that we should in America provide for 
boardless management in "close corporations," and have cited Eu-
pany has unlimited power to bind the company unless limitations are contained in 
the duly published articles. Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 130; France: Law of 1925, art. 
24, para. 2; Luxembourg: Company Law art. 191. In Germany, the manager has full 
power to bind the company, and there is no means of limiting it. GmbHG § 37. 
"""France: Law of March 4, 1943 (on stock companies) art. 12 . 
.., AktG § 75 (I)-executive board; § 86 (2)-supervisory board. In the limited lia-
bility company, the prohibition of corporate managers is not express, but is inferred 
from various provisions, SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GmBH § 6, Anmerkung III. 
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ropean experience to support their contention. But it is obvious that 
larger concerns need a plural board, with a systematic delegation of 
executive functions. 
The significance of this state of affairs for the American investor 
-is that in many European company forms he may and he must create 
the management structure that his business requires. The law does 
not furnish him a pattern into which he must fit. If he wants a one-
man management, he can probably have it. If he wants a governing 
board, with a president, secretary, and treasurer, his lawyers will 
have to draw the articles of association so as to provide for them. 
We will now deal with some of the exceptions to the general rule 
-exceptions which impose some standard pattern of organization 
on the European company. These mandatory patterns are found in 
the stock companies of Italy, France, and Germany. 
The Italian law of stock companies requires the election of a 
president (presidente), but nothing is said about his powers or re-
sponsibilities; 222 the delegation of executive functions is therefore 
as unfettered as anywhere else. If the president is to have power to 
make contracts of purchase, sale, and employment, the articles of 
incorporation should say so. There are no ·requirements for a sec-
retary or treasurer, and such officials are never used in purely 
Italian companies. American owned companies can and often do 
name such officials, but there is no great merit in the practice since 
the offices have no meaning for the Italians who deal with the com-
pany, and probably very little even for the Italians who fill the 
offices. 
In France, the law has caught up with good business practice. It 
not only requires that each stock company have a three-member 
board, but also requires that the board elect a president, and that 
the president assume responsibility for the management of the 
company.223 Other board members must refrain from exercising 
executive functions unless they are appointed to them.224 The presi-
dent may be the general manager or may appoint someone else to 
the job, but he is responsible for the management in either event. 
The qualifications of board members and of the president are 
specific but not particularly onerous. The board members may not 
occupy similar positions in more than seven other French com-
panies.225 The president cannot be simultaneously president of more 
"""C. Crv. art. 2380. The president may be elected by shareholders but if they fail 
to do so, he is chosen by his colleagues on the board. 
223 Law of Nov. 16, 1940, art. 1-2; Law of March 4, 1943, art. 14· 
,.. Ibid. 
226 Law of Nov. 16, 1940, art. 3, as amended by Law of July 7, 1953· 
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than two companies; 226 but since the statutory office of president 
exists only in stock companies, this rule seems not to inhibit his 
serving as a manager of a limited liability company, or as a man-
aging partner in a partnership. The president must be a natural 
person, but there is no rule against the other board members being 
compames. 
These provisions of French law were adopted by the "collabora-
tionist" government at Vichy, while northern France was occupied 
by Germany during World War II. They were precipitated by the 
disruption of management resulting from the division of the coun-
try by enemy occupation and the absence of board members who 
were either prisoners of war in Germany or with the outlawed Free 
French forces in Africa. The promulgation of these provisions as 
separate laws rather than amendments to the company law probably 
reflected the legislators' conception of them as emergency legisla-
tion, rather than permanent reform. 
Probably no one wants a return to the amorphous pre-war law, 
but the present provisions are widely regarded as poorly designed. 
Dean Hamel of the Paris law faculty has written, with characteristic 
Irony, 
The law of 1940 gave companies a choice of two for-
mulae,-that of the president-and-general-manager, or 
that of the nonexecutive president who is liable for the 
acts of his general manager. Several commentators 
thought they detected here a reflection of the German 
law of 1937, and of the famous Fuhrer-Prinzip. The 
president was to be the head-man of the stock company. 
He does indeed occupy a fine position in the statutory 
text; but what a peculiar head-man-who can be removed 
at pleasure by his peers (the other board members), and 
even indirectly by the shareholders; whose powers de-
pend on the authority which the board has given him, and 
can at any time amend. The president has only one char-
acteristic of a head-man-increased liability. This feature 
is his best argument in deliberations, and it does increase 
his influence, if he knows how to use it. 
What the law expresses is primarily the desire to put 
a stop to the parceling out of responsibilities between the 
president and the managing director, or worse, among 
several managing directors or general managers. It has 
concentrated responsibility on the president. That way, 
there is always someone to hold responsible. 227 
220 Law of Nov. 16, 1940, art. 3· 
227 
HAMEL, op. cit. supra note 208, no. 652 (1954). 
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5. THE GERMAN BOARDS 
The organization of management in German stock companies is 
so distinctive that it calls for a special description. There are nor-
mally two boards,228 instead of one, which might be called "govern-
ing," and which divide between them the features and the functions 
of an American board of directors. 
The one which we have grouped with other "governing boards" 
in the preceding discussion is more accurately called the "super-
visory board., (Aufsichtsrat; literally, "board of oversight"). It 
resembles the American board of directors in that a. majority of its 
members is elected by the shareholders,229 and in that it in turn 
elects the executives.230 It differs from an American board of direc-
tors in that its decisions do not bind the company in dealings with 
outsiders, 231 but it does make binding decisions to hire and fire 
executives 232 and set their pay; 233 it elects the executives from per-
sons who are not its own members; 234 and its members include labor 
representatives, who must comprise one-third of the board's mem-
bership.235 
The other German board we will call the "executive board," al-
though its German name (For stand) apparently signifies something 
like "chairmanship" (literally, "those standing in front"). It re-
sembles an American board of directors in that its decisions bind 
the company to outsiders,236 that its president, if any, is the chief 
executive of the company, 237 and that each of its members is usually 
known as a Direktor.238 It differs from an American board of direc-
tors in that its members are not elected by the shareholders, but by 
the supervisory board; 239 it is not necessarily a plural board, but 
may consist of only one man; 240 if plural, it cannot elect its own 
228 AktG §§ 70, 86. 
229 /d. § 87(1). 
=u. §75(r). 
2ll1 The statute provides that "conduct of business (Massnahmcn der Geschiifts-
fiihrung) cannot be taken over by the supervisory board." AktG § 95(5). 
232 AktG § 75· 
232 !d. §§ 77, 97· 
284 /d.§ 90(1). 
225 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz of Oct. 11, 1952 (hereinafter cited as BetrVerfG) 
( 1952) 1 Bundesgesetzblatt 68r. 
236 AktG § 71. 
237 At least, he holds the power of decision (AktG § 70(2) ), although he does not 
automatically gain authority to deal with outsiders (§ 71 (2) ). 
232 By prevailing practice, not law. 
""" AktG § 75(1). 
!WI !d. § 70( 2 ). 
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president but must await the supervisory board's decision as to 
whether there should be one and, if so, who he shall be; 241 if the 
board has a president, the other members cannot overrule him, but 
can be overruled by him; 242 its members are rarely outsiders, be-
cause they cannot be at the same time managing officers or general 
partners in any other commercial business.243 
In the presence of these diversities, it seems futile to debate 
whether the American board of directors is more like the German 
supervisory board or the German executive board. The discussion 
would be like that of the blind men around the elephant. It would be 
further complicated by the fact that American boards are so dis-
parate-some of them consisting largely of outsiders who review 
the executives' work, others consisting entirely of insiders, who 
carry on the work of the company under the guiding hand of the 
president.244 The former type of board is more like the German 
supervisory board; the latter type, more like the German executive 
board. 
For an American enterprise which is first entering Germany, the 
staffing of the two boards presents problems. The supervisory board 
is a powerful group in which one would want to place only trusted 
and competent persons, but the persons must be "outsiders," holding 
no managerial office iri the enterprise. Such persons are not easily 
found. 
The choice of the executive board members also appears to be a 
very serious matter. Like most American directors, and unlike gov-
erning board members in some other countries, the German execu-
tive board members cannot be removed except for "good cause." 245 
The executive board's power to bind the corporation to outsiders 
cannot be limited by charter provisions.246 
The problem of choosing members for the two German boards 
cannot be evaded by naming another company as a board member; 
""Id. §75(2). 
242 I d. § 70(2). 
243 /d. §79(1). 
,.. See BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS, 11-27 ( 1945). 
245 "Good cause" is not defined in the statute. Various commentators suggested soon 
after adoption of the statute that "good cause" might include such matters as a non-
confidence vote by the shareholders, but the Federal Supreme Court has warned that 
such a vote would not be "good cause" if it were based on insubstantial grounds, or 
if it were adopted merely for the purpose of justifying the executive's dismissal. De-
cision of Apr. 28, 1954, Bundesgerichtshof (II Zivilsenat) 13 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen (hereinafter cited as BGHZ) r88, at 193. 
246 AktG. § 74 (2). There is some dispute as to the effect of limitations on an outsider 
who has actual knowledge of them. HUECK, GESELLSCHAFTSVECKT 130 (1958). 
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the law specifically excludes this.247 The best one can do is to reduce 
the necessary number to one by incorporating in the limited liability 
company form, instead of the stock company. A limited liability com-
pany does not need to have a supervisory board unless it has 500 or 
mo~e employees.248 
Although the German two-board system is undeniably complex, 
it is not necessarily a system to be shunned. A distinguished Belgian 
writer compares it favorably with the Belgian system.249 German 
companies seem to have the reputation of being very well managed, 
and we think the system presents more advantages than obstacles to 
a company which is well-established, and which has ample resources 
of managerial man-power. But the system must be frankly regarded 
as burdensome for small, new companies, and probably contributes 
to the fact that limited liability companies are preferred to stock 
companies more frequently in Germany than in any other Common 
Market country. 
6. LABOR PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT; 
CO-DETERMINATION 
In Europe as in the United States, the last decades have seen a 
phenomenal growth in the rights of labor representatives to influ-
ence the decisions of management. But the European developments 
have taken different forms from those which we have seen in North 
America. 
One of the principal developments in Europe has been the labor-
management councils, where representatives of labor and manage-
ment meet together to discuss and resolve problems affecting both. 
These are not like American collective bargaining sessions, at which 
plenipotentiaries trade commitments binding each side to the other. 
They are more in the nature of forums at which representatives of 
each side try to persuade those of the other that it would be best 
for all parties if the other side's desires were met. 
This institution has gone furthest in Germany, with its celebrated 
"co-determination." This term is coupled with another to make the 
title of Part IV of the German Plant Management Law of 1952 250 
-Cooperation and Codetermination (Mitwirkung and Mitbestim-
mung). Every business establishment (subject to a few exemptions) 
247 !d. § 75 (I )-executive hoard § 86 (2). 
248 BetrVerfG § 77· 
"''VanRyn, op. cit. supra note 6, at 381, 382. 
250 BetrVerfG, see note 48 supra. 
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has to have a plant council, elected by the employees.251 They consult 
with the management on nearly every phase of operation. Their 
orbit includes specifically "group interests" ( soziale Angelegen-
heiten) such as working hours, pay periods, and vacations,252 and 
"individual interests" (personelle Angelegenheiten), such as hiring, 
firing, transfers, and promotions. 253 Workers in larger enterprises 
also consult indirectly on "business matters," which embrace manu-
facturing methods, the production program, the financial status of 
the business, and market conditions.254 For these matters, there is 
an "economic committee" (Wirtschaftsausschuss) composed of at 
least four members named by management and four named by the 
plant council.255 
The capstone of the German program is representation of labor 
in the supervisory board. One-third of the supervising board mem-
bers are elected by the employees.256 That leaves two-thirds to be 
chosen by the shareholders; of these, one-third may be appointed 
by particular shareholders specified in the charter, while only one-
third is required to be elected by the general body of shareholders.257 
But usually the body of shareholders elects two-thirds. 
The representation of employees in the supervisory board applies 
only to companies which have a supervisory board on which the 
employees can be represented. For this very purpose, the law of 
limited liability companies was amended in 19 52 to require that 
they, too, should have supervisory boards, if their employees ex-
ceed 500.258 On the other hand, stock companies with fewer than 
500 employees are exempted from the requirement if they are 
"family companies," owned entirely by one person or by a small 
group of closely related persons. 259 Hence, employees have to be 
represented today on the boards of all non-family stock companies, 
and on the boards of limited liability companies which have more 
than 500 employees. 
But exemption from board representation does not imply exemp-
tion from other phases of "co-operation and co-determination." 260 
2151 BetrVerfG §§ 6-26. 
"'
2 BetrVerfG § 56. 
•oau. § 6o. 
'"" ld. § 67. 
"'"'I d.§ 68 . 
... Id. § 76. 
257 AktG § 88. 
208 BetrVerfG § 77(1). 
"""I d. § 76(6). 
"""I d. §§ 49-75· 
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It is difficult to say whether the influence of employees in Germany 
is due chiefly to the plant councils alone (the Betriebsrate), or to the 
joint economic committees ( Wirtschaftsausschussen), or to repre-
sentation on the supervisory board. Many companies which escape 
the requirement of labor representation on the supervisory board 
must still establish plant councils or joint economic committees or 
both. 
France also has a law designed to enlarge the voice of labor in 
compa,ny management, dating from 1945, a few months after 
liberation.261 This law provides for "enterprise committees" which 
consist of the chief officer of management and a delegation of 
worker representatives varying according to the number of em-
ployees to be rep.resented. The enterprise committee is authorized 
to express its opinions on all questions which effect the organization 
of the business, or the distribution of profits; and has rights to be 
consulted on all matters affecting the management of the business, 
and its progress, and to receive the same financial statements which 
are given to shareholders. In stock companies, two labor representa-
tives have the right to attend governing board meetings, with a right 
to speak but not to vote.262 
According to our information, the voice of labor in German in-
dustry has been a good deal stronger than in France. We are told 
that French enterprise committees concern themselves chiefly with 
the pay and working conditions of the employees, while German 
employee representatives exercise a considerable influence on de-
cisions affecting production. 
In neither country do employee representatives dictate to com-
pany executives. Much less do they participate in the executive 
functions of management.263 The most that can be said is that in 
certain classes of German companies, employee representatives hold 
the balance of power in the election of executives when any sub-
stantial division arises among the shareholders' representatives. 
In other Common Market countries, as in the United States, em-
ployee representation is less formalized, but employers are obliged 
by legal or extra-legal pressures to listen to their employee's desires 
and complaints. Luxembourg law provides for employee "delega-
tions" to consult with management in the larger enterprises. In 
261 Ordinance of Feb. 22, 1945, instituting the. "comites d'entreprises." 
262 I d. art. 3· 
268 See AktG § 95 ( 5), forbidding members of the governing board to take over 
conduct of the business (Massnahmen der Geschiiftsfiihrung). 
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Italy, "internal commissions" with consultative powers are com-
monly set up by collective bargaining agreements. 
7· QUALIFICATIONS OF BOARD MEMBERS: 
NATIONALITY AND STOCKHOLDING 
The laws of European countries are generally very liberal with 
respect to who may be members of the governing boards of com-
panies. In two countries-France and Belgium-prior conviction of 
various heinous crimes will disqualify.264 In France, some or all of 
the board members must be French nationals in local railroad com-
panies, hydroelectric companies, public utility companies, petroleum 
production companies, and companies formed for mining in French 
colonies. 264a In the Netherlands, a proportion of a shipping com-
pany governing board must be Dutchmen in order to permit the 
company to fly the Dutch flag.265 And in both French and Belgian 
companies, members of the governing board must obtain a "mer-
chant's license." In France this is said to be obtainable by any foreign 
businessman who has no criminal or bankruptcy record; in Belgium 
it is said to be more exceptional. Aside from these requirements, Eu-
ropean boards may legally be composed partly or wholly of 
Americans. 
Only in French stock companies is it required that the board 
members be shareholders. In both French and Italian stock com-
panies there are requirements that shares be deposited as security 
for the potential liability of the board members; in France these 
shares must be registered in the names of the members whose good 
conduct they secure.266 This probably means that the French board 
members should be beneficial shareholders; but in practice, "quali-
"""In France, there is a long list of offenses which disqualify for any office of manage-
ment; the offenses include any common law felony, plus theft, embezzlement, violation 
of criminal provisions of bankruptcy law, including abortion or "contraceptive propa-
ganda," and violating the laws on keeping of poisons. More accurately, it is not the 
offense but the prior conviction which disqualifies. A person may also be disqualified 
if he was a board member in an earlier company which entered bankruptcy, if the 
judge in that case made an order excluding him from managerial positions in the 
future. Decree-Law of Aug. 8, 1935, art. 6, 10; Law of August 30, 1947, art. 1-2. 
There are somewhat similar provisions in Belgium; none have been cited to us from 
other countries. 
"""• RIPERT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 545 (4th ed. 1959). 
"""W.K. art. 3 II. If the necessary number of Dutch board members and managers is 
lacking, the company may still operate, but cannot fly the Dutch flag on its ships. 
266 France: Law of 1867, art. 26 (stock companies). 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE art. 2387 (stock companies). An Italian informant says that 
the shares may be endorsed and deposited by some other shareholder. 
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fying shares" are transferred by the real owner into the name of the 
French board member. In Italy, shares are deposited for the non-
owning board member without even putting them in his name. 
The choice between foreign (American) or local (European) 
board members must be based less on legal than on practical con-
siderations. We have encountered companies with the greatest varia-
tion in practice. One successful company with many foreign sub-
sidiaries followed the practice of having the same three Americans 
serve as president, secretary, and treasurer, and also as directors, 
of more than a dozen foreign companies; they were also a majority 
of the board in most cases. At the other extreme, we have found 
subsidiary companies which take pride in having a board of ex-
clusively "local" personnel. On examination of the facts, we some-
times found that some of the "all-French" boards were American 
citizens, but they were at least permanent residents of France. 
Choices in these matters must depend on many factors, of which 
the foremost will be how many local people the investors know well 
enough to trust their integrity, ability, and judgment. But we wish 
to register the observation that the companies with the longest and 
most successful experience in foreign countries are those which tend 
most strongly to compose their boards exclusively of local residents, 
of whom a majority are local citizens. 
This policy is not to be confused with that of permitting par-
ticipation of local capital. Many of the companies which have gone 
the farthest in engaging local management are strictest in regard to 
holding substantially all the shares. 
The reasons for employing local management are not based on 
apprehensions of hostility to Americans. So far as we can determine, 
neither banks nor regulatory agencies have any hostility to Amer-
ican managers. The main reason is that Europeans can do the job 
better. They are better guessers about the psychology of European 
buyers, sellers, laborers, and landlords. They are also better analysts 
of the objectives and the standards of European bankers who must 
lend money, and of the European officials who must grant permits 
and licenses. Their advantage in this respect cannot be bought from 
them in consultations as effectively as it can be evoked by giving 
them the responsibility for decision. 
A second reason for employing local management is cost. We 
start from the fact that, in terms of official exchange rates, American 
salaries are higher for comparable jobs than are European. Eu-
ropeans may live just as well or better on their nominally lower 
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salaries; but Americans going to Europe will demand the nominal 
equivalent of their American salaries, plus overseas benefits and 
travel expenses which will make their total cost about twice the cost 
of Europeans. A bull market for European managerial talent is re-
ported to be narrowing the gap; but it will remain substantial. 
Hence, we are inclined to believe that every investor in a Eu-
ropean subsidiary should aim to reach the point where his entire 
governing board and executive personnel are European residents. 
8. AUDITORS 267 
The position of auditor in European companies is quite unlike 
anything known to the American corporation. Auditors in these 
countries are not mere outsiders hired by the board to report to it; 
they are officials of the company, elected by the shareholders to re-
port on the managers. They are seldom optional; they are generally 
required by law. 
Auditors are required for stock companies in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, and Italy; 268 in some of these countries they 
are also required for certain limited liability companies.269 In the 
Netherlands, where auditors are not required by statute, they may 
be imposed by the company's own articles, and frequently are.270 
The various European legislatures have entrusted to their com-
pany auditors functions of varying scopes, but all of them are much 
broader than the functions of auditors in the United States. Stock 
company auditors in Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxembourg have 
..,.We use the term "auditor" for the following European company officials: 
Belgium: "commissaires, commissarissen." 
France: "commissaires" in stock companies; members of "conseils de surveillance" 
in limited liability companies. 
Germany: "J ahresabschlusspriifer" in stock companies, "Bilanzpriifer" in limited 
liability companies. 
Italy: "sindaci," or members of "collegia sindacale." 
Luxembourg: "commissaires" or "Kommissare" in stock companies; members of 
"conseil de surveillance" or "Aufsichtsrat" in limited liability companies. 
Nether lands: "commissarissen." 
268 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64-
France: Law of 1867, art. 32. 
Germany: AktG § 135(1). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 61. 
Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. 2397• 
... Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 134 (over five shareholders). 
France: Law of 1925, art. 32. (over twenty shareholders). 
Italy: ComcE CIVILE,art. 2488 (capital over one million lire-about $rsoo). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 200 (over twenty-five shareholders). 
There is no corresponding requirement in Germany; but the limited liability com-
pany requires a governing board if its employees exceed soo, 
""'W.K. art. 50. 
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authority to call shareholders' meetings,271 and those in Luxem-
bourg have "the unlimited power of supervision and inspection of 
all operations of the company." 271a The title of "supervisory board" 
( conseil de surveillance, Aufsichtsrat) borne by limited liability 
company auditors in France and Luxembourg suggests the breadth 
of their authority.272 In Italy, the auditors are obliged to attend all 
shareholders' and governing board meetings,273 and to investigate 
shareholders' complaints against the management,274 and are liable 
along with board members for company losses which their due care 
should have prevented.275 
In spite of these extended powers, the auditors are not in the line 
of command, as are the organs which we have called "governing 
boards." The decisive difference between them and the governing 
boards is their lack of power to choose the executives who run .the 
company. 276 
Although auditors have been required in stock companies for 
many years, they have not always been very effective. Profes·sor van 
Ryn of Brussels wrote of the Belgian situation before the legislation 
of 1953: 
As for the auditors, the situation is still more peculiar 
(than for the governing board) ; nearly everyone agrees 
that they never, or hardly ever, effectively do the job of 
investigation ( controle) which is their only excuse for 
existing. The job of auditor is generally a moderately 
lucrative sinecure, or a waiting room at the entrance of 
the governing board. 277 
:m Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 73· 
France: Law of 1867, art. 32. 
Italy: CODICE CIVILE art. 2367 (implication). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 70. 
The absence of a similar power in German auditors is probably explained by the 
grant of a similar power to the governing board (Aufsichtsrat), which is presumed 
to be as independent of management as the auditors. 
=• Company Law art. 62. 
""'France: Law of 1925, art. 32 (limited liability companies). Stock company auditors 
in France exercise a much narrower authority. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 200 (limited liability companies). 
278 C. C1v. art. 2405. 
274 C. C1v. art. 2408. 
275 C. Civ. art. 2407. 
276 See A. A. Berle, "Control in Corporate Larw, 58 CoLUN. L. REV. 1212 (1958); 
"Control" may be defined as the capacity to choose directors. As a corollary, it carries 
capacity to influence the board of directors· and possibly to dominate it. 
277 VAN RYN, I PRINCIPES DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 382 (1953). See also VAN RYN, 
LA REFORME DU CoNTR6LE DES Socuh:Es COMMERCIALES ET L'EXPERIENCE ANGLAISE 
(Belgium 1945). 
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Similar remarks could probably have been made 1n France before 
1935·278 
To eliminate subservience to the management, most of the coun-
tries now have laws designed to assure that the auditors will be com-
pletely independent. With some variations among countries, they 
are disqualified if they are employed by the company, or by the 
managers of the company, or by affiliated companies, and if they 
are related by blood or marriage to managers of the company which 
they audit.m 
In Italy the law attempts to insure independence still further by 
giving the auditors tenure for at least a three-year term unless cause 
can be shown for their removal, and requiring that their pay be fixed 
in advance of their term.280 In other countries the auditors' tenure 
apparently remains subject to the will of the shareholders, even 
though they are elected for various terms ranging from three to 
six years.281 
There are also provisions in some countries requiring that the 
auditors be qualified accountants. Germany now requires that all 
auditors be certified public accountants.282 In Belgium and France 
at least one of the auditors must be a certified public accountant in 
stock companies which have offered their shares to the general pub-
lic.283 In Italian stock companies, at least one and sometimes two of 
the auditors must be certified.284 On the other hand, French limited 
278 The Belgium company laws in the Commercial Code were amended in 1953 to 
tighten the auditing requirements. French laws had been revised in 1935 to assure 
independence of the auditors. 
279 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64, as amended in 1953. 
France: Law of 1867, art. 33· 
Germany: AktG § 137; there are no interdictions here on relationship by blood or 
marriage. 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE 2399; auditors are also disqualified by a prior bankruptcy, or 
certain criminal offenses. 
Luxembourg: Has no statutory disqualifications. 
280 C. Civ. arts. 2400, 2402. 
281 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64 his (expressly removable at will of shareholders). 
France: Law of 1867, art. 32 (provides 3 year term but is silent on tenure). 
Germany: AktG. § 136(1) and (6). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 61 (expressly removable at will). 
""" AktG § 137 (offentlich bestellte Wirtschaftspriifer oder Wirtschaftspriifungs-
gesellschaften). 
"""France: Law of 1867, art. 33 (dans les societes par actions faisant appel it l'epargne 
public). 
Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 64 his, 2 (dans les societes ayant fait ou faisant appel 
it l'epargne public). 
""'CODICE CIVILE art. 2397; the requirement depends partly on the number of auditors 
( 3 or 5) and partly on the capital (over or under 5 million lire). 
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liability company auditors are required to be shareholders, which 
makes it unlikely that they will be experts.285 Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands make no statutory requirements for either type of 
company. 
To the American investor in a European subsidiary, the audit 
requirements will not seem very burdensome, but the naming of 
auditors for a term of years will call for some study, even though 
the appointment is revocable. A single auditor is all the law requires 
except for the requirement of shareholder-auditors in French 
limited liability companies, and a five-man requirement wherever 
auditors are ne~ded in ltaly.286 In Germany the appointee may be a 
qualified auditing firm, rather than an individual.287 Since the audi-
tors' functions are supervisory rather than executive, qualified ac-
countants can be safely named, even though they know nothing of 
the company's methods and objectives. 
9· COMPENSATION OF BOARD MEMBERS AND EXECUTIVES 
In Europe, as in the United States, a variety of systems of pay-
ment are in common use-fees for attendance at meetings, fixed 
salaries and profit shares. The only common form of American 
compensation which is never encountered in Europe is the stock-
option. 
The stock option seems to hold no attractions for Europeans. 
Whether it would have any tax advantage, as it does in the United 
States, is dubious; at least there are no special provisions favoring 
it. There are many obstacles to its introduction. In the first place, 
many kinds of companies are forbidden to have authorized and 
unissued shares, or to hold treasury shares, against which the op-
tions could be allowed. Furthermore, most controlling stockholders 
in Europe are extremely jealous of their voting percentages, so that 
they would not be prone to issue new shares changing them. This 
jealousy is even more marked among American owners of stock in 
European subsidiaries, so that they would be much less willing to 
issue stock options in their European subsidiaries than they would 
in the parent companies. Mandatory preemptive rights, which give 
every shareholder a right to subscribe proportionately to new shares, 
would be an additional obstacle. The cumulation of obstacles to 
... Law of 1925, art. 32. 
286 CoDICE CIVILE art. 2397· The law says that the auditing board (collegio sindacale) 
may have either three or five members; but in either case, there must be two substitute 
members . 
..., AktG § 137· 
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stock option compensation in Europe leads us to exclude it from 
further consideration. 
In Europe, as in the United States, there are procedural prob-
lems in awarding compensation to governing board members, be-
cause of the conflict of interest involved in payments by the board 
to itself. As any American lawyer would expect, one way out is to 
submit the compensation arrangements to the shareholders for their 
approval, and this is expressly permitted by statutes in Italy and 
the Netherlands.288 But the American usage of inscribing the com-
pensation plan in the by-laws cannot be used since there are no by-
laws. Instead, we find many European compensation provisions in 
company charters.289 
There is no necessity for shareholder action, or inclusion in the 
charter, where there is no conflict of interest. For instance, the 
German supervisory board can fix the compensation of the executive 
board. In France the governing board can fix the salaries of the 
president and of the general manager (whether the jobs are sep-
arate or combined), and can award compensation to other board 
members for specific services. Furthermore, when the shareholders 
have fixed the fraction of the profits which the board members may 
receive, the board members decide how to distribute it among 
themselves.290 
A second problem .is the percentage of the profits which can be 
awarded as compensation. In French stock companies this is limited 
to ro percent.291 In German stock companies, it is limited more gen-
erally to an amount which is "reasonably related to the expenditures 
made for the benefit of subordinate personnel, or for the common 
good." The public prosecutor is empowered to take action if this 
vague standard is violated, and the Minister of Justice may issue 
regulations to make it more specific. In both France and Germany 
the statutes require the setting aside of proper reserves before the 
profit shares are calculated.292 
The deduction of profit shares in calculating taxable income is 
severely limited. ,In Italy they are never deductible. In France and 
"""Italy: Come£ CIVIL!! art. 2389 (stock companies), 2487 (limited liability com-
panies). 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 48c. 
289 This is expressly authorized by the Italian and Netherlands statutes cited in the 
preceding note, and in Germany, AktG § 98(1). The Italian law (C. Cxv. 2389) permits 
the articles to authorize the governing board to fix the compensations of those mem-
bers who have particular duties (cariche particolari)-a very vague phase. 
"""Law of March 4, 1943, art. 11. 
""'I hid • 
... See the immediately preceding citations. 
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Luxembourg a distinction is drawn between profit shares paid to 
the executive member of the board (president in France, admin-
istrateur delegue in Luxembourg), and to other members. The 
profit shares of the former are deductible; the other members' 
shares are not. As a consequence, profit shares are seldom awarded 
to non-executive board members; they are compensated in meeting 
fees, or salaries, which can be used to reduce the company's taxes. 
There are other fine distinctions in the French taxation of execu-
tive compensation, which determine whether the compensation is 
taxed to the retipient at the basic rate of s% or 22%. Only one of 
these is worth mentioning in relation to over-all planning. In the 
French limited liability company, a distinction is drawn between 
"majority managers," and "minority managers." The "majority 
managers" are those who hold a majority of the company stock, and 
their salaries are taxed at a higher basic rate, presumably on the 
suspicion that the salaries may be interchangeable with dividends. 
The tax can be escaped by turning the company into a stock com-
pany, where the same distinction is not applied. This difference has 
led to the common statement among French lawyers that the limited 
liability company is disadvantageous, from a tax point of view. This 
observation may be true for individual Frenchmen, but it will not be 
true for American parent corporations, which we presume will not 
wish to become the managers of French subsidiaries. 
10. CIVIL LIABILITIES OF MANAGERS AND BOARD MEMBERS 
The same duties which lie on American officers and directors to 
manage the business with reasonable care and skill fall on the 
shoulders of European managers and governing board members, 
and the same civil liability to indemnify the company or the unpaid 
creditors for the losses caused by these officials' sins of omission 
and commission.293 
The law of France offers a very interesting addition to this 
burden. If a stock company becomes bankrupt, the trustee in the 
bankruptcy may petition the court to saddle the board members not 
293 Belgium: C. CoM. I-IX, art. 62 (stock companies), art. 132 (limited liability com-
panies). 
France: Law of 1867, art. 44 (stock companies); Law of 1925, art. 25 (limited 
liability companies). 
Germany: AktG §84 (executive board), §99 (governing board); GmbHG §43· 
Italy: CoDICE CIVILE, arts. 2392 (stock companies), 2487 (limited liability companies). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 59 (stock companies), 192 (limited liability com-
panies) 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 47 c-d. 
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only with the losses traceable to their own conduct, but with all the 
debts of the company. Apparently, the trustee needs to present no 
evidence in support of his petition; the burden is on the president 
and the other board members to prove that they applied "the energy 
and the diligence of a full-time employee to the manageJ1?ent of the 
company's business." 294 
This unusual provision was another of the innovations of the 
Vichy regime. In an interesting case decided in I95I, the Court of 
Commerce for the Seine made each of the non-executive board mem-
bers liable for 5% of the total company debts, and three persons who 
had served as president liable for rs%, rs%, and 35%, respec-
tively.295 
Like some other Vichy embroideries on the fabric of company 
law, this one seems to be accepted as a permanent addition; the 
principle was extended in 1953 to French limited liability com-
panies.296 But it does not seem to have spread to other countries. 
V. FINANCING A EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY 
A. ~ONETARY PROBLEMS 
Every investment in European facilities will involve difficult 
choices between insid~ and outside sources of money. By "inside," 
we mean sources of money existing in the same country in which the 
facilities are to exist. "Outside" is more inclusive, because it may 
include (a) sources outside the country of investment but inside the 
Common ~arket, (b) sources which are outside the ~arket, but 
still inside Europe, or (c) sources outside the European continent. 
To be more concrete, a factory in France might be financed from 
the "inside" by French funds, or from the "outside" by funds from 
Belgium or Switzerland, or the United States. 
I. THE LICENSING OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
TRANSACTIONS 297 
As we write these lines, early in I 960, foreign exchange control 
laws are still in effect in all the Six Common Market countries. This 
294 Law of Nov. r6, 1940, art. 4· 
""'Decision of January 19, 1957, Tribunal de Commerce de Ia Seine (1951), r Gazette 
de Palais 239· 
200 Law of 1925, art. 25, as amended by Decree-Law of August 9, I953· 
m This subject is more fully explained in Chapter IV supra-"Foceign Exchange 
Controls in France," by M. Fernand Jeantet. See also Frank W. Swacker, The Free 
Movement of Capital within the Common Market, 15 Bus. LAW. 565 (1960). 
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means that a governmental agency-which we will call the "ex-
change control"-has power to forbid any foreign exchange trans-
action. If a French factory is to be built with money not now in 
France, the exchange control may by issuing an order (or refusing a 
license) forbid the purchase of French francs to build it. If the fac-
tory has been already built with foreign capital, the exchange control 
may by like means forbid the owner to turn his French profits into 
foreign currency in order to repay the foreign investor. 
In practice, the Draconian powers of the exchange control are 
exercised in ways which are generally very favorable to foreign 
capitalists. In Belgium and Luxembourg, there is today a "general 
license" for all foreign capital investments; the foreign investor 
does not even have to get permission before investing, or before 
repatriating profits and capital. In France, which is currently the 
strictest of the Six in exchange control, a license is required both for 
original investment and for repatriation, but is now readily ob-
tained. The license procedure survives chiefly in order to let the 
government assure itself that Frenchmen are not exporting their 
own capital (which they are still forbidden to do), and that capital 
movements are not made for illegal purposes (like supporting the 
Algerian rebellion) . 
The survival of the foreign exchange laws and (in some coun-
tries) of the licensing procedures also serves to remind the Amer-
ican investor that the present ease of investment and disinvestment 
is not necessarily a permanent feature of the European scene. Al-
though the history of exchange control in Europe since 1945 is a 
story of progressive relaxation, there have been periods of renewed 
restriction as well as periods of relaxation; if future currency 
crises occur, they are likely to be accompanied by revivals of ex-
change restrictions. 
Some protection against the effect of future restrictions may be 
obtained by obtaining from the exchange control agency a guarantee 
of the right to repatriate earnings and capital. In France, where a 
license to invest is still required, the control agency has an an-
nounced policy of permitting repatriation of licensed capital in-
vestments and of the profits produced by them. In Belgium and 
Luxembourg, where no license is required, the exchange control 
agency may on request give a special guarantee of future repatria-
tion. In Italy, the control agency will guarantee repatriation of 
capital and unlimited earnings from investments which are deemed 
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particularly beneficial to the Italian economy, but only capital and 
earnings at 8% on other investments. 298 
In addition to the guarantee of repatriability which may be ob-
tained from the exchange control agency, the investor may be in-
terested in examining the guarantees which result from treaty ob-
ligations of the European powers. As a part of the plan to unify 
their economies, the Common Market countries have undertaken to 
"coordinate" their exchange controls with respect to the outside 
world, including the United States.299 This presumably means some 
increase in the strictness of controls in the countries which are now 
"wide open," and some relaxation in countries now strict. The ob-
jective is not an arithmetic average, as in the case of customs, but 
"the highest possible degree of liberalization." 300 This presumably 
means the highest degree on which agreement .can be obtained; and 
the agreement must be unanimous, before directives may issue. 
Thus it appears likely, as Mr. Jeantet's essay reveals,301 that dif-
ferences between the strictness of the exchange controls which the 
various European countries apply to Americans and other out-
siders may persist at least through the 196o's. Some will license in-
vestment and disinvestment very readily, and consistently. Others, 
with less stable currencies, may be more strict. To complicate· the 
matter, the more strict countries will probably have waves of lib-
erality, when they attempt to emulate the permissive habits of their 
neighbors, but will later retreat to longer or shorter periods in 
which repatriation of capital, or even of profits, is restricted. 
These probabilities affect the financing plans of American enter-
prises in two ways. First, the prospect of a liberal foreign exchange 
policy in any given country increases the attractiveness of investing 
there; it decreases the risk that the investment will become tem-
porarily or permanently unproductive of American dollars. Second, 
the prospect of restrictions on repatriation increases the importance 
of minimizing the investment of outside funds (e.g., dollars) and of 
maximizing the use of inside funds (e.g., French francs). Even 
though the parent company has no shortage of money to invest, it 
"""Law No. 43 of Feb. 7, 1956, and Presidential Decree No. 758 of July 6, 1956. 
The investments which benefit from the unlimited guarantee are those called "produc-
tive," whieh are generally characterized by the purchase of tangible fixed assets. See 
BANCO D1 ROMA, I FOREIGN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN ITALY 23-27 (2nd ed. 1959). 
2119 Treaty art. 70. 
800 Ibid. 
301 Supra, note 297• 
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may wisely refrain from placing more than necessary in a country 
from which repatriation may prove difficult. 
2. TREATY LIMITATIONS ON EXCHANGE CONTROLS 
When and if currency controls are revived, inhibiting the repa-
triation from European countries of American capital and profits, 
Americans may notice that the controls are not erected against all 
equally; Americans may be unable to repatriate while residents of 
countries in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
( O.E.E.C.), and residents of Common Market countries, are less 
handicapped. 
With respect to their fellow members in the O.E.E.C., each of 
the Common Market countries is somewhat limited in the extent 
to which it may restdct currency exchanges. The O.E.E.C. includes 
not only the six Common Market countries but also twelve others, 
including the "Outer Seven"; of these, England and Switzerland 
are of particular interest as possible bases of operation for Amer-
ican enterprise. At this writing, the United States is not a member. 302 
In 1953, the O.E.E.C. added to the Code of Liberalisation 303 
provisions by which the seventeen members bound themselves to 
each other to relax reciprocally their exchange restrictions on "in-
visible transactions," including, among other things, the following 
items: 
Participation by subsidiary companies and branches in 
overhead expenses of parent companies situated abroad 
and vice versa . . . 
Dividends and shares in profits. 
Contractual amortization (with the exception of trans-
fers in connection with amortization having the char-
acter either of anticipated repayments or of the discharge 
of accumulated arrears) .304 
With respect to all of these, the eighteen countries of the 
O.E.E.C. bind themselves to license transfers made pursuant to 
"""There are currently in process negotiations for a reorganization of the O.E.E.C. 
which would include the United States and Canada as full members. 
808 The Code is strictly speaking a "decision" of the Council of the O.E.E.C., adopted 
in two official languages (English and French), and known in these languages as "Code 
de Liberation" and "Code of Liberalisation." The original code, adopted in 1950, 
dealt only with quotas on goods. • 
..,. These items are identified in Appendix B of the Code by references numbers 
Ch. I, B/7; Ch. II, B/r; Ch. III, B/2. They are only three out of several dozen kinds 
of "invisible transactions," so-called in contradistinction to "visible" international ship-
ments of goods. Other invisible transactions include payment for ocean freight, repairs, 
liability for damages, travel, wages, royalties, etc. 
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prior licensed undertakings. If a Swiss investment in F ranee was 
made in 1947 under an exchange license, France undertakes to 
license payments of the interest and dividends which may become 
due as a result of that licensed investment. However, the Code of 
Liberalisation enunciates no policies on the licensing of original in-
vestments which may give rise to future overhead expenses, divi-
dends, interest or amortization. As to that, the member countries 
are presently free to choose. The Organization might wnceivably 
broaden the Code to require freedom of investment among mem-
bers; but this would require unanimous consent, 305 and looks un-
likely.306 
Among Member Countries of the Common Market, currency 
controls are much further reduced. In the matter of "current pay-
ments" (on account of interest and dividends), all restrictions 
among member countries are to be lifted by the end of the first stage 
-that is, presumably by the end of 196r.307 Since current payments 
on licensed investments were already freed under the Code of Lib-
eralisation, this provision promises an advance only in that it is not 
limited to current payments on investments which may have ante-
dated the imposition of exchange controls. 
What is more important, the Member Countries bind themselves 
to abolish by 1970, to the extent necessary for the proper func-
tioning of the Common Market, "restrictions on the movement of 
capital belonging to persons resident in Member States." 308 This 
means new investments. Legislative power to effect this end is given 
to the Council of the Community, which acquires the right to legis-
late by majority' vote at the end of the second stage (December 
1964).309 By 1970 money accumulated in a Belgian enterprise (for 
instance) can be invested in France to the extent that a majority of 
the Community Council thinks appropriate. To be sure, there are 
escape clauses permitting suspension of the liberties promised; but 
they are subject to decision of the Council of the Community.310 
306 See Elkin, The Organization for European Economic Co-operation-its Structure 
and Powers, 4 EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 96, at II5 ( 1958). 
306 At present, the growth of the activities and powers of the O.E.E.C. seems to be 
arrested by the diversion of the leading powers' interest to the "Common Market" and 
the "Outer Seven." 
""'Treaty art. 67(2). 
808 Treaty art. 67 ( 1). 
"""Treaty art. 69. For the kind of "majority" required for this and other legislative 
acts, see Mr. Stein's study in this symposium. 
810 Under art. 73 (2) a state may on the ground of urgency take unilateral measures 
to arrest "disturbances in the capital market," but the Commission of the Community 
must be informed, and may modify or abolish the measures unilaterally taken. 
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As a matter of historic fact, the privilege of free investment by a 
national of one Member Country in another, which was promised 
for I970, has already been granted in I96o. On May I 1, 1960, the 
Community Council issued its Directive Number One on the subject 
of exchange control. It declared that nationals of one state were 
free to invest in another by purchase of operating properties (in-
vestissements directs), by purchase of securities which are traded 
on .stock exchanges, and by purchase of new security offerings, and 
by various other financial means. 
We will try to turn these principles into examples. An American 
company which wishes to form a French subsidiary must first get 
a permit to bu.y francs, and must later get further permits to turn 
its francs back into dollars to pay interest or repay capital. Cur-
rently, both permits may be readily obtained, but the permit to in-
vest might become much harder to obtain on any slight change in the 
international financial climate; similar circumstances are likely to 
close down on permits to repay capital. Permits to pay interest and 
dividends to Americans are likely to survive until a severe crisis; but 
they enjoy no express treaty protection,311 and may be expected to be 
sacrificed before the permits to pay interest and dividends to other 
European countries-co-members of the O.E.E.C., or of the E.E.C., 
with whom France has treaty obligations to maintain freedom of 
exchange. 
The position of a Swiss company is slightly better. As to permits 
to pay dividends and interest, it has the protection of the provisions 
of the Code of Liberalisation. As to permits to invest or withdraw 
capital, it is no better off than a Delaware corporation. 
The position of a Belgian company is radically different. Pro-
cedurally, it has the advantage that there is an executive organ of 
the Community charged with issuing orders ("directives") to carry 
out the reciprocal liberalization to which the Member States are 
pledged.312 Substantively, it is guaranteed, after I 969, such freedom 
su Various Treaties of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation, or of E~tablishment, 
promise Americans equal rights with nationals, and rights equal to those of the most 
favored nation, in regard to exchange control. But since exchange control laws are 
generally most restrictive on nationals, and do not let them take out any profits except 
for special requirements, there is nothing to be desired about "national treatment." 
The most-favored-nation clause will raise a more difficult question, when and if 
the Community Council exercises its powers to relay controls on capital movements 
between Member Countries. However, it is clear that European officials regard the 
Community as creating an exception to the most favored nation clause. Although 
American diplomats may argue to the contrary, we will consider this question on 
the basis of the law as it is now interpreted by the officials who apply and enforce it. 
812 Treaty, art. 69. 
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to invest in France and in other countries of the market, and to with-
draw its investments, as the Community Council decrees. That 
guarantee has already been put ( revocably) into effect. 
The marked advantages of a Belgian investor in the European 
market, and the lesser advantages of a Swiss investor, suggest the 
question whether a Belgian or Swiss company can qualify for the 
same advantages when it is American-owned. We have already 
noted that European law regards a company as a national of the 
country where it keeps its main office; hence one might fairly expect 
French exchange control officials to give O.E.E.C. treatment to all 
companies with home offices in Switzerland, regardless of who owns 
them. But there is one well-known exception to this view of na-
tionality; in respect to seizure of "enemy property," French courts, 
like American, have recognized ultimate ownership of voting stock 
as the determinative criterion of nationality rather than location 
of the home office. That is, a German-owned Swiss company is Ger-
man under the laws on enemy property.313 French writers, describ-
ing this phenomenon, have referred to the home office test of na-
tionality as the "private law test," and to the ultimate ownership 
test as the "public law test." 314 Since exchange control is undoubt-
edly a matter of "public law," the distinct possibility appears that 
American ownership would prevent a Swiss-based company from 
claiming the advantages of the Code of Liberalisation. This danger 
is particularly great in France, where the "control" test of corporate 
nationality attained great popularity, and was applied to deny 
foreign-owned companies any compensation for war damages, and 
even the protection of the new concept of "commercial property." 315 
If we think of a Belgian subsidiary instead of a Swiss one, the 
effect of American ownership involves various provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome. In Article 58, the control test of company na-
tionality is clearly rejected. It provides, 
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of 
a Member State and having their registered office, central 
management or main .establishment within the Community 
818 RABEL, 2 THE CoNFLICT oF LAWS, A CoMPARATIVE STUDY, 57 (1947). This view, 
which was rejected in the United States following World War I, (Behn, Meyer & Co., 
v. Miller 266 U.S. 457 (1925) ), was adopted after World War II (Clark v. Uebersee 
Finanz-Korporation 332 U.S. 480 (1947) ). 
014 ESCARRA, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 63 (1950). 
815 Rabel op. cit. 59-62. The new U.S.-French Convention of Establishment guarantees 
Americans equal rights with Frenchmen in leasing real property; this may entitle 
Americans to "commercial property" in the future. Convention of Establishment be-
tween France and U.S.A., art. VII, 41 Dept. St. Bull. 828, 831 (1959). 
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shall, for the purposes of applying the provisions of this 
Chapter, be assimilated to natural persons being nationals 
of Member States. 
But the article contains the tell-tale words, "for purposes of ap-
plying the provisions of this Chapter," and the article is found in 
Chapter 2, entitled "Right of Establishment." "Establishment" is 
defined as including "the right to engage in and carry on non-wage-
earning activities, and also to set up and manage enterprises . . . 
subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital." 316 The 
"movement of capital" is the subject of another Chapter.317 Thus 
the Treaty clearly differentiates between "establishment" and 
"movement of capital." 318 
We have spoken so far in terms of bona fide Belgian (or Dutch, 
or Luxembourgeois, or German) companies, owned by Americans, 
which might wish to expand their operations, or reinvest their 
profits, in operations in another country (such as France or Italy). 
If such Belgian companies prove to be free from the exchange re-
strictions which confront direct American investments, some Amer-
ican would probably attempt to form a Belgian company which had 
no real Belgian activity, but was formed only to gain entry to 
France. 
In response to any such scheme, France would have a clear right 
under the treaty to take preventive measures. The Treaty expressly 
provides that if residents of one Member State makes use of "trans-
fer facilities within the Community . . . in order to evade the 
rules of one of the Member States in regard to third countries," 
the Member State may take appropriate counter measures. 319 It 
must consult the other Member States before acting, but does not 
316 Treaty art. 52 § 2. 
317 Chapter 4, entitled "Capital," comprises articles 67-73, of which the first provides 
that "Member States shall, in the course of the transitional period and to the extent 
necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, progressively abolish 
as between themselves restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons 
resident in Member States ... " 
318 Chapter 2, Right of Establishment, and Chapter 4, Capital, are both parts of 
Title III, The Free Movement of Persons, Services, and Capital. But there are notable 
differences in the applicable provisions. Establishment is to be freed without qualifica-
tion (art. 52) but capital movements are to be freed "to the extent necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Common Market." (art. 67(1) ). On matters of establishment, 
the Council can act by majority vote after the end of the first stage (art. 54(2) ), but 
on matters of capital movements only after the end of the second stage (art. 69). 
However, M. Jeantet seems, in his discussion of "Probable Evolution under the 
E.E.C. Treaty," to believe that "investments" are entitled to the freedom promised 
by article 52 to "establishment." (See Chapter IV supra.) 
319 Treaty art. 70(2), par. r. 
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need to get their agreement; the Community Council can later annul 
the action, but only on finding that it went "beyond what is r·e-
quired." 320 
With respect to freedom of capital movement, the right which 
each Common Market country guarantees to the others is a right of 
"movement of capital belonging to persons in Metnber States" 
without "any discriminatory treatment based on nationality." 321 
The most obvious interpretation of this clause would be that Belgian 
companies would have freedom to invest in France (to the extent 
decreed by the Council) regardless of the ownership of their shares. 
It is not difficult to conjure up an opposing argument, to the effect 
that if the Belgian company belongs to Americans, its capital is not 
capital belonging to Belgians; but this argument is likely to be re-
sisted by most of the Common Market members, and French officials 
might encounter some difficulty in determining just who owns the 
Belgian company anyway. 
Our conclusion is that if France, for instance, should revert to a 
regime of severe exchange restrictions, companies situated in other 
Common Market countries (for instance, Belgium) would be much 
more favorably situated to effect currency exchanges than would 
Swiss-based or U.S.-based companies. The French might attempt 
special restrictions on Belgian companies which are owned by non-
members of the Common Market; but their attempts to do so would 
confront practical problems in determining the facts of ownership, 
and legal problems as to their right to discriminate among Belgian 
companies based on their ownership. Some of the legal obstacles 
would be based on the Rome Treaty provisions which we have dis-
cussed above; others might be based on various treaties, especially 
treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, which we have not 
mentioned. 
Because of the complex of exchange regulations, and the possible 
effects of the Rome Treaty upon them, there appear to be important 
potential advantages in establishing an operating company in one 
of the Common Market countries, capitalizing it sufficiently so that 
it can engage in branch or subsidiary operations in other Common 
Market countries, and permitting earnings to accumulate to the ex-
tent that they may later be wanted for reinvestment in the other 
countries. It may prove a good deal easier to reinvest such earn-
ings than earnings which have been remitted to the American parent 
"'"'!d. art. 70(2), par. 2. 
821 Id. art. 67(1). 
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or to a Swiss holding company. There is the incidental advantage 
that such earnings will escape the corporate income which they might 
incur if remitted to the American parent. 
3· FLUCTUATING EXCHANGE RATES 
Assuming that permits to invest can be obtained, the investor con-
fronts the problem of minimizing (or maximizing) the risk of cur-
rency fluctuation. If lire have been bought with dollars, and the lire 
decline in exchange value, obviously the same number of lire will not 
repurchase the same number of dollars. Conceivably, the lire decline 
will be accompanied by an increase in nominal lire profits, so that 
more lire will be earned, and the same number of dollars can be 
repurchased. But there is no certainty that this will happen. 
Considerations of this order apply differently to equity and to 
debt investments. To a foreign subsidiary, a dollar debt will be a 
dangerous thing, if the subsidiary is in a country whose currency is 
likely to fall more than the dollar; in terms of the local currency, it 
is a debt that grows. A dollar equity is quite different; since no fixed 
obligation is incurred, it does not matter so much if the dollar divi-
dends shrink. 
Considering these factors, American parent companies will not 
ordinarily want their European subsidiaries to borrow dollars, nor 
will the parent companies want to borrow dollars, to invest in the 
subsidiaries. They will want to invest equity capital from America, 
and to borrow money, if at all, in the country where the business is 
to be operated. If the rates of interest in that country are too high 
to permit advantageous "trading on the equity," the correct con-
clusion will be to refrain from borrowing; it will not usually be wise 
to borrow money in another country (such as the United States or 
Switzerland) where interest rates may be lower, because such 
countries are likely to have currencies which will become dear in 
terms of the country where the interest must be earned. 
One may be tempted to offset the potential loss from a foreign 
currency decline against the potential gain from a decline in Ameri-
can currency. An investor in Germany might contemplate the pos-
sibility that the German mark will be revalued against the dollar, 
and that his dollar debts will grow lighter, like a load of salt in a 
rainstorm. This is a dubious offset. In equity investments, the pos-
sibilities of loss may be offset against the possibilities of gain; but 
in fixed obligations, the possibility of loss is the possibility of 
disaster. 
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From these considerations, it follows that American investors will 
often be very much interested in the European market for loans, 
even though they are not interested in the European market for 
equity investment. This will probably be true even though all the 
European currencies now appear to be fairly stable; investment 
plans must contemplate the possible developments of future decades. 
B. EQUITY FINANCING 
I. DIVIDED OWNERSHIP 
Most American companies, we have found, have little interest in 
sharing their equity interests in foreign subsidiaries with other 
persons. We think the reasons are generally well-founded, and will 
become progressively more apparent during the transitional period 
of the Common Market. Any company which has a French sub-
sidiary and a German subsidiary, each making pins and needles, will 
find increasing occasion to concentrate the pin-making activity in 
one, and the needle-making activity in the other; or to close both and 
build a new plant in Luxembourg. Decisions of this sort which are 
very clear from the viewpoint of the parent company may be directly 
against the interest of any one of the subsidiaries. If so, these de-
cisions will also be against the interest of the minority holders in 
the subsidiaries. The parent must then make the unpleasant choice 
between losing operating economies, and losing the confidence of a 
group of local investors. Foreseeing this problem, it will probably 
prefer to retain all the shares except the few that must be held by 
others in order to maintain the minimum number of shareholders re-
quired by European company laws. 
There are very few legal impediments to 99% ownership of a 
European affiliated company. Our French collaborator advises that 
France has laws requiring majority or complete ownership by 
nationals in French companies which operate a travel agency, an 
accounting business, or a bank, or which claim compensation for war 
damage.322 There may be other categories, but they are exceptional 
rather than typical. 
The effect of these restrictions on Americans will be limited by 
the new U.S.-French Convention on Establishment, which permits 
exclusion of American interests only in "communications, air or 
water transport, banking ... , exploitation of the soil or other 
322 But cf. Ripert, op. cit., 454, stating that the law regarding travel agencies is the 
only one which makes an issue of the source of capital. 
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natural resources, and the production of electricity." 323 This treaty 
will forbid any direct prohibition on ownership, although it will not 
necessarily prevent the French from refusing to license currency ex-
changes for the purpose of buying interests in particular kinds of 
business. 324 
A more important undermining of these restrictions arises from 
the Treaty. Under Article 2 2 r, each Common Market Country 
must permit investment by nationals of other countries to the same 
extent as investment by its own nationals. Under this clause, an 
American-owned Dutch subsidiary may own stock in a French com-
pany, even though the American company is forbidden to own 
directly. The sweeping terms of the directive of May I I, I96o,325 
indicate that exchange control will not be used as a means of block-
ing Dutch company investment in France. 
Consequently, a 99% ownership of a European subsidiary seems 
to be legally attainable. However, there may be practical difficulties. 
If the American investor finds the right enterprise, its owners are 
not likely to be eager to sell out. If the American investor attempts 
to build a new enterprise, he must find a site, build a plant, buy 
equipment, hire labor and executives, and organize a distribution 
system, in a country where sites are generally more scarce, labor 
less mobile, trained executives less numerous, and distribution sys-
tems more tied up than in the United States-and in a country 
where he has to speak through interpreters. 
American investors frequently decide that the perils of building 
a new enterprise are less than those of divided ownership. If they 
are able to find a European going concern which has plant and 
personnel and outlets, and which is willing to sell a substantial 
323 Convention of Establishment between France and the United States, Nov. 25, 
1959, art. V(2), 51 Dept. State Bull. 829 . 
.,. Even if 99% ownership is permitted by law, it may be a factor which makes ex-
change control officials reluctant to grant investment licenses, as M. J eantet suggests 
in his essay on exchange control. We have no similar reports from other countries of 
the Market. With respect to joint investment, a distinction may generally be drawn 
between European countries, which are themselves exporters of capital, and the "under-
developed countries" of other continents, where there is a heightened sensitivity to 
foreign domination of ownership. The reasons which may dictate joint investment in 
those countries do not apply significantly to the member states of the European Eco-
nomic Community. We have been privileged to see pre-publication manuscripts of an 
extraordinary series of studies directed by Professor Wolfgang Friedman of Columbia 
University on Joint International Business Ventures, which concerns joint investment 
in various countries by the United States and local interests. Among the countries dis-
cussed as investment locations are Burma, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Philippine Islands, 
and Turkey. There is a volume on Japan, but it concerns foreign investment by Japan 
·. in other countries. 
325 European Economic Community, First Directive under Article 67, May II, 1960. 
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portion, but not all, of its shares, many American investors will 
quite properly be attracted by this alternative. In the course of time, 
they will probably be trying to buy out the local interests, but this 
does not prove they did not make the best choice in joining with 
local interests rather than starting from scratch. 
Which choice is to be preferred obviously depends on the char-
acteristics of the particular choices that are available. We think it 
is safe to say that the building of a foreign business from scratch 
is for those American investors who have extensive prior foreign 
experience, who already have significant commercial contracts in 
the country where the enterprise is to be created, and which need 
facilities that are considerably different from any already available 
in the country in question. Investors without these advantages 
should generally seek to acquire existing enterprises, and settle for 
divided ownership if they cannot obtain 99%. 
2. CONTROL DEVICES 
In many cases, the American investor will want to know whether 
he can reserve voting powers which are proportionately greater 
than his equity investment. The first answer is that one cannot do it 
by any method so simple as the issue of non-voting common stock. 
The general rule in all six countries is that all shares vote.326 There 
are statutory exceptions in two countries-Germany and Italy-
for preferred stock; 327 but preferred stock is no more fashionable 
in today's German and Italian capital markets than it is in America. 
Another familiar American device that is not likely to work in 
Europe is to have two Classes of shares-one worth a dollar, and 
the other worth a hundred dollars-which have equal votes per 
share. Italy and Luxembourg require that all shares in stock com-
panies have equal value!l28 Belgian, French and Dutch laws expressly 
provide that shares shall vote in proportion to the capital which they 
320 Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 74, as amended by Arrete Royal No. 26 of Oct. 31, 
1934, art. 3 (stock companies); C. CoM. I, IX, art. 135 (limited liability companies). 
France: Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. 1 (stock companies) ; Law of March 7, 1925, art. 28. 
Germany: AktG § II4(r); GmbHG §47. 
Italy: C. Crv. 2351 (stock companies), 2485 (limited liability companies). 
Luxembourg: Company Law arts. 71(2) (stock companies), 195 {limited liability 
companies). 
Netherlands: C. CoM. art. 44b. 
327 Germany: AktG § IIS ( r); the shares must be cumulative without limit; and 
cannot exceed half of the voting shares. 
Italy: C. Crv. art. 2351; the non-voting shares must not be more than half of all 
shares. 
a2s Italy: C. CIV. art. 2348. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37· 
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represent; 329 in other countries which have no similar statutes, 
this stratagem would probably be regarded as a violation of the 
general rule that all shares vote. 
So far as European laws permit departure from the principle of 
voting in proportion to investment, the departure tends to dissipate 
control, rather than to concentrate it. Belgium furnishes an extreme 
example, with her law that a majority owner can never cast a 
majority of votes; a single voter cannot vote more than one-fifth of 
the shares outstanding, nor cast more than two-fifths of the votes 
cast at any meeting. 330 This is a rule of public policy, not alterable by 
the charter. Owning fifty-one percent of the stock is therefore no 
gua,rantee of control, unless the fifty-one percent is distributed 
among three different shareholders, who vote in harmony. Happily, 
this provision is not mandatory in other countries; the German law 
mentions it, but only as a permissible clause in the charter.331 
At the same.time, France and Belgium offer a very interesting in-
stitution for recognizing investment without a grant of proportion-
ate voting power. American lawyers will recall the problems which 
arose in the days of high-par stock with regard to mines or patents 
or good will exchanged for stock; if later events showed the prop-
erty to be worth less than the par value of the stock, the contributors 
were in danger of liability.332 This problem was solved in France 
and Belgium by invention of "founders' " and "beneficial" shares; 333 
they are also known in Italy.334 These do not purport to be contribu-
tions to capital, and do not share in capital distribution on liquida-
tion; hence the specific value of the property contributed becomes 
immaterial. But these shares do receive dividends, just like other 
shares. 
We have mentioned them at this point, because they do not neces-
... Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 74, as amended by Law of Nov. ro, 1953, art. r, § 4· 
France: Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. r. 
Netherlands: C. CoM. art. 44b. 
830 C. CoM. I, IX, art. 76. 
331 AktG art. II4 ( 1). See also N eth. C. CoM. art. 44b. 
882 BALLANTINE on CORPORATIONS, 789 (Rev. ed. 1946); LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS, 399 ff. (1959); STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 842 ff, 
(2nd ed. 1949). 
833 See HAMEL, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 566-68 (1954). 
For statutory recognition of these types of shares, see: 
Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 75· 
France: Law of Jan. 23, 1929, art. r. 
Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. I • 
... Beneficial shares ( azioni di godimento) are mentioned by the statute only in con-
nection with reductions of capital (C. CIV. 2353), but are believed to be usable in a 
variety of other circumstances, 
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sarily have voting rights. In Belgium, they may be given votes, but 
the total votes ascribed to such shares must not exceed half the votes 
ascribed to regular ("capital") shares; in counting ·votes, theirs 
must not be counted for more than two-thirds of the total counted 
for regular shares. 33~ 
These special shares can be used in various ways to adjust voting 
power in a jointly-owned enterprise. If voting power is to be divided 
in a different ratio from profits, most of the shares (e.g., 9990) 
may be "beneficial shares," in the ratio desired for profit division, 
with a very small number of ordinary shares (e.g., 10) divided in 
the ratio desired for control. 
There remain two more vote-shifting devices in French law 
which hold some interest for an American investor. One is the per-
mission to create shares which have a double vote, when they have 
been held in registered (not bearer) form for two years. 336 Al-
though this device was probably originated as a means of keeping 
American speculators from gaining control of French enterprises at 
times of currency devaluation,337 and the charter may exclude 
foreigners from acquiring the double vote, 338 there is nothing now 
to prevent its being used to protect an American plurality. Another 
device is to exclude from attendance at meetings holders of less than 
a given number of shares, which may be set as high as 20, or one-
twenty-thousandth ( .ooo 5) of the total capital (whichever is 
higher) .339 We mention these without any recommendation as to 
when they might be used, because we suspect that under most cir-
cumstances they would do more harm than good. 
Various other devices employed in the United States to stabilize 
management in the presence of divided ownership are unavailable 
in the Community countries, and the voting trust (like other varie-
ties of trust) is unknown, except in the Netherlands. 
Voting agreements between different groups of security holders 
are evidently in use, but their enforceability is dubious at best. In 
France, any agreement which limits the voting freedom of a stock 
company shareholder is declared to be invalid.340 However, the law 
is not thought to forbid caucuses in which groups of shareholders 
agree as to how they will vote, without actually binding themselves; 
335 C. CoM. I, IX, art. 75· 
386 Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. I. 
387 See HAMEL, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 547 (1954). 
838 Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. 1. 
380 Ibid. 
840 Law of Nov. 13, 1933, art. 4, as amended by Decree-Law August 31, 1937· 
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nor does it apply to agreements among governing board members. 
The law does not purport to apply to limited liability companies; 
voting agreements as to them are presumably valid, and may be 
further cemented by the previously mentioned restrictions on share 
transfers, 341 and appointment of a manager for an indefinite or a 
long term who cannot be removed without cause.342 
In Germany, there is no law against voting agreements, but there 
is a criminal law against giving a consideration for a stock com-
pany shareholder's vote.343 Presumably this does not forbid an ex-
change of voting promises among shareholders, but penalizes the 
takiqg of some extraneous monetary consideration. 
In Belgium, a leading commentator believes that all voting agree-
ments are invalid.344 An earlier Italian view to the same effect has 
recently given way to the view that agreements among shareholders 
as to how they will vote their own stock are legal; but they will not 
be specifically enforced, and a shareholder cannot separate himself 
from the voting power. 
Possibilities of proxy control may also be considered. In France 
and Germany it appears that proxies can never be irrevocable; 345 
a Belgian commentator believes they can be irrevocable there, 
within reasonable limits.346 There are no such rules about proxy 
solicitation as we have in the United States under section I4 of the 
Securities Exchange Act, but the Netherlands forbid solicitation 
by members of the governing board.347 In other countries, manage-
ment solicitation of proxies is apparently untrammeled, and "proxy 
control" exists in many large European companies. But this would 
seem to be of little interest to American investors in subsidiaries or 
affiliates, since the shareholders are unlikely to be so dispersed as to 
make proxy control effective. 
Only in the Netherlands do we find clear judicial approval of 
voting agreements among public shareholders,348 and common usage 
of a well-recognized medium for company control by agreement of 
the investors-the voting trust. This operates much like an Ameri-
"'
1 Law of March 7, 1925, art. 22. 
"'
2 I d. art. 24. 
348 AktG § 299· 
au VANRYN, I PRIN. DE DROIT COMMERCIAL No. 707 (1954). 
845 France: HAMEL, op. cit. supra note 337, No. 533· 
Germany: AktG § 114(4). 
840 VAN RYN, op. cit. supra note 344, No. 689. 
347 W.K. art. 44a. 
348 Hooge Raad, June 30, 1944, Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 1944, No. 465. 
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can voting trust. It is of considerable interest to American partici-
pants in a "joint investment" with Dutch investors; they might agree 
on a board of voting trustees which contained representatives of 
each investing group, plus some neutral party chosen from a Dutch 
bank (for instance), or even from another country. 
3· KINDS OF SHARES: DEGREES OF NEGOTIABILITY 
In the matter of shares, European companies have a variety of 
forms which have no parallel in America. Our kind of shares-
registered in the name of the owner, but negotiable by indorsement 
and delivery-does not exist in Europe. Instead, they have three 
other kinds of shares, one of which is found in limited liability com-
panies, and the other two in stock companies. 
For simplicity, we will start with the limited liability company 
share (called part, Anteil, parte, and deelbewijs, in the various 
languages) . It is more like a share in an American partnership than 
like a share in an American corporation. It is never negotiable, 
never eligible for public issue, never listed on stock exchanges, and 
frequently transferable only with consent of the company or the 
other shareholders.349 It resembles a share in an American corpora-
tion only in that it is a unit of stated value, identical with others 
in the same company. 
In stock companies, the share is so differently conceived by 
Europeans that they give it a different name from the limited 
liability company share. It is an action, A ktie, azione, or aandeel, 
and it is so distinctive that in Germany and Italy this kind of 
company is named for the kind of shares it issues-A ktiengesell-
schaft or societa per azioni. The outstanding feature about the 
stock company share is the fact that it can be put in a negotiable 
form, which can be transferred endlessly from owner to owner 
... Not all these negative characteristics are explicitly stated in the limited liability 
statutes; more often they are implied from the fact that the statute used the word which 
applies to partnership shares, rather than the word which applies to stock company 
shares, and fails to authorize negotiable features. See the following: 
Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 124-25 (shares not transferable even between parties 
without entry on company books). 
France: Law of March 7, 1925, art. 22-23 (shares not transferable without consent 
of fellow-shareholders; transfer ineffective for any purpose until registered). 
Germany: GmbHG § 15 (share transfers must be notarized). 
Italy: C. Crv. art. 2479 (no special provisions, but no such authorization for bearer 
certificates as is made for stock companies). 
Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 189 (no transfer without consent of other share-
holders). 
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with no registration, just like money; this form is the "bearer 
share" (action au porteur, lnhaberaktie, azione al portatore, aan-
deel aan tonder) .350 
The bearer share is the typical share in publicly held European 
stock companies, with many interesting consequences. One of these 
is that when war breaks out, shareholders who are nationals of an 
enemy country, but whose identity is unknown, may be able to sell 
the.ir holdings in Switzerland, rather than having them seized as 
enemy property at the home of the company. Another consequence 
is that the principal holders of shares in large companies may 
readily remain unknown, so that questions of "control" which have 
become prominent in proceedings of the American Securities Ex-
change Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, or Anti-
Trust Division can hardly be even discussed in Europe. Likewise, 
there is unlikely to be any knowledge of the ''insider trading" which 
has given rise in this country to statutory liabilities under Securities 
Exchange Act section 16 (b) or Securities Exchange Commission 
Rule X-ra-b-5. 
The absence of a record of ownership has necessarily led to 
other practices which are unknown in the United States. Share 
certificates have attached to them coupons which are deposited in 
banks for collection of dividends, like American interest coupons, 
even though the amount of the dividend varies each year, or may be 
nothing. The company has no idea as to who is the recipient of the 
dividend, and cannot report him to the income tax collector. In 
order to establish the right to vote, certificates may be deposited 
with a bank, which certifies as to the number deposited, and gener-
ally exercises the owner's proxy.351 If the owner does not give direc-
tions, the banker exercises his own judgment. In this way, share-
holder apathy in Europe gives great power to bankers instead of, 
as in the United States, to company management. 
The other kind of sha-re in a stock company we will call qy the 
familiar American name of "registered share," although some 
writers prefer to call it "nominative share" (action nominative, 
850 Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 45· 
France: C. CoM. art. 35· 
Germany: AktG § ro. 
Italy: C. Crv. art. 2355· 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 37· 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 38c, g8d. 
351 The proxy-holder must disclose that he votes as agent, in Belgium and Luxem-
bourg. It is forbidden to vote "as owner" shares belonging to another. Belg. C. CoM. 
I, IX, art. 200; Lux. Company Law art. 162. 
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N amensaktie, azione nominativa, aandeel op naam). Although 
bearer shares are generally preferred by European investors, reg-
istered shares play a considerable role. 
In Italy, there are currently no bearer shares. Measures of eco-
nomic warfare, adopted almost twenty years ago, required that all 
shares be put in registered form.352 These have been kept in effect, 
presumably for the aid which they give to enforcement of taxes, 
exchange control, and other legislation. 
In other countries, too, shares are sometimes required to be 
registered for financial reasons. Everywhere, shares must be re-
gistered until their full value has been paid in to the company. 353 
Under the codes of French inspiration, shares which are issued in 
exchange for property are required to be registered for a "cooling 
off period," 354 or else (in Luxembourg) deposited in the company 
treasury.355 The objective is to delay speculative trading until the 
securities are adequately "seasoned." Where governing board 
members are required to be shareholders, the required shares must 
be registered in their names.356 
How great a disadvantage it is to have a share in registered, in-
stead of bearer form, we have not been able to tell. It seems clear 
that outside of Italy, shares must be in bearer form in order to be 
acceptable to buyers on organized security markets. But in Italy, 
share trading seems to have revived on and off the exchanges with-
out the aid of bearer shares. Since the registered share has not long 
been an article of commerce, we suspect that the European law ts 
852 Decree-Laws of Oct. 25, 1941, No. 1148; March 29, 1942, No. 239· 
853 Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 46. 
France: Law of r867, art. 3, as amended by Decree of Dec. 7, 1954 {all shares regis-
tered until fully paid for). 
Germany: AktG § ro{2). 
Italy: C. CIV. art. 2355. 
Luxembourg: Company Law, art. 43· 
Netherlands: W.K. art. 38c. 
354 Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 47 (until ten days after the company's second annual 
report is published). 
France: Law of r867, art. 3, as amended by Decree of Dec. 7, 1954 {shares "not 
negotiable" and certificates not to be issued until two years after incorporation). 
Italy: Cf. C. C1v. art. 2343 {shares issued for property not transferable at all until 
property is appraised by an expert, and appraisal reviewed by board members and 
auditors). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 44 {shares not negotiable until ro days after the 
second annual report of the company is published} 47· 
"""Company Law art. 47 § 2. 
356 Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 57· 
France: Law of 1867, art. 26 (further, certificates must be deposited in company 
treasury, and stamped to show that they are not transferable). 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 54· 
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much like that of the United States before adoption of the Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act; that is, somewhat unsettled, but not wholly in-
compatible with reasonable stock trading. 
4· FORMALITIES REQUIRED TO INCREASE CAPITAL 
We have mentioned before that the capital stated in the articles 
of association must have been 100% subscribed at that time. And 
unless it has all been paid in, no more may be offered. Consequently, 
the governing board cannot casually sell some additional shares 
":hen the market seems favorable, and when the company needs the 
money. 
In most kinds of companies, any addition to equity capital must 
start with an amendment of the charter, accomplished by a statutory 
majority of the shareholders. The increased capital must also be 
100% subscribed before the increase is fully effective. There may be 
further requirements to ensure that all the subscriptions are fully 
paid.357 The principal exception is the Netherlands, in which the 
liberty of forming a company with only one-fifth of its capital sub-
scribed applies also to capital increases.358 
Two countries-France and Germany-permit the original char-
ter to contain authorization for the capital increase. In France, a 
company with this power is called a stock company "with variable 
capital," (societe anonyme a capital variable) and must so de-
scribe itself. It can revise its capital downward as well as upward.359 
In Germany, there is an arrangement known as "authorized capi-
tal" (genehmigtes Kapital) ,360 but it works quite differently from 
"authorized capital" in the United States.361 When the decision to 
increase is made, the increased capital must be 100% subscribed 
and 20% paid in, just like the original capital. The only advantage 
over an amendment to increase capital is that the decision may be 
made by the executive board, rather than by the shareholders. 
The necessity for roo% subscription of the capital which a com-
pany has power to issue is a very real one. If less than roo% is 
357 All the limited liability laws, and some of the stock company laws are silent on 
increase of capital; in these circumstances, lawyers apply by analogy the provisions 
for original issue of capital, which have been described earlier in connection with 
corporate formation. Specific provisions on increasing the capital appear in Germany: 
AktG art. 149-158. Cf. Neth. C. CoM. art. 45d, para. 2. 
"""W.K. art. 36e; 45d, para. 2. 
359 Law of 1867, art. 48-54. Most lawyers see no practical advantage in the use of 
these provisions; they prefer to form a company with fixed capital, and amend later. 
360 AktG ~ 169-173. 
'""See P.UECK, GF.SELLSCHAFTSRECHT 17o-I7I (2nd. ed. 1948). 
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS 133 
subscribed, the increase is not effective; those who have subscribed 
are not bound to pay (unless the capital is formally reduced), and 
the board members are forbidden to issue shares to them.362 
Naturally, European businessmen have learned to avoid any 
such fiasco. The simplest way is to canvass the prospective sub-
scribers b_efore the capital increase is authorized, so that the amount 
authorized may coincide with that which they will actually ·sub-
scribe. This method is practical only where the new shares are to be 
issued to a small, known group. 
A second way to escape the rigidity of the 100% subscription re-
quirement is to put a clause in each subscription agreement that the 
amount of the total capital increase may be reduced without effect· 
on the subscription. Then, when the subscriptions are all in, and 
their amount known, the shareholders may amend their former 
amendment, to adjust the capital increase to the subscriptions ob-
tainable.363 This method is cumbrous, and may tend to cloud the 
atmosphere of confidence in which share subscriptions are best 
solicited. 
A third method is to obtain 100% subscription in advance from 
investment bankers, who thus underwrite the risk that the invest-
ment public will not take the entire issue at the price proposed.364 
This is the standard device used in large public financing operations. 
The importance of having a firm bid seems to be considerably 
greater than in the United States. 
Although the underwriter must promise the issuer to take the 
entire issue, the issuer can never promise the underwriter that he 
will get it. The first opportunity to take the new shares generally be-
longs to the old shareholders. The company laws confer uncondi-
tional pre-emptive rights only in France and Germany,365 but these 
rights appear to exist in all countries, at least unless specifically 
negatived, as permitted by Italian law.366 Pre-emptive rights adhere 
to preferred shares as well as to common-a factor which aggra-
vates companies' reluctance to issue preferred shares. Because of 
362 France: Law of I 867, art. 7, 42. 
Germany: AktG § 152, 84 (executive board members liable); cf. AktG § 158. 
363 Belgium: VANRYN, DROIT CoMMERCIAL no. 489 (1954); Fredericq, 4 DROIT CoM-
MERCIAL 494-95 (1950), quoting parliamentary debates of 1870. 
France: HAMEL, DROIT CoMMERCIAL 713-14 no. 591 ( 1954); Escarra, Some Points of 
Comparison between the Companies Act, 1948, and the French Law of Companies, II 
CAMB. L. ]. 15 (1951). 
864 Escarra, supra note 363. 
365 France: Decree-Law of Aug. 8, 1935. 
Germany: AktG § 153 . 
... C. Crv. 2441. 
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the European recognition of indefeasible pre-emptive rights, un-
derwriting arrangements generally have a contingent element; what 
the underwriter agrees to take is what the shareholders reject.367 
C. FINANCING WITH BORROWED FUNDS 
Most American investors will be much more interested in obtain-
ing outside financing in the form of borrowed funds than in the form 
of stock subscriptions. Aside from the problems of divided owner-
ship, there is the important fact that debt interest is generally de-
ductible from taxable income (just as in the United States), while 
dividends on stock (even preferred stock) never are. We have been 
warned of only a few exceptions to the deductibility rule. In France, 
interest is not deductible when paid to shareholders under circum-
stances that lend themselves to disguised equity investments; 368 in 
the Netherlands, contingent interest is sometimes non-deductible.369 
I. TRADING ON THE EQUITY; 
OBSTACLES TO THE USE OF "LEVERAGE" 
Some other classical advantages of borrowing money-summed 
up in the phrase, "trading on the equity, "-are probably also 
present in Europe, but with qualifications which must not be 
ignored. One of the presuppositions of "trading on the equity" is 
that interest rates are lower than dividend rates. Here we must 
notice that the same kind of inversion recently observed in the 
United States may exist in Europe. That is, the interest rate may 
become higher (or at least as high as) the dividend rate. In 1959, 
the German Central Bank Discount rate fluctuated between 2-%,% 
and 3%, which would mean a rate of at least a percent higher to 
commercial borrowers. In August, the average yield on stocks 
listed on German stock exchanges was 2-%,%.370 Hence, the cost of 
equity capital was apparently lower than the cost of borrowed 
capital. 
Perhaps the modern. theory of "trading on the equity" rests not 
so much on a difference in contemporaneous income rates, as upon 
867 For an interesting account of an international underwriting of a European share 
offering, see Bross and Alpern, International Equity Financilig, 13 Bus. LAW. 440 
(April 1958). 
368 Professor Houin advises that deductibility is denied as to interest paid on debts 
owed to shareholders when ( r) the interest exceeds a certain rate, or ( 2) the debts 
so owed amount to more than half the equity capital. 
369 In cases of "participating" bonds, whose "interest" rate rises in proportion to 
company profits, the tax collector asserts a right to regard part of the participation as a 
distribution of profit, rather than a payment of interest. 
370 First Nat. City Bank of N.Y., For. Inf. Serv., Feb., Aug., Oct., 1959. 
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a supposition that dividend rates will rise (in relation to the initial 
investment), while interest rates will not. This supposition would 
also be belied by important features of the European financial scene. 
The most important of these is the decline of fixed interest obliga-
tions, and their partial replacement by obligations which "inflate." 
The inflatable securities are of three types. One type is the bond 
convertible into stock; it is essentially like the well known con-
vertible debenture of American finance (although the problem of 
providing the shares for conversion presents special legal difficulties 
because of the European limitations on "authorized stock"). 871 A 
second type is the "participating" bond, on which the interest to be 
paid varies with the income of the company. It should not be re-
garded as equivalent to the "contingent interest" bonds which were 
issued chiefly in reorganizations of insolvent American companies, 
and which had a fairly low top limit on the maximum interest to be 
paid (for instance, 2% fixed and 3% contingent). The European 
variable interest bond generally permits an unlimited increase in 
the income rate as the company income rises, the objective being to 
let the purchasing power of the interest escape from the deadly 
embrace of the sinking franc (or other currency). 372 
A third type of inflatable bond-and the most unlike any in-
vestment familiar to Americans-is the "indexed" bond, in which 
the interest to be paid, and the principal to be repaid, rise in propor-
tion to increases in some official index, such as the index of whole-
sale prices, or the cost-of-living index.313 
Obviously, all these forms of debt security diminish greatly the 
possibility of "trading on the equity." The convertible bond tends to 
limit the leverage to the time before conversion, after which the 
advantage disappears. The "variable interest" bond tends to take 
away all leverage. The indexed bond may even have a reverse 
leverage, if the company's profits have the misfortune to rise less 
than the increase in the relevant price index. 
Naturally, the flight from fixed interest has been most marked 
in the countries where currency devaluation has been felt most 
sharply. In 19 54, French nationalized industries borrowed 3 billions 
on fixed income securities, against 67 billion on participating or 
indexed securities, according to a study of European finance. Private 
industries borrowed, respectively, 9 billions and 35 billions in the 
371 ALAMIGEON, MULOT, and PLAGNOL, LES INVESTISSEMENTS DES ENTREPRISES, 65-71 
(1958). 
370 Alamigeon treats this as one kind of "indexed" bond.Jd. 64-65. 
373 I d. 63-64. 
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same categories, respectively.374 Writing in January of I959, our 
French collaborator declares, "For practical purposes, the only debt 
securities presently being issued by companies in France are either 
securities with variable interest, or convertible securities; fixed 
interest securities of the classic type are becoming more and more 
scarce." He reports that in 1957, only one billion out of 59 billions 
of bonds were of non-inflatable types. 
However, there has been a change in the choice of inflatable 
media. While the earlier reports emphasized the use of what we 
call "indexed" bonds, the most recent issues are of the "participat-
ing" type. A financial regulation issued at the close of I 9 58 (con-
temporaneously with the relaxation of currency controls) forbade 
the issue of bonds indexed to the minimum wage or cost of living, 
but imposed no obstacles to bonds whose interest varies with the 
fort~nes of the enterprise, as measured by revenues or profits.375 
Apparently there has been no comparable development in other 
European countries. In Italy, which has also experienced severe 
currency depreciation, there has been little use of inflatable debt 
securities. Equity financing has displaced debt financing to a marked 
extent; in I 9 55, the ratio of private share issues to private bond 
issues was I 62 to 9; and it had been growing steadily.376 
The O.E.E.C. report on Germany also pointed to a tremendous 
predominance of equity issues over debt issues (I 56 to 9 in 
19 55) ; 377 convertible offerings disappeared after a brief flurry in 
195 I and 1952.378 In the Belgium-Luxembourg Monetary Union, 
which has had the stablest of the European currencies since I 94 5, 
there have been no notable developments of any of the three types of 
inflatable debt securities.379 
2. LIMITS ON DEBT OBLIGATIONS 
As in America, the principal forms of debt obligations are (I) 
bonds, designed for sale to a variety of investors, and ( 2) bank 
3
" O.E.E.C., THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
So (1957). This report appears to use "indexed" to include interest varying with factors 
extraneous to the enterprise (like the cost of living), and "participating" to designate 
interest varying with the gross revenues, operating income, or net profit of the enter-
prise. 
Some later figures appear in Vasseur, LE DROIT DE LA REFORME DES STRUCTURES 181 
(1959). 
"'
5 Ordinance of Dec. 30, 1958, portant loi de finances pour 19597 art. 79· 
376 O.E.E.C., op. cit. 97· 
377 !d. 82. 
308 !d. 83 • 
..,. /d. 92-93· 
ORGANIZING FOR BUSINESS 137 
loans, which may be discounted among banks, . but which are not 
available to a broad investing public. 
However, many companies are incapable of issuing bonds. This 
is true of limited liability companies in Belgium, France, Italy and 
Luxemhourg.aRu This limitation is apparently based on the belief 
that the streamlined organization of limited liability companies 
deprives the investor of the protection which he has in buying the 
bond of a stock company. When limited liability companies bor-
row money, they must borrow it from banks, which are professional 
lenders; the rule against issuing bonds is not construed to forbid 
giving notes to banks. This does not mean that limited liability 
companies have access only to short term credit; bank loans in 
Europe include "medium term" and even "long term" credits. 
Another distinctive limit on the use of bonds is the Italian pro-
vision which, with certain exceptions, limits the bonds which a stock 
company may issue to the amount of its capital stock.381 
J. SOURCES OF CREDIT 
Observers of European finance over the past fifteen years stress 
the scarcity of investment funds during most of this period in rela-
tion to the exaggerated demands of post-war reconstruction. In 
addition to these factors, which operated equally on equity capital 
and borrowed capital, there was a special aversion to lending, in-
spired by the experience of inflation and the expectation of more of 
the same.382 
Because of these factors, the European governments were obliged 
to create or encourage new institutions with the specific function of 
supplying credit to industry on a longer term than commercial banks 
were prepared to do.383 Most of this credit is what is called "inter-
mediate term," ranging from one to five years, but often with an 
expection of renewal so that it fulfills the economic function of true 
long-term credit. 
In France, the outstanding institution of this type is the Credit 
""'Belgium: C. CoM. I, IX, art. 131. 
France: Law of March 7, 1925, art. 4· 
Italy: C. Czv. 2486. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 188 (forbidding public issue). 
381 C. Czv. art. 2410. 
382 See O.E.E.C., THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
EUROPE (1957), and Supplements I and II, containing detailed studies of Finance in 
Austria, Germany, United States, Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy; VASSEUR, DROIT 
DE LA REFORME DES STRUCTURES INDUSTR!ELLES ( 1959) 178 ff. 
383 See O.E.E.C., op. cit. note 382, at 45 ff. 
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National.384 It acts by discounting notes taken by commercial banks, 
and rediscounting them to the Bank of France or another central 
bank. The net cost of the loan is based on the Bank of France dis-
count rate plus the discounts and commissions of intervening agen-
cies. A 1958 report indicated that the rate to a borrower would be 
7.6% at a time when the Bank of France discount rate was 5%; a~5 
the latter rate was reported in 1959 as low as 4?i %.381) 
In addition to the Credit National, which extends intermediate 
credit, France has the Credit Foncier, which extends long term 
credit secured by real estate, and some smaller semi-public credit 
institutions with various specialities. These institutions, including 
the Credit National, are tremendously important; they are the 
principal source of fixed-interest credit.387 In a year in which private 
and nationalized companies succeeded in borrowing only 12 billions 
from the public in fixed-interest obligation, the Credit N a tiona! 
rediscounted 46 billions in fixed-interest notes. In the same year 64 
billions were raised by private and nationalized industrial companies 
by participating or indexed bonds.388 The activities of the Credit 
National may decline if the recent stabilization of the French 
economy results in a revival of private lending at fixed interest. 
But at our last reports, private industry's needs for finance depended 
very heavily on the Credit National. 
Semi-public and public lending institutions play a prominent role 
also in most of the other countries of the Market, although statistics 
on their activities are not equally available. In Italy, the most im-
portant three are the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano ( I.M.I.), which 
makes direct loans to industry, and the Mediocredito which dis-
counts industrial loans made by private banks. Both are owned by 
the state.389 In Germany, there is the state-owned Kreditanstalt 
fur Wiederaufbau ( KfW) which had outstanding loans or loan 
commitments of 5,790 DM in 1954, compared with 741 DM loans 
by the largest private long-term lender, the Industriekreditbank 
( I.K.B.). 390 
In Belgium, the principal resource available for intermediate 
384 I d. 54 ff. Alamigeon, op. cit., note 372 at n6 ff. Vasseur, op. cit. note 282 at 253 ff. 
385 Alamigeon, op. cit. note 372, at 120. 
380 First Nat. City Bank of N.Y., For. Inf. Serv., March" 1959. 
887 Alamigeon, op. cit. note 372, at roo--126; O.E.E.C., op. cit. 57-58. 
388 O.E.E.C., op. cit. note 383 at 54, So. 
389 I d. 59-62. 
800 Jd. 5 I-54• 
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and long-term credit since I 946 has been the semi-public loan com-
panies, of which only one-the Societe N ationale de Credit a 
l'Industrie-makes loans to industry.391 Not only has it been the 
principal source of such funds, but it also offers subsidized interest 
rates as low as 2% for the development of facilities designed to 
relieve unemployment in depressed areas. Private banks also ex-
tended intermediate credit, but under substantial handicaps.392 An 
avenue for increased industrial financing by private banks was 
opened by measures taken in 1959, permitting private banks to make 
long term loans, subsidized or guaranteed by the government. 
So far as we can determine, the facilities of these public and semi-
public lending institutions are just as available to American-owned 
enterprises as they are to locally owned ones; we know of some 
American-owned enterprises who have had no difficulty in using 
their facilities. If their attitudes differ from those of purely private 
lenders, it is chiefly in insisting that the borrowing enterprise should 
be of apparent benefit to the national economy. Although there may 
be a gradual expansion of the market for private financing in the 
coming years, we believe that many American owned enterprises 
will continue to find their cheapest and most satisfactory source of 
financing in government-owned credit institutions. 
4· INTERNATIONAL CREDIT SOURCES 
We have spoken of credit entirely in national terms-French 
credit institutions for France, Italian credit institutions for Italy. 
Such is certainly the existing pattern of European credit; the 
reasons are many and obvious. For one thing, most of the credit is 
not spontaneous profit-seeking activity, but is supplied directly or 
indirectly by the government to help the industry in the country 
whose government supplies the credit. The hazards of fluctuating 
currencies have offered a further obstacle to international credit.393 
But it is obvious that if there is to be a truly European develop-
ment of industry and commerce, there must be a truly European 
supply of credit. Two possible forerunners of a European credit 
supply are now visible on the horizon. 
One of these is the European Investment Bank, provided for by 
891 ld. 6z-6 5· 
"""!d. 35-36. 
3911 Bye, Localisation de l'lnvestissement et Communaute Economique Europeenne, 
REVUE EcoNoMIQUE 1958, 188, 
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the Treaty of Rome. Its members, and the contributors of its capi-
tal, are to be the six countries of the Community. Its purposes are 
stated as follows: 
The task of the European Investment Bank shall be to 
contribute, by calling on the capital markets and its own 
resources, to the balanced and smooth development of the 
Common Market in the interest of the Community. For 
this purpose, the Bank shall by granting loans and guar-
antees on a non-profit-making basis facilitate the financing 
of the following projects in all sectors of the economy: 
(a) projects for developing less developed regions; 
(b) projects for modernising or converting enterprises 
or for creating new activities which are called for by the 
'progressive establishment of the Common Market where 
such projects by their size or nature cannot be entirely 
financed by the various means available in each of the 
Member States; and 
(c) projects of common interest to several Member 
States which by their size or nature cannot be entirely 
financed by the various means available in each of the 
Member States.394 
In its first two years of operation, the bank made seven loans, 
all of which had some special appeal to the interests of the Com-
munity. Six of these were in under-developed areas-two in southern 
Italy, two in southern France, one in Sicily, and one in Sardinia. 
The other was in Luxembourg. Four of the loans were for electric 
power generation, and three for chemical plants.395 An American 
company-Union Carbide-was an indirect beneficiary of one of 
the loans, through its part ownership in the new Italian company to 
which the loan was made.396 So far as conclusions can be drawn from 
so short a history, American investors are not barred from bene-
fitting from European Investment Bank loans (at least, not when 
they are joint investors). But priorities will go to projects which 
promise to beget further productive products. The Bank's Board of 
Directors reports, 
The projects to which the Bank has agreed so far, 
belong to the category of development investments in-
tended for increasing basic productions which, in turn, 
contribute to increased demand, production, and invest-
... Treaty art. 130. 
895 European Investment Bank, Annual Report (1959) 16-19. 
896 /d. ( 1958) zo-zz. 
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ment in many related fields. They are nearly all situated 
in the less developed areas of the Community, require 
fairly large amounts and are by their very nature, highly 
capital-intensive. 397 
In the private banking sector, the commercial banks of the 
various countries have recognized the probable call for international 
loans. They are preparing for it to the extent of making contacts 
between banks, so that coordinated loans can be made in (for in-
stance) francs and marks. 398 But there is no present prospect of a 
single private bank which will make a loan to a wholly out-of-state 
company, as is done every day inN ew York or Chicago.399 
D. SECURITIES REGULATION j PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
OF SECURITIES 
It is commonly said that European countries, except Belgium, 
have no securities or "blue sky" laws, and no securities commissions. 
This is true. But this does not mean that Europe is like America 
would be if all the securities and blue sky laws were repealed. 
European countries have a considerable number of laws and regula-
tions which restrict security offerings, and which we will briefly 
explain. 
397 I d. ( 19 59) 14. For further comment on the possible role of the European Invest-
ment Bank, see Vasseur, op. cit. supra note 382, 351 if. 
398 Vasseur (op. cit. note 382, at 357) reports the following international organizations 
to promote international loans: 
Societe Europeenne de Developpement Industriel, a stock company formed by one 
French and one German bank (the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, and the Deutsche 
Bank) to investigate and arrange cooperation between banks and other companies of 
the two countries. 
Societe Franco-Italienne de Developpement Industriel, a stock company formed by 
one French bank and two Italian banks (the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, and the Instituto Mohiliare Italiano) for parallel pur-
poses. 
Groupement Franco-Allemand pour le Marche Commun, an informal association of 
several French and German banks to consult on concurrent participation in loans to 
Common Market enterprises. The banks include (for France) Banque Fran(aise du 
Commerce Exterieur, Banque Louis-Dreyfus et Cie, Banque de !'Union Parisienne, 
Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale, Societe Generale Alsacienne de Banque, and (for 
Germany) Bankhaus Hardy and Co. GMBH, Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim Jr. and Cie., 
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank, Dresdner Bank AG. 
Another informal association groups banks of five countries, comprising Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft, Credit Commercial de France, Compagnie Financiere de Paris, 
Banque Lambert (Brussels), Banca di Credito Finanziario Mediobanca (Milan), Com-
pagnie d'Outremer pour l'Industrie et la Finance (Brussels), Pierson Heldring et Pier-
son (Amsterdam), MM. de Rothschild Freres (Paris). 
399 Vasseur (op. cit. note 382, at 357-358) prognosticates hopefully, but without detail, 
direct appeals by companies of one country to investors of another. 
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I. EXCLUSION OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
The law about public offerings by limited liability companies is 
very simple. No public stock offerings of limited liability companies 
are permitted in any country, and no public bond offerings except in 
Germany.400 The theory of these laws is that the simplified structure 
permitted for limited liability companies-a single manager, with 
no watchdog auditors-affords so little investor protection that the 
solicitation of investment by strangers cannot be permitted. 
2. REGISTRATION OF STOCK OFFERINGS 
The absence of separate "securities laws" in most European coun-
tries is somewhat illusory because there are certain features built 
into the European stock company laws which contain the basic 
elements of American "securities registration," as well as features 
which may recall the reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange 
Act.4ol 
We will start with the German stock company law, which is the 
most elaborate. When new stock is offered, each buyer must write 
his signature on a declaration which discloses the number of shares 
of each class offered and their offering price, and names a date on 
which subscribers will be released if 100% of the capital has not 
been subscribed.402 If shares are to be exchanged for property, the 
declaration must also show the name of the person making the ex-
change, the identity of the property, and the par value of the shares 
for which it is being exchanged.403 When all the stock has been sub-
scribed, the company managers must file as a public record copies of 
400 Belgium: As to shares, deduced from C. CoM. I, IX, art. II9 (limiting number of 
shareholders to so, and excluding corporations), 126 (restricting transfer) etc.; as to 
bonds, expressly stated by art, 13 I. 
France: Law of March 7, 1925, art. 4 (forbidding public issue of securities of any 
kind). 
Germany: GmbHG § 3, 5 (requiring that entire capital be subscribed by incor-
porators). 
Italy: As to shares, the result is deduced from C. Crv. art. 2472, which forbids issuing 
"azioni," meaning negotiable shares. As to bonds, C. Crv. 2486 forbids their issue. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 188 . 
..,_For some general comparisons of the regulation of security issue in United States 
and Europe, see Kessler, The American Securities Act and Its Foreign Counterparts, 
44 YALE L. J. II33 (1935); LEVY, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CONTROL 408-428 
(1950); Neff, A Civil Law Answer to the Problems of Securities Regulations, 28 VA. 
L. REV. 1025 (1942). 
•oa AktG § 152. 
<OS Id. arts. 152(1), 150. 
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the subscription certificates, of the contracts for issue of shares in 
exchange for property, a statement of the expenses of the flotation, 
and the governmental authorization (if required) for the offering.404 
They must also publish a notice of the completed stock subscrip-
tion, which includes a statement of the subscription price and of the 
property exchanged for shares (if any) . 405 
In France, capital increases are treated just like the original 
formation of the company. Subscribers must sign a subscription 
contract which discloses the name, purposes, and home office of the 
company, which shows how many shares will be paid for in cash and 
how many in property, and which tells where subscription payments 
are to be escrowed until the required sum is completed.406 If prop-
erty is exchanged for shares, there must be an auditors' report and a 
meeting of shareholders to approve the exchange.407 The amend-
ment which authorized the capital increase, and a certified copy of 
the subscribers' list, must be publicly filed, and a notice published in 
the Bulletin of Compulsory Legal Notices.408 
With variations in detail, there are similar provisions in the com-
pany law of Italy and Luxembourg to assure that the subscribers 
know what they are buying, and to make a public record of the fact 
of subscription.409 
Only in the Netherlands is the solicitation of subscriptions sub-
stantially unregulated by law, like intra-state solicitation in Dela-
ware and New Jersey. But the absense of legislation is supplied, at 
least in part, by rules on registration of securities for trading on 
stock exchanges. These are rules imposed by the brokerage frater-
nity, which, like many other professional groups in the Netherlands, 
exercise substantial powers of economic control. The significance of 
stock exchange regulations is considerable; since there is no well-
developed "over the counter" market outside the exchanges, the 
exchanges comprise the only market that exists. 
J. LICENSING OF PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
In spite of the absence of "Securities Commissions," it is neces-
sary in every country but Luxembourg to obtain either the authori-
""'I d. art. 155· 
too I d. art. 157. 
•o• Law of 1867, as amended by Decree of Aug. 4, 1949, art. 28. 
""'Law of 1867, art. 4· 
'
08 Law of 1867, art. 55-57, 59· 
""'Italy: C. Crv. art. 2333-2336. 
Luxembourg: Company Law art. 33-36. 
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zation or the acquiescence of some public official before a public 
offering is made, at least for very large offerings.410 
The principal difference between these systems and those of 
American security commissioners lies in the criteria of the authoriza-
tion. In Europe, the main purpose is to prevent "disturbance of the 
market." 411 Only in Belgium is the regulation of public issues 
avowedly designed partly to protect investors. The prevailing 
theory is that if too many securities were offered at a time, the 
market would be glutted, to the damage of all the concurrent 
offerors. European commentators emphasize the "thinness" of the 
European investment market-the limited amount of funds look-
ing for placement. In most of the years since I 94 5, European 
markets have been "thin" as a result of the devastation of war, 
complicated by narrow national boundaries, which funds cannot 
pass without exchange permits. With financial recovery, and the 
recovery of vigor in European capital markets, licenses have be-
come quite freely obtainable. 
Consistent with the purpose of maintaining market equilibrium, 
licenses are not generally refused, but merely postponed. But they 
are not necessarily postponed in order of application. On the con-
trary, the finance ministries authorize offerings in their order of im-
portance to the national economy. Under this test, government bond 
issues always come first; other issues must wait until government 
bond issues are fully subscribed. After that, priorities are granted 
on a wide variety of economic grounds; an offering which will tend 
to increase facilities of production for export is more desirable than 
one which will merely satisfy domestic consumer demands. An 
offering to finance a plant in a distressed area is more important 
than one for the same purpose in an area of labor scarcity. If there 
410 Belgium: Arrete Royal No. 185 of July 9, 1935, art. 26-34. 
France: Law of Dec. 23, 1946, art. 82. 
Germany: Gesetz iiber den Kapitalverkehr, Dec. 15, 1952. 
Italy: Law of May 3, 1955, No. 428 (offerings over 500 million lira-about $7so,ooo). 
Netherlands: No statute requires licensing, but ( 1) by a gentleman's agreement brokers 
will not handle the shares unless the offering has been approved by the Nederlandse 
Bank, and (2) the Minister of Justice will withhold permission for any incorporation 
or charter amendment until he is satisfied with respect to the financing plans. 
411 The Belgian law discloses two purposes; the offering can be postponed because of 
a tendency to "desequilibrer le marche des capitaux" (art. 28) Arrete Royal of July 9, 
1935, or to "induire les souscripteurs en erreur." (art. 29), Arrete Royal, No. 185 of 
July 9, 1935. The French law declares no purposes, but it is attached to a government 
budget bill, and is reportedly administered chiefly to protect the market for government 
bonds. 
Under the German law, "Die Genehmigung kann versagt werden, wenn Zinssatz, 
Ausgabe- und Riickzahlungsbedingungen bei gleichartigen Wertpapieren wesentlich 
abweichen und bei einer Genehmigung eine nachhaltige Stiirung des Kurs- und Zinsge-
fiiges am Kapitalmarkt zu befiirchten ware." 
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is a national plan of industrial development, as m France, con-
formity to the national plan will be important. 
Another difference in result which flows from the difference in 
purpose is that when money is "easy," licenses are granted with 
great freedom, or a "general license" is granted, which means in 
effect a suspension of the regulationY2 
4· THE BELGIAN BANKING COMMISSION 
Two years after the adoption of the federal Securities Act in the 
United States, Belgium created a "Banking Commission," with 
powers over the public issue of securities.413 Probably the primary 
object of the creation was the supervision of banks, and enforce-
ment of the divorce, ordered by the same law, of investment func-
tions from commercial banking functions. 414 In any event, the 
Belgian Banking Commission, as its name suggests, supervises bank-
ing in general as well as securities issues. 
The powers of the commission over securities issuance rest on 
the narrow basis of the power to postpone for a maximum of three 
months the issue of securities, and to publish its decision (with 
reasons). 415 When one thinks of the great power wielded by the 
American Securities Exchange Commission through granting or 
withholding the acceleration (by a maximum of 20 days) of the 
effective date of registration statements,416 one can perhaps appre-
ciate better the de facto influence of the Belgian commission. 
The Commission's decision to prohibit (temporarily) may be 
based on either of two grounds-that the offering is likely to un-
settle the capital market,417 or that it is likely to mislead investors as 
to the character of the business or the rights conferred by the 
securities.418 In order to inform itself, the Commission is entitled to 
a dossier which might be called a short registration statement, and 
such further information as it may request which may be useful to 
it.419 
Through its power to delay a license, or compel disclosure, or 
"" Alamigeon, op. cit. note 371 supra, at 76. 
413 Arrete Royal No. 185 of July 9, 1935; for a full examination of this decree and 
the operations under it, see PoNLOT, LE STATUT LEGAL DES BANQUES ET LE CoNTRliLE DES 
EMISSIONS DE TITRES ET VALEURS (1958). 
414 See the Report accompanying the decree, printed in Ponlot, op. cit. supra note 413, 
at 314-324; see also O.E.E.C., THE SUPPLY OF FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 35-36 (1957) . 
.,. Arrete Royal No. 185, July 9, 1935, arts. 28, 29. 
416 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 175-178 ( 1951). 
411 Arrete Royal No. 185, July 9, 1935, art. 28. 
418 I d. art. 29. 
419 I d. art. 27, 28. 
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both, the Commission has exercised a profound influence over many 
phases of corporation financial practice which have no immediate 
relation to public offerings. Believing that the purchase of treasury 
shares is a dubious practice, the Commission has induced one com-
pany to adopt provisions (presumably charter amendments) to pre-
vent repetition; another company was induced to cancel treasury 
shares, to preclude reissue.420 Where affiliated companies had bought 
shares in each other, the Commission induced both to liquidate their 
holdings.421 Where shares are issued over par, the Commission re-
quires that the surplus be placed in a reserve, unavailable for 
dividends.422 
The Commission has taken a very lively interest in profit-sharing 
plans· of executive compensation, which have had great post-war 
popularity in Belgium. Many profit sharing plans are based, it 
appears., on the excess over some quantity of profit established many 
years ago, and now outdated by inflation or other factors. In these 
cases, the Commission believes that the compensation plan should 
be revised to raise the profit base above which the profit-sharing 
plan operates.423 Taking a leaf from American practice, the Com-
mission has decided to require a listing of the compensation of the 
governing board members and top executives, with the compensa-
tion of each, and each one's qualifications. 424 However, the registra-
tion statement is not a public document, and the prospectus is not 
required to do more than show the total remuneration to the govern-
ing board members as a group. 
The Commission engages in a host of other activities, none of 
which will amaze an American familiar with the activities of the 
S.E.C., but most of which are foreign to European practice. It re-
quires the disclosure of underwriting arrangements and underwrit-
ing expenses.425 It requires disclosure that the company has paid a 
board member's expenses of legal defense, or that board members 
have conflicts of interest with the corporation.426 In one case it in-
fluenced a company with subsidiaries to present a consolidated 
balance sheet-a rare practice in Europe.427 It has also introduced 
420 Ponlot, op. cit. supra note 413, at 231, 232. 
421 I d. 237. 
422 I d. 235· 
"""Id. 239-41· 
... I d. 264. 
426 Id. 251-52 • 
... I d. zss-s6. 
""[d. 267. Officials of Esso-Standard (France) advised us that they had introduced 
a consolidated balance sheet in France in the late 1950's, hoping that other companies 
would follow suit; but no others did. 
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the use of comparative profit and loss statements covering a period 
of years.428 
These items will suffice to show that the Banking Commission, 
with a relatively small staff and small statutory basis, has an in-
fluence in many directions which recalls securities regulation in 
Washington. The fact that it is alone in doing so will emphasize, at 
the same time, the absence of similar securities regulation in the 
other countries of the mark~;t. 
E. A COMMON MARKET FOR CAPITAL? 
Our dominant impression, as we look at the prospects for Euro-
pean investment, is very different from our impression of the pros-
pects for trade in commodities. For commodities, we envision by 
1970 a truly common market, in which the same kinds of type-
writers will be sold and used in Hamburg as in Palermo, with no 
more difference in price than the cost of commerical freight. They 
cannot be scarce in Amsterdam and plentiful in Venice, nor can the 
available kinds and qualities vary greatly. 
The capital markets are quite different. We start out with differ-
ent company laws, which limit the kinds of securities which com-
panies can issue. German and French companies can make the same 
kinds of typewriters, but German limited liability companies can 
issue bonds, while French cannot. French stock companies' pre-
ferred stock must have voting rights, but German need not. Be-
sides, even the tastes of investors have changed; French investors 
demand inflatable bonds; Germans and Belgians will (to a greater 
extent) accept fixed interest. 
The prospects are also different. While there is a definite 
schedule for eliminating customs and quotas at an arithmetic rate,429 
there is no such formula for eliminating barriers to capital move-
ment. There is not even a firm promise to eliminate them entirely, 
but only "to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the 
Common Market." 430 These weasel words invite wide differences of 
opinion as to what kind of functioning is "proper" in the capital 
markets; if such differences had not existed, it would not have been 
necessary to use such weasel words. 
Although the nations pledge themselves to "co-ordination of 
exchange policies," 431 they say nothing about the licensing of in-
vestment offerings, except what may be implicit in the promise to 
... I d. 27o-'JI. 
<29 Treaty arts. 12-17, 3o-3 7• 
•oo I d. art. 67. 
mId. art. 70(1). 
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"approximate" laws of all kinds which "distort the conditions of 
competition." 432 We must therefore reconcile ourselves to a long-
term continuance of the present diversity of the measures and 
policies of regulation. 
However, diversity alone need not block the development of an 
international market. There is an interstate market for capital 
in the United States, despite the rigors of, and the irrational dif-
ferences between, the blue sky laws of Illinois and Michigan. It 
exists partly because the companies can escape to Delaware, and 
the money can escape to New York, where the requirements of only 
one state and of the federal government must be met. 
To draw a parallel in Europe, we might ask whether European 
investors' money can escape to Luxembourg-a country of notorious 
freedom from exchange regulations, and whether companies which 
operate in Italy, Germany, and Belgium would turn to this market 
for money on similar terms of investment? 
To answer this question, we will start by saying that we think 
that to some extent this is already happening. The curtain of ex-
change control is not a curtain of iron, and it will become less and 
less effective as commerce among the nations of the Market expands. 
An official of the Belgian Banking Commission told us that he 
thought the Commission's controls were evaded in a number of 
cases by investments effected in Luxembourg; this is particularly 
easy, because there is no exchange control at all between these two 
countries. (They have a monetary union.) 
But we think that the growth of a Community-wide capital market 
will be very slow, and will depend on the solution of many problems 
which are not envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. There will first 
have to be a unanimous desire, which evidently did not exist when 
the Treaty was signed, to establish a common capital market. Next, 
there will have to be a total and permanent relaxation of exchange 
controls. 
Before that will come to pass, we think there will have to be a 
general agreement on what kinds of controls over investment are 
necessary and proper, and there will have to be confidence among 
the investors of the various countries that the investments available 
in other countries are as safe as those in their own. This kind of 
confidence is not likely to arise until similar controls, or common 
controls, exist in the various countries. Perhaps this will come about 
through "approximation of laws." But an American finds it difficult 
••• !d. art. ror. 
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to imagine uniformity in investment standards without the exist-
ence of an interstate agency with direct regulatory powers, like the 
Securities Exchange Commission. Since the Treaty of Rome does 
not provide even a skeleton for such regulation, a European com-
mon capital market as Americans know it appears to be along way 
off. 
For the American businessman, this means that if he wants to 
raise money in Europe, he will probably have to raise it in the 
country where he plans to use it. Even though some of the ultimate 
investors may reside in other countries, the money will be raised 
according to the usages and regulations of the country where the 
industrial operation is located. Hence the choice of site of operation 
will be made with an eye on investment conditions as well as on 
merchandise and labor markets. 
A good location, from a financial point of view, is one in which 
investment capital is fairly plentiful, the usual investment media 
(e.g. convertible bonds, fixed interest bonds) are acceptable, and 
in which money once invested, and its profits, can be freely with-
drawn and invested in other countries of the Community, or re-
turned to the United States. The choice is the more difficult to make 
because it depends on future controls, rather than present ones. 
According to common knowledge, Belgium and Luxembourg have 
enjoyed the longest monetary stability (since 1946), with accom-
panying freedom of exchange control. Germany has been in the 
same group since about 1950. Netherlands currency has been stable, 
but exchange control has been fairly tight. Italy and France, in that 
order, have most recently attained monetary stability, and have the 
strictest currency controls today. The investor must guess what 
the respective advantages of the various countries will be tomorrow. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The lawyer's job in planning a business operation-whether for-
eign or domestic-may be thought of as involving two parts: con-
ception and communication. The lawyer must first form a mental 
picture of the company structure that he wants to set up, and of 
the roles which the various officials will play, individually and in 
relation to each other. Next, he must somehow communicate these 
ideas to the officials who are to do the acting. 
On the domestic scene both parts of the job may be carried out 
almost unconsciously, because the lawyer conceives of a structural 
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pattern which is completely traditional, and anyone who is named 
as president of a parent company, or president of a domestic sub-
sidiary, has the same conception as the lawyer of how he is supposed 
to act. 
When the American lawyer turns to a foreign business operation, 
both processes are greatly complicated. The complication of the 
communication process is obvious. An American "director" is not 
the equivalent of an Italian dirretore. Even if the "director" is 
equated with the more nearly comparable amministratore, the 
problem is not solved, because the amministratore also thinks of 
himself rather differently than does an American "director." 
But the difficulty is one of conception as well as of communica-
tion. The European institutions, and the roles which people play 
within them, are just a little different from the institutions which 
exist, and the roles which are played, in the United States. The 
American lawyer is in the position of a composer writing music for 
people who not only use a different system of musical notation but 
also play different instruments on different scales than those which 
he knows. 
Many American lawyers-of necessity-probably ignore these 
differences. They make their plans in terms of Delaware certificates 
of incorporation, Delaware boards of directors, and Delaware cap-
ital and surplus. Their instructions may be quite impossible of exe-
cution within a foreign legal system. Most of this impossibility 
will go undetected on both sides, because the faithful foreign agents 
will carry out (in Italian) whatever seems to them the most plausi-
ble interpretation of the American wishes. They will then report 
their action (in English) in the terms of the instructions. 
So long as this system works, there is no reason to change it. It 
probably is much better than it would be if the American lawyers 
succeeded in recreating on the Italian scene a corporate structure 
duplicating precisely the one in Detroit. 
But the stiffer competition of the emerging Common Market is 
likely to demand something better. American enterprises will reach 
their full potential only if some of their management know-how is 
effectively transferred to Europe, and if errors in management are 
efficiently located and corrected. This means that the American 
lawyer who bears responsibility for the organization of a European 
business operation needs to know-like a composer-something 
about the musicians who will perform his piece, the instruments 
they play, and the notations which they recognize. Learning these 
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things is an endless task, and the American lawyer will never know 
them all. But every bit that he learns about the laws and the institu-
tions of Common Market countries will contribute a little to his abil-
ity to design and control the Common Market operations of an 
American enterprise. 
Chapter IX 
The Significance of Treaties to the 
Establishment of Companies 
Thomas L. Nicholson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A study by an American lawyer of laws relevant to an American 
corporate client which is to be established in the Common Market 
area must take some account of international legislation-· the bi-
lateral or multilateral treaties involving the United States and the 
six members of the European Economic Community, those between 
or among Community countries, and those involving Community 
members and third countries other than the United States. A num-
ber of the international agreements to which the United States 
and Common Market countries are parties-the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1 and the International Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, 2 for example-are discussed 
in other chapters. The principal treaty among Community mem-
bers of relevance is, of course, the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, the central focus of this book. A re-
view of the treaties between or among Community members and 
non-members other than the United States is generally beyond the 
scope of this discussion. 
Attention will therefore be centered on the effect of "treaties of 
commerce" 3 between the United States and various Community 
members, and of the E.E.C. Treaty, on conditions of doing business 
within the Community. Some areas in which treaties may be signifi-
*J.D., M. Comp. Law; formerly Assistant and Acting Public Affairs Officer, U.S. 
Consulate General, Algiers, Algeria; Associate, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, Chicago, 
Illinois. 
1 See Ouin, The Establishment of the Customs Union, Chapter III supra. 
• See Ladas, Industrial Property, Chapter V supra. 
3 The phrase "treaties of commerce" has been coined to embrace both the traditional 
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (F.C.N. treaties) and those ex-
emplified by the Convention of Establishment with France. 
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cant to an American corporate investor are considered-in general 
areas not touched on in other chapters of this book. 4 The aims are: 
( 1) to suggest, by a detailed discussion of one treaty of commerce, 
the potential importance of such treaties to the establishment by 
an American corporation of branches or subsidiaries in the Com-
munity; ( 2) to point up comparisons between the treaty discussed 
and the E. E. C. Treaty which are of general relevance; ( 3) to 
indicate the interrelationship of the relevant treaties of commerce 
and the E.E.C. Treaty; and (4) to indicate the possible significance 
of the E.E.C. Treaty to the subsidiary of an American corporation 
established in one Community country and doing business in some 
or all of the other Member States. 
II. TREATIES OF COMMERCE 
Treaties of commerce betwe<!n the United States and Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Germany respectively are already in effect, and 
the Convention of Establishment between the United States and 
France was recently signed, although it has not yet been ratified.5 
A. TREATIES OF CoMMERCE IN GENERAL 
The basic aim of treaties of commerce is to establish a standard 
of conduct which each signatory owes to the nationals and com-
panies 6 of the other. "National treatment" is in most provisions 
the measure of each signatory's duty-neither may discriminate 
against the nationals or companies of the other state in favor of its 
own. The "most-favored-nation" clause-neither state may dis-
criminate against the nationals or companies of the other in favor of 
any other aliens or alien companies-sometimes applies,7 however, 
4 Chapter VIII supra, Organizing for Business by Professor Conard (hereinafter cited 
as Conard, ch. VIII) is sometimes a point of departure, however. 
• Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Italian Republic (here-
inafter cited as Italian F.C.N. Treaty) (effective Aug. 5, 1949), U.S. Dep't of State, 
Treaties and Other International Agreements Series (hereinafter cited as T.I.A.S.) 
No. 1965; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany (hereinafter cited as German F.C.N. Treaty) (effective July 14, 1956), 
T.I.A.S. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Netherlands 
(hereinafter cited as Dutch F.C.N. Treaty) (effective Dec. 5, 1957), T.I.A.S. 3942; 
Convention of Establishment with France (hereinafter cited as the Convention with 
France) 41 Dep't of State Bulletin 828 (Dec. 7, 1959). 
• Companies are mentioned only in U.S. treaties of commerce concluded since the 
Second World War. See Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Com-
mercial Treaties, so AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1956). 
1 E.g., with respect to payments, remittances, and transfers of funds or financial 
·instruments between the United States and France. Convention with France, art. X, 
para. x. 
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and, in a few instances, both standards must be met or some third 
criterion is applicable.8 
A number of areas of activity are regulated,9 but treaties of 
commerce "are above all treaties of establishment, concerned with 
the protection of persons, natural and juridical, and of the prop-
erty and interests of such persons." 10 
To indicate the general nature and scope of this protection, but 
more particularly to suggest some practical differences a treaty of 
commerce can make, only the Convention with France will be dis-
cussed because a full-scale consideration of the four relevant treaties 
would be both unwieldy and unwarranted. The choice of the Con-
vention with France is essentially arbitrary, although in part dic-
tated by the fact that it was the last of the four to be elaborated. 
B. THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 
The Convention with France is generally representative in con-
tent of the three other treaties of commerce here relevant, with one 
obvious difference which is reflected in its name. It is called "Con-
vention of Establishment" rather than "Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation" because it excludes rules concerning 
trade and shipping and focuses on questions of investment or, more 
broadly, on the protection of persons and property.U 
I. THE PROTECTION OF ESTABLISHMENT GENERALLY 
By virtue of Article V of the Convention with France, U.S. com-
panies "shall be accorded national treatment with respect to en-
gaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other 
activities for gain" in France "whether directly or through the in-
termediary of an agent or any other natural or juridical person." 
Included in the activities of American companies which are accord-
ingly permitted in France are: (I) the establishment and mainte-
nance of "branches ... and other establishments appropriate to 
the conduct of their business"; ( 2) the organization of "com-
• E.g., "fair and equitable treatment" is the enunciated standard of Article z. of_ the 
Dutch F.C.N. Treaty. 
• See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. 
L. Rl!v. 8os, 8o8 (1958) for an outline of their usual content. 
10 I d. at 8o6. 
u Walker, Convention of Establishment Between the United States and France, 54 
AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 394 (1960). In the following discussion only the protection of 
American companies in France will be referred to although the Convention with 
France of course protects French companies in the United States and natural as well 
as juridical persons in both countries. 
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panies under the general company laws"; (3) the acquisition of 
"majority interests in [French] companies"; and (4) the control 
and management "of the enterprises which they have established 
or acquired." The Convention further assures American corpora-
tions with interests in France: ( r) that their property, enterprises, 
and other interests will be accorded "equitable treatment," and that 
they will be granted "full legal and judicial protection" (Article I) ; 
( 2) that their "lawfully acquired rights and interests . . . [will] 
not be subjected to impairment [within France J ... by any meas-
ure of a discriminatory character" (Article IV, paragraph 1); 
( 3) that their "offices, warehouses, factories and other premises 
... [located in France] ... [will] be free from molestation and 
other unjustifiable measures" (Article IV, paragraph 2); and (4) 
that they will "not be subject to any form of taxation or any obliga-
tion relating thereto . . . [within France], which is more burden-
some than that to which . . . companies [of France J . . . in the 
same situation are or may be subject" (Article IX, paragraph 2 
(c) ) , nor "to any form of taxation [within France] upon capital, 
income, profits or any other basis, except by reason of the property 
which they possess within those territories, the income and profits 
derived from sources therein, the business in which they are there 
engaged, the transactions which they accomplish there, or any 
other bases of taxation directly related to their activities" within 
France (Article IX, paragraph 4). 
In addition American corporations may claim national treatment 
in respect: (I) to "leasing and acquiring, by purchase or otherwise, 
as well as with respect to possessing, personal property of every 
kind, whether tangible or intangible" (subject to exceptions con-
cerning ships and public safety) (Article VII, paragraph 2) ; and 
( 2) to "obtaining and maintaining patents of invention and with 
respect to rights appertaining to trade-marks, trade names and 
certification marks, or which in any manner relate to industrial 
property" (Article VIII, paragraph I). 
There are obvious omissions in this general outline of the rights 
accorded by the Convention with France to an American corpora-
tion doing business in France. The most significant omissions will 
be discussed in some detail because they afford examples of the 
importance which the Convention may have to the American cor-
porate investor. They will be discussed in a rough chronological 
order-beginning with those which might first in time be of interest 
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to an American corporation establishing branches-or, m some 
cases, subsidiaries-in France. 
2. THE COMPANIES PROTECTED 
Article XIV, paragraph 5 of the Convention provides: "Com-
panies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations ... 
[of one of the states of the United States] shall be deemed com-
panies . . . [of the United States] and shall have their juridical 
status recognized . . . [in F ranee]." 
Under this provision a corporation formed in any state of the 
United States will be recognized in France as an American com-
pany and therefore a juridical entity even if its central office 12 
(siege riel) is located in Paris-and this is true despite the French 
conflict rule under which a company's "nationality" is determined 
by the location of its central officeY In other words, the "Dela-
ware" of France (and of the Common Market countries other than 
Belgium and Luxembourg) 14 could be-tax and other considera-
tions aside-Delaware. 
But the place of formation is not the sole factor determining 
which companies are to be given protection in France by the Con-
vention. Article V, paragraph r (last sentence) provides: 
... the enterprises which ... [American nationals or 
companies J control . . . whether in the form . . . of a 
company or otherwise, shall, in all that relates to the con-
duct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment no 
less favorable than that accorded like enterprises con-
trolled by nationals and companies of . . . [France J. 
This provision means in effect that some French companies-that is, 
those formed in France by American nationals or corporations-
can claim protection under the Convention against discrimination 
by French laws or administrative acts. Its intent, of course, is to 
prevent discrimination against those French enterprises in which 
Americans have invested and which are not protected by the pro-
visions relating to American companies or nationals. 
,. This is understood to mean the place where ultimate decisions are made. See 
Conard, ch. VIII, text at notes II7 and u8, supra. 
18 Ibid. Although strictly speaking, a company has no nationality (see e.g., SAVATIER, 
COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 34 (2d ed. 1953) ), that term will be hereinafter 
used as shorthand to denote the country whose laws determine such things as its 
validity, whether it has juridical personality, its powers, and the rights of its stock-
holders. 
"See Italian F.C.N. Treaty, art. II, para. 2; German F.C.N. Treaty, art. XXV, 
para. 5; Dutch F.C,N, Treaty, art. XXIII, para. 3· 
I58 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
A third criterion, residence, may sometimes be relevant. Article 
XIV, paragraph I, in defining "national treatment" limits it to 
nationals and companies "in like situations," and paragraph I6 
of the Protocol to the Convention provides: "Residence criteria 
may be applied for purposes of determining whether or not na-
tionals and companies ... are in 'like situations' .... " 
In sum, a corporation formed in one of the United States will be 
recognized in France as American and a juridical entity wherever 
its central office or center of activity (for example, its main manu-
factUring plant) is located. It, or its subsidiaries formed in France, 
may claim national treatment under the Convention, but location 
of the central office, or of the center of activity, of it or its sub-
sidiary-presumably the "residence criteria" of a company 15-may 
determine what national treatment means. 
3· EMPLOYMENT OF NON-NATIONALS 
American corporations or their subsidiaries are generally free to 
employ non-French personnel in France, but the persons employed 
are subject to regulations which could result in significant restric-
tions on them. 
Every foreigner who wishes to remain more than three months 
in France must have the authorization of the Ministry of Interior.16 
In addition, if he wishes to act as President of the supervisory 
board (President de Conseil d' administration) of a stock company, 
as manager (gerant) of a limited liability company, or as the mana-
ger (directeur) of an agency or branch of a foreign company, he 
must have a carte d'identite de commer~ant (hereinafter "foreign 
merchant's identity card") .17 
This foreign merchant's identity card is: (I) good only for the 
occupations authorized and only for the departments ( departe-
ments) of France mentioned therein; ( 2) temporary, being limited 
in duration by the duration of the authorization to remain in France; 
( 3) a concession of the state, which the administration may refuse 
15 It is possible, however, that the location of a branch might be determinative of a 
company's residence for certain purposes, if such a conclusion were advantageous to 
the beneficiary of the treaty right 
18 Carte de sejour (hereinafter referred to as "authorization to remain"); see 
Ordonnance No. 45-2658 (hereinafter referred to as "Order") of Nov. 2, 1945, art. 6, 
[1945] Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Fran<;aise (hereinafter cited as "J.O.") 7225; 
Decret 46-1574 (hereinafter referred to as "Decree") of June 30, 1946, art. 3, [1946] 
J.O. 592o-21 and 6169. 
11 See Decree of Feb. 2, 1939 (relatif a la delivrance des cartN d'identite de com-
merfant pour les etrangers), [1939] J.O. 1645• 
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in its discretion, not a right (and if the identity card is refused, the 
applicant has no recourse) ; ( 4) renewable; and ( 5) subject to 
cancellation under certain conditions (bankruptcy, conviction of a 
crime, false declarations) .1s 
Moreover, failure to obtain the required foreign merchant's 
identity card can result in fines, the closing of the enterprise in-
volved, and even, apparently, the nullity of certain acts (for exam-
ple, the formation of a limited liability company with alien gerants 
who have no foreign merchant's identity card may be held null and 
void) .19 
The reason for the existence of identity cards has been indicated 
by Professor Savatier of the Paris Law Faculty: 
[I]t soon [in the 1930's] became clear that workers were 
not alone in demanding protection against all excessive 
foreign competition. The principal occupations [profes-
sions J were no doubt already reserved to Frenchmen by 
more or less strict monopolies. . . . But it was necessary, 
outside this restricted area, to give thought to the pro-
tection of Frenchmen against various foreign heads of 
business enterprises [chefs d' entreprises J .20 
If one adds the fact that local chambers of commerce and profes-
sional organizations play an advisory role in the issuance of foreign 
merchants' identity cards,21 it is clear that the position of U.S. 
corporations which desire to put Americans in charge of their 
French operations could be a difficult one. In fact, it apparently 
has not been; and their legal position will be significantly improved 
once the Convention with France has gone into effect. 
The Convention contains a number of provisions which are rele-
vant. Article II, paragraph I (a) and (b) create a "treaty trader" 
and a "treaty investor" class of American nationals who must be 
permitted to enter and remain in France 22 for the purpose of carry-
ing on trade between the two countries or of "developing and 
18 See Chaine, Le Statui Professionnel de l'Etranger en France, in LE STATUT DE 
L'ETRANGER ET LE MARCHE CoMMUN (57• Congres des Notaires de France, 1959) at I57· 
19 !d. at 188. 
""Savatier, A Propos des Cartes de Commer(ants, RECUEIL DALLOZ DE DoCTRINE DE 
JURISPRUDENCE ET DE LEGISLATION (hereinafter cited as D.) CHRONIQUE 21, 22 (1953]. 
(Translation by this author.) 
21 Decree of Feb. 2, 1939, art. 8, [Feb. 4, 1939) J.O. 
""'Subject to the "laws relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens" (art. II, para. I) 
(e.g., to the requirement in France that aliens obtain an authorization to remain) and 
to measures of public order, health, morals, and safety (art. II, para. 3). As to "treaty 
traders and investors," see Wilson, "Treaty-Investor" Clauses in Commercial Treaties 
of tke United States, 49 AM.]. INT'L L. 366 (1955). 
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directing the operations of an enterprise in which they have in-
vested, or in which they are actively in the process of investing, a 
substantial amount of capitaL" Moreover, by virtue of Paragraph 
2 (c) of the Protocol, Americans proceeding to France "for the 
purpose of occupying a position of responsibility in an enterprise" 
on behalf of "treaty investors" must also be permitted to enter and 
remain in France. 
The significant point here is contained in paragraph 2 (a) and 
(b) of the Protocol. Under paragraph 2 (a) "the laws and regula-
tions in force . . . [in France J which govern the access of aliens 
to the professions and occupations, as well as the exercise of such 
callings and other activities· by them, remain applicable . . . [to 
American nationals and companies J ."Under paragraph 2 (b), how-
ever, "the procedures provided for by the above-mentioned laws 
and regulations, as well as those provided for by laws and regula-
tions governing entry and sojourn of aliens, must not have the effect 
of impairing the substance of the rights set forth in Article II, para-
graph I (a) and (b)" (that is, of the rights of "treaty traders" 
and "investors" or of Americans going to France to occupy posi-
tions of responsibility in the enterprises of "treaty traders" or 
"treaty investors"). 
The result of these provisions is threefold: ( 1) authorizations 
to remain in France and foreign merchants' identity cards will still 
be required; ( 2) the issuance and renewal of foreign merchants' 
identity cards to American nationals wishing to exercise a company 
function for which such identity cards are required will no longer 
be subject to the discretion of the competent prefects-or to the 
adverse recommendations of competitors: qualifying Americans 
will have a right to identity cards; ( 3) in cases of abuse, American 
nationals will have recourse to French administrative tribunals, 
and should their decisions, in the view of the United States govern-
ment, violate the Convention with France, the United States State 
Department may make complaint to the French Government, and, 
if need be, the United States may bring action against France in 
the International Court of Justice. 
Other American personnel to be employed in France-whether 
technicians or executives-must have a work permit,23 and if they 
""Carte d'identite professionelle de tra'Vailleur or carte de tra'Vail, see Order No. 
45-z658 of Nov. z, 1945, [1945] J.O. 7Z25; Decree No. 46-1340 of June 6, 1946, [1946] 
J.O. 5018-19. 
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are accountants, technical experts, or lawyers, they must, subject 
to one exception, have fulfilled the conditions "necessary to the 
exercise of their calling under the applicable [French] legisla-
tion." 24 The exception is stated in the succeeding paragraph which 
will permit: 
... [American] companies ... to engage accountants 
and other technical experts, who are not nationals of ... 
[France], without regard to their having qualified to prac-
tice a profession within the territories of . . . [France], 
but exclusively for conducting studies and examinations 
for internal purposes on behalf of such . . . companies.25 
The significance of this provision is emphasized by the fact that 
Article II of the French Civil Code permits nationals of another 
country to exercise rights in France only to the extent that French-
men are permitted to exercise similar rights in that country. More-
over, a Joint Declaration appended to the Convention states the 
intention of the United States and France to facilitate "to the great-
est possible extent and on a basis of real and effective reciprocity 
. . . the establishment of . . . qualified personnel who are indis-
pensable to the conduct of the enterprises created by nationals and 
companies" of either country within the territory of the other. 
4· OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY 
Article VII, paragraph r of the Convention with France guaran-
tees national treatment to American nationals and companies "with 
respect to leasing, utilizing and occupying real property of all kinds 
appropriate to the exercise of the rights" accorded them by the Con-
vention. 
This will have at least one consequence of significance. A concept 
of "commercial property" (propriite commerciale) has developed 
in French law according to which the lessee of commercial property 
has a right to an eviction indemnification if renewal of his lease is 
refused by the lessor. The applicable law 26 has the effect of denying 
this renewal right to foreigners unless, inter alia, they enjoy na-
tional treatment by virtue of an international treaty.27 Article VII 
""Convention with France, art. VI, para. 1. 
20 ld. para. 2. Paragraph 9 of the Protocol to the Convention adds that the provisions 
of paragraph 2 are adopted "until such time as it may have become possible to conclude 
an agreement concerning the exercise of ... [accountancy]." 
""Decree 53-943 of Sept. 30, 1953, [1953] J.O. 8602. 
27 See Richemont, Les Ressortissants des pays, faisant partie du M archC Commun, 
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of the Convention with France plainly fulfills this requirement as 
far as American nationals and companies are concerned. 
5. RIGHT TO SUE IN FRENCH COURTS 28 
Article III, paragraph I of the Convention with France ensures 
American nationals and companies national treatment with respect 
to access to French "courts of justice as well as to administrative 
tribunals and agencies." 29 This provision will not affect, however, 
the duty of American corporate or individual plaintiffs as aliens to 
post bond (donner caution) to guarantee the payment of costs and 
damages assessed against them in actions they initiate.30 
,6, VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
An American company which decides to terminate its activities 
in France is guaranteed by the Convention with France national 
treatment in regard to the right to dispose of property of all kinds 31 
and to taxation. 32 More importantly, the Convention subjects 
France to four duties concerning repatriation of funds: ( r) it must 
accord to an American company the same treatment with respect 
to payments, remittances, and transfers of funds or financial in-
struments between France and the United States or any third coun-
try as it would to a French company in a like situation (that is, for 
example, to one "residing" in the United States) ; 33 ( 2) it must 
accord to an American company the same treatment in this respect 
as it would to the company of any third country in a like situation; 34 
( 3) it must make "reasonable provision for the withdrawal of earn-
ings"; 35 and ( 4) it must "make every effort to accord in the great-
est possible measure . . . [to an American company J the oppor-
peuvent-ils btfneficier de la propriite commerciale en France, LE DROIT EUROPEEN 380 
(No. Io, May, I959). 
""Cf. Wilson, Access-to-Courts Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 
47 AM. J. lNT'L L. 20 (I953). 
29 Moreover, American companies not engaged in activities in France may not be 
required to register as a condition of the exercise of this right (art. III, para. I) 
and right of access to the courts and recognition of juridical status (unlike other ad-
vantages of the Convention) may not be denied to companies formed in accordance 
with the laws of any one of the United States merely because they are controlled by 
non-Americans (art. XIII). 
00 See art. I6 of the Civil Code of France. Foreigners who own real estate of sufficient 
value in France to assure such payment are exempted. 
31 Art. VII, para. 3· 
32 Art. IX, para. I (c). 
33 Art. X, para. I. 
"'Ibid, 
35 Art. X, para. 3· 
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tunity to repatriate the proceeds of the liquidation 
its branches in France J ." 36 
163 
. [of 
These four duties are subject to three limitations. France may: 
( 1) impose exchange restrictions "to the extent necessary to pre-
vent its monetary reserves from falling to a very low level or to 
effect a moderate increase in very low monetary reserves"; 37 
( 2) impose "particular restrictions whenever the [International 
Monetary J Fund specifically authorizes or requests" 38 it to do so; 
and ( 3) treat different currencies differently as may be required by 
the state of its balance of payments.39 
An American company which liquidates a branch or subsidiary 
in France will be able, in summary, to count with some certainty 
on a repatriation of its earnings, and it will have important guaran-
tees that repatriation of its capital will also be possible. 
7· EXPROPRIATION 
The Convention with France will also afford significant protec-
tion to American corporate branches and subsidiaries in France 
against expropriation of their property. Expropriation is prohibited 
by Article IV, paragraph 3 "except for a public purpose and with 
payment of just compensation." More importantly, just compensa-
tion is defined as "the equivalent of the property taken . : . in 
an effectively realizable form." Compensation must be accorded 
"without needless delay," and "adequate provision for the deter-
mination and payment of the said compensation must have been 
made no later than the time of the taking." If compensation so 
measured is less than that afforded French nationals whose prop-
erty has been similarly expropriated, or if payment to them is more 
prompt, American companies may invoke the national treatment 
clause of paragraph 4 of Article IV; they may, in short, invoke 
whichever of two standards is, in fact, the more advantageous. 
France is, furthermore, again under a duty "to make every effort 
to accord in the greatest possible measure the opportunity ... to 
repatriate the proceeds .... " 40 
The Protocol adds two important clarifications. Paragraph 5 
states that "expropriation" means, inter alia, "nationalization"; and 
paragraph 6 extends the protection of Article IV, paragraph 3 to 
•• Ibid. 
37 Art. X, para. 2. 
38 Ibid. 
•• Protocol, para. 1 3· 
•• Art. X, para. 3· 
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interests held directly or indirectly by American companies in ex-
propriated property. 
III. THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE AND THE 
E.E.C. TREATY COMPARED 
At this point the perspective of the discussion shifts: the assump-
tion is that the American parent company has formed a Common 
Market subsidiary; for the sake of example and to facilitate com-
parisons with the Convention with France, it is further assumed 
that the subsidiary is located not in France but in Belgium (here-
inafter this assumed company will sometimes be referred to simply 
as the "Belgian subsidiary"). Most of the questions considered re-
late to treaty protection of the operations and branches of this as-
sumed Belgian subsidiary in other Common Market countries and 
usually in France. 
A. GENERAL CoMPARISONS 
Before comparing in detail the provisions of the Convention with 
France with their counterparts in the E.E.C. Treaty 41 some gen-
eral comparisons are useful. 
(I) The provisions of the Convention with France are in the 
main self-executing and will therefore become applicable in France 
without legislation or executive action as soon as the Convention 
goes into effect. The right-of-establishment provisions of the E.E.C. 
Treaty with few exceptions 42 require implementation by directives, 
and by a general program to be given effect by directives, adopted 
by the Council before December 31, 1961.43 
( 2) The Convention with France spells out a number of specific 
rights which American companies will enjoy in France. The E.E.C. 
Treaty is directed at protection of th~ "freedom of establishment," 
defined in very general terms and illustrated by only some specific 
examples. This difference may result in broader-although perhaps 
less certain-protection under the E.E.C. Treaty. 
(3) National treatment in regard to the establishment of an 
American enterprise in France may be claimed under the Convention 
with France only where it is provided for specifically. National 
treatment under the E.E.C. Treaty may be claimed not only in 
"Arts. 52-58. 
•• E.g., arts. 53 and 58. 
48 See Stein, The New Institutions, Chapter II supra. 
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areas where it is guaranteed by the relevant right-of-establishment 
provisions, but also, subject to special provisions, within the area 
of application of the entire Treaty. The first paragraph of Article 
7 of the E.E.C. Treaty provides: 
Within the field of application of this Treaty and without 
prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby 
be prohibited. 
( 4) Rights arising under the Convention with France may be 
vindicated in domestic French courts or, by the United States gov-
ernment, in the International Court of Justice. Rights arising under 
the E.E.C. Treaty may be vindicated in domestic courts of the 
Member States or, in some circumstances, in the Community Court 
of Justice.44 In addition, a supranational administrative agency-
the Commission-is obligated to supervise the application of the 
provisions of the Treaty 45 and to bring Member States who persist 
in violating a Treaty obligation before the Community Court of 
Justice.46 
(5) The Convention with France will have an initial term of ten 
years and is subject to termination thereafter on one year's notice. 
The E.E.C. Treaty is of unlimited duration 47 and makes no pro-
vision for termination. It may even be questionable that the Mem-
ber States have a legal right of unilateral withdrawal from the 
Community, however unlikely an armed struggle to preserve the 
union might be. 
The provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty which are comparable to 
those, discussed in detail above, of the Convention with France 
are with a few exceptions contained in Articles 52-58 of the Treaty. 
These provisions will first be considered separately; they and their 
counterparts in the Convention with France will be compared in a 
concluding section. 
B. THE CoMPARABLE PROVISIONS oF THE E.E.C. TREATY 
Articles 52-58 concern the right of establishment of Community 
country nationals and companies in countries other than their own; 
the basic purpose of these provisions is to remove legal discrimina-
tion in each of the Six against economic activities of nationals of 
Member States, other than wage-earning activities. 
•• See Stein and Hay, Chapter VII supra, New Legal Remedies of Enterprises: A 
Survey. 
'"Art. 155. 
•• Art. 169. 
"Art. 240. 
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I. THE COMPANIES PROTECTED 
Article 58, defining the companies protected, provides in part: 
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central 
management or principal establishment within the Com-
munity . . . shall be assimilated to physical persons be-
ing nationals of Member States .... 
The essential element is that the company be constituted in accord-
ance with the laws of a Member State. In addition, one of three ad-
ditional requirements must be met: ( 1) its registered office, ( 2) its 
central management, or ( 3) its principal establishment must be 
located within the Community. 
Another international agreement in this area of law is helpful 
in understanding the significance of this rule. All of the Common 
Market countries, along with some others, were parties to the 
negotiations relative to the Convention Concerning the Recognition 
of the Juridical Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations 
and Foundations elaborated at the Hague in 1951.48 Moreover, it 
could be argued that Article 220 of the E.E.C. Treaty implicitly 
recognizes the existence of this Convention in providing for nego-
tiations to ensure mutual recognition of companies "in so far as 
necessary." If the Convention is signed and ratified by all Member 
States, such negotiations will be unnecessary (Germany, Italy, and 
Luxembourg have not signed, and Belgium, France, and the Nether-
lands have signed but not ratified). 
Article I of the Hague Recognition Convention provides in part: 
The juridical personality acquired by a company ... by 
virtue of the law of the Contracting States where formal-
ities of registration or publicity have been fulfilled and 
where the registered office (siege statutaire) is located, 
will be recognized as a matter of right (de plein droit), 
provided that it has, in addition to the capacity to sue and 
be sued (ester en justice), at least the capacity to own 
property and to make contracts [and] to perform other 
juridical acts. 
Article 2 adds : 
Nonetheless, the personality, acquired in conformity with 
the provisions of Article I, may be denied recognition 
48 See Dolle, Die 7· Haager K onferen'Z, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND IN-
TERNATlONALES PRIVATRECHT r6r, r85 ff. (1952). This Convention is hereinafter referred 
to as the "Hague Recognition Convention." 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATIES 
(pourra ne pas hre reconnue) in another contracting state 
whose law takes the true central office (siege reel) into 
consideration, if the true central office is deemed to be 
located on its territory .... 
The company ... is deemed to have its true central 
office at the place where its central administration ( admi-
nistration centrale) is established .... 
For the immediate purposes of this discussion, the provisions 
of the Hague. Recognition Convention are significant in three re-
spects: (I) they recognize the possibility of a geographical divorce 
between the registered office (siege statutaire) and the true central 
office (siege reel); (2) they make clear that siege statutaire (the 
term used in Article 58 of the E.E.C. Treaty) means "registered 
office"; and ( 3) they define "true central office" (siege reel) as the 
place where the central administration (administration centrale-
another term which Article 58 uses) is located. 
Since all Six took part in the Hague Recognition Convention 
negotiations, the terms used presumably mean the same in both 
instruments. If they do, two questions about Article 58 arise. 
1) Will Companies with only a Registered Office Within the 
Community Qualify Under Article 58? Article 58 seems to make pos-
sible the creation by third-country nationals or companies (and this, 
of course, means nationals and companies of Eastern as well as West-
ern countries) of Community companies which will qualify under 
Article 58 although they have no substantial material connection 
with the Community; that is, it seems to recognize as beneficiaries 
of the right-of-establishment provisions companies which are 
formed under the law of a Member State even though they have 
only a registered office within the Community. This prospect is so 
distasteful that one commentator has suggested that Article 58 
should be understood to create three rather than two requirements 
for a qualifying company: (I) it must be formed according to the 
laws of a Member State; and ( 2) it must have its registered office 
(siege statutaire) in the Community; and (3) it must have either 
its central management (administration centrale) or its central 
establishment (principal hablissement) within the Community.49 
(Central establishment means, presumably, and among other things, 
the main store of a retail business or the main plant of a manu-
facturing concern.) 
•• Audinet, The Right of Establishment in the European Economic Community, 1959 
JoURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (No. 4, Oct.-Nov.-Dec.) 983, 1017. 
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Another commentator, Mr. Hubert Ehring, a legal counsellor of 
the E.E.C. Commission, pointing to the fact that Article 52 provides 
for abolition of the restrictions on the establishment of agencies, 
branches, or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State "estab-
lished in the territory of any Member State," argues: 
A company which has only its registered office within the 
territory of a Member State, while its administration and 
plants are located within the territory of a third country, 
is no less to be considered a part of the economy of this 
third country than is an enterprise situated in that third 
country whose owner is a national of a Member State 
(dessen lnhaber eine die Staatsangehorigkeit eines Mit-
gliedstaates besitzende natiirliche Person ist), and, (such 
a company] should therefore be treated in the same way. 5° 
Mr. Ehring therefore concludes that companies must also be estab-
lished in a Member State. He suggests further that this requirement 
is fulfilled "when the central management of a company, but not 
when its registered office alone, is located in a Member State." 51 
Other commentators, although they accept the necessity that com-
panies be established in the Community, interpret "establishment" 
somewhat differently. In their view a company need have neither its 
central administration nor its central establishment in the Com-
munity, provided a substantial part of its business is carried on in 
the Common Market and that it therefore has meaningful connec-
tions with the Community.52 
2) May One of the Six Become the "Delaware" of the Com-
munity? The first requirement of Article 58 is that a company be 
constituted under the law of one of the Member States. A first ques-
tion in determining whether a "Delaware" of the Community is a 
possibility is, therefore: What is a validly constituted company un-
der the company laws of each of the Six? More specifically, the 
question is whether or not the domestic company laws of each Com-
munity country require that the true central office of companies 
constituted thereunder be situated within its territory. 
This is not, apparently, a requirement of Dutch law,"a and Sec-
tion 5 of the German Stock Company Law provides: 
50 Ehring, Das Niederlassungsrecht, in Groeben, Boeckh, KoMMENTAR ~UM EWG-
VERTRAG (hereinafter cited as KoMMENTAR) 183. (Translation by this author.) 
51 Ibid. (Translation by this author.) 
52 WoHLFARTH, EVERLING, GLAESNER, SPRUNG, DIE EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEME!N· 
scHAFT 189 ( 1960) (hereinafter cited as WoHLFARTH, DIE EWG). 
53 See KOLLEWIJN, AMERICAN-DUTCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, No. 3 Bilateral 
Studies in Private International Law 16 (1955); and, generally, Conard, ch. VIII, text 
at note uz supra. 
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The place where the company has an office is as a rule to 
be designated as the seat, or the place from which the busi-
ness is directed or the place where the central management 
is carried on. 54 
This at least makes clear that the seat"~ need not be at the place 
where the central management (and therefore the true central 
office) is located,56 although it also indicates that there must "as 
a rule" be at least an office at the place designated by the charter as 
the seat. From Section 5 it seems possible to conclude that the Stock 
Company Law of Germany in itself does not require that the true 
central office or main establishment be located in Germany.57 
The company laws of the other four Member States do not define 
seat as explicitly as Section 5 of the German Stock Company Law, 
and, although each of the laws requires the designation and regis-
tration of a seat located within the country, none of them in itself 
requires a domestic location for the true central office of a company 
constituted pursuant to it. 
The conflict rule which determines the law governing companies 
in four of the Six does, however, impose such a requirement; accord-
ing to this rule, the law governing the status of a company is the 
law of the place where the true central office is located. If, for ex-
ample, the Belgian subsidiary has its true central office in France, 
its juridical personality will not be recognized by either country, if 
it has not complied with the law (French) which each recognizes as 
governing its status. 
The Netherlands again provides the one clear exception, and the 
rule in Germany is apparently not settled. The majority of the Ger-
man authorities appear to favor the rule which looks to the location 
of the true central office.58 On the other hand, others maintain that 
Germany determines the status of German companies which have 
only a registered office in Germany in accordance with German law.59 
"""Ais der Sitz der Aktiengesellschaft ist in der Regel der Ort, wo die Gesellschaft 
einen Betrieb hat, oder der Ort zu bestimmen, wo sich die Geschiiftsleitung befindet 
oder die Verwaltung gefiihrt wird." (Translation by this author.) 
56 "Seat" is here used as the neutral term to avoid use of "registered office" or "true 
central office." The German equivalent of "seat" is Sitz, of registered office satzung-
miissiger Sitz, and of true central office effektiver or tatsiichlicher Sitz. 
'"'See generally BEITZKE, }URISTISCHE PERSONEN IM JNTERNAT!ONALEN PRIVATRECHT 
UNO FREMDENRECHT 104 ff. (1938). 
57 The German Limited Liability Company Law has no provision comparable to 
Section 5. 
58 See, e.g., Schilling, Note 47 of Allgemeine Ein/eitung in HACHENBURG, KOMMENTAR 
ZUM GESETZ BETREFFEND DIE G.M.B.H. (1956) at 92. 
59 Schmidt, Note 7 to Section 5, in GROSSKOMMENTAR, AKT!ENGESETZ (1957) at 40: 
" .•• the Sitztheorie can be deemed correct, if it is satisfied by a nominal, statutory seat, 
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A second question in determining whether a Common Market 
"Delaware" is a possibility is, then, this: Does Article 58 directly 
affect the conflict rules of the Six? 
Article 58 requires only that companies qualifying under it shall 
be treated as Community nationals for defined purposes. Nothing is 
said in Article 58, or elsewhere in the right-of-establishment chap-
ter, about the recognition of the juridical personality of companies. 
On the other hand, it seems clear enough that Article 58 would be 
partially meaningless if the Member States were not obligated to 
recognize the juridical personality of the companies qualifying un-
der it.60 
If, however, Article 58 has created a rule which derogates from 
conflict rules of some of the Six,61 another problem arises. So under-
stood, Article 58 would seem to render meaningless the part of Arti-
cle 220 of the Treaty which provides: 
Member States shall, in so far as necessary, engage in 
negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for 
the benefit of their nationals: ... the mutual recogni-
tion of companies within the meaning of Article 58, sec-
ond paragraph. . .. 
No such negotiations would be necessary if Article 58 of itself re-
quires recognition of the juridical personality of the companies 
qualifying under it. 
It follows that Article 58 probably should not be understood to 
affect of itself the conflict rules of the Six which are not consonant 
with it. On the other hand, Article 58 in tandem with Article 220 
obligates the Member States to negotiate with each other to con-
form these rules with Article 58-in order to ensure, for example, 
that the juridical personality of a company formed in Belgium, with 
only a registered office there and with its true central office some-
where in the Community (in France, for example) will be recog-
nized in the other five Member States. Moreover, these negotia-
tions, if their timing is not to negate in part the force of Article 58, 
must take account of the timing of directives to be issued and of the 
that is a fictitious seat, and does not require .an 'effective domestic seat.' " (Translation 
by this author.) See also BEITZKE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 104A. 
00 Cf. Loussouarn, Droit International du Commerce, 1959 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU 
DROIT COMMERCIAL (No. I, Jan.-Mar.) 246, at 251-52. 
61 See Thibierge, Le Statut des Societes Etrangeres, in LE STATUT DE L':ihRANGER ET LE 
MARCHE CoMMUN (57• Congres des Notaires de France, 1959) at 334ff.; and Lous-
souarn, op. cit. supra note 6o, at 25o-51. 
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general program to be established by the Council for the removal of 
restrictions on freedom of establishment (Article 54). 
Timely ratification by the Six of the Hague Recognition Con-
vention plus one additional agreement among the Six would meet 
these obligations. Article I of the Convention provides that the 
juridical personality acquired by a company by virtue of the law of 
a signatory state where, inter alia, its registered office (siege statu-
taire) is located shall be recognized by the other signatory states 
(subject to other conditions not here relevant). Article 2 provides, 
however, that a signatory state may (pourra) refuse such recogni-
tion if the true central office (siege reel) is located within its terri-
tory (or that of another state) and if it (or the other state) "takes 
the true central office into consideration." 
Since the provisions of Article 2 are not compulsory, the Member 
States could, after ratifying the Convention, agree among them-
selves that they would recognize the juridical personality of any 
company constituted according to the laws of any of the others and 
having its registered office there, provided it is deemed to be "es-
tablished" in the Community within the meaning of Article 52.62 
This would be in keeping with the Convention and would fulfill the 
obligations arising from Articles 58 and 220. At the same time it 
would avoid the possibility that companies with no material con-
nection with the Community could claim to be beneficiaries of the 
right-of-establishment provisions of the Treaty. 
Some commentators have denied, expressly or implicitly, that 
recognition of the companies referred to in Article 58 depends on 
negotiations pursuant to Article 220.63 None of them has, however, 
suggested a reason for the reference in Article 220 to negotiations 
to ensure "the mutual recognition of companies within the meaning 
of Article 58, second paragraph" if their view is adopted. 
Regardless of the view that finally prevails, the result should 
ultimately be that companies in the Six will enjoy more flexibility of 
organization than has heretofore been possible. It would be a mis-
take, however, to conclude that a "Delaware" of the Community-
in the American sense-may develop. The idea that it is impermis-
sible to form a company in one country to avoid more onerous laws 
in another is too firmly embedded in the legal thought of the Six 
to be discarded.64 If, however, there are business reasons for form-
82 See text supra at notes 5 I and 52. 
63 See, e.g., WoHLFARTH, DrE EWG at 190; Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 6r, at 333-
337· 
"'See, e.g., Dolle, op. cit. supra note 48, at r88; and W<;~HLFARTH, DrE EWG at r88, 
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ing a company under Belgian law, for example, although it is to 
have its true central office in France, the Treaty should ultimately 
make it possible to do so, despite conflict rules which have here-
tofore made such an organizational plan perilous. 
These conclusions relating to Article 58 seem possible: 
I) No company can be a beneficiary of the right-of-establishment 
provisions if it has no substantial connection with a Community 
country; "shell" subsidiaries of third-country companies will not be 
deemed qualifying under Article 58, whatever the reason given for 
this conclusion. 
2) It will ultimately be possible to form a company in one of the 
Six and locate only its registered office there, provided it is "estab-
lished" in the Community and provided the avoidance of onerous 
laws in another of the Six is not the sole reason for such an organi-
zational plan. 
3) Article 58 probably has no direct effect on the conflict rules of 
the Six concerning the recognition of the juridical personality of 
compames. 
4) Articles 58 and 220 obligate the Member States to negotiate 
with each other to ensure that the juridical personality of the com-
panies qualifying under Article 58 will be recognized throughout 
the Community. Moreover, the timing of these negotiations will be 
imposed by the timing of the directives issued and the general pro-
gram established by the Council pursuant to Article 54· 
5) The Hague Recognition Convention, which three of the Six 
have already signed, offers an ideal vehicle for the fulfillment of 
these obligations. 
2. EMPLOYMENT OF NON-NATIONALS 
Freedom of establishment without discrimination based on na-
tionality is to be achieved under the E.E.C. Treaty by, inter alia, 
... applying the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
freedom of establishment ... in respect of the condi-
tions governing the entry of personnel of the main estab-
lishment into the managerial or supervisory organs of 
... agencies, branches and subsidiaries .... 65 
There seems to be general agreement that this provision will require 
the abolition of foreign merchants' identity cards in France as far 
as Community nationals and companies are concerned.66 The ques-
.. Art. 54(£). 
66 Loussouarn, op. cit. supra note 6o, at 253; Chaine, ap. cit. supra note 18, at 237; 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATIES 173 
tion, then, is what effect this result will have on the employment of 
non-French personnel by a French branch of the Belgian subsidiary. 
It will plainly mean, first of all, that employees of the French 
branch can work in France without the foreign merchant's identity 
card heretofore required, if they are Community (for example, 
Belgian) nationals. What, however, of an American national who 
has been employed in the Belgian subsidiary? Can he be appointed 
manager of the French branch and act in this capacity without an 
identity card? Although the answer to this question must await de-
cision by the competent authorities, three factors suggest that it 
will be an affirmative one. 
One is the fact that Article 54 (f) speaks only of "personnel of 
the main establishment"-there is no limitation in regard to na-
tionality. More convincing, however, is the second factor. This is 
the fact that, although the foreign nationality of the manager 
(gcrant) of the branch of a foreign corporation is not irrelevant 
(if he is French, he will not be required to obtain an identity card), 
it is nonetheless the foreign status of the company at which these 
regulations are directed (if the branch manager is French, the 
identity card must still be obtained, but it is issued to the directors 
of the foreign company rather than the branch manager) .67 Under 
the right-of-establishment chapter of the Treaty, however, France 
will be prevented from taking the foreign status of a Belgian com-
pany into account. Finally, it should be noted that "merchant" 
( commert.;ant) is a legal term of art, and that a branch manager is 
not, as that term is defined, in fact a "merchant." 67a 
Article 48, paragraph 2 should also force elimination of the 
labor permit (carte de travail) heretofore required of Community 
nationals (in others of the Six as well as in France). Since, however, 
the authorization to remain in France (carte de sejour) is a public 
safety measure, the requirement of this authorization is probably 
permitted by Article 56.68 
3· OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY 
Measures are to be taken under the Treaty " ... enabling a 
national of one Member State to acquire and exploit real property 
Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 61, at 339· Rapport du Conseil Economique sur le Droit 
d'Etablissement dans le Marchi Commun (Dec. 9, 1958) [Jan. 3, 1958] J.O. at 1009. 
67 Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 61, at 291-92. 
"'• See Chaine, op. cit. supra note 18, at 183. 
68 Cf. Deletre, Le Statut Civil de l'Etranger en France, in LE STATUT DE L'ETRANGER 
ET LE MARCHE CoMMUN, 74 at 154. But see, Savatier, Le Marchi Commun au regard 
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situated in the territory of another Member State .... " 69 These 
measures will not guarantee to Community nationals the right which 
French nationals enjoy to renew commercial leases (propriete com-
merciale), but they will enjoy such a right by virtue of the general 
definition of freedom of establishment contained in Article 52, 
paragraph 2 (and of the relevant provisions of French law). 70 
4· ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
Under Article 52, paragraph 2, one of the essential conditions 
of freedom of establishment is plainly the right to judicial protec-
tion.71 Indeed, Article 52 will force France to exempt Community 
nationals and companies qualifying under Article 58 from the re-
quirement that foreign plaintiffs post bonds (donner caution) to 
guarantee payment of costs and damages.72 This requirement clearly 
constitutes a discrimination based on nationality. 
5· VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
The right-of-establishment chapter says nothing about the right 
of the owners of an enterprise to cease operations, sell its assets, 
and leave the country with the proceeds, although this right has been 
termed a necessary part of the freedom of establishment.73 The 
most important aspect of this problem is almost certainly the ability 
to transfer assets. If the Belgian subsidiary liquidates its French 
branch, for example, will it be able to transfer the resultant assets 
fro~ France to Belgium? This depends on French exchange con-
trols. As Mr. J eantet has indicated, assets could be freely trans-
ferred to Belgium under present French exchange regulations. Two 
questions therefore arise: ( 1) does the Treaty limit France's power 
to institute new controls in regard to the other Member States; and 
( 2) if France instituted new controls, could they, without violating 
the Treaty, discriminate against companies like the Belgian sub-
sidiary because control is in the hands of non-Community nationals 
or companies? 
du droit international prive, 48 REVUE CRITIQUE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 237, 
at 24S (1959). 
69 Art. 54 (e). 
70 See text at note 26 supra. 
71 See also Treaty, art. 220 (last clause) concerning the recognition of judicial and 
arbitral awards. 
72 See Deletre, op. cit. supra note 68, at ISS· 
73 Zaneletti, Le Droit d'Etablissement des activith industrielles dans le cadre de Ia 
Communaute Economique Europecnne, in [1959] Les Probleme~ de !'Europe 57· 
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a. The Impact of the Treaty on Exchange Controls 
Article 52 guarantees national treatment in regard to the freedom 
of establishment "subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating 
to capital." This reservation does not mean, however, that capital 
movement restrictions may be used to circumvent the right-of-
establishment provisions. 74 Exchange controls may be continued or 
instituted only for the purposes stated in the chapter relating to 
capital. Moreover, the Community countries, pursuant to directives 
of the Council,75 will be obligated to eliminate exchange controls 
"to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the common 
market." 76 
These two rules regarding exchange controls mean that such con-
trols may not be used to give competitive advantage, for example, 
to French enterprises or, more relevantly here, to keep enterprises 
in France which wish to leave.77 The Common Market will only 
function properly if laws and regulations are eliminated which 
prevent choices based solely on the free play of economic forces, 
and freedom of establishment will plainly be less meaningful if the 
right to withdraw is artifically restricted. 
But France is authorized to take measures if divergencies be-
tween her exchange regulations in regard to non-member countries 
and those of other Member States prompt persons residing in a 
Member State to use transfer facilities within the Community to 
circumvent French controls. 78 Moreover, if France's capital market 
experiences difficulties she may, on the Commission's authoriza-
tion 79 or, in urgent cases, on her own initiative,80 take protective 
measures.81 
b. Discrimination Against Community Companies 
Controlled from Abroad 
If France should invoke either of these emergency provisions, 
could she discriminate against companies like the Belgian subsidiary 
•• See WoHLFARTH, Dl!! EWG, at 175. 
75 Art. 69. 
•• Art. 67(1). 
77 See Everling, Einzelheiten der Regelung der selbstiindigen beruflichen Tiitigkeit 
im Gemeinsamen Markt, 13 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 857 at 861 (1958). 
78 Art. 70(2) . 
.,. Art. 73 (2 ). 
80 Ibid. 
"'Measures taken on her own initiative will, however, be subject to modification or 
elimination if the Commission so decides. 
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because they are under the control of non-Community companies? 
A prior question-and it probably moots the one stated-is this: 
Would France so discriminate? Since exchange controls in France 
are based on residence, such discrimination seems unlikely. At-
tempted discrimination would nowhere find justification in the 
Treaty, in any case, since nothing in the two emergency provisions 
described would authorize France to discriminate against the Bel-
gian subsidiary in favor of other residents of Belgium. 
c. Conclusion 
The importance of these questions lies in the possibility that 
France might attempt to re-institute more stringent exchange con-
trols in regard to non-member countries than the Treaty permits 
in regard to Member States. Should this happen, the Belgian sub-
sidiary would be in the same position as other Belgian residents, 
which is to say, it would be in a better position to withdraw assets 
from France than would its American parent. But this does not 
mean that the assets could in turn be transferred from the Belgian 
subsidiary to the American parent, nor is it any indication that such 
assets could ultimately be converted into dollars. In sum, the Bel-
gian subsidiary might, by virtue of the Treaty, be able to obtain the 
proceeds of the liquidation of its French branch and to use them 
elsewhere in the Community in situations where it would be unable 
to remit to United States stockholders. 
The significance of Mr. Jeantet's conclusion-that exchange con-
trols will become a Community, rather than a national, problem-
is evident. 
6. EXPROPRIATION 
The Treaty makes no express mention of expropriation. Four 
general provisions are relevant, however. Article 222 provides: 
"This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the system existing in Mem-
ber States in respect of property." This means that the Treaty in 
no way affects the power of the Member States to expropriate pri-
vate property for public use.82 But Article 90 ( 1) subjects "public 
enterprises and enterprises to which the Member States grant spe-
cial or exclusive rights" to the rules of the Treaty. In particular it 
subjects them to Article 7 (prohibiting discrimination based on na-
tionality) and Articles 8 5-94 (the "antitrust" provisions of the 
80 See Thiesing in KoMMENTAR, op. cit. supra note so, at 64. 
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Treaty).83 Moreover, Article 37 requires the Member States to 
adjust progressively "any State monopolies of a commercial char-
acter in such a manner as will ensure the exclusion, at the date of the 
expiry of the transitional period, of all discrimination between the 
nationals of Member States in regard to conditions of supply or 
marketing of goods." This suggests that, while the expropriating 
power is unaffected, the ends to which nationalization, for example, 
can be put have in fact been limited by the Treaty, since state 
monopolies will not be able to pursue either protectionist or anti-
competitive goals.84 Finally, Article 52 requires that all Commu-
nity nationals and companies who owned expropriated property be 
compensated on the same terms that nationals of the expropriating 
Member State 85 are compensated. 
C. THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE AND THE E.E.C. 
TREATY CoMPARED IN DETAIL 
I. THE COMPANIES PROTECTED 
Both the Convention with France and the E.E.C. Treaty require 
-expressly or in effect-that the law of the place of constitution 
(and thus of the location of the registered office) should ultimately 
be determinative of the nationality of companies. Both will require 
recognition by a signatory of the juridical personality of companies 
constituted under the laws of another signatory (and therefore hav-
ing a registered office there), but the E.E.C. Treaty should be in-
terpreted to add one condition: the company must also be "estab-
lished" in the Community in keeping with Article 52. 
This added condition is significant for it will represent a first shift 
in the law of Community countries concerning companies from a 
national to a regional perspective; the condition does not require 
"establishment" in the country where the company is formed but 
anywhere in the Community. This is to say that the Treaty has 
taken a step-however limited-towards the recognition of a Com-
munity company. In this regard the contrast between the Conven-
tion with France and the E.E.C. Treaty is marked. 
The criteria determining the companies protected by the E.E.C. 
Treaty offer, then, a specific instance of the general basic difference 
83 But see art. 90 (2). 
84 Ibid. See WoHLFARTH, DIE EWG at 103. 
'"If Article 52 is not applicable, then Article 7 will be and the same result should 
follow. 
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between the Treaty and the Convention with France. The per-
spective of the Convention is that of sovereign states which want 
close economic ties with each other; that of the E.E.C. Treaty, one 
of sovereign states which want ever closer economic ties with each 
other and ultimately economic unification. 
2. THE EMPLOYMENT OF NON-NATIONALS 
The E.E.C. countries will ultimately be forced to eliminate, as 
far as Community nationals and companies are concerned, require-
ments that foreign nationals and companies be authorized to do 
business within their territories if no such authorization is required 
of their own nationals and companies. After these requirements 
have been eliminated, Community nationals will be able to work in 
France without a foreign merchant's identity card in situations for 
which it was heretofore required. Such freedom could extend even 
to non-Community nationals employed by Community companies. 
The Convention with France, on the other hand, does not absolve 
an American national from obtaining such an identity card, although 
it does afford protection against its arbitrary refusal. 
3· OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY 
Both the Convention with France and the E.E.C. Treaty will 
guarantee the right of nationals and companies of the, or of any, 
other signa tory to own real property; and both will result, for ex-
ample, in giving them a right in France to renew commercial leases 
and, if this renewal right is denied, to demand eviction indemnifica-
tion. 
The two agreements differ in one respect in this area, however, 
and this is again a specific instance of a general difference between 
them. The E.E.C. Treaty creates a general right of establishment 
of which the right to own property is, as Article 54 (3) (e) indi-
cates, an element; the Convention creates no general right of estab-
lishment but provides for a number of specific rights of which the 
right to own real property is one. Had no right to own real prop-
erty been mentioned in the Convention, none would exist under it. 
Had the Treaty made no specific mention of this right of ownership, 
the general right of establishment could still be found to imply it. 
This general difference between the two approaches is important 
in determining the scope of each. 
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4· ACCESS TO COURTS 
Nationals and companies of the signatories have a right to sue 
in the courts ofthe, or of any, other signatory under the Convention 
with France and the E.E.C. Treaty, respectively. But the E.E.C. 
Treaty goes further and will, for example, prevent France from 
requiring Community nationals and companies to post bond to guar-
antee the payment of costs and damages in actions they initiate. 
5· VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY 
A comparison of the Convention with France and the E.E.C. 
Treaty in this area is particularly speculative. Both will guarantee 
certain rights in connection with the withdrawal by a company (of 
one signatory nation) of its economic activity from the territory of 
another, but the most significant question-whether the repatria-
tion of assets to the country of origin can be prevented-will be 
determined in both cases in accordance with as yet undefined criteria. 
The Convention does, however, give some guarantee that earnings 
may be repatriated, and both the Convention and the Treaty put 
some limitation on the freedom of the signatory countries to in-
stitute new exchange controls preventing the repatriation of capital 
assets. 
The important difference between the two lies, however, again in 
their differing basic aims. As economic integration, at which the 
E.E.C. Treaty aims, proceeds, the feasibility of national exchange 
controls, which would prevent repatriation from one Community 
country to another, will diminish. A comparable result, where the 
United States and France are concerned, will only be achieved 
through agreements other than the Convention. 
6. EXPROPRIATION 
Both the Convention and the Treaty guarantee national treat-
ment by the signatories to nationals and companies of the, or of 
any, other signatory in cases of expropriation. The Convention adds 
additional requirements-compensation must be the equivalent of 
the property taken, in effectively realizable form, granted without 
needless delay, and every effort must be made to accord an opportu-
nity to repatriate the proceeds. The Treaty, on the other hand, 
specifies some of the conditions under which expropriated enter-
prises may be operated-and the limitations it imposes may reduce 
I 80 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
the possible desirability of expropriation from the point of view of 
member governments. 
IV. THE TREATIES OF COMMERCE AND THE 
E.E.C. TREATY RELATED 
Although the generally applicable criterion in the Italian, Ger-
man, and Dutch F.C.N. Treaties and in the Convention with France 
is national treatment, the most-favored-nation clause is also some-
times applicable. All four, for example, guarantee most-favored-
nation as well as national treatment in regard to exchange trans-
fers, 86 and all, except the Convention with France, refer inter alia 
to most-favored-nation treatment in connection with the organi-
zation and operation of companies.87 
A. THE EFFECT OF MosT-FAvoRED-NATION CLAUSES 
The most-favored-nation clauses raise numerous questions. For 
example, will companies "residing" in the United States be able to 
claim the same rights to repatriate assets from France which Com-
munity companies "residing" in Luxembourg will have by virtue of 
the E.E.C. Treaty provisions concerning capital movements? Or, 
for a second example, will a Delaware corporation be able to assert 
a right to national treatment in bidding on construction contracts 
of the German government because Luxembourg companies will 
have such a right under the services provisions of the E.E.C. 
Treaty? 88 
Plainly these and similar questions must first be considered in the 
light of the wording of all relevant provisions of the applicable 
treaty of commerce. Paragraph 13 of the Protocol to the Conven-
tion with France, which permits differing treatment of different cur-
rencies, might resolve the example question concerning repatriation 
of assets from France. And Article XVII, paragraph 2 of the Ger-
man F.C.N. Treaty requiring "fair and equitable treatment as com-
pared with that accorded to the ... companies ... of any third 
country, with respect to ... the awarding of ... government 
contracts ... " presumably absolves Germany of a duty to accord 
86 Italian F.C.N. Treaty, art. XVII, paras. 2, 3; German F.C.N. Treaty, art. XII, 
para. I; Dutch F.C.N. Treaty, art. XII, para. I; Convention with France, art. X, 
para. I. 
87 Italian F.C.N. Treaty, art. III, para. 1; German F.C.N. Treaty, art. VII, para. 1; 
Dutch F.C.N. Treaty, art. VII, para. 4· 
•• Arts 59-66. St'e Part V of this chapter i11jra. 
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Delaware companies most-favored-nation (as opposed to "fair and 
equitable") treatment. 
But the general question remains: Where the most-favored-
nation clause is applicable in a treaty of commerce between the 
United States and a Common Market country, can an American 
company, by virtue thereof, claim the same benefits which that coun-
try accords Community companies pursuant to the E. E. C. Treaty? 
The answer is clear in the Netherlands-it cannot. Article XXII, 
paragraph 3 of the Dutch F.C.N. Treaty provides: 
The most-favored-nation treatment provisions of the pres-
ent Treaty shall not apply to advantages accorded by 
either Party ... by virtue of a customs union .... 
Moreover, an exchange of letters makes these additional provisions 
part of the Treaty: 
( 1 ) [The Netherlands J should continue to be able to 
participate in European regional arrangements . . . 
even though the Netherlands may thereunder be 
obliged to grant some reciprocal advantages to other 
participating countries which it is unable to grant to 
non-participating countries; [and] 
( 2) Either Party, notwithstanding . . . [the provision 
concerning termination of this Treaty after 10 years 
have passed], shall be entitled to suspend the opera-
tion of particular most-favored-nation provisions of 
the Treaty to the extent deemed appropriate to the 
situation ... [if future contingencies arise]. 89 
The Italian F.C.N. Treaty, on the other hand, provides that the 
most-favored-nation provisions shall not apply to "advantages ac-
corded by virtue of a customs union of which either ... Party 
may ... become a member." 90 A comparable provision in the 
German Treaty is more explicit; it provides that most-favored-
nation treatment "in regard to customs duties and quotas on goods" 
shall not apply to "advantages accorded by either party by virtue 
of a customs union or free-trade area." 91 
""l.r., future contingencies which Article XXII, paragraph 4 does not adequately 
meet. Since the subject of the paragraph from which this second quotation is taken 
is the reconciliation of the Treaty with then-existing European arrangements (that 
is, in 1956), and since Article XXII, paragraph 4 refers only to the "treatment of 
goods" and action required or specifically permitted under the G.A.T.T., there is a 
question whether suspension of most-favored-nation provisions in connection with 
"future contingencies" created by the E.E.C. Treaty would be warranted. In the light 
of the letter as a whole, such a restrictive interpretation seems unlikely, however. 
00 Art. XXIV, para. 3 (b) . 
• , Art. XIV, para. 6. 
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"Advantages accorded by virtue of a customs union"-whether 
implicitly or explicitly-are restricted to questions of tariffs and 
quotas. The effect of other most-favored-nation provisions of the 
Italian and German treaties-read in conjunction with the E.E.C. 
Treaty-remains, therefore, an open question. The authors of the 
E.E.C. Treaty plainly had this problem in mind in drafting Article 
234. Its third paragraph provides that in applying conventions be-
tween Member States and third countries the latter 
shall take into account the fact that the advantages ac-
corded [in the E.E.C. Treaty J by each of the Member 
States are an integral part of the establishment of the 
Community and are, because of this fact, inseparably 
linked to the creation of common institutions, the attribu-
tion of powers to them and the granting of the same ad-
vantages by all other Member States. 
Obviously the drafters intended by this provision to serve notice 
that the Member States will not grant like advantages to third 
countries unless the latter offer the same benefits and accept the 
same burdens-unless, in short, the latter become members of the 
Community. The justice of this position may be appealing, but it 
involves in effect a unilateral interpretation by each Member State 
of its agreements with third countries for which there is no warrant 
in international law.92 
The position of the United States government in regard to its 
treaties of commerce with Community countries may be foresha-
dowed by its response to the letter of the government of the Neth-
erlands which became part of the Dutch F.C.N. Treaty. The answer 
of the U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands read in part: 
As your Excellencies are aware, the United States Gov-
ernment welcomes progress in the development of Euro-
pean cooperation and integration insofar as arrangements 
for cooperation and integration contribute to a freer flow 
of trade, a more efficient use of manpower and materials, 
and greater unity. In this connection, it may be recalled 
that the United States Government has given concrete sup-
port to such organizations as the European Coal and Steel 
Community and concurred in the waiver relative thereto 
granted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, bearing in mind the 
. benefits expected to accrue from arrangements designed 
to create a dynamic competitive common market within the 
"'Piot, La clause de Ia nation Ia plus favorisie, 45 REVUE ou DROIT PRIVE INTERNA-
TIONAL I ( 1952 ). 
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Community and to insure sound economic relations be-
tween the Community and outside countries. The United 
States Government is prepared to consider sympathet-
ically in the same spirit other proposals which the King-
dom of the Netherlands might make. 
An attempt to assert that the most-favored-nation status of Ameri-
can nationals or companies gives them the Community status created 
by the E.E.C. Treaty seems, in any case, unlikely to succeed in any 
Community country. 
B. CONCURRENT PROTECTION UNDER 
DIFFERENT TREATIES 
The Common Market subsidiary of an American parent may be 
in a position to claim concurrent protection under more than one 
treaty. If the Belgian subsidiary, for example, meets the standards 
of Article 58, the right-of-establishment provisions of the E. E. C. 
Treaty are applicable. In addition, it may be able to claim protection 
under Belgium's bilateral treaties of commerce-for example, the 
Franco-Belgian Convention of Establishment. 93 Finally, because the 
Convention with France recognizes control of companies as decisive 
for some purposes, the Convention may also apply. 
To take only one example, assume that France expropriates prop-
erty of the Belgian subsidiary's French branch. Under the E.E.C. 
Treaty the Belgian subsidiary will be able to claim national treat-
ment in regard to compensation; under the Franco-Belgian Con-
vention of Establishment (Article 6), most-favored-nation treat-
ment; and under the Convention with France also, apparently, the 
rights it affords in case of expropriation. Paragraph 6 of the Con-
vention's Protocol provides: 
The provisions of Article IV, paragraph 3 providing for 
the payment of compensation [in case of expropriation] 
shall extend to interests held directly or indirectly by na-
tionals and companies ... [of the United States] in 
property expropriated within the territories of . . . 
[France]. (Emphasis added.) 
V. DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY 
UNDER THE E.E.C. TREATY 
The significance of the E.E.C. Treaty to intra-Community opera-
tions of American corporate subsidiaries is obviously not limited 
00 Of Oct. 6, 1927 [Nov. 5, 1927] J.O. See especially arts. s, 6, and 7· 
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to express protection of the right of establishment. At least three 
other aspects of the Treaty are important, directly relevant, and 
generally beyond the scope of other chapters of this book. The first 
is the "services" provisions of the Treaty (Articles 59-66) ; the 
second is the Treaty's provision for assimilation of the laws of the 
Six; and the third is the pressure which the Treaty will create to 
ameliorate investment conditions. 
A. THE "SERVICES" PROVISIONS 
By virtue of Article 66 a company qualifying under Article 58 
may also claim the protection of the "services" chapter of the 
Treaty (Articles 59-66). The rights which will be created pursuant 
to this chapter will complement those arising under the "right-of-
establishment" provisions of the Treaty. The difference between 
the two lies in the situation of the persons, or what is more rele-
vant to this discussion, the situation of the companies protected. 
The "right-of-establishment" provisions envisage protection of 
persons and companies of one Member State who desire to estab-
lish, or who have already established, in another Member State. 
The "services" provisions look to protection of those of one Mem-
ber State who wish to do business in another without establishing 
there. An important segment of the rights of such a person or com-
pany are regulated by the Treaty provisions concerning tariffs, 
quotas, and capital movements. These provisions, standing alone, 
are clearly inadequate, however, to achieve the freedom of eco-
nomic activity among Member States sought by the drafters of the 
Treaty. The "services" provisions were therefore included to ef-
fect an ultimate elimination of those restrictions on economic ac-
tivity in the Community not otherwise affected by the Treaty. 
"Services" are, as a result of this "stop-gap" nature of the rele-
vant provisions, negatively defined. Article 6o provides: 
[W]ithin the meaning of the present Treaty services are 
considered to be any performance normally performed for 
remuneration to the extent that they are not regulated by 
the provisions concerning free circulation of goods, of 
capital and of persons. (This author's translation.) 
This definition suggests that "services" as used in this chapter means 
something broader than the term "services" as generally used in the 
phrase "goods and services." The French, German, and Italian 
equivalents of "performance" (if not the Dutch) suggest, in fact, 
that "services" means "any performance pursuant to contract." 
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The essential freedom to be created by the "services" provisions 
is indicated by Article 59· That Article provides in pertinent part: 
[R] estrictions on free performance of services within the 
Community shall be progressively eliminated during the 
transitional period in regard to nationals of Member 
States established in a country of the Community other 
than that of the recipient of the service. (This author's 
translation.) 
Although there is nothing in Article 59 to indicate as much, the ma-
jority opinion apparently is that the "services" provisions envisage 
only national treatment. The Economic Council of France has, how-
ever, taken another view. In its report of January 3, 19 59, it stated: 
[T]he restriction created by the second line of Article 52 
as far as establishment is concerned, which reduced this 
liberty to one of non-discrimination in regard to foreign 
nationals of a Member State, does not exist in regard to 
services. Moreover the drafters of the Treaty used the 
term "Community" here and not the term "Member 
States." The problem is, then, one of eliminating the ob-
stacles to the free performance of services within the 
territory of the Community .... 94 
Despite the Report of the Economic Council of France it will be 
assumed here that the majority view is correct. 
The "services" chapter has three provisions which have no coun-
terparts in the "right-of-establishment" chapter. The first of these, 
Article 64, provides that Member States are prepared to go fur-
ther than will be required by directives of the Council in freeing 
services, if their general economic situations and those in the rele-
vant economic sectors permit them to do so. Article 6 5 provides 
that as long as restrictions on free performance of services are not 
eliminated, each of the Member States will apply them without dis-
tinction based on nationality or residence 95 to all performers of 
services as defined in Article 59, line I. And finally Article 6o pro-
vides: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the chapter con-
cerning the right of establishment, the performer of serv-
"" Rapport du Conseil Economique du 9 dec. 1958, [Jan. 3, 1959] J.O. at 1003. (This 
author's translation.) 
""This provision could mean that France, for example, shall not now distinguish 
between Frenchmen and Belgians in applying such restrictions. This would be its 
meaning if the Economic Council has correctly interpreted the meaning of Article 59· 
If the majority is correct about Article 59, Article 64 means only that France will not 
discriminate between Belgians and Germans, for example, in applying such restrictions, 
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ices may, in order to perform them, exercise on a tempo-
rary basis his activity in the country where the service is 
supplied under the same conditions as those which that 
country imposes on its own nationals. (This author's 
translation.) 
The greater liberality of the "services" chapter, as manifested 
by these three provisions, is probably explained by the fact that the 
significance of services in the Community-that is, services within 
the meaning of the Treaty-is less than that of the economic ac-
tivity of non-nationals established within each Community country.96 
More radical changes therefore seemed possible. 
One example must serve to suggest the significance of the "serv-
ices" chapter. Assume that an American corporation which special-
izes in the manufacture and construction of pre-fabricated housing 
is 'contemplating the establishment of a Belgian subsidiary. Assume 
further that an important element in this decision is its potential 
ability to construct such housing for public housing projects. As-
sume, finally, that German laws, for example, which authorize pub-
lic housing projects generally restrict bidding to German nationals 
and companies. Should the American corporation assume that such 
restrictive laws will, pursuant to the Treaty ultimately be elimi-
nated? 
The Member States have not been fully agreed that such laws 
must be eliminated, but the Commission has assumed that they must 
be.97 And the Treaty supports the Commission's stand. The con-
struction of housing, as an example, is clearly a service, and it is 
obvious that the removal of other restrictions on the free perform-
ance of services would be meaningless to a company interested in 
the construction of public housing if it were not free to bid on gov-
ernment contracts. 
B. AssiMILATION OF THE LAws OF THE Six 
Various provisions of the Treaty will expressly, or in effect, force 
unification, harmonization, coordination, or approximation of laws 
of the Six. The term "assimilation" will hereinafter be used to de-
scribe these measures in the aggregate, and it will be used in its 
primary sense-that is, "to make similar." 
96 See Ehring, op. cit. supra note so, at 164. 
"'Cf. the discussion of the Commission's proposal pursuant to Art. 54 ( 1) in, Everling, 
Forsc~lag der Kommission der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft zur Regelung 
des· Nuderlassungsrechtes, 1960 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 570. 
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I. THE ASSIMILATING EFFECT OF 
ARTICLES S8, 220, AND 221 
Reference has already been made to one group of laws-those 
concerning the recognition of companies-which will in effect be 
assimilated pursuant to Articles 58 and 220. But Article 220 also 
provides that the Member States shall negotiate to assure for their 
nationals: 
... the maintenance of juridical personality in case of 
transfer of the central office (siege) from country to coun-
try and the possibility of merger of companies formed 
under different national laws. . . . (Translation by this 
author.) 
Added to this is the provision of Article 22 I which guarantees (as 
of January I, I96I) national treatment in respect of participation 
in the capital of companies of other Member States (in the sense 
of Article 58). 
It is, perhaps, somewhat artificial to view these as provisions 
directed at assimilation. Nonetheless, it is clear that their effect, at 
least incidentally, will be to make the laws of the Six more similar 
to one another, and it is helpful to view them in this light, as should 
become clear. 
2. PROVISIONS IN THE "RIGHT-OF-ESTABLISHMENT" 
CHAPTER EXPRESSLY REQUIRING ASSIMILATION 
Three provisions of the "right-of-establishment" chapter ex-
pressly require assimilation of the laws. 
a. Article 56(2) 
Under Article 56 ( 2) the Council is, prior to the end of the transi-
tional period, to adopt directives in order to bring about coordina-
tion of: 
legislative provisions and administrative rules and regula-
tions which prescribe a special regime for aliens . . . for 
reasons of public order, security and health. (This au-
thor's translation.) 
Such directives are to be based on Commission proposals and 
adopted, after consultation with the Assembly, by unanimous vote. 
(Coordination of administrative rules and regulations are subject 
to directives adopted by a qualified majority after the end of the 
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second stage, however.) Assimilation in this area of law is of ob-
vious importance; public order, security, and health offer ready 
justification for the negation of virtually any Treaty provision or 
administrative act of the institutions (for example, it may well be 
argued that the requirement of a foreign merchant's identity card is 
necessitated by public order and security) .98 
b. Article 57(2) 
Article 57 ( 2) requires coordination of legislative provisions and 
administrative rules and regulations of the Member States con-
cerning access to non-salaried activities and their exercise. A pro-
posal of the Commission and consultation with the Assembly are 
again necessary, and, with certain stated exceptions, the Council 
is to adopt the required directives unanimously during the first stage 
and by qualified majority thereafter. 
c. Article 54( 3) (g) 
The provision for assimilation of most direct interest to com-
panies, and the only one to be considered here in some detail, is 
Article 54(3) (g). It requires the institutions to take action to bring 
about coordination 
to the extent ... necessary and with a view to making 
them equivalent, (of) the guarantees demanded in Mem-
ber States from companies within the meaning of Article 
58, second paragraph, for the purpose of protecting the 
interests both of the members of such companies and of 
third parties. . . . (This author's translation.) 
This provision could have far-reaching consequences. A German 
professor has even suggested that it may outlaw the provisions of 
the projected reform of German stock company law.99 
This is an extreme view of the reach of Article 54(3) (g), but 
the effects it may have are important enough to consider at least 
some of them in detail. One way of doing this is to list the parties 
affected by company laws and to ask which aspects of their relation-
ships with each other are governed by rules designed to protect 
members and third parties. The interested parties-if the discussion 
is confined to stock companies-are the stockholders, the corpora-
tion, the directors and officers, creditors, other third parties, and 
98 See Chaine, op. cit. supra note 18, at 195. 
90 Biirmann, I st eine A ktienreform iiberhaupt no ell zuliissig f! 14 }URISTENZEITUNG 
434 (1959)· 
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the state. Obviously the rules governing corporation-stockholder 
relations and corporation-creditor relations are of primary rele-
vance. But what of the rules governing other relationships? For 
example, the provisions in American corporation law permitting 
derivative suits constitute a clear recognition that harm done by 
directors of the corporation harms the stockholders. Thus, some 
rules governing the company-director relationship may require co-
ordination pursuant to Article 54 ( 3) (g) . . 
Or, for a more remote example, take the rules determining when 
corporate existence begins. They most directly affect the company-
state relationship, but it seems clear enough that they are also rele-
vant in defining the protection of stockholders and creditors. 
The limits of the area of company law which could be coordinated 
pursuant to Article 54 (3) (g) can, then, be very broadly defined. 
Within these limits, what-to ask a further question-are some of 
the presently applicable rules of stock company law which should 
be coordinated in the interest of Community stockholders and credi-
tors? Two examples of differing rules in some of the six countries 
which are relevant to the competing claims for protection of stock-
holders and creditors suggest the kind of answer which can be ex-
pected to this question.100 
I) Disregard of Corporate Entity. Some of the rules concerning 
the conditions under which stockholders may be held liable for the 
debts of the stock company differ in the Six. Specifically, these are 
the situations in which the corporate entity may be disregarded-
the veil "pierced." 
Assume, for example, that an American corporation has acquired 
So percent of the stock of a Dutch stock company, the remainder 
of the shares being in the hands of the American corporation's 
Dutch partners. Wishing to assign certain markets to the Dutch 
company and aware of the problems which an agreement to share 
markets may create under the U.S. antitrust laws if the Dutch com-
pany is permitted to hold itself out as a wholly independent entity, 
the U.S. management adopts the following policy on advice of coun-
sel: Some Western European markets will be left exclusively to the 
Dutch affiliate (but no agreement to this effect will be adopted) ; 
100 
For discussions of the rules which require assimilation under Article 54(3) (g), 
and under the Treaty generally see, Loussouarn, Le droit international du commerce 
et le Marclte Commun, 12 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE ou DROIT CoMMERCIAL (Oct.-Dec., 
1959); Biirmann, Die Europaischen Gemeinschaften und die Rechtsangleichung, 14 
]UR!STENZElTUNG 553 (1959); Strauss, FRAGEN DER RECHTSANGLE!CHUNG IM RAHMEN 
PER EUROPA!SCHEN GEME!NSCHAFTEN ( 1959). 
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the affiliate will, however, be treated wherever possible as if it were 
simply the overseas division of the American corporation, ultimate 
control being always in the hands of the U.S. company. 
Key executives are thereafter transferred temporarily from the 
United States to the Netherlands with a view to familiarizing Dutch 
personnel with American mass market business methods; and per-
sonnel of the Dutch company pass freely back and forth between 
the two ·companies for training purposes. Transactions are not al-
ways at arm's length; and, because of the pace general economic 
growth within the Common Market, the business of the Dutch 
company has developed more quickly than anticipated and this 
unexpectedly rapid growth has given the Dutch affiliate an appear-
ance of being under-capitalized. 
Having first gotten substantial judgments against the Dutch af-
filiate which it cannot pay, creditors of the affiliate now attempt to 
obtain payment from the American corporation in the Netherlands, 
France, and Germany-in each of which the American corporation 
has assets and in each of which one plaintiff is domiciled. In each 
case the plaintiff-creditors argue that the Dutch corporate entity 
should be ignored and the shareholders held liable. 
In the Netherlands the U.S. stockholder would not, in all likeli-
hood, be held liable. Disregard of juridical personality is apparently 
extremely rare.101 On the other hand, a French court could consider 
the existence of the affiliate an "abuse of juridical personality" and 
hold that in France the two companies should be considered as 
one.102 Finally, a German court might consider that the juridical 
personality of the Dutch affiliate should be denied recognition-
particularly in view of its capitalization and the complete control 
exercised by the American company-since 
... the legal status of the juridical person cannot be 
recognized to the extent that the uses to which it is put are 
contrary to the purposes of the legal order .103 
In sum, disregard of the corporate entity would be unlikely in the 
Netherlands, probable in France, and possible in Germany. 
Assuming that a German or French court might conclude that 
the juridical personality of the Dutch affiliate should be disregarded 
under the law of the forum, a conflict question arises. Under the 
101 See Conard, Chapter VIII, section II, A, 6, b, supra. 
102 See Legeais, L'Extension de la jail/ite sociale, 10 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROIT 
COMMERCIAL 289 ( 1957) · 
"'" :12 Bundesgerichtshof (Zivilsachen) 226, 231 ( 1956). (Translation by this author.) 
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general conflict rule of both Germany and France the law of the 
Nether lands would determine whether a company with its central 
office ( Sitz, siege) in the Netherlands should be viewed as a jurid-
ical entity. But application of this rule, like that of others, is sub-
ject to the proviso that its application must not violate the purpose 
of a German law or French ordre public. 104 A German or French 
court could, then, conclude that application of the usual rule in the 
example case would be such a violation; a Belgian court in a like 
case in fact did so. 105 
If we assume a wholly-owned subsidiary of an American corpora-
tion, the problem is even more complex. There is no apparent ob-
jection, or penalty attached, to the ultimate concentration of all 
shares in the hands, of one shareholder in the Netherlands or in 
Germany. In France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, on the other hand, 
ultimate single owne~ship of all the shares results in dissolution 
of the company. Some-for example a Belgian commercial court 106 
-have concluded that dissolution is automatic, and that liquida-
tion is not, therefore, a prerequisite of the personal liability of a 
sole stockholder. And "strawmen" will provide no insulation against 
this liability in Belgium, for example. In Italy, single ownership of 
all the shares will not dissolve the company, but the single share-
holder is liable for the debts of the company contracted during the 
period of single ownership should the company become insolvent.107 
2) Powers of the Heads of Companies to Bind Them. A second 
example of rules of company law of the Six which should be coordi-
nated in keeping with Article 54(3) (g) was suggested by a French 
notary in a particularly able discussion of the status of foreign cor-
porations in Common Market countries. 108 It concerns the power 
of the heads of companies to bind the company. 
In France there is, according to Mr. Thibierge, a difference be-
tween their powers to bind the stock company-the societe anonyme 
-and those to bind the limited liability company-the societe a 
responsabilite limitee. Under French stock company laws their 
powers are defined in the charter, or confirmed by subsequent action 
or decision. Heads of the stock company obligate the company, 
10
' See, e.g., Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch § 30: Die Anwendung 
eines ausliindischen Gesetzes ist ausgeschlossen, wenn die Anwendung gegen die 
guten Sitten oder gegen den Zweck eines deutschen Gesetzes verstossen wiirde. 
'""Judgment of Jan. 5, 1911, Cour de Cassation, Pasicrisie II 68 (19II). 
100 Judgment of Oct. 13, 1951, Tribunal Commercial de Bruxelles, Pasicrisie III 65 
(1952). 
107 Art. 2362, Coo. Crv. 
108 Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 61 at 344 fl. 
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therefore, only if they have express authority to do so, unless the 
action taken concerns usual every-day company transactions which 
it may be expected all company heads are authorized to carry out. 
If real estate is to be sold, or money borrowed, however, company 
heads have only the power expressly conferred on them, and third 
parties fail to verify this power at their peril. 
Under the French limited liability company act, on the other hand, 
the heads of the company are granted powers by law which third 
parties may rely on even if the charter limits them. Such limitations 
will render the company heads liable to the stockholders if they are 
transgressed, but that is their only potential effect. These legal 
powers are, in short, granted as a matter of public policy. 
The rules pertaining to limited liability companies in France were 
borrowed from the German limited-liability-company law. Under 
German law, however, the heads of German stock companies also 
have powers which the law grants as a matter of public policy and 
which are unalterable by charter. 
In Italy company heads have all powers to obligate the company, 
but limitations on their powers are binding on third parties if they 
have been recorded in the public register of enterprises or if the 
company can prove such third persons knew of the restrictions. 
Finally, in Belgium the powers of the heads of the limited lia-
bility company as well as of those of stock companies can be re-
stricted in the company charter to the detriment of third parties, 
even parties who have no knowledge of the restrictions. 
3· ASSIMILATION UNDER THE TREATY SUMMARIZED 
Three instances of assimilation in the Six have here been sug-
gested. Their possible significance is worth consideration at this 
point. 
The three instances were-to re-order them: (I) assimilation of 
laws to the principle of non-discrimination (Article 22 I, for ex-
ample, which eliminates discrimination against the participation of 
non-nationals in the capital of companies) ; ( 2) assimilation with 
one another of the laws protecting stockholders and creditors (Arti-
cle 54(3) (g); and (3) assimilation of the conflict rules determin-
ing the nationality of corporations (Articles 58 and 220). 
The first of these may be most significant in eliminating legal 
obstacles to Community-wide operations-present governmental 
discrimination based on nationality will be removed and future dis-
crimination is prohibited. The second may be most important in 
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eliminating economic obstacles stemming from differences of the 
laws: If creditors can be certain that their protection will be essen-
tially the same regardless of the place of formation of a company 
within the Community, Community-wide transactions will be facili-
tated. And if stockholders can be sure of like protection regardless 
of the laws within the Community under which a company is formed, 
they may be more willing to approve Community-wide ventures. 
More important, companies may find it easier to raise capital on a 
Community rather than country basis. 
The third instance of assimilation discussed-that to be effected 
by Articles 58 and 2 zo-may be most significant as first attack on 
psychological obstacles to Community-wide company operation. Be-
cause Article 58 (read with Article 52) looks to location of any 
two of the three elements (the registered office, the central manage-
ment, and the central establishment) not in the country where the 
company is formed but anywhere in the Community, it contains an 
invitation to view the Six as a whole, to substitute a Community for 
a natio~al perspective. 
Such a shift in perspective, if it became general, would be im-
portant not only to the Community company which desires to oper-
ate on a Community-wide basis. The extent of legislative assimila-
tion in the Six will be determined by the extent to which such a shift 
occurs. Coordination of the laws is possible now, but the extent of 
unification would seem to depend on the extent to which a Commu-
nity consciousness replaces the present sense of allegiance solely to 
the six nation-states. 
4· FURTHER PROPOSALS FOR ASSIMILATION 
Three suggestions have already been publicly made which are 
relevant to the Community-wide operation of companies, which 
seem feasible, and which may be the next logical steps, departing 
from Article 58, in the progression towards a Community view-
point and unification. 
The first of these suggested changes is the institution by treaty 
of a Community companies register.109 No Common Market com-
pany would be required to register but advantages of registration 
would be substantial. For example, limitations of the powers of 
company heads would be effective against third parties from the 
date of their publication in the register-but only then. Moreover, 
registration could be accompanied by the issuance of a European 
109 /d. at 352. 
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License of Establishment, which would result in simultaneous regis-
tration of the company in the commercial registers of each of the 
Six. 
The second suggested change-and this obviously goes consider-
ably further in the direction of a unified Community company law-
has been to create a Common Market Securities Exchange Com-
missionY0 The argument is that some such central regulation of 
the issuance of shares is necessary if investors are to be attracted in 
any numbers to Community companies established in other coun-
tries. An intermediate step in this direction-a uniform prospectus 
which could effect the listing of stock with all of the exchanges in 
the Six-has also been discussed by the exchanges.111 
Professor Tunc, of the Faculty of Law of Paris, in an article 
on the United States S.E.C. had already recommended in 1952 
that French legislators might take inspiration from the various U.S. 
federal laws controlling corporations and their issuance of shares.112 
Something comparable to the S.E.C. has also been urged in Hol-
land, and in Belgium a Banking Commission already exists which 
plays a role similar to that of the S.E.CY3 
The final suggestion has come-with only minor variations-
from a number of sources-a secretary of state of the German 
Ministry of Justice, 114 from the French notary 115 already quoted, 
and from a Dutch professor.116 It has also been the basis of an in-
ternational congress convened by the Paris bar on June 16, q, 18, 
1960.117 The proposal is that a Common Market stock companies 
law should be created which organizers could, but need not, choose. 
Professor Sanders of Holland has suggested as a model the Cana-
dian Dominion Companies Act. The purport of this analogy is 
indicated by these sentences from Fraser's HANDBOOK ON CANA-
DIAN COMPANY LAW: 
Each province in Canada has a Companies Act of its own, 
under which companies may be incorporated, and there is 
also a Dominion Companies Act under which companies 
""/d. at 354-
m See The Journal of Commerce, r :r (Aug. 2, 1960). 
m Tunc, Le Controle federal des societes par actions aux Etats·Unis, 5 REVUE 
TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROIT COMMERCIAL 255, 509 (1952). 
118 See Conard, Chapter VIII at V, D, 4, supra. 
114 Strauss, op. cit. supra note 100, at 24 ff. 
115 Thibierge, op. cit. supra note 61. 
110 Sanders, P ers une societe anonyme europeenne? 1960 LE DROIT EuROPEEN 9 (No. 
r6, Jan.'. 
111 See 1960 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 172 (No. 25, May). 
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may be formed with power to carry on business through-
out the Dominion. (p. xix) 
Dominion companies have a status and powers entitling 
them to carry on business throughout Canada which no 
provincial legislature is entitled to destroy. (p. 7) 
Both Professor Sanders and Dr. Strauss of the German Ministry 
of Justice point to the fact that European states have already created 
by convention a number of international public companies. "Euro-
fima"-a company formed to finance the renewal of railroad equip-
ment-is one. Moreover Articles 45 and following of the Euratom· 
Treaty set a precedent in providing for Community Joint Enter-
prises to foster undertakings of outstanding importance to the de-
velopment of atomic industry. Euratom Joint Enterprises will be 
constituted by a decision of the Euratom Council. 
To the proposals of Professor Sanders and Dr. Strauss, Notary 
Thibierge adds the suggestion that a Community Arbitral Tribunal 
be created. Parties to disputes concerning the treaty law creating 
Common Market stock companies could refer to this tribunal by 
agreement. Mr. Thibierge thereby emphasizes the fact-which the 
Common Market Treaty recognizes in granting the Court of Jus-
tice sovereign jurisdiction in interpretation of the Treaty-that 
common rules require uniform interpretation. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The three instances of legislative assimilation discussed, when 
completed by the three proposals alluded to, would form a program 
of progressive assimilation of laws affecting companies. 
Beginning with adherence to the principle of non-discrimination, 
it adds coordination of the laws protecting shareholders and credi-
tors. The perspective in both instances is the nation-state. Unifica-
tion of the conflict rule determining company nationality-Articles 
58 and 2 20-is strikingly different in viewpoint: the six countries 
are seen as an entity. 
The proposal to create a Common Market companies register 
would entail a modest step toward unification involving the creation 
of a minor supranational agency. The Common Market S.E.C. 
proposal would, if realized, represent a far more significant piece 
of international legislation and would create a major supranational 
administrative agency. Finally, the proposal to create a Community 
Stock Companies Law by treaty under which companies could, but 
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need not, be formed would obviously be a highly significant step to-
wards unification. 
C. THE PRESSURE TO AMELIORATE 
INVESTMENT CoNDITIONs 
It is obviously difficult to isolate the causes for the efforts of the 
Common Market countries, with the exception of Germany, to at-
tract foreign investment. Some, if not all, would no doubt have been 
made even if the Common Market had not come into existence. 
But the creation of the Common Market has plainly increased 
the interest of the foreign investor in the Six, and thereby the stakes 
for which the individual countries are striving. The important point 
is that such efforts are being made both by the individual countries 
of the Six 118 and by non-member countries, notably Great Britain. 
The importance of this fact lies in the pressure which it generates 
to ameliorate investment conditions. The existence of this pressure 
must be taken into account in assessing the effective significance of 
the Treaty. 
It has been suggested, for example, that restrictions on the right 
of aliens to exercise non-wage-earning activities will not be elimi-
nated but simply extended to apply to nationals as well. It is also 
possible to assimilate laws and regulations by adopting the most 
restrictive standards applied by any of the Six (for example, those 
concerning access to non-wage-earning activities (Article 57 ( 2)). 
The desire to attract foreign capital will be an important factor 
countering the inevitable pressures to move in such directions, and 
the Treaty will do much to increase it. 
118 See Delvaux, Investissements ttrangers et Marche Commun, 1960 REVUE DU 
MARCHE CoMMUN 183, 19o-92 (No. 25, May). 
Chapter X 
The Protection of Competition 
Stefan A. Riesenfeld * 
I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE, BACKGROUND, AND 
INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN 
THE E.E.C. TREATY 
A. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PERTINENT 
ARTICLES 
I. PLACE OF THE REGULATIONS WITHIN THE 
TOTAL STRUCTURE OF THE TREATY 
One of the most important and widely publicized aspects of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community is its 
protection of competition in the Common Market. Since the publi-
cation of the texts of the respective international agreements,1 a 
veritable flood of literature on that subject has emerged in the 
Community countries as well as abroad, and a host of controversies 
has arisen over the significance and import of the controlling 
clauses.2 
The pertinent articles differ greatly in structure and are dis-
tributed and arranged over various portions of the Treaty, as a 
*Dr. ]ur., Breslau, 1931; Dott. in Giur., Milan, 1934; LL.B., University of Cali-
fornia, 1937; S.].D., Harvard, 1940. Professor of Law and Vice-Chairman, Institute 
of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California. Special Con-
sultant to the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations. Author of books on social legislation, inter-
national law, insurance Ia w, and other subjects and of numerous articles in the field 
of commercial transactions and trade regulations in German and American legal 
publications. 
1 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community is one of the group 
of international agreements signed in Rome on March 25th, 1957. It is supplemented 
by the Convention relating to certain Institutions common to the European Communi-
ties, of the same date, and a number of protocols. 
2 See the bibliography in part IV, notes 580 and 634 infra. 
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consequence of the fact that the play of the forces of competition 
in the market may be channelized and affected by different modes 
and measures of governmental action as well as by arrangements 
and other practices of private enterprises. However, this dispersal 
of the regulations and the multitude of interference types envisaged 
must not becloud the essential unity of purpose and interconnection 
of the various segments of the total scheme. 
The E.E.C. Treaty is divided into six principal parts dealing, 
consecutively, with the Principles (Articles 1-8), the Bases of the 
Community (Articles 9-84), the Policy of the Community (Arti-
cles 8 s- I JO)' the Association of Countries and Territories Over-
seas (Articles 13 1-136), the Institutions of the Community (Arti-
cles I37-246), and, finally, General and Concluding Provisions 
(Articles 210-248). Articles bearing on the protection of com-
petition are found primarily in the First, Second, and Third parts 
of the Treaty. 
The most comprehensive and specific set of provisions on the 
subject is placed in Part Three, Title I, Chapter I of the Treaty, 
and bears the telling sub-heading "Rules of Competition." It deals 
with restrictive practices by private or public enterprises (Articles 
8 5-90), dumping (Article 9 I), and public subsidies (Article 9 2). 
It must not be overlooked, however, that the provisions of this 
chapter are supplemented by important articles in other parts or 
chapters of the Treaty. 
In the first place, Part One of the Treaty, which establishes the 
governing principles of and for the Community, specifies, in Article 
3, the principal activites of the Community for the accomplishment 
of its task and lists, in a catalogue of eleven programmatic items, 
the following two : 
(f) The establishment of a system which safeguards the competi-
tion within the Common Market against adulterations; .. 
(h) The harmonization of the provisions of national laws to the 
extent required for an orderly functioning of the Common 
Market .... 
The particular position in the Treaty, as well as the broad 
phraseology of this provision, makes it clear that one of the basic 
objectives and tenets of the Common Market is the achievement 
of a market order which is free from "falsifications" due to dis-
criminatory or otherwise unduly restrictive practices whether im-
posed by governmental mandate or initiated by private action.3 
3 Moreover, it should be noted that the proscription of any discrimination on national 
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Again, since Part Two regulating the Bases of the Community 
focuses primarily on the structural pattern of the Common Market 
as created by the gradual abolition of reciprocal territorial barriers 
restricting the freedom of inter-market trade, employment or 
mobility of workers, and movement of capital, only such interfer-
ence with competition is dealt with in that connection as stems from 
quantitative restrictions or government monopolies entailing dis-
criminations on a territorial or local basis. The Treaty aims at the 
ultimate elimination of all quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports impinging on inter-market trade; but Article 36 excepts 
prohibitions against, and restrictions of, the importation, exporta-
tion, or transit of goods, justified by reasons of public morals, or-
der, and safety, of the protection of the health and life of persons 
and animals, of the preservation of plants, of the conservation of 
natural treasures having an artistic, historical, or archeological 
value, or of the protection of industrial or commercial property. 
Nevertheless the Article specifies that such prohibitions and re-
strictions must "not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on the commerce among the Member 
States." 
Article 37, similarly, ordains a transformation of existing state 
trade monopolies in such a fashion that at the end of the transi-
tional period any discrimination among nationals of the Member 
States is eliminated with respect to conditions governing supply to, 
or procurement from, such monopolies. This provision is declared 
to apply to all institutions by which a Member State exercises, in 
law, or in fact, a direct or indirect control, direction, or discernible 
influence over importation or exportation among Member States. 
It also applies to monopolies conferred by a Member State upon 
other legal entities. 
2. THE RULES OF COMPETITION FOR ENTERPRISES 
IN PARTICULAR 
As has been stated before, the core of the Treaty provisions for 
the protection of competition in the Common Market are con-
grounds is one of, the guiding principles of the E. E. C. by virtue of Article 7 of the 
Treaty which provides: 
Any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited within the 
field of application of this Treaty, without prejudice to the special provisions 
contained therein. 
The Council, acting with qualified majority upon a proposal of the Com-
mission and after consultation of the Assembly, may publish any regulation for 
the purpose of prohibiting such discrimination. 
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tained in Articles 8 5-90. While the last of these articles deals 
primarily with public enterprises and enterprises which have been 
accorded special or exclusive rights, the first five contain rules gov-
erning the market conduct of enterprises in general. Since the fol-
lowing discussions deal primarily with their significance and ap-
plication, the full text of these Articles 4 is set out for the con-
venience of the reader : 
ARTICLE 85 
(I) Incompatible with the Common Market and prohib-
ited are all agreements between enterprises, all decisions 
of associations of enterprises and all concerted practices 
which are apt to affect the commerce between Member 
States and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or adulteration of competition within the 
Common Market, and especially those which consist in:-
(a) fixing directly or indirectly the purchase or sales 
prices or other conditions of transacting business; 
(b) limiting or controlling the production, distribu-
tion, technical development or investment; 
(c) dividing the markets or sources of supply; 
(d) applying unequal conditions for equivalent goods 
or services vis-a-vis other contracting parties, 
thereby inflicting upon them a competitive disad-
vantage; 
(e) conditioning the conclusion of contracts upon the 
acceptance by the other contracting parties of ad-
ditional goods or services, which, neither by their 
nature nor by commercial usage, have any connec-
tion with the object of these contracts. 
( 2) The agreements or decisions prohibited according to 
this article are void. 
( 3) However, the provisions of paragraph (I) may be 
declared inapplicable to: 
any agreement or category of agreements between en-
terprises, 
any decision or category of decisions of associations of 
enterprises, and 
any concerted practice or category of concerted prac-
tices, 
which contribute to the improvement of the production 
or distribution of commodities or to the promotion of 
• The wording of the translations is by the author. No satisfactory English trans-
lation is in print. The difficulties of an adequate rendition in English of the provisions 
of the Treaty are formidably enhanced by the fact that there are substantial divergen-
cies between the four controlling texts. See infra passim. 
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technological or economic progress, while reserving an 
appropriate share of the resulting profit to the consumers 
and without: 
(a) imposing on the enterprises involved any restric-
tions not indispensable for the attainment of these 
objectives, or 
(b) enabling such enterprises to eliminate competition 
in respect of a substantial portion of the commod-
ities involved. 
ARTICLE 86 
(I) Incompatible with the Common Market and pro-
hibited is the abusive exploitation of a dominant position 
in the Common Market or a substantial part thereof by 
one or several enterprises to the extent that it is capable 
of affecting the commerce between Member States. 
These abusive practices may consist especially in: 
(a) fixing directly or indirectly the purchase or sales 
prices or other conditions of transacting business; 
(b) limiting or controlling the production, distribu-
tion, technical development or investment; 
(c) applying unequal conditions for equivalent goods 
or services vis-a-vis other contracting parties, 
thereby inflicting upon them a competitive disad-
vantage; 
(d) conditioning the conclusion of contracts upon the 
acceptance by the other contracting parties of ad-
ditional goods or services which, neither by their 
nature nor by commercial usage, have any connec-
nection with the object of these contracts. 
ARTICLE 87 
(I) Within a period of three years from the entry into 
force of this Treaty, the Council, by unanimous vote upon 
a proposal by the Commission and after consultation of the 
Assembly, shall issue all appropriate regulations or direc-
tives for the purpose of the application of the principles 
laid down in Articles 8 5 and 86. 
If such provisions have not been adopted within the 
above-mentioned time limit, they shall be enacted by the 
Council pursuant to a vote by a qualified majority upon a 
proposal by the Commission and after consultation of the 
Assembly. 
( 2) The provisions specified in paragraph (I) have the 
purpos_e, in particular, of: 
(a) assuring the observance of the prohibitions set 
forth in Articles 8 5 and 86 through the imposition 
of punitive or coercive fines; 
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(b) determining the particulars governing the applica-
tion of Article 8 5.• paragraph ( 3), having regard 
for the need both of assuring an effective supervi-
sion and, at the same time, of simplifying adminis-
trative control to the greatest possible extent; 
(c) specifying, if need be, the scope of application of 
Articles 8 5 and 8 6 with respect to the different 
sectors of the economy; 
(d) defining the respective tasks of the Commission 
and of the Court of Justice in the application of 
the provisions envisaged in this paragraph; 
(c) defining the relations between the provisions of 
national law on the one hand and on the other 
hand the provisions, contained in this Section or 
issued pursuant to this Article. 
ARTICLE 88 
llntil the entering into force of the provisions issued 
in application of Article 87, the authorities of the Mem-
ber States shall pass on the permissibility of agreements, 
decisions and concerted actions as well as on the abusive 
exploitation of a dominant position in the Common Mar-
ket in conformity with the law of their own countries and 
with the provisions of Articles 8 5, especially paragraph 
(3), and 86. 
ARTICLE 89 
(I) Article 88 notwithstanding, the Commission, upon 
assumption of its activities, shall watch over the observ-
ance of the principles laid down in Articles 8 5 and 86. 
At the request of a Member State or ex officio, and in 
cooperation with the proper authorities of the Member 
State obliged to render official assistance, it shall investi-
gate the cases in which contraventions of these principles 
are suspected. If it finds that there has been a contraven-
tion, it shall propose appropriate means for its discon-
tinuance. 
( 2) If the contravention is not discontinued the Com-
mission shall render a decision to the effect that there has 
been such a contravention, furnishing reasons for its find-
ing. It may publish the decision and authorize the Member 
States to take the necessary remedial measures, specifying 
the conditions and particulars thereof. 
ARTICLE 90 
(I) The Member States shall not issue or retain in force 
any measures which contravene this Treaty, and in par-
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ticular its Articles 7 and 8 5-94, with respect to public 
enterprises to which they accord special or exclusive 
rights. 
( 2) Enterprises which are entrusted with the rendition 
of services of general economic interest or which have the 
character of a fiscal monopoly are subject to the provisions 
of this Treaty, especially the rules governing competition, 
to the extent that the application of these provisions does 
not prevent, in law or in fact, the performance of the 
special task imposed on them. The development of trade 
must not be affected to a degree which is contrary to the 
interest of the Community. 
( 3) The Commission supervises the application of this 
article and, if necessary, addresses the appropriate direc-
tives or decisions to the Member States. 
B. GENESIS OF THE RULES PROTECTING COMPETITION 
AND THE PROBLEMS OF THEIR INTERPRETATION 
When the governing texts 5 of the Treaty were published, it be-
came evident to the students of the subject that the chapter on the 
rules governing competition would create perplexing and far-reach-
ing problems. The doubts and controversies prompted by the 
phrasing and arrangement of the pertinent articles concerned not 
only the exact types of restrictive practices falling within the pur-
view of these regulations, but also their relation to the existing 
laws governing the subject in the Member Countries and their 
status prior to their implementation as envisaged by the Treaty. 
The complexities of proper interpretation are greatly augmented 
by the fact that the four governing versions of the text vary only 
too often in significant nuances of style and vocabulary, with the 
result that the proper construction cannot safely rely on the phras-
ing of a particular clause in only one language, and that any textual 
interpretation must always take account of the composite meaning 
conveyed by the four instruments. 
Unfortunately, the task of interpretation finds precious little 
guidance or assistance in the actual minutes or exposes of the drafts-
men, inasmuch as they have not been put into print. To be sure, 
some commentators have had access to the preparatory materials 
for the purpose of publishing essential passages.6 But not much 
• According to Article 248 of the Treaty, the German, French, Italian, and Dutch 
texts are each equally authentic and equally binding. 
• Le Marche Commun et /'Euratom, 10 CHRONIQUE DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE 399 
(Brussels 1957). 
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can be gleaned therefrom; moreover, in the case of Articles 8 5-9 I, 
the drafters consciously chose phraseology of a certain vagueness 
in order to facilitate possible agreement. 7 
Undoubtedly the richest source of interpretive clues among the 
documents preceding the final formulation of the Treaty is the fa-
mous Spaak Committee Report 8 which constituted the tentative 
blueprint for the Common Market. The idea of such an institu-
tion emerged in the wake of the wreck of the plans for a European 
Defense Community and stemmed from the belief that the eco-
nomic arena furnished better prospects for European integration 
than the political sphere. The Council of Europe, the Common 
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, and the 
governments of the Benelux countries supported efforts in that 
direction as early as I 9 54, and the German government arrayed 
itself with these forces by a memorandum of I955· As a result, the 
Foreign Ministers of the E.C.S.C. countries, meeting in Messina 
in I955, agreed upon the activation of such a plan and appointed 
an intergovernmental committee under the chairmanship of Dr. 
Spaak, then Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to work out a 
suitable scheme for the creation of a common market. The labors 
of the Committee resulted in a report which was published in April 
I956 and accepted by the following conference of the Foreign 
Ministers in Venice as the basis for the final negotiations of the 
Treaty.9 
The Report, after commenting briefly on the advantages of a 
European common market, stated at the outset that the creation of 
such a market required a "converging action following three main 
lines of approach," of which one consisted in the establishment of 
"normal conditions of competition" through elimination of all pro-
tective barriers compartmentalizing the European economy and 
another in the assurance of normal conditions of competition by 
remedying the effects of state interventions and monopolistic situa-
tions.10 
In elaborating on the second point, the Report emphasized that, 
7 I d. at 482, referring to a document drafted by the secretariat of the Intergovern-
mental Conference. 
8 Comite Intergouvernemental cree par Ia Conference de Messine, Rapport des Chefs 
de Delegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres [hereinafter cited as Spaak Re-
port] (Brussels, April 21, 1956). 
• See the official commentaries in Appendix (Anlage) C to Bundestagsdrucksache 
3440, Deutscher Bundestag, z.Wahlperiode 1953, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundes-
tages, 2. Wahlperiode 1953 (1957). 
10 Spaak Report, supra note 8, at 1 s. 
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in view of the custom of enterprises to form cartels with the en-
suing monopolistic practices and possibilities of discrimination and 
market division, it was necessary to impose rules of competition 
upon the enterprises in order to prevent virtual dismemberment 
of the market through discriminatory pricing, dumping, and market 
divisions. In addition it was necessary to curtail all state inter-
vention undertaken for the purpose of favoring national enter-
prises (and thus with "the purpose and effect of adulterating com-
petition") rather than in the general interest and for the increase 
of over-all production. Moreover, for the achievement of a truly 
competitive market, it was also necessary to ascertain and, so far 
as feasible, to correct the incidences which flowed for competition 
from the disparity of state legislation in general.U 
It followed that the control of the standards of competition 
among enterprises, the curtailment or elimination of subsidies and 
similar measures, and the provision of counter-measures against 
distortions as well as possible harmonization of state legislation 
were among the principal actions needed to establish a common 
market and to make it function. 12 
These rather general observations of the Spaak Report were, 
later therein, followed by a more detailed outline of the rules of 
competition in conjunction with an over-all study of "a policy for 
the common market." 13 
In turning first to the rules applicable to the enterprises, the Re-
port focused on two main problems-that of discrimination and 
that of monopoly. The authors of this section were fully aware of 
the fact that these two problems were overlapping and that, in the 
absence of public measures to that effect, discriminatory treatment 
of consumers or suppliers is practicable chiefly if the enterprises 
engaging in such conduct possess monopolistic powers by virtue of 
size, specialization, or cartelization. An intervention in case of dis-
crimination, therefore, was considered warranted and necessary 
when a consumer is virtually compelled to submit to the terms 
of his supplier, or vice-versa, and suffers a competitive disadvantage 
from discriminatory treatment. In addition, it was urged that 
monopolistic situations and practices needed curbing if they contra-
vened the fundamental objectives of the common market, as is the 
case in the event of a division of markets, restriction of produc-
11 I d. at 16 and 17. 
,. I d. at 23. 
13 I d. at 53· 
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tion or technological progress, or capture or domination of the 
market for a product by a single enterprise. It was recognized, 
however, that purely local practices, which did not affect commerce 
between the states, did not need to come within the purview of the 
Treaty. A comparison of the form of the final Treaty, as outlined 
before, with the Spaak Report demonstrates clearly that the latter 
exerted a substantial influence on the former and, therefore, is a 
valuable guide to its interpretation. 
In addition to the Spaak Report, guides to a solution of prob-
lems of interpretation created by the Treaty may be found in the 
documents and in the discussions which, though following the 
formulation of its text, formed part of the ratification procedures 
in the Community countries. Apart from the parliamentary debates 
in the different countries, an official commentary, appended by the 
German government to the text of the Treaty in the course of the 
ratification procedures in the German parliament, deserves atten-
tion.14 
In ascertaining the meaning and effect of the Treaty sight should 
also not be lost of the fact that its provisions relating to restrictive 
business practices were not the first venture into the field of inter-
national regulation of restrictive business practices and that previ-
ous efforts and experiences were undoubtedly in the mind of the 
draftsmen. This applies with particular force to the analogous 
provisions in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community/5 but may also be true with respect to the chapter on 
restrictive business practices in the abortive Havana Charter for 
the proposed International Trade Organisation.16 
Most of all, the views of the draftsmen must have been in-
"I Schriftenreihe zum Handbuch fiir Europaische Wirtschaft 223 (Der Gemeinsame 
Markt) I957· 
15 Treaty constituting the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.), Articles 
4, 65, and 66. On the influence of the provisions protecting competition in the E.C.S.C. 
Treaty on the analogous provisions in the E.E.C. Treaty, see the observations to that ef-
fect in the general report by Dr. Heilwig in the Report of the Committee on Economic 
Policy of the German Bundestag on the draft of the Law Against Restraints of Com-
petition, Schriftlicher Bericht des Ausschusses fiir Wirtschaftspolitik (2I. Ausschuss) 
iiber den Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, Deutscher Bun-
destag, z. Wahlperiode, zu Drucksache 3644, I at 9, IO ( I957). 
16 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation, [I947-48] U.S. Dept. 
of State, Commercial Policy Series nos. 113-I4; U.N. Doc. E/Conf. z/78 (I948). The 
Havana Charter dealt in Chapter V with restrictive business practices. Article 46, 
delineating the general policy towards restrictive business practices, was to apply 
"whenever .. 
2. {b) the practice is engaged in, or made effective, by one or more private or 
public commercial enterprises or by any combination, agreement or 
other arrangement between any such enterprises, and 
(c) such commercial enterprises, individuaily or coiiectively, possess effec-
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fluenced by the development of legislation against anti-competitive 
practices in the various Member Countries, especially Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands. For that reason, as well as because 
the regulations of the Treaty are superimposed upon the various 
national measures of this type, individual national legislation will 
be discussed prior to a detailed study of the scope and effect of 
the pertinent articles in the Treaty. 
II. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION 
UNDER THE NATIONAL LAWS OF 
THE COMMUNITY MEMBERS 
A. GERMANY 
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE LAW AGAINST 
RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION OF I957 
a. The Period Prior to the Allied Occupation 
(I) Developments before the passage of the Cartel 
Ordinance of 1923. Germany evolved special legislation for the 
protection of competition and the control of cartels and other 
restrictive business practices only in the wake of World War I. 
Prior to that time illegality, if any, of combinations in restraint of 
trade or monopolistic practices had to be based on the general 
principles of law, especially those deduced from the German Civil 
CodeP 
To be sure, prohibitions of certain injurious types of restrictive 
trade practices go back to the early sixteenth century. But they 
tive control of trade among a number of countries in one or more prod-
ucts" 
and defined as ~uch practice the following: 
"3· (a) fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed in dealing with others 
in the purchase, sale or lease of any product; 
(b) excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any territorial 
market or field of business activity, or allocating customers, or fixing 
sales quotas or purchase quotas; 
(c) discriminating against particular enterprises; 
(d) limiting production or fixing production quotas; 
(e) preventing by agreement the development or application of technology 
or invention whether patented or unpatented; 
(f) extending the use of rights under patents, trademarks or copyrights 
granted by any Member to matters which, according to its laws and 
regulations, are not within the scope of such grants, or to products or 
conditions of production, use or sale which are likewise not the sub-
jects of such grants." 
17 For the pre-1923 status of German law concerning restrictive business practices 
see: !SAY, DIE GESCHICHTE DER KARTELLGESETZGEllUNGEN (1955) j Kronstein & Leighton, 
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remained sporadic and ineffective.18 In the mining industry re-
strictive and monopolistic practices were actually authorized and 
encouraged or even imposed by governmental action.19 The liberal-
istic ideas and tendencies of the nineteenth century brought about 
in Germany, as in other countries, the recognition of the two great, 
though polar, principles of freedom of trade and freedom of 
· contract. The former principle was proclaimed in Germany in a 
basic code regulating the exercise of trades and professions, the 
Gewerbeordnung of I 8 69. The rise in Germany of numerous cartel 
agreements as an aftermath to the economic depression of I 873 
brought the import of this legislation for the legality and enforce-
ability of restrictive agreements into sharp focus. In two famous 
decisions, rendered toward the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Supreme Court of Germany held that the principle of freedom of 
trade as laid down in the Gewerbeordnung did not bar the self-
protection of manufacturers and distributors against ruinous com-
petition.20 It thus opened the gate for the celebrated differentiation 
between "good" and "bad" cartels, holding agreements of the first 
type to be valid and judicially enforceable.21 
World War I and the period of scarcity following it entailed a 
brief period of economic regulation against excessive price increases 
which was formally terminated in I926.22 Moreover, the trends 
toward the abolition of the old capitalistic market order and the 
erection of a planned economy that accompanied the collapse of the 
Imperial Regime produced publicly controlled compulsory cartel 
organizations in the coal and potassium industries (I 9 I 9) ,23 and 
subsequently a similar arrangement was introduced in the German 
match manufacturing industries ( 1930) .24 Any general regulation 
of the status of cartels, however, had to wait until four years after 
the War. 
( 2) From the Cartel Ordinance of 1923 to the Nazi 
regime. In I 923 finally, the government, pressed by public opm-
Cartel Control: A Record of Failure, 55 YALE L. J. 297, 302 ( 1946); Schwartz, Anti-
trust Legislation and Policy in Germany-A Comparative Study, 105 U. Pa. L. RF.V. 
617, 625 ( 1957). 
18 See Isay, op. cit. supra note 17, at 5 and 81. 
19 Id. at 13, 15, and 83. 
"'German Supreme Court, June 25, 1890, 28 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtes in 
Zivilsachen [hereinafter cited as RGZ] 238; German Supreme Court, Feb. 4, 1897, 
38 RGZ, 155. 
21 Cf. the comments by I say, op. cit. supra note 17, at 32; Kronstein & Leighton, supra 
note 17, at 302; Schwartz, suPra note 17, at 626-3 x. 
""!say, op. cit. supra note 17, at 37· 
23 Id. at 34 and 35· 
24 Id. at 36. 
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ion,25 enacted the famous Ordinance Against Abuse of Economic 
Power, the so-called Cartel Ordinance, which remained the prin-
cipal basis of German law on that subject until the advent of 
Nazism. This measure refrained from an outright prohibition of 
combinations in restraint of trade and provided merely for the 
suppression of certain abusive practices and a limited govern-
mental supervision. 26 
The Ordinance applied, with one exception, only to cartels, 
syndicates, and similar arrangements, defined (in Section r) as 
"agreements and resolutions which establish obligations with 
reference to the modes of production or marketing, the application 
of conditions of doing business and the calculation or charging of 
prices." Accordingly, it governed only horizontal arrangements 
between independent enterprises, entered into for the purpose and 
with the intent of influencing market conditions.27 As a result 
purely vertical price maintenance schemes, that is, price fixing 
agreements between a single manufacturer, or wholesaler, and one 
of his customers, or all of his customers separately, did not fall 
under the sweep of the Ordinance. Price maintenance arrangements 
enforced by cartels, however, were covered by the statutory pro-
visions.28 
The Ordinance required the agreements and resolutions governed 
by it to be in writing and declared void any such agreements or reso-
lutions which the parties thereto promised to observe by giving their 
word of honor or making similar solemn assurances. It attempted to 
forestall an excessive stranglehold of cartels on the market by four 
types of legal devices specified primarily in Sections 4, 8, 9, and ro. 
The first of the indicated Sections empowered the Minister of Eco-
nomics to intervene for the protection of the national economy or 
the public welfare and to: 
I) institute proceedings for the complete or partial cancellation 
of the cartel agreement in the newly created Cartel Court, or 
2) subject it to an unconditional right of withdrawal by its mem-
bers, or 
3) establish censorship over all of its actions. 
"'!d. at 40. 
26 Leading German commentaries on the Ordinance of 1923, as amended, are 
LEHNICH-FISCHER, DAS DEUTSCHE KARTELLGESETZ (1924); lSAY-TSCHIERSCHKY, KAR-
TELLVERORDNUNG (1925); MULLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, KARTELLRECHT (3rd ed. 1938). For 
an English discussion of the pertinent provisions and their application, see Kronstein 
& Leighton, supra note 17. 
27 For a detailed discussion of the cartel concept as developed by the German Su-
preme Court: MtiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at V, II. 
28 See the references in MtiLLENSIEFEN-DiiRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at V, 12. 
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Section 8 gave each cartel member the right to withdraw from 
the cartel whenever there was an important reason for such step. 
Section 9 subjected cartel actions forfeiting deposits or impos-
ing boycotts or similar. sanctions to a preliminary authorization 
by the presiding judge of the Cartel Court, whose decision was 
subject to review by the whole bench.29 This tribunal also had 
jurisdiction over contested withdrawals by cartel members pur-
suant to Section 8. 
Finally, Section IO permitted the Cartel Court to authorize 
aggrieved parties to rescind contracts with cartels, combines, or 
trusts, where the conditions of doing business or the pricing prac-
tices were apt to threaten the national economy or the public wel-
fare in exploitation of a dominant market position. Contracts con-
cluded under identical conditions, after such determination by the 
Cartel Court, were declared void ab initio. 
Section 10 was thus the only provision in the Ordinance which 
was applicable, not only to cartels in the technical sense, but also 
to other organizations with a dominant market position, such as 
trusts and combines. The Section, however, was of little practical 
significance since in the case of cartels the right of intervention 
under Section 4 was more comprehensive and more direct. An 
amendment of 1933 further increased the advantage of a reliance 
on Section 4 by eliminating the necessity of a proceeding in the 
Cartel Court and authorizing the Minister of Economics to pro-
nounce immediately the total or partial nullity of cartel agreements 
or resolutions of the specified type.30 
The actual application of Sections 4, 8, and 9 produced difficult 
questions of interpretation and economic policy and has evoked 
retrospective censure by respected students of the field. 31 
The most comprehensive and most perplexing of the provisions 
mentioned was the requirement of administrative or quasi-judicial 
authorization for boycotts and similar exclusionary measures, im-
posed by cartels for the enforcement of discipline against defect-
ing members or for extension of the organization to outsiders. The 
Cartel Court considered as measures needing prior approval all 
29 Section 9, para. 4, authorized the Minister of Economics to confer jurisdiction over 
the initial determination of the propriety of exclusionary measures of cartels operating 
only in individual German states or parts thereof to local authorities instead of leaving 
it with the presiding judge of the Cartel Court. 
30 Law of July 15, 1933, [1933] Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited as RGBI.] 487. 
See MtiLLENSIEFEN-DoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note z6, at VI, 13. 
81 See especially Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 17; Schwartz, supra note 17, at 
639/f. 
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bars excluding an enterprise from customary business dealings.32 
Authorization was to be refused if the contemplated action en-
tailed a threat to the national economy or the public welfare or 
constituted an undue restriction of his freedom of action in the 
economic field for the party involved. The Cartel Court deemed 
such situation to be present if the boycott sought the expulsion of a 
competitor from the market, but not, at least according to later 
decisions,33 if it merely aimed at pressure to make him join the 
cartel. Unauthorized action by the cartel entitled the aggrieved 
party to damages and injunctive relief in the ordinary courts of 
justice. An amendment of 1932, however, predicated such remedy 
upon prior declaration by the Cartel Court of a violation of Sec-
tion 9.34 
The power of partial or total cancellation of cartel agreements 
in the interest of the national economy or public welfare, entrusted 
to the Minister of Economics by Section 4, permitted theoretically 
an even more radical and flexible governmental intervention, both 
before and after the abolition of judicial review in 1933. However, 
it is doubtful whether any really effective use was ever made of 
this possibility.35 At any rate, the mere fact that an agreement was 
annulled did not render it void or illegal with retrospective effect.36 
Beginning with 1930 the Cartel Ordinance was supplemented by 
a series of enactments designed to implement the deflationistic 
policies of the government by either facilitating or ordaining a 
lowering of the price level. Accordingly, an emergency decree by 
the President of the Republic in 1930 authorized the government 
to invalidate price fixing agreements, whether in form of horizontal 
arrangements or of vertical agreements between a manufacturer 
or wholesaler and individual retailers, if they either constituted 
an obstacle to economical production or distribution of goods and 
services or entailed an unwarranted restriction on the freedom of 
action in the market.37 Pursuant to the powers under this decree, 
the government invalidated agreements between a supplier and his 
purchaser which obligated the latter to observe specified pricing 
practices with respect to goods of another type or from another 
32 MiiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at VIII, 5· 
32 ld. VIII, 6; Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 17, at 310. 
34 Law of June 14, 1932, c. VI, art. x, [1932] RGBJ. 285, 289; MiiLLENSIEFEN-
DoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at VIII, 31 and 35· 
""Kronstein & Leighton, supra note 17, at 313. 
36 MiiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at VI, 8. 
37 Emergency Decree of July 26, 1930, c.s §§ 1-5, [1930] RGBI. 3n, 328; See 
MiiLLENSIEFEN-DoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, IV, 26. 
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source or with respect to services rendered in connection with the 
supplied goods. Price fixing arrangements relating merely to the 
goods purchased thus remained unaffected and valid.38 
In I93 I the government ordered a lowering by 10% of all 
prices set in vertical price fixing agreements pertaining to trademark-
protected goods.39 A further lowering by 10% of prices set in all 
price fixing agreements, whether of the horizontal or the vertical 
type, was prescribed by a subsequent ordinance of the same year.40 
As a result German law of this period outlawed directly only 
a very limited type of restrictive agreements, and, in general, pur-
sued a case-by-case approach to abuse control. Invalidity or tortious-
ness of certain agreements, however, could be based, in especially 
oppressive cases, upon the Statute Against Unfair Competition or 
the general provisions relating to invalidity of legal transactions 
(Section I 3 8) and anti-social infliction of injury (Section 8 26) 
of the Civil CodeY 
(3) Developments in the Third Reich. The radical 
change in governmental philosophy and policy which occurred with 
the advent to power of the Nazi leaders in I 933 left cartels un-
disturbed at first, but in the course of time transformed them into 
instruments of the totalitarian regime and, finally, in I943 prac-
tically suppressed them. Little could be gained from tracing this 
development in detail, but a few major stops on the road are worth 
discussing. 
A statute of I933, amending the Cartel Ordinance, abolished 
the need of judicial proceedings for the total or partial invalidation 
of cartel agreements by the Minister of Economics under Section 
4 and extended the permissibility of boycotts and exclusionary 
measures against enterprises managed by unreliable persons.42 At 
the same date a further statute was enacted which provided for 
the compulsory cartelization of enterprises or the compulsory ex-
tension of cartels to outsiders if the Minister of Economics deemed 
it to be in the interest of the enterprises concerned, the economy as 
a whole, and the public welfareY In connection with such measures, 
the Minister was also empowered to re-define the rights and duties 
38 I d. XV, 12 and XV, 18. 
89 For the text of the decree: id. IV, 29. 
"" For the text: id. IV, 32· 
"See in this connection Kronstein & Leighton, supra, note 17, at 325; Schwartz, 
supra note 17, at 632. 
"'See supra note 30 and MtkLENSIEFEN-OORINKEL, op. rit. supra note 26, at liT. 
•• For the text: see MiiLLENSIEFEN-DORINKEr., op. cit. supra note 26, at IV, 1 r. 
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of the cartel members. Moreover, the Minister was authorized _to 
prohibit the establishment of new enterprises or the expansion of 
existing facilities in a market if such action appeared to be neces-
sary in view of the exigencies of this branch of the industry and 
the national economy as a whole. This statute, which formed the 
basis for approximately sixty actual governmental interventions 
in the period between 1933 and 1938,44 served as a model for 
similar legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands.45 
In December 1934 the Government prohibited all increases of 
prices controlled by private price-maintenance schemes,46 and in 
1936 the establishment of a general price-stop followedY In ad-
dition, the Commissioner for Prices issued an Ordinance Relating 
to Price Maintenance Agreements or Recommendations for Goods 
Sold Under Trademarks, of Oct. 27, 1937, which did empower 
him to declare such agreements terminated and illegal.48 As a con-
sequence cartels lost all functions in price policies and became more 
and more semi-public instruments for market regulation.49 In 1943 
their total replacement by government agencies was completed.50 
b. The Interlude of Allied Legislation 
Following the surrender by Germany, Allied policy turned to-
ward a de-concentration of the German industry and a suppression 
of cartels.51 The so-called Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, 
contained a paragraph which provided: 
At the earliest practicable date, the German economy 
shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the 
present excessive concentrations of economic powers as 
exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and 
other monopolistic arrangements. 52 
.. See the survey in MULLENSIEFEN-DiiRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at XII, 47-54 
and 59· 
46 See part II, sections C and D of text infra. 
46 See MULLENSIEFEN-DoRINKEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at IV, 53· 
41 /d. IV, 66. 
'"For details: id. IV, 74 and XV, 85. The Ordinance was superseded by another 
ordinance relating to price-maintenance arrangements of November 23, 1940, [1940] 
RGBI.l, 1573. 
•• For details, see MULLENSIEFEN-DiiRINKEL, op. cit supra note 26, at XIV, Iff. 
60 Cartel-Cleanup Decree (Kartellbereinigungserlass) of the German Minister of 
Economics, May 20, 1943, issued pursuant to the authority contained in the Market-
Supervision Ordinance of October 20, 1942, [1942] RGBI.I, 619. 
51 For further references: lsAY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 63; Schwartz, supra note 17, 
at 642. 
""Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Aug. 2, 1945), Official Gazette 
of the Control Council for Germany, Supp. No. I, at I 5 (April 30, I 946). 
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Tgis agreement was implemented by separate enactments of the 
Control Powers, in consequence of the impossibility of reaching 
an understanding between the Soviet and the Western Powers. 
In the three Western Zones the pertinent policies were carried 
out by two types of action. On the one hand there were special 
de-concentration proceedings against particular giant combines in 
the coal and steel industry, the chemical industry, the motion pic-
ture industry, and in banking, initiated on the basis of individual 
legislation.53 These proceedings aimed at and, in part, accomplished 
an at least temporary restructuring of the particular sectors of the 
German economy. On the other hand, in each of the three Western 
Zones the military occupation authorities, in I 94 7, also enacted 
general legislation for the curtailment of restrictive business prac-
tices. The laws for the American and British Zones 54 were alike. 
They were patterned after the antitrust legislation in the United 
States, but were much more detailed and specific in their prohibi-
tions and, in certain respects, went considerably beyond the thrust 
of the American original. The French law was considerably less 
detailed and somewhat more tolerant towards cartels.55 
The pertinent legislation was kept in force and in Allied hands 
even after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
I 949, by virtue of a specific reservation of such power in section 
2b of the Occupation Statute of that year.56 The termination of the 
occupation regime in I 9 55, pursuant to the so-called Paris agree-
ments, returned to Germany "the full authority of a sovereign 
state over its internal and external affairs." 57 It was agreed be-
tween Germany and the three Allied Powers that until repeal or 
amendment, in accordance with the German Basic Law, legislation 
enacted by the Occupation Authorities should remain in force, 58 
63 See Schwartz, supra note 17, at 646. 
"'For the U.S. Zone and Bremen: Law No. 56, Military Government Gazette, Ger-
many, United States Area of Control, issue C, at 2 (1947); for the British Zone: 
Ordinance No. 78, 16 Military Government Gazette, Germany, British Zone of 
Control 412 (1947). The catalogue of anticompetitive practices in art. V, Sec. 9(c) is 
of particular interest as it served as a model for subsequent European legislation. 
66 For the French Zone: Military Government Ordinance No. 96, June 9, 1947, 2 
Journal Olliciel du Commandement en Chef Fran<;ais en Allemagne 784 ( 1947); see 
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 643. 
68 The reserved powers covered "Decartelisation, Deconcentration [and] Nondis-
crimination in Trade Matters"; for a reprint of the text, see 43 AM. J. !NT'L. L. SUPP. 
172 (1949)· 
67 Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, signed at Paris, October 23rd, 1954 and in force May sth, 1955, art. r, para. 
z; see 49 AM. J. lNT'L. L. SUPP. 57 (1955). 
58 Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupa-
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and specific provisions were stipulated for the status of the coal 
mining and iron and steel industries and for the completion of the 
liquidation of the German Dye Trust. 59 
The Allied legislation against the concentration of economic 
power, accordingly, remained valid and applicable by German 
authorities until the entry into force on January 1, 1958, of the new 
Law Against Restraints of Competition, promulgated on July 
27, 1957. As a result, the German Ministry of Economics, as 
well as the German courts, were confronted with many difficult 
questions of interpretation regarding the validity or legality of 
cartels or other activities in restraint of trade, challenged under 
Laws Nos. 56, 78, and 96. Generally speaking, the German au-
thorities, in construing the applicable legislation, looked to Amer-
ican precedents and practices for guidance and thus had to familiar-
ize themselves with non-indigenous notions and traditions. It was 
therefore recognized by the interested and responsible quarters as 
early as 1952 that there ought to be a prompt replacement of the 
Allied enactments by a modern German law which, combining the 
experiences both under the Cartel Ordinance of 1923 and under 
the Allied Law Against Concentration of Economic Power, would 
produce a social market-order suitable to the political and economic 
climate in the young republic and in harmony with the basic tenets 
of German judicial administration.60 
tion, signed at Paris, Oct. 23, I954, in force May 5, I955, art. 2, para. I; see 49 AM. ]. 
1NT'L. L. SUPP. 69 jj. (I955). 
59 /d. arts. 9 and II. A special chapter pertaining to decartelization and deconcen-
tration, contained in the 1952 version of the Convention, was deleted in 1954; see 49 
AM.]. INT'L. L. SuPP. 77, 78, (I955). But the German government committed itself, 
by letter of October 23rd, I954 addressed to the High Commissioners, to guarantee the 
maintenance of free competition in the future German Law. [I955] Bundesgesetzblatt 
[hereinafter cited as BGBI.] II, 482. 
60 The government bill which finally, and after considerable modification, became 
law in 1957 was first introduced in the German Parliament in I952. Two prior gov-
ernment projects both drafted in I949 failed because the first of them proceeded too 
much on a policy of state intervention, while the second one was inacceptable to the 
Occupation Powers as leaving too much freedom to cartelization. For a history of these 
drafts see the General Report by Dr. Hellwig in the Report on the Draft Law against 
Restraints of Competition of the Committee for Economic Policy, Schriftlicher Bericht 
des Ausschusses fiir Wirtschaftspolitik (21. Ausschuss) iiber den Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
gegen W ettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, Deut3cher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode, zu Druck-
sache 3644, I et seq. (1957). 
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2. THE ERA OF LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF 
COMPETITION OF JULY 27, 1957 
a. Character and Scope i11 General 
(I) Background and basic structure of the Law. The 
promulgation on July 27, 1957, of the new Law of Competition 
marked the conclusion of a prolonged and bitter controversy be-
tween two opposing schools of thought.61 One, advanced in par-
ticular by the German National Association of Manufacturers 
( B.D.I.), harked back to the dogma of freedom of contract and 
the traditional differentiation between good and bad cartels and 
opposed any legislative intervention except for the purpose of 
curbing abuses; 62 the other, represented by the German Minister of 
Economics, proceeded on the teachings of the neo-liberalist doc-
trine and advocated a policy of prohibiting, at least in principle, 
any restrictive arrangements, especially those of a horizontal type, 
with provisions for dispensation in exceptional cases. Ultimately 
the latter approach was adopted. However, by way of compromise, 
concessions had to be made in form of a lengthy catalogue of 
classes of enterprises exempted outright from the regulation of the 
act and of a number of exceptions and possible dispensations from 
the prohibition against restrictive arrangements if the same are 
entered into for particular purposes or under special circumstances. 
The new Law,63 which aims at a comprehensive regulation of 
the law relating to restrictive business practices,64 is arranged in 
61 The original governmental bill was transmitted to the German House of Rep-
resentatives (Bundestag) on June 13th, 1952, and was transferred to its Committee on 
Economic Policy, following a general debate on June 26th, 1952. Preoccupation with 
other matters prevented the completion of the deliberations prior to the end of the 
legislative period. Early in 1954 the German Government decided to re-introduce the 
bill in the Second Parliament. The Senate (Bundesrat) voted in favor of a number of 
modifications, and the bill, with the observations of the Government on the changes 
proposed by the Senate, did not reach the House of Representatives until January 
1955· It was finally passed by that body on July 3rd, 1957 and by the Senate, July 19th, 
1957· 
62 For details: Schwartz, Antitrust Legislation and Policy in Germany-A Compara-
tive Study, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 617, 6:u (1957). 
63 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen [hereinafter cited as Restraints of 
Competition Law], [1957] BGBI. I, 1081. An English translation of the Law was 
published by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, World Trade Information Service, pt. I, 
No. 58-1 ( 1958). The new Law repealed all prior statutes and decrees on the sub-
ject. The decree of March 9, 1932 prohibiting bonuses to customers in form of free 
merchandise or services and the Law of Nov. 25, 1933, regulating discounts remain in 
force. 
64 Commentaries on the new Law are KAUFMANN, RAUTMANN, STRICKRODT, U.A., 
FRANKFURTER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN (1958); 
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six main titles containing, consecutively, provisions for the sub-
stantive law of restraints of competition; sanctions; administrative 
agencies charged with the application of the act; procedure; ex-
empted categories of enterprises; and transitional and concluding 
matters. The two titles laying down the operative rules and the ex-
emptions therefrom obviously constitute the core of the new legisla-
tion. Title One, specifying the various restrictive practices en-
visaged by the Law, divides its subject in turn into six chapters, 
dealing with: (I) cartels, ( 2) other restrictive agreements, 
(3) enterprises with dominating market power, (4) additional 
restrictive or discriminatory practices, ( 5) codes of competition, 
and ( 6) formal requirements and civil sanctions. 
As can be inferred from this list, the Law focuses on, and 
differentiates among, four principal classes of restrictive practices 
-restrictions in the form of arrangements or resolutions of the 
horizontal type (cartels) ; restrictive agreements of vertical char-
acter; abusive exploitation of a monopoly or oligopoly; and, finally, 
discriminatory and coercive practices not falling within the afore-
mentioned three categories. 
( 2) Cartel agreements and cartel resolutions 
(a) Section I of the Law. Section I of the Law an-
nounces the basic policy toward cartels : 
Agreements between enterprises or associations of en-
terprises, concluded for the accomplishment of a common 
purpose, and resolutions of associations of enterprises are 
invalid to the extent that they are apt to affect the produc-
tion or the market conditions for the commerce in goods 
or occupational services by means of restraints of competi-
ti~m. This does not apply where this Law provides other-
wise. 
As indicated by the "does-not-apply" clause and as mentioned 
before, the principle of invalidating cartel agreements and de-
cisions is limited by far-reaching exceptions and provisions for 
executive dispensations. 
Generally speaking, in the cases of the statutory exceptions the 
cartel agreements and resolutions falling within their scope are 
either valid if properly filed with the Cartel Office 65 or become 
LANGEN, KOMMENTAR ZUM KARTELLGESETZ (3d. ed. 1958); MULLER-GRIES, KOMMENTAR 
ZUM GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN (1958); MULLER-HENNEBERG, 
SCHWARTZ, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, KOMMENTAR (1958); RASCH, 
WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, KARTELL-UND MONOPOLRECHT (1957) • 
.. Restraints of Competition Law§ 9 (2). In only one case-that of cartel agreements 
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valid upon expiration of three months from such filing, unless the 
office raises objections for specified reasons within such period.66 
The Cartel Office subsequently may declare them to be invalid if 
such action is necessary to suppress abuses of market power gained 
through the statutory privilege.67 Conversely, in the cases of per-
missive dispensation by the Executive, the cartel agreements and 
resolutions subject thereto need prior authorization to be valid 68 
and are rendered invalid by the expiration of the period of author-
ization without renewal or by revocation of the authorization 
based on the grounds specified by the Law.69 
(b) Statutory exceptions. The statutory exceptions 
encompass five categories of cartel agreements or resolutions which 
are deemed to exert no, or only relatively minor, restraints on 
competition in domestic markets. These five classes are agreements 
and resolutions which 
I) serve merely for the protection and promotion of exports 
without regulation of competition in domestic markets (pure 
export cartels) ; 70 or 
2) provide for uniform methods of stating specifications for 
goods and services or of itemizing prices (without price 
fixing) in industries where prior inspection is not feasible 
(quotation cartels) ; 71 or 
3) provide for uniform application of the general terms of doing 
business, delivery, or payment, including discounts ( condi-
tions cartels) ; 72 or 
4) regulate rebates which represent genuine compensation for 
services rendered and do not entail discrimination between 
different levels of distribution or between customers on the 
same level who, in taking delivery, perform the same services 
to their suppliers (rebate cartels) ; 73 or 
or decisions regulating uniform methods of stating specifications for goods and services 
or of itemizing prices without fixing prices or price components-does the Law refrain 
from making filing a condition for their validity, although prompt filing is imposed as 
duty upon the parties. I d. § 9 (2). 
00 Restraints of Competition Law§§ 2(3), 3(3) and s(r), governing the validity of 
conditions cartels, rebate cartels and rationalization cartels. 
67 !d. §§ r2; see also § 3(4). 
68 /d.§u(r). 
69 !d. §II (5). 
70 /d.§6(x). 
71 /d. § 5 (4). 
72 !d.§ 2(1). 
73 /d.§ 3(1). 
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION 2 I 9 
5) regulate uniform application of standards or types (standard-
ization cartels). 74 
In the case of the rebate cartels, the Cartel Office may base its 
initial objection on the ground that it is evident that the agreement 
or resolution in question has harmful effects on the course of pro-
duction or trade or on supplying consumers adequately or, in par-
ticular, that it renders the entry into a trade on a given level of 
distribution more difficult. Moreover, initial objection or subsequent 
intervention may be rested on the fact that market participants have 
shown that they are subject to discrimination by reason of the agree-
ment or resolution in question.75 
(c) Categories of cartel agreements and resolutions. 
In addition, the Law enumerates six categories of cartel agreements 
and resolutions, the validity of which depends on previous executive 
authorization (authorization cartels). These dispensations are 
provided for on the theory that the cartel agreements or decisions 
of the particular type, though normally exerting undue restraint on 
competition, may be desirable in view of special conditions or 
emergencies in the particular industry or in the interest of the 
national economy as a whole. 
These cartel agreements and resolutions for which authoriza-
tion may be obtained cover the cases in which the particular 
action 
I) is taken, in response to a decline in sales based on a perma-
nent change in demand, by enterprises engaged in the produc-
tion, manufacture, or processing of goods, provided that 
the agreement or resolution is needed for an orderly adjust-
ment of the productive capacity to market conditions and 
that the regulation takes the national economy as a whole 
and the general welfare into account (structural crises car-
tels) ; 76 or 
2) constitutes regulation which serves to rationalize economic 
processes and is apt substantially to enhance the productivity 
or profitability of the enterprises involved in technological, 
administrative, or organizational respects, and thus to im-
prove their capacity to satisfy demand, provided that the 
advantages of the rationalization are reasonably propor-
74 Jd. § 5 (I) • 
75 Id. §§ 3 ( 3) and 3 ( 4). 
76/d. §4. 
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tionate to the restraint of competition effected thereby 
(simple rationalization cartels) ; 77 or 
3) effectuates rationalization in conjunction with price fixing 
or the establishment of common agencies for procurement 
or marketing (syndicates), provided that the goal of rational-
ization cannot be achieved in any other way and that the 
rationalization is desirable in the public interest ( rationaliza-
tion cartels of higher order) ; 78 or 
4) serves to protect and promote exports in cases in which 
regulation affects commerce in goods and services in do-
mestic markets, provided, and to the extent, that it is re-
quired to safeguard the intended regulation of competition 
in foreign markets (export cartels affecting domestic com-
merce) ; 79 or 
5) regulates solely imports into the area governed by the Law 
and is confined to situations where the German consumers of 
the imports are confronted with no or only insubstantial 
competition (import cartels); 80 or 
6) does not fall within the aforementioned categories, but 
where a restraint of competition is necessary for exceptional 
reasons of the paramount interest to the national economy 
and the general welfare or where there is an immediate 
danger threatening the survival of the major part of the 
enterprises in a branch of industry, provided that there is 
no, or no timely, possibility that other legislative or economic 
measures can be taken and that the restraint of competition 
is apt to avert the danger (emergency cartels) .81 
In the first five of these classes, the Cartel Office is entrusted 
with the grant or denial of applications for authorization. The 
emergency powers which become operative in the sixth category, 
however, are reserved to the Federal Minister of Economics. The 
Law surrounds the exercise of the discretion of the Cartel Office 
or the Minister of Economics, in the disposition of applications for 
grants or renewals of authorizations, with a number of additional 
special formal or substantive safeguards other than the conditions 
77 !d. § 5 (2). Cartels providing for rationalization through specialization may 
be autorized only if the specialization does not foreclose competition in the mar-
ket. 
78JJ. § 5·(,). 
79JJ. §6(2). 
""Jd. § 7· 
"'!d.§§ 8(r) and 8(2). 
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mentioned above.82 A detailed discussion of them seems, however, 
unnecessary. 
Cartel agreements and resolutions which are valid either be-
cause they fall within one of the five statutory exceptions or be-
cause they belong to one of the six classes for which prior author-
ization by the Cartel Authority may be secured and they, in fact, 
have been so authorized, are, nevertheless, subject to a right of 
withdrawal for important cause by any of the participants. 83 The 
Law specifies that an important cause is deemed to be present in 
particular if the freedom of economic action of the person asserting 
such right is either curtailed to an undue degree or impaired by 
discriminatory unequal treatment in comparison with that of the 
other participants.84 
(3) Vertical restricti•ve agreements. The second chapter 
of Part I of the Restraints of Competition Law 85 deals with the 
validity of restrictive agreements of the vertical type, such as con-
tract provisions for resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, tie-
ins, and the like. In appraising the scope of this regulation, one 
must keep in mind at the outset that it is supplemented by a special 
chapter dealing with restrictive practices by an enterprise or enter-
prises possessing dominant market power.86 
(a) Treatment of agreements imposing resale prices 
or other contractual terms. The Law differentiates the treatment 
of agreements imposing resale prices or other contractual terms 
from that of other vertical restrictive stipulations. The basic rule 
with respect to the former is contained in Section 15 which pro-
vides: 
Agreements between enterprises with respect to goods or 
occupational services which apply to domestic markets 
are void to the extent that they restrict one of the parties 
thereto in its freedom to determine prices or other terms 
in the contracts which such party may conclude with third 
parties in regard to the goods so supplied, other goods or 
occupational services.87 
This general proscription of vertical price fixing is, however, 
rendered inapplicable to the most common cases of resale price 
82 Id. §§ 2(2), 3(2), 3(3)1-3, 5(3) last sentence, 6(2) last sentence, 7(2), 8(3), 11, 
12. 
83 Jd.§13(1). 
84 Ibid . 
.. I d. §§ IS-21, 
86 I d. §§ 22-24. 
81 /d. § 15. 
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maintenance agreements covering trademarked or brand goods (as 
defined by the Law) or products of publishing houses.88 In defining 
the exact scope of this exception with respect to trademarked or 
brand goods the Law requires that they be subject to price compe-
tition by similar goods of other producers or dealers. Further-
more, the exception applies only to the goods or publications which 
are supplied by the enterprise imposing resale price maintenance, 
but it extends to arrangements with legal or economic force and 
permits stipulations for the imposition of the same obligation upon 
subsequent customers down to the resale to the ultimate consumer. 
The concept of trademarked or brand goods is broadly defined and 
includes all products which the enterprise imposing resale mainte-
nance guarantees to supply in identical or improved quality and 
which carry on their body, wrapping, or container a mark identify-
ing their origin (whether consisting in a designation of the firm, 
a word, or picture) . 89 
The resale price maintenance contracts for trademarked goods 
are not valid unless filed with the Cartel Office accompanied by 
complete information concerning all imposed resale prices or mar-
gins of profit.90 The Cartel Office may institute proceedings to de-
clare a price-fixing agreement inoperative, either with immediate ef-
fect or beginning at a specified future date, and to prohibit execution 
of a new price-fixing stipulation of similar content, if: the condi-
tions for its validity are not, or no longer, fulfilled; its enforcement 
engenders abuse; or the price-fixing agreement by itself or in com-
bination with other restraints of competition is apt to increase the 
price for the protected goods, prevent a reduction in their price, 
or curtail their production or distribution in a manner not justified 
by general economic conditions.91 As the wording of this provision 
shows, the authority of the Cartel Office to invalidate price-fixing 
agreements is neither exclusive of, nor coextensive with, the power 
of ordinary courts of justice to hold agreements of that type void or 
unenforceable in controversies between particular parties because 
the conditions of their validity were not met at the time they were 
concluded or subsequently ceased to be fullfilled. 92 
58 /J. § 16(1), I and 2. 
89 /d. § I6{z). 
00 /J. § 16 (4). 
91 Jd. § I7(I). 
92 LANGEN, op. cit. supra note 64, § 17, II, 3; Schwartz in MuLLER·HENNEBERG, 
ScHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 64, § 17, 20. 
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(b) Exclusive dealing; tie-ins; use of resale restric-
tions. In addition, the Law specifies four other types of vertical 
restrictive agreements which, while not proscribed or rendered 
void on principle, may nevertheless call for an intervention by the 
Cartel Office whenever they have certain specified undesirable ef-
fects.93 The four categories so envisaged are contracts between 
enterprises with respect to goods or occupational services which 
impose upon one of the parties thereto: 
(r) 
(2) 
restraints in the free use of the goods supplied, 
other goods or professional services, or 
restraints in the procurement of other goods or 
services from third parties or in the supply thereof 
to third parties, or 
restraints in the resale of the goods supplied to 
third parties, or 
obligations to receive goods or occupational serv-
vices which are not connected therewith by nature 
or commercial custom. 
The Cartel Office may intervene in these types of agreements 
and declare the stipulations of the indicated content to be inopera-
tive, either with immediate effect or to begin at a specified future 
date, to the extent that such restrictions limit unfairly the freedom 
of economic action of a party to the contract or of a third enterprise 
and that their scope impairs substantially the competition in the 
market for these or other goods or occupational services. 
(c) Restrictions attached to the transfer or licensing 
of patents, other rights of industrial property or technological 
know-how. The Law contains special regulations applicable to 
restrictions placed on the assignee or licensee of patents, utility 
models, or other rights of industrial property as well as to restric-
tions imposed in connection with the sale or lease of non-patented 
inventions, manufacturing processes, blueprints, and similar tech-
nological know-how.94 
The basic rule is contained in Section 20 ( r) which provides: 
Contracts respecting the acquisition or the use of patents, 
utility models, or exclusive rights in brands are invalid to 
the extent that they impose upon the assignee or licensee 
any restrictions in his dealings which exceed the scope of 
93 Restraints of Competition Law § x8 ( x) and (2) • 
.. Id. §§ 20, 21. 
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the statutory privilege; restrictions concerning the mode, 
extent, quantity, territory or period of the exercise of the 
privilege do not exceed the scope thereof. 
But this principle is qualified by a catalogue of five types of re-
strictions which do not come within the purview of Section 20 (I), 
if they do not exceed the duration of the statutory industrial prop-
erty right which is the object of the assignment or license.95 These 
restrictions are : 
( 1) limitations of the assignee or licensee, insofar and as 
long as they are justified by an interest of the assignor or 
licensor in a technically unobjectionable exploitation of 
the object of the statutory privilege; 
( 2) obligations of the assignee or licensee with respect 
to the price charged for the protected article; 
( 3) obligations of the assignee or licensee to exchange 
experiences or to license improvement or new use patents, 
provided that there are corresponding obligations of the 
patentee or licensor; 
( 4) obligations of the assignee or licensee not to contest 
the validity of the statutory right involved; 
( 5) obligations of the assignee or licensee to the extent 
that they relate to the regulation of competition in non-
domestic markets. 
In addition, the Cartel Office may authorize the conclusion of 
agreements, otherwise invalid under Section 20 (I), if neither the 
freedom of economic action of the assignee or licensee or of other 
enterprises is unfairly restricted nor the extent of the restrictions 
substantially impairs competition.96 Cases of this type are, for ex-
ample, assignments or licenses of process patents coupled with the 
obligation of the assignee or licensee to procure the necessary 
materials from the assignor or licensor. 97 
The statute provides expressly that the regulations regarding 
cartels remain applicable, 98 evidently in order to provide for cases 
where the restrictive agreements pertaining to patents and similar 
rights possess cartel elements, that is, horizontal features. 
The same rules apply with respect to agreements concerning the 
""Id. §zo(z). 
00 /d. §zo(g). 
97 See the observations to that effect in Chapter III by Dr. Hoffman, in the Report of 
the Committee on Economic Policy of the German Bundestag on the Draft Law against 
Restraints of Competition, Schriftlicher Bericht des ilusschusses fiir Wirtschaftspolitik 
(2I. flus schuss) iiber den Entwurf cines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode zu Drucksache 3644 (1957). 
98 Restraints of Competition Law § 20(4). 
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sale or lease of non-patented inventions, manufacturing processes, 
blueprints and technological know-how.99 
(4) Abuse of dominant market power. The Law con-
tains a special regulation concerning the situation where a single 
enterprise or a group of enterprises enjoys a position of dominance 
in the market.100 In such a case the Cartel Office is given the power 
to intervene in order to curb two types of anticompetitive practices if 
they amount to an abuse of dominant market power. 
The two types of practices which may, under proper regard for 
all circumstances, be deemed to constitute an abuse of market domi-
nance are: 
1) the demand or offer of prices or the insistence on terms and 
conditions in the conclusion of contracts for goods or service; 
2) the condition in the conclusion of contracts for goods and 
services that the other party take other goods and servtces 
unrelated by nature or commercial custom.101 
The possible intervention by the Cartel Office in the case of 
such abuse consists in a prohibition of the objectionable practices 
and an invalidation of the respective contractual clauses.102 
The Law ascribes dominant market power to a single enterprise 
insofar as it is subject to no, or no substantial, competition in re-
gard to certain goods or services. Two, or several, enterprises are 
deemed to dominate the market insofar as, for factual reasons, 
there exists no substantial competition between them with respect to 
a certain category of goods or occupational services or in particular 
markets and insofar as they, cumulatively, are subject to no, or no 
substantial, competition with respect to these items.103 Where the 
several enterprises form a combine, the Cartel Office may take action 
against each individual constituent. 
In addition/04 the statute imposes a duty to notify the Cartel 
Office in cases of merger, acquisition of the assets or production 
facilities of other enterprises, management contracts, or acquisition 
of controlling stock in other enterprises if the resulting combination 
or one of the participating enterprises prior to the combination is 
in control of a share of the market in certain goods or services 
totalling or exceeding 20% . 
.. /d. § 21. 
100 I d. § 22. 
101 Id. § 22(3). 
10"/d. §22(4). 
102
/d. §§:a(t) and (2). 
1"'ld. § 23. 
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If the Cartel Office, upon such notification, thinks that the com-
bination results in, or increases, dominant market power, it may 
initiate the necessary inquiries.105 The original government draft 
had subjected the combination of enterprises under particular con-
ditions to a prior authorization by the Cartel Office. In the course 
of the parliamentary proceedings this requirement was reduced to 
a mere duty of notification. 
( 5) Other restrictive or discriminatory practices. The 
restrictive practices envisaged by the Law in Sections I-8 (cartel 
agreements and resolutions) and in Sections I 5-2 I (vertical agree-
ments) are of a direct and contractual or formal character. Since 
objectionable restrictions of competition may also result from in-
direct and non-contractual or non-formalized action, whether con-
certed or individual, the statute supplements the aforementioned 
provisions by a proscription of various additional restrictive prac-
tices not falling within the categories outlined so far, especially 
with a view to shielding outsiders. Moreover since cartels and 
enterprises with dominant or privileged status in the market are 
in a particularly sensitive position, the Law subjects their business 
transactions to special standards of fair and impartial dealing. 
The final formulation of the Sections of this Chapter was the 
product of considerable parliamentary change in the original 
government bill, and thus the resulting organization of the material 
into four categories of prohibitions appears somewhat haphazard.106 
I) Section 2 5 (I) prohibits resort to pressures or incentives for 
the purpose of inducing evasions of the statutory limitations. 
"Enterprises and association of enterprises, may neither 
threaten or inflict damages nor promise or grant advan-
tages to other enterprises for the purpose of inducing them 
to a conduct which may not be the subject of a contractual 
undertaking, either because of a statutory mandate or an 
order issued pursuant to this Act." 
2) Section 2 5 ( 2) proscribes coercion of outsiders which com-
pels them to participate in permitted, though restrictive, 
practices. 
"Enterprises or associations of enterprises may not coerce 
other enterprises to : 
I. accede to a cartel agreement, trade association, or 
cartel resolution within the meaning of § § 2 to 8, 29 
. . . of this Act; 
""I d. § 24. 
106 See the observations by LANGEN, op. cit. supra note 64, in his prefatory comments 
inch. 4· 
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2. form a combination within the meaning of this Act 
with another enterprise; 
3· pursue parallel conduct in the market for the pur-
pose of restricting competition." 
227 
Accordingly, while conscious parallelism as such is not within the 
statutory bans, coercion thereto is taboo. 
3) Section 26 ( 1) is directed against secondary boycotts, pro-
viding that 
" ... enterprises and association of enterprises may not, 
in order to harm particular competitors, induce other en-
terprises or associations of enterprises to impose boycotts 
with respect to supply or procurement." 
4) Section 26 (2), finally, rounds out the list of "may-nots" by 
a mandate to the effect that 
" ... enterprises with dominant market power, cartels 
within the meaning of § § I to 8, . . . [listing certain 
special Sections of the Act] and enterprises which engage 
in resale price maintenance within the meaning of § I 6 
[and certain special Sections] may not unfairly hinder 
other enterprises, whether directly or indirectly in their 
business activities, usually open to similar enterprises, or 
discriminate, whether directly or indirectly between sim-
ilar enterprises without adequate objective reasons." 
This catalogue of prohibitions is followed by a concluding Sec-
tion 107 which empowers the Cartel Office to order the admission 
of an enterprise into a trade association where the exclusion 
amounts to an unfair discrimination entailing competition dis-
advantages. 
( 6) Codes of fair competition. The Law authorizes 
trade associations to establish codes of fair competition for the 
purpose of combatting unfairness in the economic contest between 
members of the same section of commerce or industry.108 The Car-
tel Office keeps a separate register for such codes and exercises a 
certain degree of supervision over the legality of the provisions of 
the codes thus filed for registration.109 Observance of such reg-
istered rules of competition may be the subject of stipulations 
among the interested parties without running afoul of the general 
invalidation of cartel agreements.U0 
Whether or not a prohibition against, or insistence upon, par-
"''Restraints of Competition Law § 27. 
1
'" I d. §§ 28 ( r) and ( 2). 
"'"!d. §§ 28(3), and 31· 
110 !d. §§ 29. 
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ticular business practices amounts to a legitimate rule of fair com-
petition may often depend upon a careful case-by-case determina-
tion.111 
( 7) Exemptions and separate regulations for particular 
industries. The Law contains exemptions of varying breadth as 
well as separate regulations for particular trades and industries.112 
The sectors of the economy thus set apart cover transportation and 
communications, 113 agriculture/14 central banking and industries 
operated as public monopolies, m insurance, 116 and public utilities 
in the field of energy and water supply.117 
The exemptions differ greatly as to their range. They may extend 
to all provisions of the Law 118 or only to particular Sections thereof, 
especially to Sections I and IS-I8,119 to Sections I, IS, and r8/20 
or solely Sections I and I 5.121 The details are too complex to war-
rant discussion in this survey. 
b. Administration; Sanctions and Liability for Infractions 
(I) Scope and distribution of administrative responsi-
bilities. As has been pointed out, the basic invalidations by the 
Law of cartel agreements and of vertical agreements that re-
strict a recipient of goods or services in his freedom to contract in 
regard thereto with third parties, are tempered by broad excep-
tions and possibilities of dispensation, coupled with a prohibition 
against abuses. Similarly, enterprises with dominant market power 
are subject to certain standards and control against abuses. 
As a result the Law had to establish both an elaborate ad-
ministrative machinery and a number of formal requirements (such 
as reduction of agreements to writing, filing thereof with the Cartel 
Authority, and, in appropriate cases, entry in a special register) for 
the purpose of operating or facilitating the policing of the system. 
Apart from the authorization of emergency cartels, which is re-
served to the Federal Minister of Economics,122 the administrative 
111 
LANGEN, op. cit. supra note 64, comments § 28, I, 2. 
112 Restraints of Competition Law pt. V, 
113 !d. § 99· 
1H Jd, § IOO. 
115 Jd. § IOI. 
110 I d. § 102. 
117 I d. § 103. 
118 /d.§§ 99(1) and IOI. 
119 /d. § 99(2) (high sea, coastal, and river navigation and port facilities). 
=/d. §§ 100, 103 (agriculture and public utilities). 
121 !d. § 102 (insurance and financing institutions). 
122 See text to note 8 I supra. 
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responsibilities for the proper application of the law are entrusted 
to the "Cartel Authority." Because of the political structure of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the exercise of the powers and . 
functions of the Cartel Authority are distributed among a new 
federal administrative agency, the Federal Cartel Office, and the 
top authorities for economic matters in the states constituting West 
Germany. 
The Federal Cartel Office has exclusive jurisdiction over crises 
cartels, export and import cartels, resale price maintenance agree-
ments, enterprises with dominant market power, mergers and 
assimilated transactions, as well as matters involving the federal 
railway and postal services.123 The Federal Cartel Office likewise 
has jurisdiction where the effects of the conduct influencing the mar-
ket, of the restraints of competition or discriminations, or of the 
rules of competition extend beyond the boundaries of an individual 
state; otherwise the latter matters are left to the state authorities.124 
The Law gives the Cartel Authority broad investigatory 
powers 125 and establishes elaborate procedural rules for administra-
tive proceedings, 126 administrative rehearings 127 and judicial re-
view of administrative decisions.128 
( 2) Penalties and tort liability for infractions. Since the 
Restraints of Competition Law is essentially a regulatory and police 
measure, it is obvious that its effectiveness depends upon the avail-
ability of appropriate forms of compulsion. Accordingly, the Law 
provides for a system of fines to be imposed as penalty for the 
intentional disregard of the invalidity of certain types of agree-
ments or resolutions, as specified in the various statutory provisions, 
or for the intentional violation of statutory prohibitions, as well 
as for the intentional or negligent disregard of the invalidity of an 
agreement or resolution flowing from an administrative declaration 
to that effect, and for the intentional or negligent violation of ad-
ministrative orders or requirements. 129 In addition, the Law penal-
izes intentional furnishing of false or incomplete information for 
the purpose of obtaining an authorization or avoiding an objec-
tion,130 and intentional inflicting of injuries on others because they 
"'"Restraints of Competition Law §§44(1), I.a), b), c) and e). 
'""Jd. §44, (1), I.d) and 3· 
125 Id. §§ 46 and 47· 
126 Id. §§51-58. 
= Id. §§ 5<)-61. 
128 Id. §§ 62-75· 
'""Id. §38(1), 1, 8, 2, 4, 5, and 6. 
""'Id. §38(1), 7· 
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have prompted orders by the Cartel Authority or exercised their 
right of withdrawal from a cartel.131 
This catalogue of types of conduct penalized by fine is supple-
mented by a most important clause relating to the imposition of 
fines as penalty for mere recommendations. Such sanction is incurred 
in two cases. One is the intentional participation, by means of 
recommendations, in the violations specified above; the other con-
sists of recommendations which effectuate an evasion of statutory 
prohibitions or orders of the Cartel Authority by means of parallel 
conduct.132 The Law, however, excepts recommendations of prices 
or price calculations, made by associations of enterprises to their 
members, if these recommendations have the purpose of creating 
competitive conditions vis-a-vis big enterprises or big combines and 
if such recommendations are expressly designated as non-binding 
and are not enforced by social, economic, or other pressure. 133 
Undoubtedly some of the most important, but also most per-
plexing, problems in the administration of the new law will relate 
to the bearing of its provisions on the tort liability of enterprises 
engaging in restrictive practices.134 Generally speaking, this ques-
tion will be governed by the interaction between the general prin-
ciples of tort liability, established by the German Civil Code, and 
the various provisions relating to the invalidity or proscription of 
certain practices by the Restraints of Competition Law. The Law 
contains only one specific Section in this connection, 135 which in part 
duplicates and in part enlarges an analogous section of the Civil 
Code. 
The German Civil Code establishes three broad categories of 
conduct which entail liability in tort: 
I) intentional or negligent and illegal inflicting of injury to the 
life, health, liberty, property or other absolute right of an-
other; 136 
131 Id. § 38(1), 9· 
132 Id. § 38(2), first and second sentences. 
183 Id. § 38(2), third sentence. 
1
"' See in this connection especially: Gleiss & Kracht, Missbrauchsbestimmungen des 
GWB als Schutzgesetz, 12 NEUE }URISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [hereinafter cited as 
NJW] 971 (1959); Spengler, Zivilrechtliche Auswirkungen des Kartellgesetzes, 10 
WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB (hereinafter cited as Wu\V] 410, at 417 (1960). 
Schramm & Klaka, Das Deliktrecht im Gesetz gegen W ettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, 4 
WETTBEWERB IN RECHT UND PRAXIS 75 ( 1958) j Benisch in MiiLLER-HENNEBERG, 
SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 64, § 35(2)-(5). 
135 Restraints of Competition Law § 35· 
136 BiiRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 823, para. I. 
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2) intentional or negligent violation of a statute, enacted for 
the purpose of protecting another; 137 
3) other intentional and unethical inflicting of injury on an-
other.138 
The Restraints of Competition Law duplicates and enlarges the 
second of these categories by imposing tort liability upon any 
contravention of any provision of the Law or of any order issued 
by the Cartel Authority or a court of review pursuant to the Law, 
insofar as such provision or order has the purpose of protecting 
another, and by providing for the recovery of exemplary damages 
in case of disobedience of a mandate ordering admission of the 
plaintiff into a trade association.139 
The question as to which provisions of the Law or orders by the 
Cartel Office or a court of review will be deemed to have the pur-
pose of protecting another in the position of the plaintiff is liable 
to involve difficult policy considerations and cannot be answered 
with certainty at this stage. At any rate, the possibility of liability 
under the other two broad tort categories specified in the Code must 
be kept in mind, especially in view of the fact that an established 
and operating enterprise is recognized as a basis for an absolute 
right within the meaning of the Civil Code, Section 823 I, which 
is protected against intentional or negligent illegal invasion. How-
ever, the problem as to which restrictive practices may be deemed 
to be "illegal" and not merely "invalid" conceivably will have to 
be answered by applying the same tests that determine the pro-
tective purpose of the statutory provision or order invalidating 
them. A conclusive answer must likewise await further decisional 
clarification. Finally, it must be noted that the Law Against Un-
fair Competition of June 9, 1909, may furnish additional grounds 
for tort liability. 
c. Initial Judicial and Administrative Experience 
(I) Categories of administrative operations. It goes 
without saying that an act as broad and complex as the new Re-
straints of Competition Law is bound to produce countless practical 
uncertainties and controversies 140 and that its actual scope and 
=I d. § 823, para. 2. 
188 ld. § 826. 
139 Restraints of Competition Law § 35· 
140 A complete bibliography of the ceaseless flood of articles and comments published 
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significance will depend on gradual administrative, judicial, and 
doctrinal classification. 
A great deal about the initial experiences with the new Law can 
be gleaned from the first two annual reports of the Federal Cartel 
Office which were published in 1959 and 196oY1 As could be ex-
pected, the principal activities of the Federal Cartel Office, as well as 
of the state cartel authorities, consisted in the processing and, where 
appropriate, scrutiny of the vast number of notifications and regis-
tration statements submitted pursuant to the various mandates of 
the Law, in the examination of applications for authorization, as 
required for various categories of cartels or patent licenses con-
taining restrictive clauses and assimilated stipulations, and in the 
investigation of the notifications relative to mergers and assimilated 
forms of economic concentration. Thus the Federal Cartel Office, 
during the first two years of its activities, received 144- notifications, 
or applications for authorization, of cartel agreements permitted by 
the Law under the conditions specified in Sections 2-7/42 and regis-
tration statements of 203,109 vertical price-fixing stipulations com-
municated by 1,056 firms. 143 Ten additional notifications, or applica-
tions for authorization, of cartel agreements were submitted to 
state authorities, 144 and the Federal Minister of Economics received 
three petitions for authorization under the general interest clauses 
of Section 8.145 
Of course, a substantial portion of the work load of the cartel 
in the various learned or trade journals is practically impossible and hardly of interest 
to the non-German reader. 
141 Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1958 sowie iiber 
die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, Deutscher Bundestag, 3· Wahl-
periode, Drucksache 1000. (15 April 1959); Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine 
Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1959 sowie iiber Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 1795 (13 April 1960). 
142 Report for 1959, supra note 141, at 96. The breakdown shows that 36 of these 
144 notifications or applications were petitions for authorization of rationalization 
cartels with price agreements or common sales or purchase agencies under § 5 ( 3), 
while another 48 were filings of export cartels without regulation of competition 
within Germany pursuant to § 6(1). The remaining 70 items involved all of the 
other seven allowed categories of cartels. 
"
3 /d. at 114. In addition, the Federal Cartel Office received 94 applications for 
authorization of patent and trade secret licenses containing restrictive stipulations, 
while 158 further licenses or assimilated agreements were submitted to it for ex-
amination. !d. at 43 and u8. 
1
" !d. at 97· 
140 Report for 1958, supra note 141, at 2. One of these petitions involved the short-
lived Coal-Fuel Oil Cartel which, inter alia, aimed at a restriction of the competition 
between oil and coal as industrial fuel, in order to protect the German coal industry 
against further increase of its existing dangerous overproduction. The petition was 
granted on February 17, 1959· 
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authorities consisted also in proceedings for the suppression of sus-
pected violations of the statutory prohibitions or of suspected 
abuses. During the first two years the Law was in effect the Federal 
Cartel Office initiated 8 59 investigations of suspected violations, 
while state authorities instituted 824 such proceedings.146 In each 
instance by far the greatest number of cases concerned violations 
of the general ban against horizontal agreements in restraint of 
trade.147 In addition the Federal Cartel Office commenced 323 in-
vestigations of suspected abuses, primarily of vertical resale price 
maintenance agreements.148 
( 2) Particular judicial or administrative decisions. In the 
course of the first two and one-half years of operation of the Law a 
number of important issues have come before the courts 148a and ad-
ministrative agencies. The High Court of Germany rendered its 
first leading opinion clarifying various basic aspects of the new 
Law in October I958 in a suit between the two well-known rival 
manufacturers of eau de cologne, 47I I and Johann Maria Farina.149 
The former distributed its products under a genuine system of re-
tail price maintenance agreements, while the latter did not operate 
under such an arrangement but published retail prices for its 
products on its price lists, bills of sale, brand labels, and advertise-
ments. 4 7 I I considered this practice of its competitor as a viola-
tion of the Restraints of Competition Law and the Law Against 
Unfair Competition and brought an action for a permanent in-
junction. The Court held that plaintiff was entitled to the relief 
prayed for. In reaching this result the Court considered the inter-
relation of Sections I5, I6(I), I6(4), and 38 of the Law and 
came to the conclusion that the invalidity laid down by Section I 5 
in general terms for vertical restrictive agreements extended to 
resale price maintenance agreements for articles sold under trade-
marks or manufacturers' brands, and that the exception provided 
for in Section I 6 (I) applied only to agreements properly registered 
with the Federal Cartel Office in accordance with Section I 6 ( 4) . 
It held further that "invalidity" implied at the same time a "prohi-
bition." Consequently, Section 38 ( 2), prohibiting recommendations 
140 Report for 1959, at 125, 126. 
"'Ibid. The Federal Cartel Office started 424, and the state authorities 546, proceed-
ings against purported § I violations. 
""I d. at 122. Abuse proceedings under § 17 totaled 189. 
148
" For a good survey see Klaue, Zwei Jahre Rechtsprechung zum Gesetz gegen 
W ettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, 6 WuW 319 ( 1960). 
149 Eau de cologne, 4711 v. Johann Maria Farina, 28 Entscheidungen des Bundes-
gerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [hereinafter cited as BGHZ] 222, II NJW 1868 ( 1958). 
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which effectuate evasions of statutory prohibitions through uniform 
conduct, covered recommendations of retail prices, if they were 
publicized in such a way as to be generally observed by the mer-
chants, as was found by the court below to be the case in the con-
troversy before it. Having arrived at the determination that retail 
price recommendations of the type in question were illegal, the 
Court addressed itself to the further question of whether violations 
of the statutory mandate entitled a private party and, in particular, 
a competitor to relief. It held that the prohibitions of Sections 15, 
16, and 38 (2) amounted to a law aiming at the protection of others 
within the meaning of Restraints of Competition Law, Section 35 150 
and that therefore an intentional or negligent contravention con-
stituted a private tort for which a competitor or other injured 
party could seek redress by way of damages or injunction.151 
Another important decision by the High Court involving the 
Restraints of Competition Law likewise dwelt on the private law 
ramifications of the Law.152 It arose out of a discriminatory refusal 
to an enterprise of membership in a trade association. Such action 
constitutes an abuse against which the Cartel Authority may pro-
ceed upon petition of the aggrieved party by virtue of a special 
provision in the Law to that effect. 153 The Court held that the 
Law, by providing an administrative remedy in the public interest, 
did not mean to deprive the aggrieved party of redress in the 
ordinary courts. It held further that the regulation of Section 27 
amounted to a law aiming at the protection of the excluded enter-
prise, thus entitling the latter to mandatory relief in cases of in-
tentional or negligent contravention, pursuant to Section 35 of the 
Restraints of Competition Law, and not merely in cases of inten-
tional and unethical action, pursuant to Section 826 of the German 
Civil Code. 
A series of pioneering judicial decisions settled basic procedural 
matters, such as the jurisdiction over, and the proper procedure in, 
private controversies involving application and interpretation of 
150 See text to notes 135 and 139 supra. 
:L5l The court held further that retail price recommendations relating to merchandise 
sold under trade marks or brands are entitled to registration with the Federal Cartel 
Office if they are "factually" binding and that, upon such notification, the practice be-
comes permissible. The court also ruled, upon a cross-complaint for declaratory judg-
ment by defendant, that the mere designation of the specified retail prices as "non-
obligatory standard prices" does not remove the ban of the law. 
:u;• Judgment of BGH of Feb. 25, 1959, 29 BGHZ 344, u NJW 88o (1959); 9 
WuW 566 (1959). 
'
53 Restraints of Competition Law § 27. 
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the new Law.154 Others dealt with important questions of substan-
tive law, particularly with difficult aspects of resale price main-
tenance. Thus the Court of Appeals of Frankfurt rendered a 
lengthy opinion laying down the various conditions which must be 
met by a manufacturer's retail price maintenance scheme in order 
to be enforceable against a price-cutting non-signer/55 while the 
Court of Appeals of Munich decided whether a publisher who had 
established a resale price maintenance system was entitled to dis-
continue delivery to one of his dealers without running afoul of 
the statutory prohibition against discrimination by enterprises with 
dominant market power.156 
The Federal Cartel Office likewise passed on many fundamental 
questions, for example, on the authorizability of certain cartel 
types 157 and the invalidation of exclusive-dealing agreements.158 
Of course, the comprehensiveness and novelty of the Law will 
call for a great deal of judicial or administrative clarification for 
a long time to come.159 Some of the decisions mentioned here will 
be discussed further in connection with the problem of the private 
law consequences under national legislation of violations of the 
articles in the E.E.C. Treaty proscribing specified anticompetitive 
practices by private enterprise. 
15
' Judgment of BGH of July 9, I958, II NJW I395 ( I958) ; Judgment of BGH of 
Dec. I9, 1958, u NJW 575 (I959); Judgment of BGH of June IS, 1959, 30 BGHZ 
I86, 12 NJW 143 (I959); Judgment of BGH of July Io, 1959, 10 WuW 36I (1960). 
Judgment of BGH of November 11, 1959, 3I BGHZ 162; Judgment of Oberlandes-
gericht [hereinafter cited as OLG] Frankfurt of July 17, 1958, II NJW 1637 (1958). 
155 Judgment of OLG Frankfurt of July I7, 1958, 9 WuW 361 (1959); II NJW 1637 
(I958); criticized by Von Gamm, Die Durchsetzung der Preisbindung im Ferlet-
zungsprozess, 12 NJW 964 (1959). For a recent BGH decision'involving the conditions 
for the enforcement of resale price maintenance systems against signers, see Judgment 
of BGH of Jan. zo, 1959, 9 WuW 733 (I959). 
""'Judgment of OLG Miinchen of Jan. 26, 1959, 12 NJW 943 (I959). For another 
interesting case involving liability of enterprises possessing dominant market power 
for discriminatory refusal to deal, see Judgment of OLG Celie of Sept. I, I958, 9 WuW 
455 (1959)-
157 See the decision of the appeals division authorizing the aggregate-volume rebate-
cartel of the wallpaper industry, 9 WuW 455 (I959). For a discussion of current 
problems in the administration of the Law, see Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber 
seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre I959, Deutscher Bundestag, 3· \Vahlperiode, Drucksache 
1795 (1960). 
158 
See the Melitta case, 9 WuW 756 (I959). The two annual reports of the Federal 
Cartel Office, supra note 141, contain detailed discussions of the many problems of 
interpretation that the Office had to face in the administration of the Law. 
159 For a recent important decision by the German Supreme Court involving the 
concept of a cartel agreement within the meaning of the Restraints of Competition 
Law § 1 see Judgment of BGH of Oct. 26, 1959, 3I BGHZ 105; for a most important 
decision clarifying when mere recommendations constitute prohibited circumventions 
of the Law see Judgment of BGH of Jan. I4, 1960, 13 NJW 723 (1960); 10 WuW 
347 (1960). 
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B. FRANCE 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH LAW RELATIVE 
TO RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES PRIOR TO 
THE LEGISLATION OF I 9 53 
a. Period Prior to 1945: The Regime 
of Article 419 of the Penal Code 
(I) Development until World War II. French law 
governing restrictive business practices is the product of rather late 
growth.160 During the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth 
century there existed only limited concern about the curbing of such 
activities and, at some periods between the two world wars, con-
centration and cartellization were even fostered officially, especially 
by administrative action. As a result, the French approach to the 
protection of competition, whether viewed from a factual or legal 
aspect, is quite complex and rather difficult to describe. For reasons 
which will become apparent, the evolution of French law can be 
divided into three major periods. 
The traditional liberalistic tendencies of French decisional law 
and legal doctrine until comparatively recently made the courts 
quite hesitant to interfere with business practices. A statute of 
March 2-I7, I 79 I, had liquidated the medieval restrictions on the 
access to professional and commercial life and proclaimed freedom 
of trade.161 The Code Napoleon a little later elevated freedom of 
160 French literature ·on the Ia w governing cartels and other restrictive business 
practices has become rather voluminous. Of the copious publications of comparatively 
recent vintage we mention Reuter, A propos des ententes industrielles et commerciales, 
15 DROIT SociAL 442, 508 (1952); 1953 ibid. 1; Mazard, Prix imposes et prix d'entente, 
16 DROIT SOCIAL 129 ( 1953); Souleau, La reg/ementation des ententes professionne/les 
dans le decrrt-loi du 9 aout 1953 16 DROIT SociAL 577 (1953); Moreau et Merigot, 
Les ententes professionnelles devant Ia loi, in LA DocuMENTATION FRAN<;:AISE, ENTENTES 
ET MoNOPOLES DANS LE MoNDE, France No. 1736, May 5, 1953 (1953); Barbry and 
Plaisant, Libre concurrence et ententes industrielles, [1954] Dalloz [hereinafter cited 
as D.] I, 67; Souleau, Prix, in ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, Repertoire de Droit Criminel 
675 ( 1954); Soule au, Speculation Illicite, in ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, Repertoire de Droit 
Criminel 865 (1954); Plaisant and Lassier, Les Ententes 1ndustrielles sous forme de 
Societes ou d'Associations, JURIS-CLASSEUR DES SOCIETES 178 (1955); Lassier, La regie-
mentation de Ia concurrence et des ententes economiques en France: Bilan des trois 
premieres annees d'app/ication, LIGUE INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LA CONCURRENCE 
DELOYALE, Communication No. 43, 14 (1957); Lassier, Monopoles et Pratiques Com-
merciales Restrictives, International Bar Association Conference, Seventh Conference 
Report, 278, 1958; Castel, France, in FRIEDMANN, ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE 
SYMPOSIUM 91 ( 1956) ; Castel, Recent trends in compulsory licensing in case of non-use 
of patents: A comparative analysis, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 330 No. 5 (1954). 
161 For the text see f178CJ-183o] Sirey, Lois Ann. 92. 
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contract to a cardinal principle of the French legal system.162 Where 
these two liberties clashed, the courts were perplexed and flounder-
ing. 
The chief statutory basis for resolving the dilemma was to be 
found in Article 4 I 9 of the Penal Code of I 8 10, creating the crime 
commonly designated as distortion of the price level (alteration 
des prix). Otherwise some isolated provisions and general prin-
ciples developed by the courts had to serve the purpose. 
Until its revision in I926, Article 419 of the Penal Code pro-
scribed and penalized "the raising or depressing of the price level 
for victuals, merchandise or public securities above or below that 
which would have flown from natural and untrammeled competi-
tion" through two major types of conduct: either (a) "intentional 
dissemination in the public of false or calumnious facts, the making 
of offers topping the price asked for by the sellers themselves, or 
any sort of fraudulent ways or means," or (b) "by combination 
or coalition among the principal holders of the same type of mer-
chandise or victual, aiming at not selling it or not selling it except 
at a specified price." In applying this section, especially in respect 
to combinations, the courts vacillated from period to period, re-
flecting the changing moods of the times.163 At first the courts fa-
vored a broad construction. Thus the statutory terms "victuals" 
and "merchandise" were held to include transportation/54 and the 
actual raising or lowering of the price level was not considered 
critical if the purpose of the combination was the attainment of 
such results. 165 The passage of the law of 1884, establishing full 
freedom of association/66 was deemed to be a legislative recogni-
102 CODE CIVIL art. II34· 
163 For a detailed analysis see Moreau in Moreau et Merigot, op. cit. supra note t6o, 
at 38. 
164 The two leading cases in that respect involved a combination of two stagecoach 
companies which attempted to undersell their competitors, Messageries Royales et 
Generales c. Guerin, Cass. Crim. Div. 1836, [1836] Sirey, Jur. 882; Messageries 
Fran~aises c. Messageries Royales et Generales, Cass. Crim. Div. 1839, [1839] Sirey, 
Jur. 722. 
166 As early as 1850 the Supreme Court of France declared in a case involving an 
agreement between local merchants and ship captains stipulating for discriminatory 
freight charges against outsiders "that in a commercial matter it is not necessary that 
the decision which finds the perpetration of a coalition declare expressly that the re-
sult of the combination was a raising or lowering of the price level of goods so long 
as the whole of the decision is to that effect." Gombaud c. Petit, [185o]. D. I, 212. 
166 [1884] D. IV, 129. Arts. 2 & 3 thereof provided: "The trade unions or associations, 
even of more than twenty persons exercising the same profession, similar trades or 
connected professions concurring in the manufacture of specified products, may be 
established freely without governmental authorization." "The trade unions have as 
their exclusive object the study and the protection of economic, industrial, commercial 
and agricultural interests." 
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tion of the principle that trade associations and combinations for 
economic purposes were not illegal per se and resulted in, or at 
least strengthened, a doctrinal and decisional trend of differentiat-
ing between "good" and "bad" cartels. 167 Combinations of manufac-
turers were found not to be illicit even where they engaged in price-
fixing, division of markets, or restriction of production, 168 and the 
French Supreme Court went along in sanctioning such holdings.169 
As a consequence the provisions of Article 419 of the Penal Code 
appeared more and more an anachronism, and a revision of the law 
relative to status of combinations was felt to be in order. In 1926 
an amendment became reality/70 and the pertinent section was 
overhauled. In its new and current form, Article 419 penalized 
the effectuation of, or the attempt to effectuate, an artificial rise or 
fall of the price level for victuals, merchandise, or public or private 
securities (a) by specified or other fraudulent maneuvers or (b) 
by individual or concerted action on the market with the purpose 
of obtaining a profit which would not result from the natural play 
of demand and supply.171 Actually, the new law, apart from closing 
certain gaps relative to attempts and individual action, engendered 
little change. Combinations were held illegal only in infrequent and 
comparatively minor cases of local character which, as Professor 
Reuter has so aptly put it, smacked of a setting borrowed from a 
Balzac novel.172 
161 Illustrative of and analyzing this trend are especially the long annotation by 
Professor Percerou to a decision of May 3, 1911 by the French Supreme Court in Gail-
lard et autres c. La Renaissance, [1912) D. I, 33, 39, and the opinion by Justice Michei-
Jaffard in the same case, id. at 40. This case involved a combination of plate glass 
cutters and polishers providing for cooperation in production and standardization of 
pricing practices. 
168 See, for instance, the decision of the Appellate Court of Nancy of 1902 in the 
matter of the Comptoir Metallurgique de Longwy, involving a combination of the 
principal foundries in Lorraine providing for common purchases, production quotas, 
fixed sales prices, etc., discussed by Moreau in Moreau et M'erigot, op. cit. supra note 
160, at 41, and by Plaisant and Lassier, op. cit. supra note 160, at 9 and 13. 
169 E.g., in the case of Gaillard et autres c. La Renaissance, supra note 167. 
17° For the legislative history see Moreau in Moreau et Merigot, op. cit. suPra note 
160, at 42. 
171 "Anyone ( 1) who by means of false or calumnious facts disseminated intentionally 
in the public, or by offers thrown on the market with the purpose of disturbing the 
quotations, or by offers topping the prices demanded by the sellers themselves or by 
whatever other fraudulent ways and means; or (2) who by perpetrating or attempting 
to perpetrate an action on the market, whether individually or in concert or coalition 
and with the purpose of securing a profit not resulting from the natural play of supply 
and demand, directly or through a middleman effectuates, or attempts to effectuate, 
an artificial rise or fall of the price for victuals, wares, or public or private securities, 
shall be punished with imprisonment ... or a fine .... " 
172 Reuter, II propos des ententes industrielles et commercialrs, 16 DROIT SociAL 1 at 
4 (1953). 
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION 2 39 
Where a combination is illicit because it aims at, or results in, 
excessive profits or the elimination of competitors, the participants 
are not only subject to criminal prosecution but may be held liable 
for damages by the injured competitor.173 Moreover, dissatisfied 
parties may have the agreement annulled by civil action 174 or assert 
its invalidity as a defense if the other members of the combination 
attempt to collect stipulated damages for breach thereof.175 
The economic crisis of the thirties and the impact of World War 
II resulted in a further strengthening of the status and role of the 
cartels. 
In France, as in most other countries, there was a widespread be-
lief that the great depression was caused by over-production and 
consequent disorganization of the market and that the cure was to 
be found in a strict self-regulation by the various branches of indus-
try and commerce. As a result, the government between 1935 and 
193 8 proceeded to foster or even require cartellization in a num-
ber of industries and trades and obtained power to do so in a 
number of other instances.176 The sugar industry/77 shoe manufac-
turing, 178 high sea fisheries/79 the potassium industry / 80 and the ex-
port trade 181 are perhaps the most important instances of such ac-
tion. 
( 2) World War II. World War II brought a complete 
transition to a controlled economy in the form of the authoritarian 
corporative state 182 which lasted until the establishment of the 
Fourth Republic and was formally terminated by a statute of 
173 See, e.g., Messageries Royales et Generales c. Guerin, suPra note 164, holding that 
art. 419 permits the institution of a prosecution by the injured competitor coupled with 
the recovery of damages. 
174 See, e.g., Gombaud c. Petit, supra note 165. 
175 See, e.g., Gaillard et autres c. La Renaissance, supra note 167. 
17° For a detailed discussion of this phase of French legislation see Moreau in Moreau 
et Merigot, op. cit. supra note 16o, at 63-75. 
171 Decrees of Aug. 8, 1935 and Oct. 30, 1935, [1935] D. IV, 252, 533· 
178 Law of Mar. 22, 1936, implemented by regulation of Mar. 26, 1936, [1936] D. IV, 
155, 160 and Law of Apr. 7, 1936, [1936] D. IV, r6o. 
179 Decree and regulation of Jan. 14, 1936, discussed by Moreau in Moreau et 
Merigot, op. cit. supra note 16o, at 67. 
180 Law of Jan. 23, 1937, [1938] D. IV, 156. 
181 Decree of May 24, 1938, [1938] D. IV, 259, discussed by Teitgen, in Note, 1 DROIT 
SoCIAL 237 (1938). 
, .. The two main legislative enactments establishing the framework for this action 
were the Law of July II, 1938 regarding the organization of the nation in time of war 
[1939] D. IV, 209 (especially arts. 46 and 49), and the Law of Aug. 16, 1940, regard~ 
ing the provisional organization of industrial production, [1940] D. IV, 253; see Noyelle, 
L'economie dirigee selon la loi du I6 aout 1940, 7 CoLLECTION DROIT SociAL 4 (1941); 
Teitgen, L'organisation provisoire de la production industrielle et les principes du 
droit public fran,ais, 9 CoLLECTION DROIT SOCIAL 2 ( 1941) ; Personnaz, Les Groupe-
ments d'importation et de repartition, 18 COLLECTION DROIT SoCIAL 23 (1943). 
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1946.183 Yet, there still survived numerous semi-official trade as-
sociations which had been formed during the crises and wartimes 
and which appeared to be ripe for liquidation. This was accom-
plished by a decree of 1949 and a regulation of 1950 implement-
ing it.184 However, this action failed to make a clean sweep. The 
government retained certain compulsory combinations and sub-
combinations with official functions, especially in the steel industry 
and the coal import trade, and, as a consequence, found itself in-
volved eventually in a protracted controversy with the High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.185 
183 Law No. 46-827 of Apr. 26, 1946, effectuating dissolution of the professional 
organisms, [1946] D. IV, 195. 
, .. Decree No. 49--1236, modifying the conditions of liquidation of certain organisms 
of the para-administrative sector, JoURNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;AISE 
[hereinafter cited as J.O.] Sept. 12, 1949, 9278 (1949); regulation of Jan. II, 1950 of 
the Minister for Finances and Economic Affairs, specifying the organisms affected by 
the decree 49-1236, J.O. Jan. II, 1950, 395 (1950). 
"'"For details see European Coal and Steel Community, High Authority, FouRTH 
GENERAL REPORT, 147 (1956); FIFTH GENERAL REPORT, 130, 157 (1957); SIXTH GENERAL 
REPORT II, 93 ( 1958). The facts, as gathered from these reports and inquiries by the 
author, are as follows: In November 1944 the shortage of both coal and foreign cur-
rency prompted the organization of a private non-profit corporation, styled A.T.I.C. 
(Association technique de )'importation charbonniere), which included as members 
the major importer-consumers and representatives of the professionally recognized im-
porter-distributors, the latter being organized in two trade associations called, re-
spectively, G.P.I.R. ( Groupement professionnel des importeurs revendeurs) and 
G.P.I.R.T. ( Groupement professionnel des importeurs revendeurs par voie terrestre). 
Subsequently, in 1944 and early in 1945, the Ministry of Industrial Production charged 
A.T.I.C. with certain public functions. Its activities were placed under the supervision 
of a government commissioner and the State was entitled to nominate the president of 
the corporation. The nationalization of the French coal mines by the Law of May 17, 
1946 ([1946] D. IV, 230) entailed a further strengthening of the prerogatives and 
functions of A.T.I.C. Meanwhile the government also had undertaken a re-definition 
of the functions of the various cartel-agencies of the steel industry by regulation of 
June 28, 1947 (J.O. 6234). A corporation called C.P.S. (Comptoir fran~;ais des produits 
siderurgiques) was recognized as the joint sales agency of the steel industry, in charge 
of the allocation of orders, as well as the delivery terms. Another corporation called 
O.R.C.I.S. (Office de reparation des combustibles pour l'industrie siderurgique) was 
placed in charge of the coal industry's procurement, having a monopoly with respect 
to all plants using at least 100 tons per month. A.T.I.C. henceforth was composed of 
the two importer-distributor organizations mentioned above, and a few of the largest 
consumers, such as O.R.C.I.S., the Electricite de France and the Societe Nationale des 
Chemins de Fer. By Decree No. 57-46 of January 24, 1948 (J.O. 791) it was established 
that both the purchase and transport, until delivery to its destination, of foreign coal 
could not be effectuated except through an association of importers, the reciprocal ob-
ligation to be regulated by agreement between the government and the association; 
and in consequence of this provision A.T.I.C. on April 7, 1948 was placed in charge 
of these functions. In 1952 in order to conform with the French law of 1952 regarding 
price-fixing and in anticipation of the impending establishment of the European com-
mon market for steel, the steel industry changed the status of the C.P.S. into a trade 
association, with mainly statistical functions. The structure and functions of A.T.I.C. 
and its components, however, remained unchanged. As a result the High Authority 
felt that this setup in the French coal industry was inconsistent with the Treaty and 
entered into protracted negotiations with the French government. The French govern-
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b. The Period from 1945-1952: The Advent 
of "Acts Assimilated to Illegal Pricing" 
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The recoil from the system of the corporative state launched by 
the Vichy government brought a return to the free market economy. 
Nevertheless, this change-over was slow, beset with difficulties, 
and by no means complete. Certain sectors of the French economy, 
especially in the fields of banking, insurance, production and dis-
tribution of electricity and gas, and coal mining were withdrawn 
partially or totally from private enterprise by means of the famous 
nationalization decrees of I 94 5 and I 946.186 In the remaining areas 
retention of price control remained unavoidable at first. The war, 
of course, had necessitated in France, as elsewhere, the introduc-
tion of rationing and price controls. The latter was accomplished 
by a series of price freezing decrees which culminated in the codi-
fication of October 2 I, I 940.187 The restoration of the Free French 
government was followed in 1945 by the enactment of a new com-
prehensive price control ordinance 188 which reproduced a great por-
tion of the provisions of the prior legislation. 
The Ordinance of June I945, which since its passage has been 
the object of a steady stream of amendments, defines and penalizes, 
in Article 36, a lengthy array of types of action labeled as "illicit 
pricing practices." This catalogue is followed, in the subsequent 
article, by the enumeration of additional categories of prohibited 
conduct, lumped together under the common designation of "of-
fenses assimilated to illicit pricing practices." The latter list in-
ment was willing to, and did, deprive O.R.C.I.S. of its legal coal purchase monopoly 
for the steel industry and opened membership in G.T.I.R. and G.P.I.R.T. to all 
authorized importers. Moreover, by Decree No. 57-46 of January 14, 1957 (Dall. Bull. 
Leg. 72) it changed the position of A.T.I.C. with respect to coal purchases in the coun-
tries belonging to the European Coal and Steel Community to that of a broker or agent, 
free from administrative veto or instruction. As this action still required French buyers 
to procure non-French Community coal through the state-controlled cartel agency and 
to purchase from non-French dealers in the Community through the medium of author-
ized French dealers, the High Authority, on December 18, 1957, issued a decision 
finding that such regulation was incompatible with the duties under the Treaty. The 
French Government asked for review and annulment of this decision by complaint 
filed on February 26, 1958 (7 Journ. Off. de Ia Communaute Europeenne du Charbon 
et de I'Acier 151 (1958) ). 
186 See I HAMEL AND LAGARDE, TRAITE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 37, 887 ( 1954) and the 
Laws of Dec. 2, 1945 (banking), April 25, 1946 (insurance), April 8, 1946 (gas and 
electricity) and May 17, 1946 (coal mining). 
187 
Law for the modification, completion and consolidation of price legislation, (1940] 
Sirey, Lois, Decrets etc. 1654. 
188 
Ordinance No. 45-1483 of June 30, 1945, (1945] Sirey, Lois Ann. 1898. 
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eludes 189 a variety of restrictive or discriminatory business prac-
tices. In the course of time it has been considerably expanded and 
has come to constitute the actual core of French legislation safe-
guarding economic competition.190 
Article 3 7 of the Ordinance of June I 94 5, as originally enacted, 
proscribed three categories of restrictive business practices, com-
mittable by dealers, manufacturers, or artisans: 191 (a) the refusal 
to sell disposable stock-in-trade or to render feasible services; 192 
(b) arbitrary discrimination in the hours for the sale of different 
kinds of merchandise or for the rendition of different types of serv-
ices; 193 and (c) tie-in clauses or quantity restrictions.194 In addi-
tion, the ordinance specified a general crime of speculative hoard-
ing, committable either by persons other than merchants, artisans, 
or growers with respect to any kind of commodity, or by mer-
189 Some of the infractions classified as "offenses assimilated to illicit pricing prac-
tices" cannot be considered as restrictive or discriminatory business practices, but 
merely as actions apt or calculated to thwart the maintenance and enforcement of 
price controls. Thus art. 37 (I) (d) prohibits the failure to produce certain business 
records promptly upon request by the authorities. Conversely, some of the actions, 
proscribed under the rubric of illicit pricing practices may perhaps under certain cir-
cumstances assume a restrictive flavor, particularly the offense specified in art. 36 (8) 
and styled as intervention of a new (i.e., noncustomary) middleman. For a discussion 
of the elements of this type of infraction see Souleau, Prix, ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, 
Repertoire de Droit Criminel 675 at 68o ( I954). 
190 As Professor Reuter has pointed out and illustrated so lucidly, th~ French price 
control system originally was conceived as an autonomous arrangement designed to 
determine ceiling prices. Yet quickly and to a steadily increasing extent it had to con-
cern itself with the mechanics of the competitive process and to combat and proscribe 
certain restrictive practices while, on the other hand, its administration on occasion 
necessitated resort to "dirigistic" and concentrative techniques, 16 DROIT SociAL I, IO 
(I953)· 
191 Actually the three categories specified were incorporated from a prior decree of 
January 30, I940, [1940] Sirey, Lois Ann. I39+ 
192 Art. 37(I) (a): "To withhold products destined for sale by refusing to fill orders 
of purchasers within the limits of disposability or to refuse the filling of orders for 
the rendition of services within the limits of available means, so long as such orders 
do not possess an abnormal character and the sale of these products or the rendition of 
these services are not prohibited by special regulation or subject to conditions which 
are not met." 
193 Art. 37 ( 1) (b) : "Absent the applicability of any special regulation, to restrict the 
sale of certain products or the rendition of certain services to certain hours of the day, 
although the establishments or shops involved remain open for the sale of other prod-
ucts or the rendition of other services." 
1
" Art. 37(1) (c): "Absent the applicability of any special regulation, to condition the 
sale of any product or the rendition of any service upon either the simultaneous pur-
chase of other products or the purchase of a required quantity or the rendition of 
another service." It may be mentioned in this connection that exclusive dealing con-
tracts (as distinguished from tying clauses) were restricted in duration to a period of 
ten years by a statute of October 14, 1943, [1943] Sirey, Lois Ann. 1378, cf. Hemard, 
Les Contrats commerciaux in ESCARRA ET RAULT, TRA!TE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE 
DROIT CoMMERCIAL 66 (1953). 
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chants, artisans, or growers with respect to commodities or goods 
foreign to their authorized trade or occupation.195 
In I 946 196 this list of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing prac-
tices was lengthened by inclusion of a prohibition against individual 
as well as concerted or collective action aiming at the thwarting 
of price control through threats or effectuation of withdrawal 
from activity as a dealer, manufacturer, or artisan. In I947 fur-
ther additions to and modifications of illicit pricing practices and 
offenses assimilated thereto were made. Thus, tying of an exchange 
of goods or services, outside of personal or family needs, to the 
sale of products, the rendition of services, or the offer of such sale 
or rendition was declared to be a further illicit pricing practice.197 
Moreover, the definition of the offense of speculative hoarding of 
inventory as committable by growers, manufacturers, or merchants 
were identified and expanded and the catalogue of Article 37 was 
lengthened to conform to that change. 
In I952, at a time when the enactment of general cartel legislation 
was a much debated issue, the government decided to propose im-
mediate and separate measures against concerted price-fixing. The 
result was the passage of Law No. 52-835 of July I 8, I952, which 
added to the catalogue of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing 
practices in Article 3 7 of the Ordinance of I 94 5 a new clause to 
that effect. It prohibited the imposition and maintenance of mini-
mum prices by means of organized or collective action, except with 
respect to articles protected by a trademark or within the limits 
of governmental dispensation. The Law provided specifically that 
it should cease to be operative upon the enactment of a general 
law on the subject of business combinations.198 
In addition, the return of a relative abundance of goods necessi-
tated the outlawing of a business practice which was deemed to 
permit large scale suppliers an undue advantage over their small 
competitors: the sale with gratuities. A statute of March 20, 1951, 
prohibited and penalized sales coupled with the distribution of 
gratuities of all sorts such as other merchandise, coupons, etc.m 
195 0rdin. of June go, 1945, arts. g7(2) and 45 in conjunction with arts. 41-44. 
100 Law No. 46-1024 of May 14, 1946, [1946] D. IV, 224-
11" Law No. 47-587 of April 4, 1947, art. I, [1947] D. IV, 148 amending art. g6 of 
the Ordinance No. 45-148g of June go, 1945· 
198 Law No. 52-8g5 of July 18, 1952 [1952] D. IV, 259· For a detailed discussion of its 
history and significance see Mazard, Prix imposes et prix d'entente, 16 DROIT SociAL 
129 (195g). 
199 Cf. Hemard, Les ventes avec primes, u REVUE TRIM, DE DROIT CoMMERCIAL 47g 
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2. THE PERIOD SINCE 1953: CARTEL LEGISLATION OF 1953 
AND ITS SEQUELS 
The year 1953 brought a special and more general regulation of 
the activities of combinations of enterprises. It constituted the 
climax of and, in a real sense, the anticlimax to, the long series of 
attempts during the preceding thirty years to obtain comprehensive 
parliamentary action determining the legal status of cartels and 
similar combinations.200 The sharp conflict between the two cham-
bers about the scope and content of such legislation early in 1953 
prompted the Laniel government to forego reliance on parliamen-
tary action and to resolve the impasse by using the emergency 
powers in the economic field conferred upon the government by 
Law No. 53-611 of July II, 1953, for economic and financial re-
habilitation.201 The result of this decision was the passage of 
Decree No. 53-704 of August 9, 1953, relative to the maintenance 
or re-establishment of free competition in industry and commerce.202 
Formally this Decree added a new section entitled "Maintenance 
of free competition" to the Price Control Ordinance of 194 5 
(composed of Articles 59 bis, ter, and quater) and amended Article 
37 thereof which (as discussed above) defines and punishes offenses 
assimilated to illegal pricing practices. 
The new Article 59 bis prohibits, with qualifications subsequently 
specified, "all concerted actions, agreements, express or implied un-
derstandings, or combinations under whatever form or for whatever 
reasons, that have as objective or may have as result the restraint 
of the full exercise of competition by hindering the lowering of 
costs or sales prices or by facilitating an artificial rise of the prices." 
Article 59 ter, however, exempts two categories of cases from 
this prohibition: (a) those in which the otherwise prohibited ac-
tion was taken in compliance with a statute or regulation, and (b) 
( 1958); Hemard, Les contrats commerciaux in EscARRA ET RAULT, TRAITE THEORIQUE 
ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 63 ( 1953 ). 
200 For a detailed discussion of the various French projects for a legislative determi-
nation of the status of monopolies and combinations of enterprises, see Moreau in 
Moreau et Merigot, Les ententes professionnelles devant la loi, 93, 151 (LA Docu-
MENTATION FRAN~AISE, RECUEILS ET MONOGRAPHIES, No. 21, 1953). 
201 See Souleau, La reglementation des ententes professionnelles dans le decret-loi du 
9 a out I95J, 16 DROIT SociAL 577 ( 1953) ; Poinso-Chapuis, Le controle des ententes 
professionnelles et le probleme de la liberte des ententes, 16 DROIT SociAL 576 ( 1953) ; 
Barbry and Plaisant, Libre concurrence et ententes industrielles, [1954] D. I, 67; 
Delpech, Ententes Professionnelles, in I Dalloz, Repertoire de Droit Commercial et des 
Societes 783, 792 (1956). For the Law of July n, 1953 see [1953] Dall. Bull. Leg. su. 
202 [1953] Dall. Bull. Leg. 587. 
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those in which the actions could be justified as resulting in an im-
provement or extension of the markets for the production or as 
assuring the development of the economic process through ra-
tionalization and specialization. 
Agreements and undertakings thus proscribed are declared void 
as a matter of private law, but the participants are barred from 
invoking the nullity against third parties.203 In addition, engaging, 
or inducing to engage, in prohibited combinations was specifically 
included in the catalogue of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing 
practices. 204 
In order to assure the proper application and enforcement of the 
new regime, the Decree established a special administrative agency 
entitled Commission Technique des Ententes and composed of I 2 
members, of whom six were to be chosen from high-ranking judicial 
or administrative officers, four from business organizations, and 
two from the National Committee for Productivity.205 This body 
is given investigatory powers and charged with the responsibility 
of ascertaining whether or not violations of the terms of the ordi-
nance have occurred and to initiate prosecution in case of such 
finding. Further implementation regarding the proceedings of and 
before the Commission was left to an administrative regulation 
which was issued on January 2 7, I 9 5 4.206 Moreover, by Circular 
of March 3 r, 1954,207 the Ministry of Economic Affairs issued a 
detailed commentary explaining and construing the cartel pro-
visions of the Decree of I953· This Circular, though not possessing 
the force of law, has had decisive effect on the subsequent practice. 
In addition to the new discipline of cartel activities the Decree 
of 1953 amended some of the existing prohibitions of restrictive 
practices. Thus, the offense constituted by a refusal to deal was 
slightly re-phrased and enlarged by a new interdiction of habitual 
discriminatory price increases not justified by cost differen-
tials.208 Similarly, the scope of the prohibition against the main-
"'"Art. 59 bis. paras. 2 and 3· 
,.,. Art. 37(3), as revised. 
205 Art. 59 quater. 
206 Decree No. 54-97 of Jan. 27, 1954, [1954] D. IV, 86. For a discussion of the 
procedure of the commission see Durand, La commission technique des ententes, 23 DROIT 
SociAL 65 ( 1960). 
207 Secretariat d'Etat aux Affaires Economiques, Direction Generale des Prix et des 
Enquetes Economiques, Circulaire No. 6 5, entitled Instruction portant commentaire des 
dispositions du decret no. 53-704 du 9 aout 1953 relatives aux ententes professionnelles. 
20' The new definition of the offense (art. 37 (I) (a) ) reads as follows: "To refuse 
the filling of orders by purchasers of products or for the rendition of services within 
the limits of feasibility, so long as these orders do not present an abnormal character, 
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tenance of minimum prices was expanded in several respects and 
the exceptions clarified.209 It should be noted, in particular, that 
now all vertical fixing of minimum prices, whether by an individual 
manufacturer employing the proscribed methods or by collective 
action, are condemned by the law. These two categories of infrac-
tions and their various elements formed the content of an elaborate 
administrative commentary, published by Circular of February 15, 
1954·210 
In 1 9 55, apart from a further addition (concerning formalities 
to be observed in sales on credit and installment sales) to the 
catalogue of offenses assimilated to illicit pricing practices,211 the 
government issued an important decree which again fostered and 
strengthened cartelization.212 By tne terms of this enactment, gov-
ernment authorization could be obtained for the formation of 
enterprise combinations, with national or regional scope, for the 
purpose of plant rationalization or conversion. In addition, such 
combinations were enabled to obtain direct subsidies of various 
types, and contributions to them by the member enterprises were 
declared to be tax deductible. 
In 195 8 the Council of State held that the Laniel government 
had lacked the powers for the imposition of penal sanctions for 
engaging in restrictive combinations.213 As a result, the provisiOns 
of the Decree of 1953 had to be re-enacted. This step was taken 
emanate from good faith offerers and the sale of the products or the rendition of serv-
ices are not prohibited by law or administrative regulation, as well as to engage 
habitually in discriminatory price increases which are not justified by cost differ-
entials." For a detailed comparison between the new and the old elements of the 
offense, see Barbry and Plaisant, Libre concurrence et ententes industrielles, [1954] D. 
I, 67, 70. 
""'The new definition of the offense (art. 37(4)) has the following form: "[It is 
unlawful] for any person to confer, maintain or impose a minimum character upon 
the price of products and rendition of services or upon the commercial mark-ups, either 
by means of tariffs or price lists or by virtue of combinations, whatever may be their 
nature or form. 
"This subsection does not apply in cases where the products or services are the 
object of a dispensation granted by joint order of the Minister for Economic Affairs, 
the Minister of Commerce and the Minister having a particular interest in the matter. 
This dispensation, which in any event must be of limited duration, may be granted 
particularly in view of the novelty of the product or service; of the exclusiveness de-
rived from a patent, a license of exploitation or the deposit of a utility model; of the 
need for a booklet of charges signifying warranty of quality and specification of con-
dition; or of an advertising campaign for the purpose of launching." 
21° For the complete text see [1954] D. IV, 96. 
ru Decree No. 55-585 of May 20, 1955, [1955] Dall. Bull. Leg. 559· 
=Decree No. 55-877 of June 30, 1955, [1955] Dall. Bull. Leg. 740, implemented by 
Decree No. 55-1369, of October 18, 1955 [1955] Dall. Bull. Leg. 1012. 
""'Syndicat des grossistes en m~thial electrique de Ia region de Provence et autres, 
Conseil d'Etat June 18, 1958, [1958] Rec. Cons. d'Etat, 358 (1958), Juris-Classeur 
Periodique [hereinafter cited as Juris-Class. Per.) No. 10727. As a result, convictions 
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by Decree No. 58-545 of June 24, 1958.214 While in most respects 
it was merely a textual reproduction of the prior decree, it made 
some minor changes in the composition and procedure of the Com-
mission Technique des Ententes and inserted some additions in the 
definitions of the offenses constituted by a "refusal to deal" or by 
discriminatory price increases. The former crime is now committed 
only by a failure to fill normal and bona fide orders within the limits 
of feasibility and under conditions conforming with commercial 
usages. The latter infraction now consists in the habitual resort to 
discriminatory sales terms or price increases not justified by cor-
responding augmentations in the costs of procurement or service.215 
A decree of August 17, 1959,216 introduced some further modi-
fications in the size and composition of the Commission Technique 
des Ententes,217 eliminated some unnecessary formalities in the pro-
cedure and, above all, provided for the publication of annual reports 
including the decisions of the Minister and the opinions of the Com-
mtsswn. 
3· THE RESULTING CURRENT PICTURE 
a. General Summary 
From the foregoing discussion of the legislative developments 
in France, it can be concluded that at least one line of her economic 
and juristic policies has taken the course of protecting workable 
and working competition against restraints and impairments flow-
ing from an untrammeled adherence to the principle of freedom 
of contract. Legislative enactments and decisional developments 
have combined in the suppression of certain agreements, whether 
of the horizontal or the vertical type, as restrictive, discriminatory, 
or abusive. On the other hand, it cannot be said that there exists a 
uniform and clear-cut policy against combinations in restraint of 
under the pertinent sections of the decree of 1953 had to be set aside, Lissac c. Daire, 
Cour d'Appel de Paris, (9• ch. corr.) Oct. 29, 1958, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10864; 
De Lassus de Saint Genies, Trib. corr. Seine, (12e ch.) Oct. 28, 1958, [1958] Juris-
Class. Per. No. 1088o. 
2
" Decree No. 58-545, [1958] Dall. Bull. Leg. 447· Its legality is discussed by Auby, 
Limitations apportees a l'ixercice, par le Gouvernement, de pouvoirs spiciaux: Apropos 
de Ia legalite du dicret du 24- juin 1958 modi/iant certaines dispositions de /'ordonnance 
no. 4-5-1483 du ]O juin 194-5, [1960] D. I, 46. 
215 The italicized words are the amendments. 
216 Decree No. 59-1004, [1959] D. IV, 574-
217 The commission is now composed of fourteen members. Its president is a Coun-
cillor of State, a justice of the Court of Cassation, or a senior judge of the Court of 
Accounts; five members are selected from the members of the Council of State or 
the judiciary; six members are chosen by reason of their professional competency; and 
two members are elected because of their economic expertise. 
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trade or monopolization. To be sure, cartels and similar combina-
tions have been subjected to an ever-increasing control and curbing 
of manifest abuses. But they still enjoy a wide area of toleration 
and legitimate action and, above that, there are many conditions 
or sectors of the economy in which the government considers com-
binations and their discipline as salutary and in the public interest 
with the attendant grant of privileges and subsidies.218 As a result, 
the situation is not free from paradoxes and dilemmas. 
As a matter of positive law, the main statutory sources for the 
suppression of restrictive, discriminatory, or abusive business prac-
tices are to be found in Article 4 I 9 of the Penal Code and Articles 
37 and 59 bis, ter and quater of the Price Control Ordinance of 
1945, as amended. Conversely, legislative bases for the fostering 
or aiding of combinations are widely dispersed and quite obscure. 
b. Currently Existing Prohibitions and Their Interrelation 
( 1) Article 419 of the Penal Code and the general prin-
ciples of law. Article 419 of the Penal Code and the general prin-
ciples of law based upon it, as well as upon the proclamation of 
the freedom of trade, still serve as the ultimate palliatives against 
unabashed and abusive restraints of competition and are invoked 
by the courts, with increased liberality, to vindicate the interests of 
consumers or obstinate competitors or to relieve unwilling partici-
pants. 
Thus, the Court of Cassation not long ago upheld a judgment by 
the Court of Appeals of Paris which condemned the blacklisting of a 
perfume store owner by the trade association of perfume manufac-
turers on account of violations of his resale price maintenance obli-
gations and awarded damages to the boycotted plaintiff.219 Like-
wise, the courts have held invalid and unenforceable agreements 
by bakeries prohibiting supplying of grocery stores and other retail-
ers 220 or home delivery services.221 
218 For a recent forceful advocacy of the necessity and advantages of cartels in manu-
facture or export trade by a government official charged with economic administration 
see Teissedre, Les groupements d'exportateurs: Effort d'adaptation au Marche Com-
mun, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 404 (No. 8); for a more resigned appraisal 
see Merigot, Les donnees economiques du Probleme de la legislation des ententes en 
France, in Moreau et Merigot, Les entmtes professionnelles de'Vant la loi, op. cit. supra 
note 160, at 7· 
219 Groupement des parfumeurs de marques n\glementees c. Berthier, Cour de Cas-
sation, (ch. civ.) May 9, 1957, [1957] D. II, 665, with note by Esmein, upholding 
Cour d'Appel de Paris, June 23, 1953, [1954] D. II, 366, with note by Leaute. 
"""Boulangers d'Aix-les-Bains c. Mallen et Guichet, Cour d'Appel de Chambery, 
May z6, 1953, [1954] D. II, 365. 
221 Vattement c. Arnette, Cour d' Appel de Rouen, (2" ch.) Nov. 14, 1957, [1958] D. 
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However, the main sources of judicial or administrative action 
are now the detailed provisions codified in the Price Control Ordi-
nance of I 94 5, as amended, especially in Articles 3 7 ( I)- ( 5) and 
59 bis and ter. 
( 2) Particular restrictive practices prohibited by Ordi-
nance No. 45-1483. As has been discussed in the previous section 
in connection with the development of French law relative to the 
protection of competition, Ordinance No. 45-I483, as currently 
applicable, contains in Article 37 a catalogue of specifically pro-
scribed restrictive practices.222 This list has been lengthened and 
modified in details by a series of enactments passed since the origi-
nal enactment in I 94 5, especially by Decree No. 5 3-70 5 for the 
preservation or re-establishment of free commercial and industrial 
competition and Decree No. 58-545, re-enacting it with slight 
modifications. The most important of these prohibitions are those 
against (a) discriminatory refusal to deal (Article 3 7 (I) {a) first 
branch) ; 223 (b) habitual discriminatory price increase (Article 
37(I)(a) second branch); 224 (c) discriminatory restriction of 
store hours with respect to particular commodities or services 
(Article 37(I){b)); 225 {d) tie-ins {Article 37 {I){c); 226 and 
{e) fixing of minimum resale prices (Article 3 7 ( 4) ) .227 
The list shows that French law contains no special provision 
against exclusive dealing (requirement) contracts as such, apart 
III, 138; Andouin et autres c. Fortin, Cour d'Appel de Poitiers, July z, 1954 [1954] D. 
II, 771. 
"""As mentioned before, the decree penalizes also other pricing practices which, 
without being restrictive, are deemed to be in violation of the public price controls. 
Thus, art. 36 ( 9) penalizes sales or offers of sales at conditions constituting disguised 
additions to the quoted price, construed in Min. Public c. G., Trib. corr. Ales, Oct. z6, 
1956 [1956] Juris-Class. Per. No. 9593; art. 36 (13), mentioned supra in the text at 
note 197, penalizes the coupling of sales and service contracts with the trading of 
other goods or services except for the satisfaction of personal or family needs. The 
latter interdiction supplements the general prohibition of tie-ins, made by art. 37 
(1) (c), supra note 193. 
223 See supra note zo8 . 
... See supra note zo8. 
=See supra note 193. 
"""See supra note 194. In addition to the proscription of express tying contracts, 
French law specifically prohibits and penalizes hidden tie-ins by means of stamps for 
or outright gifts of "free" merchandise to purchasers. A statute to the effect was passed 
in 1951, Law. No. 51-356 of March zo, 1951, [1951] D. IV, 89, and supplemented by 
the Interpretative Governmental Decree No. 51-u78 of Sept. 19, 1951, [1951] D. IV, 
366. The latter was invalidated in part by the Council of State in 1956, Societe Ap-
provisionnement Livraison, Vente et Publicite, C. E. June 1, 1956, Rec. Cons. d'Etat 
216 ( 1956) [1957] Juris-Class. Per. No. 9749, with note by Hemard. For a recent 
Court of Cassation decision applying the statute see Borocco et autres, Cour de Cassa-
tion (Ch. crim.) Nov. rz, 1957, [1958] D. II, Z71, with note by Hemard. 
ll!¥1 See supra note zo9. 
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from the above-mentioned statute of I943,228 which restricts their 
duration to ten years. Accordingly, it has been held that an agree-
ment whereby a retailer has obligated himself vis-a-vis a manufac-
turer to procure all his requirements of a particular class of mer-
chandise from the latter is unaffected by the Decree of I 9 53 and 
enforceable.229 Conversely, the courts likewise have held that grants 
of exclusive territorial franchises for the sale of particular products, 
stipulated between a manufacturer and certain dealers, do not con-
stitute an undue discriminatory refusal to sell within the meaning 
of the Decree of I 9 53 and that they are enforceable, by quasi-
delictual action, even against third parties disregarding such ar-
rangement.230 Where, however, the producer or wholesaler has not 
established a system of exclusive distributorships, his failure to 
supply customers without legitimate cause falls within the notion 
of a discriminatory refusal to sell, proscribed by the Decree of 
I958.231 The interpretative Circular of February I 5, I954, men-
tioned above, is in accord with these results.232 
The aforementioned prohibition against the fixing of minimum 
resale prices or minimum mark-ups is very broad in its scope. It 
clearly applies to all types of vertical arrangements, whether by 
means of formal or informal, express or tacit, understandings or 
by means of price lists of schedules and regardless of whether they 
emanate from a single person or combination.233 The notion of 
minimum prices and mark-ups includes the cases where no varia-
tions are permitted.234 Exemptions may be granted by orders of the 
appropriate Ministers. The decree lists as proper instances de-
"""See supra note 194-
229 Epoux Ruer c. Soc. des Grandes Brasseries de Charmes, Cour d'Appel de Colmar 
of Nov. 5, 1958, [1959] D. II, 183 . 
... Soc. Guerlain c. Morand, Cour d'Appel d'Aix (2" ch.), Oct. 14, 1958, [1959] Juris-
Class. Per. No. 10924; Editions G. P. c. Brunei "Le Crayon d'Or," Cour d'Appel de 
Bordeaux (2" ch.), Dec. m, 1958, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10933; Soc. Guerlain c. 
Dame Vandanjou, Trib. Comm. Nantes, April 23, 1956, [1956] Juris-Class. Per. No. 
9640; Soc. Guerlain c. Soc. Marie Antoinette, Trib. Comm. Nice, April 29, 1955, id. 
with note by Plaisant and Lassier. 
231 Min. Pub. c. Bugnon, Trib. Corr. de Lyon, Oct. 3, 1956 No. 9790 [1957] Juris-Class. 
Per. with note by Plaisant and Lassier; Daire c. Lissac et Ste. Industrielle de Lunetterie, 
Trib. Corr. de Ia Seine (12" ch.), Dec. 23, 1957, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10+27, 
reversed because of invalidity of decree of 1953, Cour d'Appel de Paris (9" ch. corr.), 
Oct. 29, 1958, [1958] Juris-Class. Per. No. 10864. 
233 Circular of February 15, 1954, Section I, A., [1954] D. IV, 96, at 97 ( 1954). 
233 Circular of February 15, 1954, Section II, A. Plaisant and Lassier, Les ententes 
industrielles sous forme de socitftes ou d'associations, JURIS-CLASSEUR DES SociETES, 178 
at 9 (1955) suggest that art. 37(4) does not apply to resale price maintenance pursuant 
to a horizontal agreement. Even if this were correct, such agreements still would be 
prohibited by articles 59 bis and 37(3) • 
... See the statements to that effect in section liB of the Circular. 
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mands by producers of patented articles or products meeting special 
standards as to quality or dimensions. 
( 3) The general prohibition against concerted restraints 
of trade. It goes without saying that the most important portion 
of the French law for the protection of competition consists in the 
generalized prohibition of concerted practices in restraint of trade 
and the establishment of a special administrative machinery for 
the investigation of possible violations.23" 
Article 59 his of Decree No. 45-1483, as inserted by the Decree 
of 1953, proscribes in general terms "all concerted actions, agree-
ments, express or tacit understandings, or coalitions, in whatever 
form and for whatever reason, which have as their object or may 
have as their effect a restraint of the free exercise of competition, 
by hindering the lowering of the costs or prices or by favoring an 
artificial rise of the prices." While the scope of this prohibition is 
very broad, nevertheless it must not be overlooked that, as Circular 
No. 65 of March 31, 1954/36 emphasizes, its terms outlaw con-
certed restraints of the full exercise of competition only if they 
are susceptible of a deleterious effect on the price level. Actions of 
this type are, in particular, voluntary limitation of production or 
sales, sanctions against exceeding sales quotas fixed in advance, 
division of primary materials or orders among the cartel members, 
and division of customers according to geographical criteria.237 
Moreover, the law provides for exemptions. The latter are based 
either on special legal authorizations or upon the ground that the 
measures in question have the effect of improving and extending 
the outlets for the production or of assuring the development of 
economic progress through rationalization and specialization.238 
In order to facilitate the ascertainment and proper appraisal of 
the rather complex economic factors which determine the applicabil-
ity of the law, a special advisory administrative tribunal, called 
Commission Technique des Ententes, is established. It is in charge of 
the formal investigations which are initiated either upon the request 
of the Minister of Economic Affairs or upon the Commission's own 
motion.239 It holds hearings which, however, are not open to the pub-
235 Decree No. 53-704 of August 9, 1953, art. 1. 
230 Supra note 207. 
"''
7 Circular No. 65, at p. 10. 
238 Decree No. 45-1483, art. 59 ter. as inserted by Decree No. 53-704. 
230 Decree No. 54-97 of January 27, 1954, regulating the administration of the ap-
plication of Decree No. 53-704, [1954] D. IV, 86, as amended by Decree No. 59-1004 
of Aug. 17, 1959, [1959] D. IV 574; see supra notes zo6, 216, 217, and Durand, op. cit. 
supra note zo6. 
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lic.240 Its opinions which are advisory in nature must be based on 
stated findings and may contain recommendations concerning the 
practices under examination.241 Originally the opinions of the Com-
mission and the decisions of the Minister were considered con-
fidential and not published. Decree No. 59- I 004 of August I7, 
1959/42 however, provided for the publication of comprehensive 
annual reports by the Commission, including, by way of appendix, 
the individual ministerial decisions and the opinions of the Com-
mission. The Decree specjfied that this mandate included the period 
of operation prior to its enactment. Accordingly, the Commission 
has now published three reports covering the period of the years 
1954-1957·243 In addition, the Minister of Economic Affairs gave 
a detailed summary of the experience during the first three years 
in reply to a parliamentary inquiry addressed to him in January 
1957·244 
According to the information imparted by these sources, the 
Commission, during the period from April 9, 1954 to January 31, 
1958, made a final disposition in fourteen cases referred to it, of 
which thirteen terminated in formal opinions.245 In a number of 
these proceedings the Minister of Economic Affairs, acting upon 
the advice of the Commission, proposed to the parties the measures 
deemed necessary to re-establish a sufficient degree of competition. 
So far as it can be deduced from the reports, in every instance where 
apposite, his suggestions were accepted and carried out. As a re-
sult, all proceedings reported for the indicated period had termi-
nated amicably.246 
In the course of these thirteen interventions, the Commission and 
the Minister had the opportunity to crystallize the principles guid-
ing the application of the law, that is principles for the determina-
tion of whether a concerted action of the defined "anticompetitive" 
""'Decree No. 54-97 of Jan. 27, I954, art. I2, [1954], D. IV, 86. 
241 I d. art. I 5 . 
... Supra note 2I6. 
243 J.O., Documents Administratifs, Nos. I, 2, and II (I96o). The first two reports 
are discussed by Plaisant and Lassier, Les trois premieres annees d'une politique drs 
ententes, [1960] D. I, 6I. 
,.. Assemblee Nationale, I957. No. 4987, J.O., Oct. I91 I957, at 4569. 
""'Rapport de Ia Commission Technique des Ententes pour les annees I954 et I956, 
J.O., Documents Administratifs No. I ( I96o); Rapport de Ia Commission Technique 
des Ententes pour l'annee I956. J.O. Documents Administratifs No.2 (I96o). Rapport 
de Ia Commission Technique des Ententes pour l'annee I957, J. 0. Documents Ad-
ministratifs No. II (I96o) . 
... See Section III in the reply of the Minister of Economics to the parliamentary 
inquiry of I957, supra note 244, and the two reports of the Commission, supra note 245· 
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character has been engaged in, and whether such conduct is exempt 
from the prohibition in view of the over-all beneficial effects.247 In 
developing the criteria for the solution of the latter issue the 
Commission developed the approach of preparing "a veritable 
economic balance sheet." 248 Practices without ultimate advantages 
for the national economy and the consumers are condemned,249 
while restrictive practices which, under existing conditions, tend to 
result in improvement of the market structure or technological 
progress are condoned, at least for the near future. 
As the Minister and the Commission in its annual reports under-
scored, the criteria established by the Commission are essentially 
constructive. The Commission has endeavored not to tend toward a 
systematic suppression of cartels, but to obtain the approbation of 
the interested parties for its formulae of technical progress and 
general interest. For that reason it has favored agreements for con-
centration and specialization, at least as long as no danger of 
monopoly results. 
Under the provisions of the Decree No. 45-1483, as amended, 
the courts possess jurisdiction to pass on the validity or invalidity 
of restrictive arrangements independent of the Commission and 
the courts are under no duty to refer such questions to the adminis-
trative tribunal. Nevertheless the courts may seek or take cogni-
zance of the opinion of Commission, without, however, being bound 
by its conclusions. 249a 
"'
7 See the comments to that effect in the reply of the Minister of Economic Affairs 
to the parliamentary inquiry of 1957, supra note 244, and the discussion by the Com-
mission in the three reports supra note 245. See also the discussion of this new body 
of decisional law by Durand, op. cit. supra note 206, and Plaisant and Lassier, op. cit. 
supra note 243· 
"'
8 See Sec. V, B in the reply of the Minister, supra note 244· 
249 The response lists four types of effects which have led to the condemnation of the re-
'pective restrictive practices: (a) alignment of a common sales price on the basis of the 
highest costs in the branch; (b) crystallization of industrial or commercial positions 
which hamper the chances of the best placed enterprises for further advance, (c) crea-
tion of a factual monopoly for the benefit of a single distributor which renders the 
customers closely dependent upon a single merchant and does not permit them to dis-
cuss usefully either the price or the quality of service, (d) establishment of lists of 
minimum prices or discriminatory pricing practices. 
"""'See the discussion to that effect in Rapport de Ia Commission Technique des 
Ententes pour l'annee 1957, J.O. Documents Administratifs No. n, at 212 (1960). 
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C. THE NETHERLANDS 
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE ECONOMIC 
COMPETITION ACT OF 1956-1958 
a. The Period Before and During the 
German Occupation 
(1) The Entrepreneurs' Agreements Act of I935· The 
Netherlands entered the era of special legislation with respect to 
cartels only as a result of, and in defense against, the demoraliza-
tion of the markets produced by the great depression of the 
thirties.250 Up to that time few domestic cartels were operative in 
the Netherlands and their activities were not thought to call for 
legislative intervention. However, the cut-throat competition in 
the fight for survival during the depression changed the picture 
and was thought to create a legitimate need for market organiza-
tion by means of cartels and, in appropriate cases, their com-
pulsory extension to outsiders. 
The first measure of this kind was the Entrepreneurs' Agree-
ments Act, passed in 1935. Influenced by the then contemporary 
German legislation, which on the one hand provided for the curb-
ing of cartel abuses but on the other hand authorized compulsory 
extension of cartels to outsiders by administrative order,251 the 
Dutch law took a twofold approach. 
Article 2 empowered the Minister of Economic Affairs, upon 
application by the industry, to render entrepreneurs' agreements, 
as defined by the Act,252 binding on outsiders whenever, in his judg-
ment, such agreements were, or might be, of predominant signifi-
cance to the economic conditions in that particular branch of the 
economy, and if the public interest required such extension. Con-
versely, Article 6 enabled the Minister to invalidate entrepreneurs' 
agreements, as defined by the Act, if such action was required in 
the public interest. 
During the period of the applicability of the Act, between 1935 
260 For discussions of the development and status of Dutch Cartel Legislation: 
WEEBERS, CoNTROLE Op INTERNATlONALE KARTELS 97jf. ( I957); Verloren van Themaat, 
Het Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding, I SociAAL-EcoNOMISCHE WETGEVING I29 (I952); 
Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste !lmbtsperiode Van Minister 
Zijlstra, 5 SoCIAAL-ECONOM!SCHE WETGEVING I ( I957). 
251 See note 43 supra. 
259 Entrepreneurs' Agreements were cartel agreements and resolutions of enterprises 
engaged in the field of commerce and manufacture, excluding agriculture and fisheries, 
concerning business dealings. 
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and I94I there were 38 applications for compulsory extension, 
eight of which were granted, fifteen rejected, and those remaining 
discontinued. There was no case of invalidation under this Act.253 
( 2) The Cartel Ordinance of 1941, as amended in 1943· 
The Act of I 93 5 was superseded by the Cartel Ordinance of No-
vember 5, I 94 I, enacted under the aegis of the German Occupa-
tion Authorities.254 This Ordinance extended the regulation and 
supervision of cartels and assigned vast powers in that respect to 
the Secretary General in the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and 
Navigation. 
The pivotal concept of the ordinance was that of "trade regu-
lations," defined, after an amendment in I94J,255 as "provisions for 
the regulation of competition between persons who conduct an 
enterprise in any branch of commerce or trade and of whom at 
least one is domiciled in the Nether lands; such provisions for the 
regulation of competition including also provsions for the regula-
tion of financial obligations connected with a regulation of com-
petition applicable to the participants." 256 
The Ordinance required reduction to writing of all regulation 
of trade, as thus defined, if arrived at after its entry into force, as 
well as communication of all existing or subsequently established 
trade regulations to the Secretary GeneraJ.257 Moreover it sub-
jected their establishment, ambit of bindingness, validity, content, 
and execution to vast substantive powers lodged in the Secretary 
General. On the one hand, he was given authority either to render 
existing trade regulations obligatory on outsiders, whether with 
or without attachment of conditions,258 or to issue trade regulations 
de novo with obligatory force for all members of a trade or in-
dustry.259 On the other hand, he was empowered to: 
I) supplement, alter or invalidate, in whole or in part, 
trade regulations; 
253 See Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Wet Economische Mededinging 9 
(I958). 
254 Verordnung der Generalsekretare in den Ministerien fiir Handel, Gewerbe und 
Schiffahrt und fiir Landwirtschaft und Fischerei iiber das Kartellwesen, [I94I] Verord-
nungsblatt fiir die besetzten Niederlandischen Gebiete 88I. 
255 ld. as amended by Verordnung der Generalsekretare in den Ministerien fiir 
Landwirtschaft und Fischerei und fiir Handel, Gewerbe und Schiffahrt, wodurch 
die Kartellverordnung abgeandert und erganzt wird [hereinafter cited as Cartel Ordi-
nance], [I943] Verordnungsblatt fiir die besetzten Niederlandischen Gebiete III. 
256 I d. §I (3). 
257 Cartel Ordinance § 2 (I) and ( 3) 
... I d. § 3· 
259 ld. §4-
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2) supplement, alter, or invalidate, in whole or in part, 
resolutions for the execution of trade regulations; 
3) take measures for the execution of trade regulations; 
4) take measures for the administration of organisations 
or institutions entrusted with tasks connected with 
the execution of trade regulations.260 
The Ordinance provided expressly that no one was permitted 
to use legal or economic means for the purpose of restricting others 
in their freedom of action relative to matters envisaged by the in-
validated trade regulation or resolution for its execution and en-
titled anyone with a legitimate interest in the maintenance of such 
freedom of action to the recovery of actual or exemplary damages.261 
Moreover an amendment of 1943 262 entrusted the Secretary 
General with special powers over persons or enterprises which, by 
reason of factual elements or their legal status, exert a substantial 
influence upon market conditions. The Secretary General was 
authorized to give directions to such persons or enterprises relative 
to the conduct to be pursued by them with respect to market con-
ditions, if, in his opinion, they exercised their influence to the injury 
of the general welfare, the interests of the economy as a whole, a 
branch of industry, or another person or enterprise. 
The Secretary General was given broad investigatory powers 
for the execution of his functions. 263 
The administration of this law during the German occupation 
is of little interest for present purposes, as the whole economy was 
placed upon a totalitarian basis, and there was little room for 
cartel practices as such. Nevertheless the provisions of the Cartel 
Ordinance are of significance because they remained the basis for 
the status of cartels after the liberation and after the end of the 
economy of scarcity which required extensive controls, especially 
in the area of pricing.264 
b. From the Liberation to the Enactment of the 
Act of 1956-1958 
T award the end of 1 948 the Dutch economy returned to normalcy 
and cartel policy again became an issue of importance. Although 
a draft of a new Law on Economic Competition was prepared by 
260 ld.§6(z). 
2fll Id. § 7(3) and (4). 
"""Id. § 7a. 
263 !d. § 8 . 
... Cf. Verloren van Thernaat, H et Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding, 1 SociAAL-
EcoNOMISCHE WETGEVING 129 (1952). 
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the Dutch Government as early as 1950,265 the course of parliamen-
tary action on the substantive aspects of the law was not completed 
until June 28, 1956,266 and the passage of final statute providing 
for procedural implementation and putting the act into actual 
operation had to wait until July 16, 1958.267 
Meanwhile the Cartel Ordinance of 1941-1943 remained the 
basis for governmental intervention against restrictive practices 
by cartels and enterprises with dominant market power. But 
whereas at the time of its enactment the main thrust of this 
Ordinance stemmed from its provisions for compulsory carteliza-
tion and the executive assurance of market regulations, its center 
of gravity now shifted to the sections aiming at the protection of 
the market from undue interference. 
The Dutch Government resorted to this ordinance as early as 
1946 when it rendered three decisions for the invalidation of 
clauses in cartel agreements which restricted the resale trade in 
automobile tires to garages, to the exclusion of other retailers.268 
The next intervention of this type occurred in 1948 when the gov-
ernment invalidated a clause in the cartel agreement for the illumina-
tion and electro-technical industry, requiring wholesalers to order 
products from Dutch manufacturers exclusively through the medium 
of agents.269 It was, however, only from the beginning of 1950 that 
the government had to, and did, intensify its intervention for the 
supervision of and curbing of abuses by cartels.270 
There had been a tremendous increase in the number of cartels, 
registered under Section 2 ( 3) of the Cartel Ordinance in the 
period between 1950 and 1956.271 In 1950 the number of cartels 
006 For a discussion of the 1950 draft: Verloren van Themaat, Enkele Juridische 
Aspecten van de Evolutie der Kartelpolitiek, 14 EcoNOMIE 203 (1950); Ameringen & 
Bra hers, J7 oorontwerp Economische M ededinging, 195 I N aamloze Vennootschap 187; 
Advies van de Sociaal-Economische Raad betreffende het Voorontwerp wet Econo-
mische Mededinging, Tweede Kamer (2. Chamber), Document No. 3295, No.4, Session 
1953/54; Verloren van Themaat, Netherlands, in FRIEDMANN, ANTITRUST LAWS, A 
COMPARATIVE SYMPOSIUM 258 at 265 (1956). 
266 [1956] Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [hereinafter cited as 
Stb.] 1061. 
""' [1958] Stb. 825. 
")8 [19-J-6] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 2 and No. 39· 
••• [I9.J.6] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 222. 
"'"For references: WEEBERS, op. cit. supra note 250 at 100; Verloren van Themaat, 
Het Kartelbeleid Sinds de Bevrijding, I SOCIAAL·ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 129 (1952); 
Verloren van Themaat, Netherlands, in FRIEDMANN, ANTITRUST LAWS, A COMPARATIVE 
SYMPOSIUM; Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste Ambtsperiode van 
Minister Zijlstra, 5 SoCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING I ( 1957); Verloren van Themaat, 
Cartel Policy in the Netherlands, in UNiv. OF CHICAGO GRADUATE ScHOOL oF BusiNEss, 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 18 (1960). 
271 For details: Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste Ambtsperiode 
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with national scope in the Netherlands amounted to 455; in I956 
it reached a total of 8 50.272 In addition in I 9 56 there existed I ,ooo 
registered cartels with regional or local character. As a result of 
the active government policy no substantial growth in the spread of 
cartels was observable after I956. 
In order to cope with the increasingly burdensome task and to 
place the necessary intervention on a more democratic basis, the 
Cartel Ordinance was implemented and supplemented by other 
acts and regulations, and, in addition, informal procedures adapted 
to particular purposes were worked out. Thus the Royal Decree of 
July I6, I949,273 established a permanent Commission of the 
Economic Council to perform advisory functions in administering 
the Cartel Ordinance. It was replaced with a Commission for Trade 
Regulations, established by a decree of the Minister of Economic 
Affairs of May 25, I950,274 with the task of rendering advice in 
the invalidation or compulsory extension of trade regulations. In 
May 1951 the duties of communicating trade regulations to the 
proper public officials were made the subject of a detailed admin-
istrative order,275 and a new statute of the same year authorized 
the Minister to suspend provisions in trade regulations until the 
completion of the final determination.276 Finally, investigation and 
prosecution of infractions against the Cartel Ordinance became 
more active as a result of measures taken in I 9 so and I 9 51.277 
On the basis thus provided, the Minister for Economic Affairs, 
between the beginning of I950 and November I956, conducted 
and completed 4I formal proceedings for the purpose of determin-
ing whether "there existed an occasion for invoking the powers 
granted in the Cartel Ordinance," especially those given by Section 
6 (partial or total invalidation of cartel agreements), Section 3 
(extension of cartels to outsiders), or Section 7a (orders regulat-
ing the conduct of enterprises with dominant market power) .278 
van Minister Zijlstra, 5 SoCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING, I. (1957); Verloren van 
Themaat, Cartel Policy in theN etherlands, op. cit. supra note 270. 
m About so regulated production, 180 contained market quota arrangements, more 
than soo included price-agreements, about 250 fixed other contract terms, more than 
100 incorporated exclusive dealing arrangements and 90 established central buying or 
selling agencies. Verloren van Them a at, Cartel Policy in the Netherlands, op. cit. 
supra note 270. 
273 [1949] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 172. 
274 [1950] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. ror. 
275 [1951] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 89. 
276 !d. No. 107. 
277 See Verloren van Themaat, supra note 264, at 133. 
278 The decisions initiating and terminating such proceedings are published in 
Nederlandse Staatscourant, 
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In the majority of the cases involving the invalidation of provisions 
in cartel agreements, the parties voluntarily amended the questioned 
provisions and thereby obviated a need for actual intervention. 278a In 
a substantial number of proceedings, however, all or some of the 
regulations investigated were actually declared to be enforceable, 
while a few investigations were closed because it became evident 
that there was no cause for action or because the agreements in 
question were terminated.279 At least once the Minister for Ec-
onomic Affairs has used his power under Section 7a; he ordered the 
Milk Homogenization Enterprises of Amsterdam, Utrecht, and 
surroundings, to supply lawfully established grocers in these cities 
with packaged milk products for resale.280 On the other hand, the 
Minister so far has never used his power to extend cartels to out-
siders, and he has rejected an application to that effect.281 
In assessing the scope and effectiveness of the Dutch policy 
against abuses by cartels, the appraisal must not be based only 
on the results of these half a hundred formal proceedings. They 
produced a body of decisional law on the basis of which the Minister 
for Economic Affairs was able to deal with similar abuses by other 
cartels on a more informal basis without request for advice from 
the Commission for Trade Regulations. In fact the number of 
these informal settlements is many times that of the formal pro-
ceedings.282 As a result the latter type of investigation is resorted 
to only in cases ( 1) which present new questions of principle, 
( 2) which involve cartels of a complicated character where it 
appears desirable to offer the interested parties the opportunity 
of clarifying by means of hearings the concrete consequences, and 
(3) where no agreement with the cartel in question can be reached 
or where the cartel as well as the Minister for various reasons 
prefer a formal procedure.283 
r.sa For a recent example, see the elimination of four types of restrictive practices 
agreed upon by the cartel of the construction industry, after they were found objection-
able in an investigation, Decision of March 2, 1960, [1960] Nederlandse Staatscourant 
No. 45, at 7· 
27° Cf. the survey (status of 1956} by WIJSEN, DEVELOPMENTS IN CARTEL LEGISLATION 
AND CARTEL PoLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS 5 (Mimeo. 1957). 
280 Decision of Oct. 2, 1957, [1957] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 192. 
281 Application of Association of Brakefluid Manufacturers for extension of their 
cartel to outsiders; rejected by Decision of March 20, 1957, [1957] Nederlandse 
Staatscourant No. 57· 
1182 See the statements to that effect in the discussion of the actual practice under the 
Cartel Ordinance by the Ministers concerned in the "Memorandum of Reply" of April 
13, 1955, Second House, Doc. No. 3295 No. 7, Session 1954-1955, at 2 (1955), and 
the summary by Verloren van Themaat, Het Kartelbeleid in de Eerste ilmbtsprriode 
van Minister Zij[stra, 5 SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING I (1957]. 
""' Verloren van Themaat, supra note 282. 
260 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Formal proceedings are often broad in scope, and the decisions 
terminating them are detailed and carefully reasoned. In summar-
izing the substantive principles which can be deduced from the 
case law thus developed, the ministers concerned with the admin-
istration of the Cartel Ordinance have isolated the following eight 
categories of cartel practices which have called for official inter-
vention in the public interest: 284 
1) The unconditional exclusion of enterprises or groups of 
enterprises from the supplying or procuring of goods or 
services, whereby such enterprises (for example, co-operatives 
or department stores) are seriously hampered in exercising 
a particular commercial function in the same manner as 
other enterprises (complete boycott of particular enterprises 
or particular types of enterprises) ; 
2) The conditioning of the admission of enterprises to the 
supplying or procuring of goods or services upon the con-
sent of a cartel agency, without providing that the determina-
tion of whether or not the consent should be given should be 
made pursuant to rules of admission that are acceptable from 
the viewpoint of general economic policy and susceptible of 
being tested objectively (arbitrary action with respect to the 
access to a market); 
3) The coercion of enterprises or groups of enterprises, either 
by actual exclusion or threats of exclusion from the supply-
ing or procuring of goods or services, for the purpose of gain-
ing compliance with stipulations in trade regulations, where 
such coercion does not possess utility which-from a com-
munity point of view-balances the harm flowing from the 
compulsion for the person subjected thereto (coercive com-
pliance) ; 
4) The requirement that supply be obtained through specified 
channels of distribution whereby an efficient and adequate 
provisioning of the trade or the general public may be 
hampered (rigidifying methods of distribution) ; 
_5) The restriction of the extent of production to a quantity 
smaller than the demand which reasonably can be expected 
(limitations on production); 
6) The regulation of production in such measure that indi-
vidual producers are deprived of their chance of increasing 
""'Memorandum of Reply, April 13, 1955, Second House, Document No. 3295, No. 7, 
Session 1954-1955, at 1. 
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their share in the total production (freezing of individual 
positions) ; 
7) The fixing of uniform minimum prices: 
when there was no reason to assume that a mm1mum pnce 
regulation was necessary in the particular area; or 
at a level or by a method of calculation amounting to an 
obstacle to economically warranted competition (price-
freezing); 
8) The making of regulations of various kinds with respect to 
public bids where the same are an obstacle to economically 
warranted competition or effectuate price increases. 
While this catalogue was meant to be neither complete nor 
inexorable (as the Ministers were careful to point out) ,285 it serves 
as a valuable guide to the principal practices deemed to constitute 
abuses. 
2. THE ECONOMIC COMPETITION ACT OF 
1956-1958 
a. General Characteristics and Scope 
Basically the new Economic Competition Act of 1956-1958 286 
continues the pattern of the Cartel Ordinance of 1941 and utilizes 
the practical experience gained under the previous cartel legisla-
tion. Again the Act can be classified as so-called "abuse legisla-
tion," 287 and, like its predecessor, it provides for three large cat-
=I d. at 2. 
286 [1956] Stb. No. 401; [1958] Stb. No. 412 and No. 413. The first draft of the 
legislation, prepared late in 1950, was submitted to the Social-Economic Council in 
1951 and formed the subject of a detailed criticism by that body (published in 1953, 
2d House, Doc. No. 3295-4, Sess. 1953-1954). A new draft was perfected and submitted 
to the Second House of the Dutch Parliament in 1953, 2d House Doc. No. 3295-2, Sess. 
1953-1954. It was accompanied by an "Explanatory Memorandum" of the Ministers 
concerned, discussing in detail the reasons for the new legislation and the policies 
governing it as well as furnishing comments on the various measures envisaged, 
2d House, Doc. No. 3295-3, Sess. 1953-1954. In consequence of certain objections 
raised by the House the Ministers concerned with the cartel policy subsequently sub-
mitted another lengthy statement on the existing practice and the principal features of 
the draft, Memorandum of Reply, 2d House, Doc. No. 3295-7, Sess. 1954-1955. In 1956 
the substantive provisions were enacted as law, but its entry into force postponed until 
further implementation relating to judicial review. [1956] Stb. No. 401. In 1958 the 
"Law Providing for Appeal from Determinations under the Economic Competition Act" 
was passed, amending the Act of 1956 accordingly. [1958] Stb. No. 412. The entry 
into force of the Act as revised and republished ([1958] Stb. No. 413) was left to 
further determination. The Law was put into force by ordinance of Nov. 11, 1958, 
[1958] Stb. No. 491. (The Act of 1956 as amended in 1958 will hereinafter be called 
Economic Competition Act.} 
287 See the statement to that effect, op. cit. supra note 284, at 3· 
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egories of measures: (a) the compulsory extension of cartels to 
outsiders,288 (b) the invalidation, in whole or in part, of cartel 
agreements deemed to be in conflict with the general welfare,289 
and (c) the regulation of the conduct of enterprises with dominant 
market power.290 Despite the continuance of the established ap-
proach, however, the new Act provides for some new methods of 
control and incorporates a vast number of changes in detail and 
technical modifications. 
Most of all, the new legislation aims at the replacement of the 
broad and untrammeled powers of the government under the Cartel 
Ordinance of 1941-1943 by a regulation more consonant with the 
standards required by the rule of law.291 Accordingly, the new 
Act circumscribes carefully the forms of, and grounds for, public 
intervention and possible exemptions and dispensations and sub-
jects the administrative determination to judicial review by the 
Tribunal of Appeal in Industrial Matters, created in 1954.292 In 
addition, it redefines its scope of applicability by replacing the 
former central term of "trade regulation" with a newly created 
concept, designated as "competition regulation," which in some 
respects is broader in scope as it covers all sectors of economic 
activity and not only trade and industry in the narrow sense. Con-
versely, in other respects it is narrower as it is restricted to legally 
enforceable agreements and resolutions for the regulation of com-
petition.293 The statute provides, however, that its applicability 
may be extended, by general executive order, either in toto to 
designated agreements or resolutions which merely affect competi-
tion 294 or, as far as apposite, to designated written arrangements 
regulating or affecting competition which are not legally binding 
in character.295 Furthermore, publicity is introduced as a new type 
of sanction, both against competition arrangements deemed to be, 
or to be applied, in conflict with the public interest and against 
uses of economic power deemed to be in conflict with the public 
interest.296 Last, although not least, the new Act introduces, for 
288 Economic Competition Act arts. 6-9. 
289 I d. art. 1o-15, 19-23. 
200 I d. arts. 24-27. 
m See the comments to that effect in the Explanatory Memorandum of 1953 hy the 
responsible Ministers of State, 2d House, Doc. No. 3295-2, at 7 ( 1953-54). 
292 Economic Competition Act art. 33· 
293 I d. art I (x), defining competition regulation as "agreement or resolution, pursuant 
to private law, which constitutes a regulation of competition among owners of enter-
prises." 
""'/d. art. I( 3 ). 
"""!d. art. 1 (4). 
200 Jd. arts. 19(1) (a) and 24(1) (a). 
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the first time, the possibility of invalidating competition agreements 
of specified types of character by means of generic regulation, 
though not without allowance of dispensations.297 
As under the regime of the former Cartel Ordinance, as modified 
in I950, the Minister of Economic Affairs is assisted in the adminis-
tration of the Act by a special advisory board, now styled the 
Economic Competition Commission.298 It consists of a minimum 
of twelve regular members who may be supplemented, if deemed 
necessary, by a number of extraordinary members. Consultation 
of the Commission is compulsory in formal proceedings for the 
issuance of generic or specific orders for the supervision or sup-
pression of restrictive practices as authorized by the Act,299 as well 
as for the grant of dispensation from generic prohibitions.300 
b. Particular Regulations of the New Act 
(I) Duty of registration and reduction to writing. Like 
the prior law the new Act requires communication to the Minister 
of Economic Affairs of all competition regulations within the mean-
ing of Article I (I) as well as of such agreements, resolutions, and 
understandings to which the application of the Act has been ex-
tended, either in toto or as far as apposite, by administrative 
regulation pursuant to Article I (3) and I (4).301 The contents 
of the notification are determined by administrative regulation. 
The duty of communication is imposed upon (a) the owners of 
enterprises which are subject to the regulation and have their seat 
in the Netherlands, (b) those persons who in addition to the 
owners are parties to the agreement or have participated in the 
resolution based on private law, (c) those who have obligated 
themselves in writing to execute the regulation or to perform the 
duty of communication.302 Upon request by the Minister, which 
may be made at any time, such persons must also submit informa-
tion as to which enterprises are then subject to a specified regula-
tion.303 
Because of the broad scope of the definition of competitive 
regulation, the Act authorizes the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
where appropriate, in conjunction with another Minister interested 
2
'" I d. arts. Io-15. 
••• /d. art. 28. 
""
9 Jd. arts. 5(2), 7(1), 20(1), 25(1), 23(3), 27(3). 
"""Jd. art. 13 ( 1 ). 
301 /d. art. 2(1). 
302 Ibid. 
303 ld. art. 3· 
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in the matter, to establish general exemptions or, upon application, 
to grant individual dispensation from the duty of communication.304 
Such exemption must be established for competition regulations 
which do not apply to competition in the Netherlands.305 
Non-observance of the provisions for communication is a mis-
demeanor.306 In addition, the Act authorizes the government to 
enact general executive decrees which deprive designated competi-
tion regulations of their enforceability if they are not reduced to 
writing and communicated in accordance with Article 2 within one 
month from the time they have come into existence.307 The reason 
for this provision is the opinion of its draftsmen that penal sanc-
tions may not suffice to guarantee the proper and timely communica-
tion of the more important competition regulations.308 A similar 
rule existed under the Cartel Ordinance of 1941-1943.309 
( 2) Extension to outsiders. Like its two predecessors, 
the new Act provides for the compulsory extension of existing com-
petition regulations, in whole or in part, to outsiders.310 In con-
trast to the Cartel Ordinance of 1941-1943, however, such exten-
... I d. art. 4· 
005 ld. art. 4(1), last sentence. Exercising the powers granted by, and executing the 
mandates of, art. 4, the appropriate Ministers of State issued an order on June 3, 1960, 
providing for dispensation from the duties under art. 2, para. I, for the following five 
classes of competition regulations: 
(a) those that are not in force for more than one month except where there is a 
•tipulation for express or implied prolongation; 
(b) those concluded by a supplier and a customer whereby the prices are fixed at 
which the customer may resell the goods obtained from the supplier; 
(c) those among retailers in milk, milk products, and special milk products, as 
defined in art. 2, para. r, of the Order establishing the Trade Organization of the 
Retail Trade in Milk and Milk and Dairy Products, aiming at the rationalization 
of the local supply of these goods; 
(d) those which do regulate no other matters concerning economic competition 
except: (I) the joint purchase of goods; (2) the obligation of a supplier to supply 
specified goods, whether within a designated territory or not, exclusively to one cus-
tomer; (3) the obligation of a customer to procure specified goods, whether within a 
designated territory or not, exclusively from one supplier; (4) the obligation of an 
agent for certain goods or services to represent exclusively one principal, whether 
within a designated territory or not; (5) the obligation not to exercise a specified 
trade or business, whether within a designated territory or not, provided that these 
stipulations are part of an agreement of employment or for the transfer of an enter-
prise which includes such trade or business; ( 6) the production, distribution, or pro-
curement of goods abroad as well as the rendition or utilization of services abroad; 
( 7) international transportation, so far as such regulation of competition covers one 
or more natural or juristic persons domiciled abroad; 
(e) those which do not regulate economic competition within the Netherlands. 
[rg6o] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 107, at 9· 
306 Id. art. 41(3). 
"'
7 I d. art. 5· 
"''Memorandum of Explanation, 2d Chamber, Document No. 3295-2, at IS ( 1953-54). 
809 Cartel Ordinance art. 2 (4). 
310 Economic Competition Act arts. 6-9. 
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sion is no longer authorized unless one or more of the enterprises 
affected thereby make an application to this end.311 It requires, in 
addition, (a) that in a particular branch of the economy the number 
or the aggregate market share of the enterprises which are sub-
ject to the regulation sought to be extended, according to the 
judgment of the Minister of Economics, exceed substantially the 
number or the aggregate market share of the other enterprises and 
(b) that the interest of that branch of the economy, consistent with 
the general welfare, demands such action. 312 The period of the 
compulsory extension is limited to a maximum of three years.313 The 
law authorizes the Ministers to provide for general exemptions or, 
upon application, to grant individual dispensations from the regula-
tions thus extended to outsiders.314 Such exemptions or dispensations 
may be subject to limitations or conditions.315 The dispensations may 
be modified or revoked, subject, however, to judicial review.316 
In consequence of such compulsory extension of a competition 
regulation to outsiders, the latter are bound by its terms and stipula-
tions, such judicially enforceable obligation existing vis-a-vis any 
party having a legitimate interest in its performance.317 
Under the conditions as developed in recent years, the govern-
ment saw no reason to resort to the use of similar powers under 
the previous law and rejected applications from the industry re-
questing it to do so.318 Nevertheless, attempts to obtain compulsory 
extension of cartels to outsiders are being made even now,319 and, 
at any rate, the provisions in the new Act constitute an important 
reserve power. 
(3) Invalidation of restrictive agreements and resolu-
tions. Like the prior law, the new Act makes provision for govern-
mental action terminating or suspending, in whole or in part, the 
enforceability of restrictive agreements or resolutions deemed to 
311 I d. art. 7· 
312 /d. art. 6{1). 
313 Id. art. 6(2). 
314 I d. art. 8 (I). 
316 Id. art. 8(2). 
316 I d. arts. 8 ( 3) and 33 (I) a. 
317 I d. art. 9· 
318 See, e.g., the rejection by the Minister of Economic Affairs in March, 1957 of the 
application by the Association of Brakefluid Manufacturers, Veremfa, for the com-
pulsory extension of their "brakefluid convention" to outsiders, [1957] Nederlandse 
Staatscourant No. 57, at 5· 
319 See, e.g., the notifications regarding the pending application by two trade associa-
tions of opticians for the compulsory extension of a resolution by their principal officers 
limiting the permissibility of discounts, [1959] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 64, at 
13; No. 109, at 3· 
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be in conflict with the public interest. While, however, the former 
two Cartel Ordinances authorized such decrees only in individual 
proceedings, the new statute, following a suggestion of the Social 
Economic Council made in 195 I, authorizes the issuance of general 
executive orders for the generic invalidation of certain classes and 
types of restrictive clauses in agreements and resolutions, 320 in 
addition to individual intervention with respect to particular agree-
ments or resolutions.321 
Generic invalidation of stipulations, in competition regulations, 
of a specified nature or effect may be ordered when such measure 
appears to be necessary in the public interest. The invalidation 
lapses after five years, unless revoked prior to the expiration of 
such period.322 The issuance or revocation of an order containing 
a generic invalidation requires previous consultation of the Ec-
onomic Competition Commission.323 Though, generally speaking, 
such generic invalidation applies to all clauses in conventions and 
resolutions falling within its scope, whether then in existence or 
thereafter agreed upon, the Act envisages the grant of exemptions. 
Accordingly, such general order may contain an authorization, 
pursuant to which the Minister, upon application, may render the 
same inapplicable to a competition regulation subsequently agreed 
upon which has been submitted in draft form in conjunction with 
such request; 324 and in case of such authorization the Minister may 
grant an exemption also with respect to an existing competition 
regulation, provided that an application to that effect was sub-
mitted before the generic invalidation went into force.325 Such 
exemptions may be coupled with restrictions and conditions and are 
subject to modification or revocation.326 When an application for 
an exemption from a generic invalidation has been rejected or such 
""'Economic Competition Act arts. 1o-1s. 
321 I d. arts. 19-23. 
"""Id. art. 10( r) and (4). 
323 Id. art. u{r). The request for advice must be published in the Nederlandse 
Staatscourant, Economic Competition Act art. II (z). For the first example see [1959] 
Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 52, containing notice to the effect that the Minister for 
Economic Affairs, in conjunction with the Minister of Justice, has consulted the Com-
mission on the question of whether a generic invalidation should be decreed of clauses 
in competition regulations which govern the imposition of sanctions for the infraction 
of a regulation without providing for a number of specified guaranties as to the 
impartiality of the disciplinary tribunal and the fairness of the proceedings. 
Another request for advice relating to a generic invalidation of vertical resale price 
maintenance agreement was made on March 3, 1960, and published March 8, 1960, 
[r96o] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 47, at 7· 
... Economic Competition Act art. 12 ( r ). 
925 Id. art. r2 (z ). 
326 Id. art. r2 (3) and (4). 
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exemption has been modified or revoked, the Minister may suspend 
the enforceability of the clauses involved until final determination 
of the question whenever in his judgment there exists an important 
ground for such action. 327 
In case a generic invalidation of certain specified provisions in 
competition regulations has been decreed in accordance with the 
Act, any conduct tending to ignore or circumvent such measure is 
prohibited and made punishable.328 Where the generic invalidation 
results only in partial invalidity of an agreement, the parties thereto 
may withdraw from the remaining portion within a month from 
the time that the order in question has become applicable to such 
agreement. 329 
In providing for individual invalidation, in whole or in part, of 
particular competition regulations by special proceedings, 330 the 
new Act retains substantially the pattern developed under the 
previous law. Thus the Minister may take such action only after an 
advisory opinion by the Economic Competition Commission has 
been rendered upon hearing the affected and other interested 
parties.331 In case of urgency the Minister may suspend the regula-
tion in question until a final determination on the invalidation has 
been reached.332 The invalidation may be conditional.333 Ignoring 
or circumventing such invalidation or suspension is prohibited and 
punishable.334 Partial invalidation entitles the parties to timely 
withdrawal from the whole.335 
Invalidation of an individual competition regulation is authorized 
by the Act if, and to the extent that, such regulation or its applica-
tion, in the judgment of the Minister of Economic Affairs and 
other appropriate Ministers, conflicts with the public interest.336 
The Act refrains from prescribing any more precise or detailed 
standards for the intervention by the authorities and, in particular, 
avoids any catalogue of proscribed categories or types of competi-
tion regulation. Rather the matter is left purposely to the develop-
= Id. art. IZ{6). 
828 Id. arts. 15(1) and 41(1). Similar rules apply with respect to conduct tending to 
ignore or circumvent suspension orders issued in conjunction with the denial, modifica-
tion or revocation of an exemption from a generic invalidation. Economic Competition 
Act arts. 12(8) and 41 (1). 
323 I d. art. 14. 
380 I d. arts. 19-23. 
'"'1 I d. art. 20 . 
..- Id. art. 23 (r). 
333 Ibid. 
834 Id. arts. 22, 23(5), 41(1). 
835 I d. art. 21. 
386 I d. art. 19. 
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ment of decisional law through a case-by-case approach.337 As a 
result, the administrative policies developed and articulated under 
the regime of the Cartel Ordinance will remain controlling, at 
least for the near future. 338 
( 4) Suppression of abuses of economic power. Since 
invalidation, whether generic or individual, is an appropriate 
remedy only in the case of binding arrangements, the Act provides 
for additional forms of governmental intervention against certain 
uses of "positions of economic power" not resting on binding agree-
ments or resolutions where such uses are deemed to be in conflict 
with the public interest.339 Accordingly, "position of economic 
power" is defined broadly as "factual or legal relationship in the 
economy which results in a dominant influence of one or several 
owners of enterprises upon a market for goods or services in the 
Nether lands." 340 
In contrast to American law or the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, 
the Dutch Act neither prevents nor controls excessive concentra-
tions of economic power as such nor authorizes steps for their 
dissipation.341 It merely provides for measures to curtail abuses, by 
empowering the authorities to impose certain duties or rules of 
conduct upon the persons deemed to possess such power. The Act 
authorizes four types of orders which may be issued in such cases,342 
those which 
(a) require abstention from activities tending, by legal 
or factual means, to induce designated owners of 
enterprises to pursue specified conduct in the market 
concerned; 
(b) require the supply of specified goods or the rendition 
837 See the comments to that effect in the Memorandum of Reply of 1955, 2d House, 
Doc. No. 3295-7, at 4 (1955). 
383 A survey of the guiding principles was recently released, in mimeographed form, 
by the Dutch authorities. A German translation thereof is printed in 6 WuW 428 
(1959). For an instance of a recent invalidation, based on Economic Competition Act, 
art. 19, of an agreement among the store owners in a shopping center whereby they 
obligated themselves for a period of so years neither to conduct nor to permit the con-
duct of competing businesses in such stores, see [1959] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 
65, at 5 and 6. The Minister deemed such exclusive arrangements to be in conflict with 
the public interest for the reason that its duration was excessive and, in view of the 
lack of other stores in the vicinity, apt to hamper a sound development of the distribu-
tion pattern needed by the neighborhood. 
389 Economic Competition Act arts. 24-27. For the necessity and functions of this 
type of intervention, consult especially Memorandum of Explanation of 1953, 2d House, 
Doc. No. 3295, at 9 ( 1959). 
340 Economic Competition Act art. r ( x ). 
341 See the comments to that effect in the Memorandum of Reply, 2d House, Doc. No. 
3295-7, at 7 (1955) . 
... Economic Competition Act :~rt. 24(r).b(x")-(4"). 
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of specified services to designated persons against 
cash and, in the absence of other mandates to that 
effect, at the cash price and the terms for delivery of 
goods or rendition of services that are usual in the 
market involved; 
(c) contain rules concerning the price for specified goods 
or services; 
(d) contain rules concerning the terms for the delivery 
of specified goods or the rendering of certain serv-
ices and the payment therefor, including rules which 
prohibit the limiting of buyers in their right to dis-
pose of the goods purchased, or the conditioning of 
the delivery of specified goods or the rendering of 
specified services upon the purchase or sale of other 
goods or the acceptance or rendering of other serv-
ices or the performance of certain activities. 
The maximum period during which such orders may remain in 
force is five years.343 Their issuance requires prior consultation of 
the Economic Competition Commission.344 Compliance can be en-
forced by any person who has a legitimate interest in their ob-
servance.345 In cases of urgency the Minister of Economics may 
issue temporary orders of that kind while hearings before the 
Commission are in progress.346 
Intervention of this type has been resorted to on various occasions 
in the past, and there is good reason to believe that the pertinent 
articles of the Act will be frequently resorted to.347 
D. BELGIUM 
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE LAW AGAINST 
ABUSE OF ECONOMIC POWER OF MAY 27, I960 
a. Statutory Development and Trends of the Case 
Law Apart from the Cartel Decree of 1935 
(I) Statutory development. Belgian law relating to re-
strictive business practices prior to I 93 5 followed a course of de-
velopment which was, at first, identical with and, subsequently, at 
343 Id. art. 24(2). 
344 I d. art. 25. 
845 I d. art. 26. 
"'"I d. art. 27. 
347 See, for instance, the recent investigation concerning resort to the powers under 
art. 24 for the purpose of suppressing the boycott of a wholesale grocery store by cigar 
manufacturers, initiated at the instigation of competing wholesale dealers of tobacco 
products, [1959] Nederlandse Staatscourant No. 91, at 4· 
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least parallel to that occurring in France.348 Thus, as a result of the 
annexation and incorporation of Belgium by the French in I 7 9 5, 349 
the celebrated Decree of March 2-17, I79 I, establishing freedom 
of trade was rendered (and still is) 350 applicable in that country; 
Article 4 I 9 of the French Penal Code of I 8 I o, defining the crime 
of the "distortion of the price level," discussed before, likewise 
extended to the Belgian provinces and remained in force even after 
their separation from France in I 8 I 5 and their independence from 
the Nether lands in I 8 3 r. 
The enactment of the Penal Code of I 8 67 did not engender any 
substantial change in the situation. Article 3 I I of that Code sub-
jected to punishment "persons who by fraudulent means of any 
kind have maneuvered the rise or fall of the price for victuals, 
goods or notes and securities." That prohibition was supplemented, 
if not in fact superseded, by an Act of July I8, I924, "for the 
suppression of illicit speculation in victuals and goods or notes and 
securities" that expanded the ambit of unlawful manipulations of 
the market and differentiated two distinct classes of proscribed 
conduct, only one being fraudulent. The new Act penalized those 
348 For discussions of Belgium law relative to restrictive practices in general, or 
certain phases thereof, see especially: Del Marmo), Le traitement juridique des con-
traintes economiques, 71 JoURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 453 ( 1956); De'J Marmo), Le boy-
cottage commercial en droit prive, ANN ALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE LIEGE ( 1956) ; 
Del Marmo), La Iiberti du commerce en droit beige, 68 JouRNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 65 
( 1953) ; Del Marmol, La reglementation juridique des ententes industrielles en 
Belgique, 10 ANNALES DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCES PoLITIQUES 3 (No. 39, 1950); Del 
Marmo), Les ententes industrielles en droit compare, in CoLLECTION D'ETUDES DE LA 
REVUE DE LA BANQUE, at 93 (1950); Del Marmo), La reglementation juriJique des 
ententes industrielles, REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE, No. 
special 125 ( 1950); Del Marmo), Protection contre les a bus de Ia puissance iconomique, 
13 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 65 (1949); Del Marmo), Rapport sur le boycottage commercial 
en droit prive beige, 10 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION H. CAPITANT 101 (1959); Haesaert, 
Prix imposes, in 1932 PANDECTES PERIODIQUES 566; LIMPENS, PRIJSHANDHAVING BUITEN 
CONTRACT BIJ VERKOOP VAN MERKARTIKELEN (1943); Limpens and Van Ryn, La re-
sponsabi/ite du tiers complice de la violation d'un contrat, 5 REVUE CRITIQUE DE }URIS-
PRUDENCE BELGE 85 (1951); Machiels, Des conventions de monopole, 70 }OURNAL DES 
TRIBUNAUX [hereinafter cited as }OURN. DES TRIB.] 40 (1955); Van Bunnen, Eflets a 
l'egard des tiers de quelques conventions conclues par autrui, 71 JoURNAL DES TRIBU-
NAUX 245 (1956); Van Heeke, De bescherming tegen misbruiken 'Van de economische 
macht, 1948 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 625. For discussion by non-Belgian authors see 
Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde, Benelux II, Belgique et Luxembourg, in LA 
DocUMENTATION FRAN<;;AISE, NOTES ET ETUDES DOCUMENTAIRES, Nos. 1777, 1778 ( 1953) ; 
Benz, Kartellentwicklung und Kartellpolitik in Belgien, in }AHN AND }UNCKERSTORFF, 
lNTERNATIONALES HANDBUCH DER KARTELLPOLITIK (1958); Strauss and Wolff, Kartel/-
recht, in 4 SCHLEGELBERGER, RECHTSVERGL. HANDWORTERBUCH, 614 at 642 ( 1933), 
WEEBERS, CONTROLE OP lNTERNATIONALE KARTELS 52 (1957). 
349 Decree of Oct. 1, 1795, [1789-1830] Sirey, Lois Ann. 353· 
350 See Del Marmo), La Iiberti du commerce en droit beige, 68 JouRN. DES TRIB. 65 
(1953)· 
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who by fraudulent means of any kind have maneuvered 
or attempted to maneuver, or maintained or attempted to 
maintain, the high or low level of prices for victuals or 
goods or notes and securities; or who, even without fraud-
ulent means, have voluntarily maneuvered, maintained or 
attempted to maintain, in the national market, an abnor-
mally high level of prices for victuals or goods or notes 
and securities, whether by prohibitions or agreements aim-
ing at the fixing of minimum or maximum sales prices or 
by restrictions on the production or free circulation of 
products.351 
Owing to the limitations in scope of the second clause (which 
is confined to activities aiming at abnormally high or low price 
levels) and of the need for complex economic tests implicit in 
such restriction, this statutory regulation has remained without 
great practical significance.352 
Further important legislation in the field of restrictive practices 
was enacted in 1934 when Royal Decree No. 55 of December 1934 
(for the protection of producers, merchants, and consumers against 
certain activities tending to adulterate the normal conditions of 
competition) sweepingly provided for cease and desist orders 
against 
acts contrary to honest usages in matters of commerce 
and industry, whereby a merchant, manufacturer or arti-
san . . . generally impairs or attempts to impair the 
ability to compete of his competitors or any of 
them .... 353 
This provision actually is one of the chief statutory bases of 
judicial intervention against restrictive practices. However, the 
courts have granted relief thereunder only sparingly and in espe-
cially strong cases. 
Finally in 1946 the Price Control Decree of May 14 of that 
year expressly prohibited tying agreements entered into or de-
manded "under abusive exploitation of a situation of scarcity or 
need." 354 Again the courts have taken a narrow view of the 
851 2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK, LES CODES EN VIGUEUR EN BELGIQUE 678 (29th ed. 
1957). 
852 Cf. Del Marmo!, op. cit. supra note 350, text at n. 22. Similarly, a legislative decree 
of 1945 "for the suppression of infractions against the regulations for the supply of 
the country" proscribes "pricing practices in excess of the normal prices" with respect 
to products, materials, victuals, goods, or animals and vests the courts with full powers 
to determine the abnormal character of the challenged prices • 
... 2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK, op. cit. supra note 351, at 673. 
"""I d. at 686. In ·addition Belgium, like other European countries, has special legisla-
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statutory qualification and have held that in the absence of such 
exceptional conditions, tying clauses are unobjectionable.355 
( 2) The trend of the case law. Generally speaking, the 
Belgian courts like (or perhaps even more than) their French 
counterparts have been reluctant, if not loath, to invoke either the 
general principles of civil law or the statutory provisions listed 
in order to interfere with restrictive agreements, whether of the 
horizontal or vertical type, and have shown increasing willingness 
to lend their arm for the enforcement of restrictive vertical agree-
ments even against their disregard by third parties with knowledge 
thereof. Thus in the case of resale price maintenance agreements 
it has come to be the recognized principle that a manufacturer who 
sells his products with the stipulation that his customers must resell 
the same either at a fixed retail price or by requiring further resale 
price agreements, and who diligently watches over the observance 
of this arrangement, may recover damages on quasi-delictual 
grounds from a third party who markets the products at a lesser 
amount with knowledge of the manufacturer's price system.356 The 
manufacturer is entitled to keep the distributors in line by circulars 
and other means of publicity.357 But the courts have considered it 
to be an unfair trade practice subject to be enjoined where com-
peting retailers collectively tried to coerce a manufacturer to ex-
clude a price-cutting retailer from his dealership although the re-
sale price maintenance scheme theretofore had not been consistently 
enforced.358 In the cases of exclusive dealing arrangements, espe-
cially regional sole distributor franchises, similar trends are dis-
cernible, and courts have protected the dealer against injury re-
tion prohibiting the coupling of the promise of a gratuity with a contract of sale or for 
the rendition of services, Decree No. 61 of Jan. 13, 1935, 2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK, 
op. cit. supra note 351, at 708. 
856 See e.g., M.P.c.B. (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, 1956), 71 JoURN. DES TRIB. 718. 
866 For an important recent case discussing the bases and scope of this doctrine see 
Office Beige des Ventes c. S. A. Philips (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, May 13, 1958), 74 
JoURN. DES TRIB. III (1959), with note by Van Bunnen, but cf. Willems c. S.A. Ets. 
Jacques Neefs et a/. (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, June 8, 1955), 71 JouRN. DES TRIB. 253 
(1956), with note by Van Bunnen; for surveys of the doctrinal and decisional develop-
ments see especially LIMPENS, PRIJSHANDHAVING BUITEN CONTRAT BIJ VERKOOP VAN 
MERKARTIKELEN ( 1943) ; Del Marmo!, La liberte du commerce en droit belge, 68 
JoURN. DES TRIB. 65, at 69 (1953); Van Bunnen, Effets a l'egard des tiers de quelques 
conventions conclues par autrui, 71 JoURN. DES TRIB. 245, at 248 (1956); Del Marmo!, 
Rapport sur le boycottage commercial en droit prive beige, ro TRAVAUX DE L'AssocrA-
TION H. CAPITA NT IOI, at 142 ( 1959). 
061 Union Spepha c. S. A. Pharmacies X. et al. (Ct. of App. Bruxelles, 1957), 73 
JoURN. DES TRIB. 290 (1958). 
"""Anciens Laminoirs a Plomb c. Van Marcke et al. (Com. Trib. Ghent 1953), 68 
JouRN. DES TRIB. 551 ( 1953). 
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suiting from invasions of his territory by others with knowledge 
of his exclusive rights.359 However, the courts have been hesitant 
about giving the same protection against a competitor to a man-
ufacturer who required his customers to obtain from him all their 
needed supply of a certain commodity.360 
Similar willingness has been shown by the Belgian courts to 
condone, and give judicial remedies to, cartels and similar hor-
izontal agreements whether for the fixing of prices, the division 
of markets, or the regulation of production, provided that such 
concerted action falls short of the conduct proscribed by the penal 
statutes mentioned before.361 Even group boycotts are held to be 
unobjectionable, at least as long as they are the sanction for price-
cutting or other violations of proper market behavior.362 
b. The Cartel Decree of 1935 
In the throes of the great depression of the mid-thirties, Belgium, 
like her neighbor the Netherlands, followed the example of Ger-
many and enacted legislation for the compulsory extension of 
cartels and similar trade associations to outsiders. Royal Decree 
No. 62 of January 13, 1935, "authorizing the establishment of 
economic regulation of production and distribution" specified the 
conditions under which, and set up the procedures by which, "any 
professional association of manufacturers or distributors vested 
with legal personality may seek the extension of obligations, volun-
359 S.a.r.l. Ets. H. Horn c. Staelens-Vervaet (Ct. of App. Ghent, 1955), 71 }OURN. 
DES TRIB. 252 (1956); Otten c. S. A. Gelec (Ct. of App. Ghent, 1958), 73 }OURN. DES 
TRIB. 404 (1958); Dick c. Holvoed (Ct. of App. Ghent, 1959) 23 Rechtskundig Week-
blad 636 (1959); but contra S. A. Technique et Commerciale "Jobo" c. S. A. Les Arts 
Menagers (Comm. Trib. Liege, 1954), 70 JouRN. DES TRIB. 39 (1955), noted by 
Machiels ibid.; Ets. Reno c. S. A. Van Adelsberg & De Vries (Comm. Trib. Bruxelles, 
1958), 74 JouRN. DES TRIB. 81 (1959); De Greef c. Anysz (Comm. Trib. Bruxelles, 
1958), 74 }OURN. DES TRIB. 82 (1959). See the discussion by Van Bunnen, Effets a 
l'egard des tiers de quelques conventions conclues par autrui, 71 JoURN. DES TRIB. 245, 
249 (1958). 
300 S. A. Coca-Cola Export Corp. c. S. A. Grandes Brasseries Ultra (Ct. of App. Ghent, 
1950), 5 REV. CRIT. DE }URISPR. BELGE 81, criticized by Limpens and Van Ryn, La 
responsabilite du tiers complice de Ia violation d'un contra!, ibid. at 85, Del Marmo!, 
La liberte du commerce en droit beige, 68 }OURN. DES TRIB. 65, at 66 (1953). 
361 See the discussion by Del Marmo!, La liberte du commerce en droit beige, 68 
}OURN. DES TRIB. 65, at 67 ( 1953) ; Del Marmo!, La reglementation juridique des 
ententes industrie/les en Belgique, 10 ANNALES DE DROIT ET DE SciENCES POLITIQUES 3 
(1950). 
362 See Del Marmo!, La liberte du commerce en droit beige, 68 JouRN. DES TRIB. 65, at 
67 ( 1953); Del Marmo!, Le Traitement juridique des contraintes economiques, 71 
}oURN. DES TRIB. 453 (1956); Del Marmo!, Le boycottage commercial en droit prive, 
ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE LIEGE (1956); Del Marmo), Rapport sur /e boycot-
tage commercia/ en droit prive beige, 10 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION H. CAPITANT 1011 
at II3 (1959). 
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tarily assumed by it, concerning production, distribution, sale, ex-
port or import to all other manufacturers or distributors belong-
ing to the same branch of industry or commerce." 363 
In order to accomplish such purpose, the association must address 
a request to that effect to the Minister for Economic Affairs.364 
The request must be accompanied, inter alia, by evidence showing 
that the obligation sought to be extended was assumed voluntarily 
by manufacturers or distributors representing the indisputable ma-
jority of interest in that branch of industry and commerce and that 
the extension is in the general interest.365 The request, if deemed 
proper, is thereupon published in the M oniteur Belge with the 
announcement that adverse interests should register their opposi-
tion.366 If there is such opposition, the parties are invited to submit 
their controversy to a single arbitrator or to a board of arbitra-
tors.367 If arbitration fails to materialize, the controversy is 
brought before the Council for Economic Disputes,368 an adminis-
trative tribunal especially created for such purpose by the Decree 
of 1935-369 If there is no valid opposition, or if the arbitrator or 
arbitrators or the Council for Economic Disputes render a favor-
able opinion, the King may grant or reject the request; 370 if the 
arbitrator or arbitrators or the Council are adverse to the request, 
the King must reject it.371 The obligations thus extended to out-
siders also bind new manufacturers and distributors. 372 If such 
obligations limit production, importation, or exportation, no new 
manufacturer may enter the market without special royal authoriza-
tion upon advice by the Council for Economic Disputes, specifying, 
if apposite, the amount of products or materials which the ap-
plicant may manufacture, import, or export.373 
This Decree which seems to be still in force despite the new legis-
363 Decree No. 62, I935, art. I, par. I. 2 SERVAIS AND MECHELYNCK, op. cit. supra note 351, 
at 692. For an excellent discussion of the provisions of, and the practice under, this 
decree see Moreau, Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde, Benelux, II Belgique et 
Luxembourg, Deuxieme Partie, 20 If. (DocuMENTATION FRAN<;AISE, NoTES ET ETUDES, 
No. I778) (I953)· 
364 Decree No. 62, I935, art. I, para. 2. 
366 Decree No. 62, I935, art. I, para. 3{c). 
866 Decree No. 62, I935, art. 2. 
367 Decree No. 62, I935, art. 4· 
368 Decree No. 62, I935, art. 5· 
360 Decree No. 62, I935, art. 6 fl. Cf. Verhaegen, Considerations sur le Conseil du 
Contentieux economique, 62 }OURN. DES TRIB. 533 (I947). 
370 Decree No. 62, I935, art. I9, para. I. 
371 Decree No. 62, I935, art. I9·, para. 3· 
872 Decree No. 62, I935, art. 20, para. I. 
873 Decree No. 62, I935, art. 20, para. 2-4. 
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lation against abuse of economic power of 1960 has apparently been 
applied cautiously and judiciously.374 According to statistics published 
by the Office of the Council for Economic Disputes in I 9 52,375 the 
total number of applications filed with the Council in the period 
from 1935 to the beginning of 1952 amounted to 95· Sixty-two 
came from associations of manufacturers, while the remaining 
thirty-three stemmed from associations of distributors.376 The 
majority of them were either rejected or withdrawn, 377 but a sub-
stantial number of applications by manufacturers' groups were 
successful and entailed the compulsory extension of the obligations 
assumed by them to outsiders in a variety of industries.378 While 
most of these regulations have expired and have not been renewed, 
there may still be a few industries subject to regulation under this 
Decree.379 
2. THE LAW OF MAY 27, 1960, FOR PROTECTION 
AGAINST THE ABUSE OF ECONOMIC POWER 
a. Evolution of Legislative Proposals to Curb 
Monopolistic Power 
As early as 1937 the Belgian Government was concerned over 
abuses of monopolistic power and the lack of adequate legal bases 
for proceeding against the abuses. A tentative draft-bill was per-
fected and, in 1938, submitted to the Permanent Legislative Com-
mittee; but the political events culminating in the outbreak of 
World War II prevented further progress. 380 
8
" See the conclusions to that effect by Moreau, op. cit. supra note 363 at 25, and the 
comments by Verhaegen, op. cit. supra note 369, at 535· 
375 Reproduced in Moreau, Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde, Benelux, II Belgique 
et Luxembourg, Deuxieme Partie, 20 at 26 (DocUMENTATION FRAN<;AISE, NOTES ET 
ETUDES, No. 1778) (1953). 
876 Between 1935 and 1941 the ratio of applications by distributors' associations and 
those by manufacturers' associations was 27 to 38; between 1941 and 1952 it decreased 
to a ratio of 6 to 24. One of the main reasons for this apparent disparity has been seen 
in the fact that the possible closure of the market against newcomers under art. 20 
applied only to manufacturers. 
371 So far no application by associations of distributors for extensions to outsiders has 
ever met with success. 
378 A report submitted in 1952 by the staff of the Council for Economic Disputes to 
the Central Economic Council listed 15 manufacturing industries which had been sub-
ject to economic regulation under the Decree of 1935, viz. carbonic acid, bolts, bottles, 
wire and nails, rubber, glass panes, steel bars, special glasses, water meters, cups, cop-
per sulphate, rolling mill rolls, compressible tubing, road equipment, pressed cork. 
879 For a survey of the status in 1954, see I BAUDHUIN, CODE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIER 
1587 (1954). 
380 For a discussion of the various Belgian drafts of legislation for the protection 
against abuses of economic power see Moreau, Ententes et Monopoles dans le Monde; 
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After the liberation, in January 1947, Representative Duvieusart 
and some of his colleagues introduced a bill for the protection 
against abuses of economic power, which aimed at a broad and 
comprehensive regulation of that subject.381 The proposed legisla-
tion was divided into two chapters, of which the first dealt with the 
protection of private interests, while the second was devoted to the 
supervision of economic power and the protection of the public 
interest against abuses. In the protection of private interests the 
proposal differentiated in turn between that accorded to cartel 
members against excessive or unwarranted disciplinary measures 
imposed by the organization and that made available to outsiders 
or other third parties with respect to unduly restrictive practices. 
In the part providing for official intervention in the public interest 
the proposed legislation established procedures for ascertaining 
whether certain organizations had acquired dominant market power. 
In case of affirmative findings the public authorities were author-
ized to control further economic concentration in the hands of the 
enterprises so designated and to suppress their restrictive practices 
deemed to be injurious to the public interest, if necessary by dis-
solution. The bill provoked violent attacks from the spokesmen 
for industry and was subjected to extensive criticism in professional 
journals.382 As a result, no further parliamentary action followed. 
M. Duvieusart, having become Minister for Economic Affairs in 
1947, proceeded to the preparation of a government bill with the 
same objectives, but taking account of some of the objections 
leveled against his former proposal. A draft of the proposed legisla-
tion was completed in 195 I and transmitted for advice to the 
Central Council for the Economy.383 The latter approved the bill 
in 1952 making, however, significant suggestions for amendments.384 
The government draft as submitted resembled the original Duvieu-
sart bill of I 94 7 in differentiating between abuses by cartels vis-
a-vis third parties and practices contrary to the public interest. But 
Benelux, II Belgique et Luxembourg, Deuxieme Partie, 38-56 (in DocUMENTATION FRAN-
«;:AISE, NOTES ET ETUDES, No. 1778, 1953); Gunther, Belgische Kartellpolitik, 5 WuW 
242 (1955), Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21 (1957-1958); Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 216 
( 1958-1959 ). 
081 For the text of the bill see Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Doc. No. 123 
( 1946/r947) · 
382 See especially Del Marmo!, Protection contre les abus de Ia puissance economique, 
x949 REVUE DE LA BANQUE 65. 
388 The text of the draft is reproduced by Moreau, op. cit. supra note 380, at 65 . 
... The text of the opinion of the Central Council for Economy is reproduced by 
Moreau, op. cit. supra note 380, at 49· 
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it differed, on the one hand, by the restriction of government in-
vestigations to cases where serious indications of abuses exist as 
well as the omission of restrictions on mergers and other forms 
of concentration, and, on the other hand, by inclusion of provisions 
for abuses of preponderant economic power by public entities and 
against implementation of the then proposed International Trade 
Organization. The Central Council for the Economy, in recom-
mending modifications, suggested, in particular, the elimination of 
the section dealing with abuses vis-a-vis cartel members and of the 
chapter on Belgian cooperation in the international repression of 
restrictive business practices. Following this advice the government 
in 1 9 53 perfected a new text of the proposed legislation and sub-
mitted it to the Council of State. The latter raised several ques-
tions and objections, especially because of the violation of the 
principle of the separation of powers. 
As a result, the government proceeded to a further revision of 
the proposed legislation and submitted it again, on June 26, 1956, 
to the Council of State.385 The draft as transmitted was based 
squarely upon a policy which does not deem combinations or con-
centrations of economic power to be evils in themselves but calls 
for public intervention only in cases of abuses. Accordingly, it re-
frained from declaring cartel agreements to be invalid or illegal 
and rejected the introduction of a cartel register. 386 
The first part of the proposed legislation contained definitions 
of the two pivotal concepts of the contemplated regulation: "ec-
onomic power" and "abuse." The former was defined as "power 
possessed by a natural or juristic person, acting individually, or by 
a group of such persons, acting in concert, to exert, within the ter-
ritory of the Kingdom by means of industrial, commercial, agricul-
tural or financial activities, a preponderant influence upon the supply 
of the market with goods or capital or upon the price or quality 
of particular goods and services." 387 "Abuse" was declared to be 
committed, "whenever one or more private persons possessing 
such economic power inflict harm upon the public interest by means 
of practices which adulterate or restrict the normal play of compe-
tition or which hamper either the economic freedom of producers, 
distributors or consumers or the development of production or 
trade." 388 The general definition of abuse was followed, by way 
385 For this phase of the development see Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21 (1957-1958). 
880 Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21, at 5-7. 
88T Draft-Bill art. r. 
888 Draft-Bill art. 2, para. 1, 
278 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
of example, by an enumeration of twelve types of practices espe-
cially apt to have the proscribed effect.389 
The two definitions were followed by a series of provisions reg-
ulating the procedures for the ascertainment and suppression of 
abuses of economic power within the meaning of the law. The 
proposed legislation envisaged and differentiated two types of 
proceedings.390 One, aiming at the ultimate suppression of un-
covered abuses, was to be of a formal nature, conducted with 
full investigatory powers by the officials in charge thereof and 
culminating in a veritable hearing before an administrative tribunal. 
The other was designed to be more of preliminary and informal 
character, conducted without broad investigatory powers of the 
officials in charge thereof and terminating in a report of the find-
ings without a special hearing stage. The administrative tribunal 
intervening in the hearing stage was to be the Council for Economic 
Disputes, created by the Cartel Decree of 1935, while the actual 
investigation was to be entrusted to a newly established official at 
the Council for Economic Disputes, the Commissioner in charge 
of investigations of abuse of economic power. The formal pro-
cedures were to be initiated upon complaint by persons claiming to 
be injured by practices constituting abuse of economic power, upon 
request of the Minister for Economic Affairs, or upon the Com-
missioner's own motion. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Coun-
cil for Economic Disputes was to render a reasoned advisory 
opinion as to whether an abuse was established and to propose 
appropriate remedies. If the Minister accepted the finding of an 
abuse, two courses of action were to be open to him.391 Either he 
might proceed in an amicable fashion and communicate recom-
mendations for the termination of the practices in question or he 
might procure a royal decree determining the existence of an abuse 
and imposing upon the perpetrators the measures required for 
eliminating the abuse. Disobedience was to entail penal sanctions. 
889 Draft-Bill art. 2, para. 2. The twelve categories of presumptively abusive prac-
tices were: (1) practices tending to raise, maintain, or lower price levels; (2) unwar-
ranted discrimination between purchasers; ( 3) coercion of third persons not to sell 
to or buy from certain other persons; (4) selling below cost; (5) hampering improve-
ment or operation of technical processes or inventions; (6) quantitative limitation 
or qualitative alteration of the production; ( 7) resale price maintenance; (8) division 
of customers; ( 9) stipulation of exclusive dealing or loyalty clauses; ( 10) tied sales; 
(II) restrictions of the volume of sales or purchases for economic purposes; ( 12) re-
strictive, discriminatory, or coercive measures tending to distort the distribution of 
primary materials, manufactured article, or credit. 
800 See Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21, at 43 (1957-1958). 
391 Government Draft arts. 7 and 9· 
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The Council of State, in passing on the draft, suggested a num-
ber of substantive changes and a rearrangement of the articles 
mainly for purposes of clarification.392 Perhaps the most significant 
modifications suggested were the elimination of the enumeration 
of the twelve categories of practices constituting presumptively 
an abuse of economic power and the insertion of special provisions 
for the exemption of the State, its territorial subdivisions, the 
public entities, and other agencies of public interest subject to the 
authority or control of one of the Ministers of State. 
The government accepted these recommendations and deposited 
a revised draft, following the Council of State proposal, with the 
Senate in November 1957.393 The bill lapsed, however, as a result 
of the end of the parliamentary session. 
b. Genesis and Structure of the Law of 
May 27, 1960 
On June 9, 1959, the government deposited a new bill with the 
Senate and, after it was passed by that body, introduced it in the 
same form in the Chamber of Representatives on December 16, 
1959.394 The Chamber of Representatives likewise adopted the 
government bill under rejection of several amendments proposed 
by members of the House on May 18 and 19, and the bill became 
law on May 27, 1960.395 The new statute incorporates the substance 
and structure of the government bill of 1957, but it is changed in 
some respects for the purpose of greater efficiency and streamlining, 
and the former absolute exemption with respect to public or quasi-
public entities has been replaced by a more qualified rule. In deriving 
the ultimate form of the proposal the government had before it, 
and to a large extent followed, the views of the Central Council for 
the Economy and of the Council of State.396 
The new legislation repeats the definitions of economic power and 
abuse contained in the 1957 draft. Thus, the actual law, like the 
final form of the 1 9 57 proposal, defines abuse by means of a general 
formula and omits any enumeration of specific practices. Likewise, 
as before, provision is made for two types of initial proceedings 
to be conducted by or under the supervision of a newly appointed 
"""Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 21, at 37 If. ( 1957-1958). 
393 /d. at 28 If, 
"""Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 216 ( 1958-1959) ; Belgian Chamber of Representatives, 
Doc. Nos. 383-1 and 383-2 (1959-1960). 
395 Belgian Chambre des Representants, Annales parlementaires, Nos. 85-87 ( 1959-
1960); 130 MONITEUR B:tGE 4674 (Jur.e 22, 1960'. 
396 Belgian Senate, Doc. No. 216, at 5 (1958-1959). 
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Commissioner for investigations of abuses of economic power at 
the Council for Economic Disputes. These proceedings are either 
informal inquiries for the purpose of determining whether or not a 
formal prosecution shall be instituted 397 or formal investigations.39s 
Again, the latter are to be initiated either upon complaint by injured 
parties or upon request of the Minister of Economics, but the Com-
missioner is now given the power of refusing to proceed upon com-
plaint by private parties if he deems it to be inadmissible or un-
founded. If, as a result of the preliminary investigation, the Com-
missioner or the Minister for Economic affairs concludes that the 
proceedings shall be pursued further, the case is transferred to the 
Council for Economic Disputes for hearing before one of its special 
trial divisions. As proposed before, the opinion of that tribunal is 
advisory only. If the Minister for Economic Affairs accepts its find-
ings of an abuse of economic power, he must, under the new law, 
proceed in an amicable fashion and make such recommendations as 
he deems appropriate for discontinuance of the objectionable prac-
tices.399 If the parties accept the recommendations, the matter is 
settled by an agreement. If the parties fail to follow the recom-
mendations, even after a more formal reiteration, or if they neglect 
to perform the agreement, the Minister may obtain a formal royal 
decree issuing a cease and desist order. If the abuse is committed 
by a juristic person which has been proceeded against previously, 
the royal decree may, in addition to the measures required to 
terminate the new abuse, add some special sanctions designed to 
curb existing or the acquisition of further economic power.400 
Perhaps the two most important new provisions of the act are 
inserted for the purpose of harmonizing the Belgian law with the 
mandates and the policy of the European Economic Community 
Treaty. Thus, a new Article 28 prescribes: "Whenever the Belgian 
authorities have to decide, by virtue of Article 88 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community, ratified by the 
Law of December 2, 1957, upon the permissibility of cartels and 
upon the abusive exploitation of a dominant position in the Com-
mon Market, such determination must be made by the authorities 
defined in the present law: ( 1) either in conformity with Articles 
391 Art. s. Inquiries of this type are initiated by the Commissioner either when there 
are serious indications of an abuse of economic power in a particular market or upon 
request by the Minister. 
398 Art. 4-
399 Art. 14. 
•oo Art. rs. 
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION 28 I 
8 5 (I) and 86 of the Treaty and following, the procedure pre-
scribed by the present act; ( 2) or in conformity with Article 8 5 ( 3) 
of the Treaty and following the procedure provided for in Article 
14, paragraph 8 et seq. with the exception of the three years' limita-
tion." Furthermore, because of the fact that the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty contains, in Article 90, special rules with 
respect to public and quasi-public entities, the exemption contained 
in the former bill is changed so as to empower the King to regulate 
the scope and mode of the applicability of the new statute to such 
entities by royal decree.401 
E. ITALY 
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN LAW 
RELATIVE TO ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
a. Developments Prior to the Fascist Cartel 
Legislation of 1923-1936 and the Enactment 
of the Civil Code of 1942 
Italian law, in its current state, contains no comprehensive special 
legislation for the control or suppression of anticompetitive prac-
tices that is actually enforceable. Rather the chief statutory bases 
for legal action in this field consist of the articles contained in 
Book V, Title X of the Civil Code of 1942, entitled "Of the 
Regulation of Competition and Consortia," as supplemented by 
applicable articles pertaining to the law of contracts and torts and 
the Penal Code.402 This condition results from, and is explainable 
401 Art. 27. 
402 For recent general works dealing with the legal protection of competition in Italy, 
see especially ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BENI IMMATERIAL! (2d ed. 
1957); Ghiron, La concorrenza e i consorzi (in VASSALLI et a/., TRATTATO DI DIRITTO 
CIVILE ITALIANO, Vol. 10) (reprinted 1954); Tonni and Ferrara, Die Konsortien im 
ita/ienischen Recht in }AHN-}UNCKERSTORFF, INTERNATIONALES HANDBUCH DER KAR-
TELLPOLITIK, 285 (1958); for older books or articles treating the subject see AscARELLI, 
CONSORZI VOLONTARI TRA IMPRENDITORI (2d ed, 1937); Ascarelli, Le Unioni di imprese, 
33 Rrv. DEL DIR. COMM. 152 (1935); 8ALANDRA, IL DIRITTO DELLE UNION! DI IMPRESE 
(1934); Ascarelli, Note preliminari .wile intese industriali, 1933 RIVISTA ITALIANA PER 
LE SCIENZE GIURIDICHE 90; De Sanctis, Das Recht der Kartelle und anderen Unter-
nehmenszusammenfassungen in Jta/ien (KARTELI. UND KONZERNRECHT DES AUSLANDES, 
Eo. R. !SAY, issue 4) (1928); Strauss-Wolff, Kartellrecht: Italien in 4 RECHTSVER-
OLEICHENDES HANDWORTERBUCH FUR DAS ZIVIL-UND HANDELSRECHT (ed. Schlegelberger) 
650 ( 1932) ; Ricca-Barberis, I sindacati industriali e Ia giurisprudenza, r Rrv. DEL 
DIR. CoMM. 458 ( 1903). For the treatment of particular aspects, see especially Santini, 
La vendita a prezzo imposto, 6 Rrv. TRIM. DI DrR. E PROC. CIVILE 1042 (1952); Frances-
chelli, Importazioni libere in zona di esclusiva e concorrenza sleale, 3 RIV. DI DIR. IND., 
I, 97 (1954); La Lumia, Ancora su importazioni libere 4 Rrv. DI DIR. IND., I, 5 (1955). 
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by, the difficulties of adapting the Italian legal system and economic 
structure to the sharp change in political philosophy attending the 
abolition of the Fascist corporative state. 
Prior to the advent of Fascism, the Italian legislator had felt 
little need for special interference with cartels and other restric-
tive arrangements, apart from the general limitations on free-
dom of contract contained in the Civil Code of 186 5 403 and certain 
sections of the Penal Code of 1888. The latter penalized inter-
ference with freedom of trade through violence or threats 404 and 
the production of a rise or fall of the prices in public markets or 
exchanges through the spreading of false news or use of other 
fraudulent means.405 Conspiracy by five or more persons to commit 
such offenses was likewise punishable.406 
As a result of the absence of specific norms governing the legal-
ity of cartels or other restrictive combinations and because of the 
unwillingness of the Italian courts to deduce rules for the protec-
tion of competition against private restraints from the legislation 
establishing freedom of trade,407 it became recognized that cartels 
and similar arrangements are legal and enforceable as long as they 
do not engage in practices proscribed by the Penal Code or have 
particularly aggravated effects. The leading precedent which es-
tablished the course which was followed subsequently by the courts 
was the decision of the Court of Cassation of Naples of May 
26, 1903, in the case of Algranati ed altri c. Ferro, Cobianchi ed 
altri.408 In that controversy some members of a cartel had brought 
a damage action against other members because of alleged viola-
tion of certain obligations mutually assumed by them. The de-
... CIVIL ConE {1865), art. 1119: "An obligation ... resting on an illicit cause cannot 
have any effect"; art. 1122: "The cause is illicit, whenever it is in contravention to 
the law, good custom or public order." 
""PENAL CODE {1888), art. 165: "Anybody, who by means of violence or threats, 
restrains or hampers, in any way whatsoever, the freedom of work or trade shall be 
punished .... " For a detailed exposition of the background and scope of this pro-
vision see particularly 4 MANZINI, TRATTATO DI DIRITIO PENALE ITALIANO 715 ff. (2d 
ed. 1921). 
400 I d. art. 293: "Anybody, who through the spreading of false news or other 
fraudulent means, produces in the public markets or commercial exchanges a rise or 
fall of the prices for wages, victuals, wares, or instruments which are negotiable in 
the public market or admitted in the lists of stock exchanges shall be punished .... " 
This article was supplemented by the special provision of art. 326 which imposed in-
creased punishment on "anyone who, by means of false news or other fraudulent means, 
produces a scarcity of, or increase in price for, food stuffs .... " See 6 MANZINI, TRAT-
TATO D1 DIRITI'O PENALE ITALIANO 265 (2d ed. 1922). 
406 PENAL CODE (1888), art. 248. 
4fY1 Italian legislation establishing the freedom of trade cumulated in the Act No. 
1797 of May 29, 1864, 9 Leggi e Decreti 626 ( 1864). 
""'Court of Cassation of Naples, May 26, 1903, [1903] Giurisprudenza Italiana 
[hereinafter cited as Giur. Ita!.] I, x, 845. 
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION 
fendants claimed that agreements such as the one in question were 
invalid under Italian law and that therefore they were not re-
sponsible for any breach of contract. The Court of Cassation, af-
firming to that extent the detailed decision of the court below,409 
held to the contrary. The high tribunal rested its result on the 
ground that, apart from the narrow and inapplicable sections of the 
Penal Code, Italian law contained no positive prohibition against 
concerted action by producers or distributors and that it was not 
for the judiciary to arrogate to itself the essentially legislative 
function of regulating the new phenomenon of joint economic ac-
tion. Moreover, the Court felt that "in the case of honest cartels, 
the gains and savings achieved by them" might enure to the benefit 
not only of the members, but also of the employees and, in the 
long run, the consumers. 
In consequence of this determination, which was much discussed 
in contemporary legal periodicals,410 courts and textwriters accepted 
the position that cartels and similar anticompetitive arrangements 
were not prohibited in principle and that judicial intervention was 
apposite only in case of outright infractions of the Penal Code or 
other special circumstances.411 As a result, courts and doctrinal ef-
forts occupied themselves primarily not with the permissibility of 
cartels and similar combinations, but rather with their exact juristic 
nature and the reciprocal rights, obligations, and remedies of their 
members as well as of third parties engaging in business transac-
tions with them.412 
The Italian government likewise not only condoned such restric-
tive combinations by failing to take legislative action for the con-
trol or suppression of their activities, but actually fostered their 
existence by creating a few compulsory cartels in certain industries 
by special legislation.413 
••• Court of Appeals of Naples, July 2, I900, [I900] Giur. Ital. I, 2, 703. 
410 See the detailed survey by Ricca-Barberis, I sindacati industriali e Ia giuris-
prudenza, I RIVISTA DI D!R. COMM. 458 (I903). 
411 For details see De Sanctis, op. cit. supra note 402, 42; Ascarelli, Note preliminari 
sulle intese indu.rtriali, 1913 RIV. I TAL. PERLE ScrENZE GruRIDICHE, at 103, 169; Ascarelli, 
Le unioni di imprese, 33 Rrv. DI DIR. CoMM. 152, at 155 (1935). 
412 These problems have been the subject of an overwhelming mass of technical con-
troversies among Italian legal writers. For discussions under the aegis of the old 
civil code, see especially SALANDRA, IL DIRITTO DELLE UNION! DI IMPRESE ( CONSORZI E 
GRUPP!) (1934); ASCARELLI, CONSORZI YOLONTARI TRA IMPRENDITORI (2d ed. 1937); 
Carnelutti, Natura giuridica dei consorzi industriali, 37 Rrv. Dl DrR. CoMM. I, I ( 1939) ; 
FRANCESCHELLI, I CoNSORZI INDUSTRIAL! ( 1939) ; Betti, Societa commercia/e costituita 
Per finalita di consorzio, 39 Rrv. m DrR. CoMM. II, 335 (1941). 
413 For the early growth of Italian cartels, see Pitigliani, The Development of Italian 
Cartt'l.r Under Fascism, 48 JoURN. PoL. EcoN. 375 at 377 (1940). 
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b. The Fascist Cartel Legislation and the Regulation 
of the New Civil Code of 1942 
(1) Compulsory cartels: the Act of 1932. The Fascist 
tenets of the "corporative state" and a totalitarian economy 
prompted an even increased predilection for cartels, coupled with 
an effort of converting them, to a varying extent, into instruments 
of the state and of governmental policy. This manifested itself in 
further creations of compulsory cartels 414 and, in 1932, in the pas-
sage of a statute "concerning the establishment and the operations 
of consortia among enterprises engaged in the same branch of eco-
nomic activity." 415 
The new Act provided for the formation, by royal decree, of 
compulsory cartels among enterprises, belonging to the same branch 
of the economy, for the purpose of regulating production and com-
petition and for the coordination of compulsory cartels servicing 
interconnected branches of the economy.416 Government action of 
this type was predicated upon a request to that effect either by 70 
percent of all the enterprises in a particular industry controlling 70 
percent of the aggregate output or, in the absence of the requisite 
number, by firms controlling together 8 5 percent of the total out-
put. In the case of agriculture the requirements were somewhat 
less stringent.417 In addition, the government had to find that grant-
ing such request was in the interest of the national economy and 
tended to achieve a more rational technological or economic or-
ganization of the production.418 The Act provided in detail for 
close supervision of the cartel activities by the government as well 
as by the corporative body representing the particular sector of the 
economy.419 It regulated, in addition, various aspects of the internal 
organization and legal status of such compulsory cartels.420 Ac-
tually, the law was never applied, as a decree envisaged by it for 
its implementation 421 was never enacted. Rather the government 
414 For a survey of the status of compulsory cartels in Italy and the governmental 
attitude toward their establishment, see the exposition by Mussolini of the bill of 1932 
regulating the formation and organization of compulsory cartels, reprinted in [1932] 
Le Leggi 753· 
416 Law No. 834 (1932), [1932] Le Leggi 753· 
.,. Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. r. 
417 Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 2 (a) • 
.,. Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 2 (b) . 
.,. Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, arts. 6 and 7· 
420 Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 5· 
421 Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 12. 
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proceeded, as before, with the establishment of compulsory cartels 
by individuallegislation.422 
Formation of compulsory organizations (consortia) by special 
statute or decree occurred not only in industry and commerce but 
also in the agricultural sector of the economy, there, however, 
more frequently on a local basis.423 Subsequent legislation in 1938,424 
1939,425 and 1942,426 however, profoundly changed the status and 
structure of the agricultural consortia, whether voluntary or com-
pulsory, by supplementing them with, and incorporating them into, 
a completely totalitarian organization of Italian agriculture.427 
(2) Voluntary cartels: legislation of 1936-I937· Volun-
tary cartels, likewise, became of increased governmental interest 
under the sweep of Fascist legislation. Already the Compulsory 
Cartelization Act of 1932 had required voluntary cartels regulat-
ing the economic activities of their members to transmit their 
charters and by-laws to the authorities and, in addition, had au-
thorized a considerably further-reaching supervision for voluntary 
cartels representing seventy-five or more per cent of the national 
production.428 A decree of 1936,429 converted into statute law in 
1937,430 extended the imposed publicity and provided for com-
munication to the secretariat of the appropriate corporations of 
annual balance sheets and detailed reports. Whenever the dis-
"" See ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BEN! IMMATERIAL! 126 (2d ed. 
1957) ; Pitigliani, op. cit. supra note 413, at 385. 
423 See Pitigliani, op. cit. supra note 413 at 396. For instance, a statute of July 18, 
1930, [1932] Le Leggi 66o, established a compulsory consortium of the grape growers 
on the island of Pantelleria, the "Consorzio viti vinicolo de Pantelleria." The subse-
quent insolvency of this consortium created difficult problems regarding its amena-
bility to the bankruptcy act, Tribunale di Trapani, 1954, [1954] Foro Italiano [here-
inafter cited as Foro It.] I, 1493. 
, .. Law of June 16, 1938, No. 1008 for the unification of the provincial economic 
entities in the field of agriculture, [1938] Le Leggi 819. 
425 Law of Feb. 2, 1939, No. 159, converting into statute the Decree of Sept. 5, 1938, 
No. 1593 concerning the reform of the nature and organization of the Agrarian Con-
sortia, [1939] Le Leggi 247, [1938] Le Leggi 1300. 
420 Law of May 18, No. 566, reorganization of the economic entities for agriculture 
and the Agrarian Consortia, [1942] Le Leggi 530. 
421 The final organization as completed by the law of 1942 consisted of diverse Na-
tional Entities designed to act as an auxiliary arm of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
of the Provincial Agrarian Consortia charged both with regulatory and commercial 
functions. The latter were re-transformed into regular agricultural cooperatives by 
the Legislative Decree of May 7, 1948, No. 1235, concerning the organization of the 
agrarian consortia and the Italian federation of agrarian consortia, Gazzetta Ufficiale, 
Oct. 16, 1948, No. 242 (supp.) 
423 Compulsory Cartelization Act, 1932, art. 10. 
429 Royal Decree of April x6, 1936, No. 1296, [1936] Le Leggi 684. 
480 Law of April 22, 1937, No. 961, [1937] Le Leggi 582. The exposition of the bill 
given by the Minister of Corporations contained a list of the 91 cartels operating dur-
ing the end of 1936. 
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closures indicated the appositeness of such action, the Minister for 
Corporations was empowered to issue directives for modification 
of the cartel activities. Moreover, the public authorities could 
delegate appropriate functions to the cartels. The law, however, 
applied only to cartels of national importance. 
(3) The regulation of the new Civil Code of 1942. 
The Civil Code of 1942 attempts to subject the whole field of 
lawful competition and the limitation thereof by private transac-
tions to a comprehensive, though fairly broad, regulation.431 It pro-
vides in general that agreements which restrict competition must 
be susceptible of written proof, must be limited to a defined area 
or activity, and must not exceed a period of five years.432 It sup-
plements this general rule with more detailed provisions govern-
ing cartels with a common organization for the coordination of 
production and trade (consortia) 433 differentiating, in turn, be-
tween such consortia without and with external activities.434 The 
Code lists a number of conditions as to form and content which 
must be complied with by the contracts establishing such con-
sortia 435 and contains a number of other articles concerning legal 
status and internal functioning of the cartels.436 In contrast to ordi-
nary agreements in restraint of trade, whether vertical or hori-
zontal, which are limited to a maximum period of five years, or-
ganized cartels may be established for a period not exceeding ten 
years.437 
The Code also includes provisions dealing with the establish-
ment of compulsory cartels 438 and with the necessity for govern-
ment authorization and supervision.439 However, these sections are 
currently not applicable as their entry into force was postponed 440 
"'
1 CIVIL CoDE 1942, Bk. V, Title X, arts. 2595-2620. 
••• CIVIL CoDE 1942, art. 2596. 
""'For a discussion of the distinction between simple cartels (falling under the rule 
of art. 2596) and "cartels, between several entrepreneurs exercising identical or con-
nected economic activities, having as their object the regulation of these activities by 
means of a common organization" (falling under the rules of art. 26oz If.), see 
ASCARELLI, TEORIA DELLA CoNCORRENZA E DEI BEN! IMMATERIAL! 72, 86, 89, 91 (2d ed. 
1957). 
""CIVIL CoDE 1942, arts. 2606-2611, 2612-2615 • 
... CIVIL CoDE 1942, art. 2603. 
""'CIVIL CODE 1942, arts. 2605-2611. 
437 CIVIL CODE 1942, art. 2604, cf. Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 433, at 89, who deems 
the differentiation unjustified so far as it discriminates between simple and organized 
cartels. 
438 CIVIL CoDE 1942, arts. 2616, 2617. 
439 CIVIL CODE 1942, art. 2618. 
440 Decree, March 30, 1942, No. 318, for the application and implementation of the 
Civil Code, art. rn, [1942] Le Leggi 380. 
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until the issuance of a special decree to that effect which has not 
been enacted as yet. As no operative prior regulation existed on 
the subject, Italy at present lacks any special machinery for the 
control of anticompetitive practices apart from the ordinary courts 
of justice.441 
Italian law likewise made no provision to curb economic con-
centration by horizontal or vertical integration. In fact, the trend 
toward a monopolistic or oligopolistic structure in all of Italy's 
basic industries was greatly accentuated by the operations of the 
lstituto per la Ricostruzione lndustriale which, since its creation 
in 1933,442 has achieved financial control of the state over a sub-
stantial portion of the industry of the country.443 In the case of 
enterprises endowed with a legal monopoly the Code imposes a 
duty to contract with any potential customer and without discrimi-
nation; 444 but this rule does not cover factual monopolists.445 
2. THE PRESENT STATE OF ITALIAN LAW GOVERNING 
ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS 
FOR REFORM 
a. Current State of Italian Law Governing 
Anticompetitive Practices 
The collapse of the Fascist regime and the formal suppression 
of the agencies of the corporative state 446 did not result in an im-
mediate drastic change of the law with respect to illegality or super-
vision of anticompetitive practices. 
To be sure, the new Constitution of 1947, in Article 41, has ele-
vated freedom of private economic initiative to an Italian civil 
right.447 But the actual scope of this liberty, vis-a-vis legislative ac-
tion, as well as its immediate impact on the administraton of justice 
in private controversies involving the legality or validity of anti-
"' Cf. Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 433, at 127. 
442 Legislative Decree No.5 (1933), converted into a statute by Law No. 512 (1933), 
[1933] Le Leggi 49, 560. 
443 See Bernini, International Cartels and National Legislation: Some Comparative 
Observations, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INDUSTRIAL£, I, 39, 76 ( 1955). 
444 CIVIL CoDE 1942, art. 2597· 
445 Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 433, at 43 ff. 
446 Legislative Decrees of August 9, 1943, No. 721, [1943] Le Leggi 473, and of 
Nov. 23, 1944, No. 362. 
447 Italian Constitution art. 41: "Private economic initiative is free. It cannot be em-
ployed so as to be incompatible with social utility or in a way that inflicts injury to 
human safety, freedom or dignity. The law determines the appropriate programs and 
controls to the end that public and private economic activity may be directed and 
coordinated toward social goals." 
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competitive arrangements, is controversial 448 and needs clarifica-
tion by decisional practice.449 Apparently this Article does not pre-
vent the establishment of compulsory cartels where such action is 
deemed to be in the public interest.450 At any rate, generally speak-
ing, the permissibility or enforceability of restrictive practices, 
whether concerted or not, still depends primarily on the provisions 
of the Penal Code of I 930 and of the Civil Code of I 942, partic-
ularly its sections governing contracts, torts, and unfair competi-
tion. 
The present Penal Code of I 930, like its predecessor, contains 
only fairly narrow prohibitions, such as the imposition of penalties 
on the dissemination of false news or the employment of other 
stratagems for the purpose of affecting the market price of goods 
or securities 451 and on the direct interference with the freedom of 
industry and commerce by way of violence practiced on objects or 
by fraudulent means. 452 Nevertheless, it has been concluded that 
concerted boycotts, though short of a violation of the Penal Code, 
may constitute a tort.453 
In general, however, Italian law condones restrictive agreements, 
whether of the horizontal or vertical type, and enforces them, at 
least inter partes. Thus, stipulations for resale price maintenance 
and the grant of exclusive territorial distributorships have been 
held legitimate and enforceable between the parties.454 The Italian 
... See the controversy between Santini, La vendita a prezzo imposto, 6 R1v. TRIM. DI 
DIR. E PRoc. CIV. 1042, 1050 note r8 (1952) and Ascarelli, Sui progetto di Iegge "anti-
trust," 4 RIV. TRIM. DI DIR. E PROC. CIV. 742, 749 ( 1950). But see also the recent ex-
position by the latter author on the orientation and significance of art. 41 in TEORIA 
DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEI BEN! INDUSTRIAL!, II-r6 (2d ed. 1957). 
""The new Italian Constitutional Court has considered the limits which legislative 
action may place on the liberty guaranteed by art. 41 and vice versa in several cases; 
see decision no. 29 of Jan. 26, 1957, [1957] Giur. It. I, 432 (upholding the constitu-
tionality of public health legislation); decision no. 50 of Apr. 13, 1957, [1957] Giur. It. 
I, 642 (upholding the constitutionality of export or import restrictions) ; decision no. 
103 of July 8, 1957, [1957] Foro It. I, 1139 (upholding the constitutionality of price 
control legislation). 
450 Recent cases which have questioned the constitutionality of legislation imposing 
contributions to the compulsory National Cellulose and Paper Cartel on the members 
of the industry and, accordingly, brought that issue before the Constitutional Court, 
have done so only because of the retroactive character of those measures; see Corte 
di Cassazione, order no. 69 of Jan. 28, 1957, [1957] Le Leggi 927; order no. 70 of Jan. 
28, 1957, [1957] Le Leggi 919, [1958] Giur. It. I, r, 635; order no. 351 of June 25, 1957, 
[1957] Foro It. I, 1728; Tribunale di Bergamo, order of Jan. 8, 1958, [1958] Le Leggi 
479, [1958] Foro It. I, 998, [1958] Giur It. I, 2, 427. 
461 PENAL CODE 1930, art. 501. 
452 PENAL CoDE 1930, art. 513 . 
... Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 32, at 78, 201; Grisoli, Le boycottage en droit italien, 
IO TRAY. DE L'Assoc. H. CAPITANT 171 (1956). 
464 With respect to the validity of vertical price fixing agreements, see Dominici c. 
S.p.az. Palmolive, Cass., no. 3503, Oct. 26, 1955, [1956] Giur. It. I, r, 216. The legality 
THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION 
courts, however, have been reluctant to provide remedies against 
third parties acting in disregard of such arrangements.455 Some re-
cent authors have questioned this attitude and argued in favor of 
outsider liability.456 
b. Proposals for Further Antirestrictive Practices 
Legislation 
Italy, like other countries, has witnessed, in recent years, sev-
eral proposals for more extensive legislation for the suppression 
and control of anticompetitive practices. Thus, in I950 the Italian 
Government submitted to Parliament the draft of an "Act Con-
taining Provisions for the Supervision of Cartel Agreements." 457 
The proposal was never debated and lapsed as a result of the dis-
solution of Parliament in I953· In March I955 two members of 
Parliament, the Hon. Malagodi and Bozzi, introduced a new bill 
containing "Norms for the Protection of the Freedom of Com-
petition and Trade." 458 It was much more ambitious in scope and 
provided not only for the filing of restrictive agreements with a 
newly established administrative board, but prohibited outright 
restrictive practices for the purpose of achieving unjustified price 
increases to the injury of consumers. Again the end of the parlia-
mentary session entailed the lapse of this bill. On March I 2, I 9 59, 
Representatives Malagodi, Bozzi, Cortese, and Alpino introduced 
a revised bill containing "Norms for the protection of the freedom 
of competition and trade," which considerably enlarged the scope 
of exclusive dealership arrangements is settled by decisions too numerous to cite and 
is implied by the cases cited infra, note 455· 
455 Recent decisions by the Corte di Cassazione have reaffirmed its traditional posi-
tion that disregard by a merchant of an exclusive dealership granted to a competitor 
does not entail liability for the latter, whether in tort or on the basis of unfair com-
petition; De Marchi c. Sentieri, Cass. Oct. 22, I956, [I957J Foro It. I, 588; Cianci c. 
De Marchi, Cass. Mar. I4, I957, [I957J Foro It. I, 356; Salengo c. lvaldi, Cass. July 
3I, I957, [I958] Giur. It. I, I, 692; Strano c. De Marchi, Cass. Jan. 2I, I958, [I958] 
Foro It. I, I88. In the last case cited, however, the Court has qualified these general 
principles and held that liability for unfair competition is incurred if the outsider 
procures the merchandise by illicit means. On principle the same rules should govern 
the liability for price-cutting by outsiders, although there are no recent holdings by the 
Court of Cassation on that issue . 
... See in particular Santini, La vendita a prezzo imposto, 6 RIV. TRIM. DI DIR. E PRoc. 
CIV. I042, I063 ff. ( 1952) ; Ligi, La disciplina della concorrenza e il contralto di agenzia 
con esclusiva in una interessante fattispecie, 3 Rrv. DI DrR. CIVILE Io6 ( I957), and 
Ligi, Note, [I957] Foro It. I, 588, all with copious references. 
457 The text of the bill is reproduced in 4 Riv. TRIM. DI DIR. E PRoc. Crv. 752 (I950), 
preceded by a critical discussion by Professor Ascarelli, Sui progetto di Iegge "anti-
trust," id. at 742. 
""'The text of the bill is reproduced in I RIV. DI DrR. Civ. 369 ( I955), preceded by a 
critical discussion by Professor Visentini, Un progetto di Iegge antitrust, id. at 358. 
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of the prohibitions and regulations of the previous proposal.459 
Later in 1959 the Government itself prepared a Draft Bill for 
the protection of the freedom of competition 460 which is reputed 
to have good prospects of being adopted in the near future. It con-
tains comprehensive prohibitions against restrictive understandings 
among entrepreneurs and abuse of dominant market power, re-
quires communication of cartel agreements to the Minister for In-
dustry and Commerce, and establishes a special administrative and 
judicial machinery for its enforcement. 
The principal prohibition of the bill extends to all "understand-
ings among entrepreneurs which, by means of contracts, accords or 
concerted practices, or by means of clauses in charters, general or 
regulatory provisions, or resolutions of consortia or associations 
of enterprises, are capable of hampering, falsifying or limiting in 
any way the competition in the domestic market." Following the 
example of the E.E.C. Treaty the bill specifies that the prohibition 
applies in particular to "understandings that 
I) fix, directly or indirectly, purchase or sales prices or other 
contractual terms; 
2) limit or control production, outlets, technical development, 
or investments; 
3) divide markets or sources of supply; 
4) apply, in commercial dealings, unequal conditions to similar 
or equivalent goods or services; 
5) condition the conclusion of contracts upon the acceptance of 
supplementary goods or services which neither by their na-
ture nor by commercial usage are connected with the con-
tracts themselves." 461 
This broad interdiction of collective restraints is followed by a 
prohibition against abuse of dominant market power, circumscribed 
as "manipulating, in the market for particular goods or services, 
the price, the conditions of delivery, or the flow of supply in such 
fashion as to subject the consumers or particular categories of enter-
prises to unjustified burdens or restrictions." Dominant market 
power is deemed to exist when the respective enterprises, either by 
themselves or as a result of combinations, understandings, or ac-
cords, are not subject to efficient competition in the internal mar-
""'The bill is reprinted in [1959] Foro It. IV, 154, preceded by comments of Ligi, 
and in 8 Rrv. nr DrR. IND., I, 193 (1959), preceded by comments signed G. G., id. at 189. 
460 For the text of the draft bill see Testo definitivo del disegno di Iegge per Ia 
tutela della liberta di concorrenza, [1960] Foro It. IV, 30 . 
.. 
1 I d., art. I. 
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ket.462 The bill specifies that certain transactions as such are not 
considered to be understandings within the meaning of the law. It 
includes in that list "mergers of associations, concentration of shares, 
management and agency contracts even though they provide for 
exclusive dealing, assignments or licenses of patents, except, in the 
case of licenses, agreements that provide for reciprocal exclusive 
licensing or contain additional clauses which by themselves perform 
anticompetitive functions." 463 The bill requires communication to 
the Minister of Industry and Commerce of all understandings, 
whether formalized or oral, that regulate the production or the 
commerce of the parties thereto.464 
For the proper enforcement of the law a new administrative body, 
called Commission for the Protection of Competition, is established. 
It is composed of eighteen members, chosen from specified govern-
ment departments and persons with the requisite economic or legal 
expertise. Upon request by the Minister of Industry and Com-
merce, it conducts investigations for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether there are (communicated or non-communicated) illegal 
understandings in operation or whether abuses of dominant mar-
ket power are being committed. It advises the Minister of its find-
ings and suggests measures which should be adopted.465 
If the Commission finds that there is an illegal understanding or 
abuse of dominant market power, the Minister may issue a warning 
to the parties involved and demand cessation of such conduct. If 
the parties comply, no further governmental action will be taken 
and they will not be subject to the penalties imposed by the law 
upon participation in prohibited understandings or abuse of domi-
nant market power. If the parties fail to comply, the Minister may 
institute proceedings for declaratory judgment in a newly estab-
lished special division of the District Court of Rome for the pur-
pose of establishing the illegality of the understanding or the abuse 
of dominant market power. In case the special division makes 
a finding to that effect, proceedings for penalties will be insti-
tuted. 
Actions for declaratory judgment of the type described are also 
made available to all other interested parties provided their inten-
tion of initiating such proceedings was duly communicated to the 
Minister at least three months prior thereto. Compliance by the 
••• I d., art. 2. 
468 I d., art. 3· 
... I d., art. 4· 
•o.• I d., arts. 5 and 6. 
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enterprises with a warning by the Minister is no bar to the latter 
proceedings. 
Determination of the illegality of an understanding or of the 
abuse of dominant market power by the special division of the 
District Court of Rome is also required whenever such issue arises 
in civil, criminal or administrative proceedings. If necessary, such 
other proceedings must be discontinued until such determination. 
It is res judicata vis-a-vis all interested parties.466 
F. LuxEMBOURG 
As might be expected in view of the relative size and industrial 
structure of the country, as well as its close economic and legal 
ties with Belgium, Luxembourg has not enacted any special legisla-
tion with respect to restrictive business practices.467 In fact, as the 
home of one of the largest steel producers in the world, the well-
known ARB ED ( Acieries Reunies de Burbach-Eich-Du Delange), 
Luxembourg was also the seat of the powerful continental Euro-
pean Steel Cartel, the Entente Internationale de L'Acier, which 
in turn was the pivot of the notorious International Steel Cartei.468 
Luxemburgian law, as a result of the political history of the 
Duchy, still stems to a large extent from the French legislation be-
tween 179 I (proclamation of freedom of trade) and I 8 I 5 469 and 
belongs to the French family of legal systems. Many of Luxem-
bourg's more recent statutes and decrees, however, are copies or 
adaptations of Belgian acts. Thus the Penal Code of the Duchy 
was borrowed from its western neighbor in I 879 470 and, accord-
ingly, contains, in Article 3 I I, an identical prohibition against 
fraudulent production of price rises and falls as governs in Bel-
gium.471 Similarly, a Grand Ducal Decree of January 22, I936, 472 
466 /d., arts. 11-16. 
467 About the Luxemburgian law relating to restrictive business practices, see es-
pecially METZLER, MELANGES DE DROIT LUXEMBOURGEOIS, 58 If., 260 If. (1949); Ententes 
et Monopoles dans le Monde: Benelux II, Belgique et Luxembourg (DocUMENTATION 
FRANc;'AISE, NoTES ET ETUDES DocuMENTAIREs, No. 1778) 69 If. (1953). 
468 About the E.I.A. and the International Steel Cartel, see HEXNER, THE INTER· 
NATIONAL STEEL CARTEL ( 1943) ; METZLER, op. cit. supra note 467 at 59; LISTER, EUROPE'S 
CoAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY 181 (1960). 
469 Accordingly the French Civil Code of 1804 as well as the Commercial Code of 
1807 are both in force in Luxembourg. 
470 HAMMES, CoDE DE LA LEGISLATION PEN ALE EN VIGUEUR DANS LE GRAND-DUCHE DE 
LUXEMBOURG, Vol. I (1953). 
471 Similarly, a Grand Ducal Decree of May 31, 1938, against illegal speculation in 
victuals, goods, and securities, repeated the somewhat broader formula of the Belgian 
law of July 18, 1924 on the same subject discussed supra part II, sec. D. See Huss, Le 
boycottage en droit luxembourgeois, 10 TRAV. DE Assoc. H. CAPITANT 176 (1956). 
""Grand Ducal Decree of January 15, 1936, as amended by Grand Ducal Decree of 
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enacted for the purpose of "protecting producers, merchants and 
consumers against certain activities tending to falsify the normal 
conditions of competition," replaced the major part of a prior law 
against unfair competition, the new provisions being modeled after 
the Belgian Ordinance on that subject of 1934.473 
While the decree against unfair competition, following the 
Belgian model, contains a broad and general prohibition against 
the infliction of harm, or the attempt to inflict harm, to the com-
petitive capacity of a competitor, Luxemburgian courts, like their 
Belgian counterparts, seem to have used this provision only halt-
ingly for the curbing of anticompetitive practices and have con-
doned cartels and similar restrictive arrangements.474 Resale price 
maintenance agreements are held to be valid and enforceable not 
only inter partes, but also, on the theory of quasi-tort or unfair 
competition, against price-cutting outsiders.475 The validity of ex-
clusive dealership arrangements likewise seems to be beyond ques-
tion.476 
In the field of concentrations it is worth noting that Luxem-
bourg, in 1929, enacted particular legislation aiming at the encour-
agement of the formation of holding companies, that is, corpora-
tions created for the purpose of acquiring and exploiting financial 
participation in other enterprises, by according them exemption 
from corporate income taxes and other fiscal advantages.477 More-
over, an enabling act of 1937 authorized the issuance of special 
government regulations for the purpose of modifying the general 
corporation and holding companies law, so far as applicable to 
holding companies acquiring or having acquired stock in foreign 
July 16, 1938, in HAMMES, CODE DE LA LEGISLATION PENALE EN VIGUEUR DANS LE GRAND-
DUCHE DE LuxEMBOURG, Vol. II, sub voce, Concurrence DcHoyale. 
473 See the discussion of the Belgian ordinance, supra sec. D. In contrast to the Bel-
gian ordinance, the Luxemburgian decree contains, in the list of particularized of-
fenses, a special prohibition against sales accompanied by free gifts or trading stamps, 
first outlawed by Grand Ducal Decree of May 9, 1934 [1934] Pas. Lux. 343• 
m See METZLER, op. cit. supra note 467, at 58. It has been suggested, however, that 
the Grand Ducal Decree of 1936 against unfair competition, as well as the law of May 
II, 1936 guaranteeing the freedom of association, provides sufficient sanctions against 
boycotts, especially those having the purpose of coercing outsiders to adhere to a cartel, 
Huss, op. cit. supra note 471 at 178. 
"
5 See METZLER, op. cit. supra note 467, at 6o. 
476 Thus, ARBED has granted exclusive global distributorship for its products to the 
Comptoir Metallurgique Luxembourgeois [COLUMET A]. 
477 Law of July 31, 1929, [1929-1932] Pas. Lux. 145. Compare de Sola Caiiizares, 
Les societh financieres en droit compare, 7 REV. INT. DE DR. CoMP. 6oo, 6o3, 604 (1955). 
According to Maul, La limitation de Ia responsabilite dans les entreprises commerciales, 
Rapport sur le droit luxembourgeois, 9 TRAY. DE L'Assoc. H. CAPITANT 124, at 127, on 
Jan. I, 1955 there existed 1165 Luxemburgian holding companies incorporated as 
business corporations ( ~ocietes anonymes or societes a responsabilite limitee). 
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corporations having a value of at least one billion Luxemburgian 
francs, and of providing for a special tax status for such com-
panies.478 
In order to comply with the mandates of the E.E.C. Treaty, the 
Luxemburgian government contemplates the introduction of legis-
lation necessary for the implementation of its provisions. 
III. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN THE 
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY 
A. FuNDAMENTAL AsPECTs OF THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK OF THE EuROPEAN CoMMON MARKET 
FOR COAL AND STEEL 
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND 
STEEL COMMUNITY 
a. Historical Background 
Without going into the complex political and economic reasons 
which prompted the establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community by the six nations participating therein, 479 suffice it to 
say that it was conceived as the first great step toward economic 
integration of continental Western Europe, taking the form of a 
common market in a basic sector of the economy, i.e., the coal and 
steel industries. The initial public impetus came from a declaration 
of the French Government on May 9, 1950, which proposed "to 
place the combined coal and steel production of France and Ger-
many under a common High Authority in an organization open to 
other European Countries." 480 The governments of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (with the approval of the Allied High Com-
mission), of Italy, and of the Benelux countries accepted these 
478 Act of Dec. 27, I937, art. I ( 7), [1937] Pas. Lux. 224. In exercise of the power so 
delegated the government, on Dec. I7, I938, issued two decrees, one of which governed 
the corporate actions necessary for the acquisition by a holding company of the stock of 
a foreign corporation valued at a billion francs or more, while the other regulated the 
tax status of holding companies of that size, [I938] Pas. Lux. 505 and 5II. 
479 For a discussion of the varied causes and the background of the creation of the 
E.C.S.C., see in particular RIEBEN, DES ENTENTES DE MAITRES DE FoRGES AU PLAN 
SCHUMAN 3I4 (I954); HAUSSMANN, DER SCHUMAN-PLAN IM EUROPAISCHEN ZWIEL!CHT 
7 (I952); REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 23 (I953); 
RACINE, VERS UNE EUROPE NoUVELLE PARLE PLAN SCHUMAN 25 (1954); DIEBOLD, THE 
ScHUMAN PLAN 8 ( I959) ; LISTER, op. cit. supra note 468, at 3 ( I96o). 
""The text of the whole declaration is reproduced in Rapport de Ia Delegation 
Frano;;aise sur le Traite et Ia Convention Signes a Paris le IS Avril I95I (published 
by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs) at 9 (1951). 
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principles, and beginning with June 20, 1950, a conference of dele-
gates under the chairmanship of Mr. Monnet worked out the de-
tails of the Treaty.481 The draft was completed in March 1951 
and the Treaty was signed on April 18, 1951.482 Upon ratification 
by the member states it went into force on July 23, 1952.483 
b. Structure and Organs of the European Coal 
and Steel Community 
The "basis" of the European Coal and Steel Community is a 
"common market for coal and steel" 484 which is subject to com-
prehensive and, with qualifications, exclusive economic powers 
vested in four Community organs, in accordance with the detailed 
and complex provisions of the Treaty. The exact juridical qualifi-
cation of the Community and Community organs has evoked a 
voluminous, but largely semantic, debate, prompted in part by the 
fact that the Treaty itself, in one place, uses the phrase "supra-
national." 485 
The four Community organs, under whose aegis the life of the 
market is placed, were originally named the High Authority, the 
Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers, and the Court 
of Justice.486 Upon establishment of the E.E.C. and Euratom in 
1957, the Common Assembly was replaced by a single assembly 
for the three communities, styling itself the European Parlia-
'
81 For an account of the progress of the work of the conference which stretched over 
a period of nine months see RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479 at 76-96; cf. also Schuman, 
Origines et Elaboration du Plan "Schuman," 3 CAHIERS DE BRUGES 266 (1953). 
482 The treaty was drafted in French and, accordingly, has only one authoritative 
text. The original and a German translation are published in [1952] BGBI. II, 447· 
An English translation was published by the High Authority. Art. 56 of the Treaty 
was modified in 1960 by the procedure applicable to so-called "little amendments" 
which is established by art. 95, para. 3, of the Treaty. The text of the new art. 56 is' 
published in [1960] Journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes [hereinafter cited 
as }'L OFF.] 781. 
483 [1952] BGBI. II, 978. For a brief survey of the parliamentary debates preceding 
the individual ratifications, see RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479 at 102-n6; MASON, THE 
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, EXPERIMENT IN SUPRANATIONALISM 1o-33 
( 1955); DIEBOLD, op. cit. supra note 479, at 78-n2. 
, .. E. C. S.C. Treaty arts. 1, 2 and 4· 
'""See the discussion, with survey of the copious literature, by MATHIJSBN, LE DROIT 
llE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 144-156 (1958); note, in 
addition, De Visscher, La Communaute Europeene du Charbon et de l'Acier et /es 
Etats Membres, 2 ACTES 0FFICIELS DU CONGRES INTERNATIONAL D'ETUDES SUR LA C.E.C.A. 
[hereinafter cited as AcrEs 0FFICIELS] 7, at 31 (1957); Catalano, Le fonti normati'lle 
della Communita Europea del Carbone e dell'Acciaio, 2 id. n7, at 12o; Delvaux, La 
notion de supranationalite dans le traite du r8 A'VTil I95I, creant Ia C.E.C.A., 2 id. 225; 
Miinch, Delimitation du domaine du droit des communautes supranationales par rap-
Port. au droit etatique interne, 2 id. 271, at 274 . 
... E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 7· 
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mentary Assembly, and the Court of Justice was transformed into 
a common Community organ.487 
Without going into the details of the respective attributes and 
jurisdictions of the four organs, it may be indicated, in a general 
way, that the High Authority is envisaged as the principal execu-
tive and regulatory agency of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity; conversely, the Parliamentary Assembly exercises general 
supervisory and extremely limited embryonic legislative powers, 
while the Special Council of Ministers, in its role as a Community 
institution, apart from separate responsibilities for certain organi-
zational and budgetary matters, is established mainly as a body 
charged with the clearance of actions by the High Authority in-
volving major policy determinations and with the maintenance of 
harmony between national and Community policies.488 The Court, 
of course, is the chief instrument for preserving the legality, under 
the Treaty, of the conduct of the Community organs, the member 
states, and the enterprises subject to the Community law.489 
2. CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE DISCIPLINE 
OF THE COMMON MARKET FOR COAL AND STEEL 
a. Basic Orientation of the Market 
The E.C.S.C. Treaty, in Articles 2-5, spells out the fundamental 
law of the Community by fixing its objectives and tasks, as well as 
designating the basic rules for the creation, administration, and 
orientation of the Common Market. 490 While the ultimate goals 
m Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Commu-
nities, of March 25, 1957 [1957] BGBI. II, 1156 . 
... About the institutional aspects of the E.C.S.C. see, in particular, REUTER, LA CoM-
MUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER (1953); Mattern, Rechtsgrund/agen 
und Praxis der Montanversammlung, 7 NJW 218 (1954); MASON, op. cit. supra note 
483 at 34-52; De Visscher, op. cit. supra note 485 at 20. In actual practice the Council 
of Ministers has tended to function more as a representation of the divergent national 
interests than as a Community apparatus, and more as a policy-making agency than 
as a brake on the High Authority; see the comments by Reuter, Les interventions de 
Ia Haute Autorite, 5 ACTES 0FFICIELS 7, 69. 
489 See especially VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JusTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND 
STEEL COMMUNITY ( 1954). The new rules of procedure are published [1959] J'!. OFF. 
349, [1960] J'L OFF. 13. 
490 See the repeated statements to that effect by the Court of Justice for the E. C. S.C., 
in Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux et Acieries Belges c. Haute Autorite de Ia 
C.E.C.A., 4 REc. DE LA JuRISPRUDENCE DE LA CouR [hereinafter cited as Rec.] 223, at 
242-244 (1958); Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahl Industrie et al. c. Haute 
Auto rite, Id. 261, at 288, 289 ( 1958) ; Chambre Syndicale de Ia Siderurgie Fran~;aise c. 
Haute Autorite, Id. 363, at 382, 383 ( 1958); Societe des Anciens Etablissements Aubert 
et Duval c. Haute Autorite, Id. 399, at 417, 418 (1958); Societe d'electro-chimie, 
d'electro-metallurgie et des acieries electriques d'Ugine c. Haute Autorite, Id. 435, at 
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and aspirations of the Community may be of a social and political 
character, its route is determined on the basis of a predominantly 
economic conception: that of a coherent and non-compartmental-
ized, under normal conditions spontaneously functioning, effectively 
competitive market. 491 Accordingly, Article 4 enumerates four cate-
gories of actions by member states that are recognized as incom-
patible with a common market for coal and steel and therefore 
abolished and prohibited within the Community, in the manner 





import and export duties, or extractions with an 
equivalent effect, and quantitative restrictions on the 
movement of coal and steel; 
measures or practices discriminating among produc-
ers, among buyers or among consumers, especially 
with reference to prices, delivery terms and transpor-
tation rates, as well as measures or practices which 
hamper the buyer in the free choice of his supplier; 
state subsidies or aids, or special charges imposed 
by the state, in any form whatsoever; 
restrictive practices tending towards the division or 
the exploitation of the markets. 
These provisions designed to blueprint the proper market mecha-
nism are surrounded by definitions of the Community goals (Arti-
cle 3) and mandates for Community action (Article 5) which, inter 
alia, direct the Community institutions to "assure to all consumers 
in comparable positions within the common market equal access to 
the sources of production," 492 and to "assure the establishment, 
the maintenance and the observance of normal conditions of com-
petition and not to interfere directly with the production and the 
operation of the market except when the circumstances require 
action." 493 
These precepts, including the fundamental prohibitions enshrined 
in Article 4, are not mere programs, but directly controlling rules 
454, 455 ( 1958); Syndicat de Ia Siderurgie du Centre-Midi c. Haute Autorite, Id. 471, 
at 491, 492, 493 (1958). · 
491 About the economic conceptions and policies enshrined in the treaty see Rapport 
de Ia Delegation Fran~aise, supra note 480 at 71, 91; KRAWIELICKI, DAs MoNOPOLVERBOT 
IM ScHUMAN PLAN (1952); HAUSSMANN, op. cit. supra note 479 especially 10 and 52; 
Reuter, Les interventions de la Haute Autorite, 5 AcTEs 0FFICIELS 7; comments by 
Dupriez, id. at 223; Demaria, Le systeme des prix et Ia concurrence dans le marche 
commun, 6 AcTES 0FFICIELS 7, at 32; Allais, Le systeme des prix et la concurrence dans 
le marchC commun de Ia C.E.C.A., 6 id. 143, at 153. 
492 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 3(b). 
••• E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 5, para. 2, cl:' 3· 
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of conduct 494 that became operative immediately upon the initiation 
of the respective common markets for each of the three categories 
of products : (a) coal, iron ore, and scrap, 495 (b) steel, 496 and (c) 
special steels.497 Consequently they must be constantly taken into 
consideration in the application of the other provisions of the 
Treaty.498 
b. Built-In "Dirigistic" Safety Valves 
Although the basic orientation of the market discipline is that 
of a "tempered liberalism," 499 the framers of the Treaty realized 
full well, in the light of past experiences, that the scope and struc-
ture of the market for coal and steel, as well as its susceptibility 
to technological or cyclical changes, rendered it unrealistic to rely 
on an unshackled spontaneous market mechanism as' the exclusive 
device for the achievement of the Community aims. They felt a 
need for empowering the Community institutions to resort, on a 
supranational level, to public interventions of varying character 
and severity.500 Accordingly, they inserted in the Treaty a "hier-
archy" of allowable "dirigistic" measures, either for the purpose 
of promoting the maintenance, improvement, and expansion of the 
means of production or for the purpose of controlling the produc-
tion or consumption in periods of oversupply or shortages,501 sub-
ject always to the aggregate of basic limitations deriving from 
Articles 2-5.502 
c. Treaty Provisions Implementing the Basic Orientation 
As the normal basis of the European Coal and Steel Community 
is a coherent competitive market, freed from compartmentalization 
... Groupement des Industries Siderurgiques Luxembourgeoises c. Haute Autorite, 2 
Rec. 53, at 9I (I956); and authorities cited note 490 supra . 
... The common market for coal, iron ore, and scrap was initiated on Feb. Io, I953, 
but the free movement of scrap was postponed until March 15, 1953, Letters of the 
High Authority to the Member States of Feb. IO, I953 and Decision 2-53, [I953] 
}'L OFF. 5, 6. 
•""The common market for steel was initiated on May I, I953, [I953] J'L OFF. 112. 
m The common market for special steels was initiated on August I, 1954, [I954] 
J'L OFF. 478. 
498 See the authorities cited supra notes 490 and 494· 
499 Ophiils, Das Wirtschaftsrecht des Schuman plans, 4 NJW 381 ( I95I). 
600 See the analysis in Rapport de Ia Delegation Fram;aise, supra note 479, at ISI-
I66; Reuter, Les Interventions de la Haute Auto rite, 5 ACTES OFFICIELS 7 ( 1957). 
1!01 Measures of the latter type are price controls or, if not sufficient, rationing or 
restrictions on production, see E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 5, 57, 58, 6I. 
"""The details are worked out gradually by the various decisions of the Court on that 
subject. 
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or other protectionistic interferences by the national governments, 
as well as from restrictive or discriminatory practices by its enter-
prises themselves, the Treaty has not been content with the broad 
formulae laid down in Articles 2-5, but has implemented them with 
more specific regulations relating to pricing practices,503 to cartels 
and concentrations,504 and to interferences by the member states 
with the competitive process,505 which will be discussed in greater 
detail below.506 
The intellectual origin of the provisions against restrictive prac-
tices and concentrations has been the subject of conflicting theses 
and conjectures. It is not clear whether regulations of that type 
were envisaged in the working papers distributed by the French 
delegation to the other conferees at the beginning of negotiations 
or whether they were inserted into the draft only at a later stage.507 
To be sure, a well-informed French author has spoken of an "anti-
cartel conception" as the basis of the Schuman plan; 508 but other 
sources have asserted that the provisions in question were due to 
the German influence, either upon the insistence of the Occupa-
tion Authorities, who wished to anchor the effects of their decarteli-
zation and deconcentration policies vis-a-vis the German coal and 
steel combines into the framework of the Treaty, or because of the 
economic philosophy of the Adenauer government.509 At any rate, 
the other powers agreed on the need for such stipulations, though 
in advance of their own national legislation, in order to safeguard 
the competitive mechanism of the market.510 In fact, the structure 
and phraseology of Article 6 5 show more the imprint of con-
temporary Belgian and French legislative techniques than the 
paternity of German draftsmanship.511 
008 E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 6o. 
'""E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 65, 66. 
'"'"E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 67 . 
..,. As the E.C.S.C. Court of Justice has frequently emphasized, the implementing 
provisions must not be construed as if standing by themselves, but must be interpreted 
and applied together with the norms of arts. 2-5 as a whole, if need be under reconcilia-
tion of the somewhat divergent objectives specified in art. 3· See the authorities cited 
supra notes 490 and 494· 
607 See RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479, at 83, 93· 
"""See RACINE, op. cit. supra note 479, at 94· 
..,. See the discussion by Haussmann, op. cit. supra note 479, at ro, 150. Actually, it 
appears that only art. 66 and its formulation (concentrations) was the source of special 
concern to the Occupation Authorities and the subject of special difficulties and nego-
tiations. See Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbs-Beschrankungen, Deutscher 
Bundestag, Ist Elective Period, Doc. No. 3462, Annex 1, at 18 ( 1952). 
610 Rapport de Ia Delegation Franc;aise supra note 480, at 91, 92 ( 1952). 
611 See infra part A, sec. 2, 
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d. Coverage of the Market Discipline 
Since the European Coal and Steel Community, in its very nature, 
aims at only a partial or, more exactly, segmental economic inte-
gration, the extent of the coverage of the market discipline raises 
important issues. (I) The types of products to which the market 
extends are defined in three special Annexes to the Treaty, and 
include iron and manganese ore, scrap, pig iron and steel ingots, 
semi-finished products, and finished iron or steel products, such as 
rails, beams, wire rods, and sheets. ( 2) Enterprises subject to, and 
entitled to the Court's protection by reason of, the market disci-
pline are the coal and steel producers within the European terri-
tories of the member states and also, but only with reference to 
the provisions regulating restrictive practices and concentrations, 
enterprises and organizations engaging in commercial distribution 
excepting sales to domestic consumers or artisans. 512 ( 3) The mar-
ket discipline is not restricted to private enterprises but binds na-
tionalized enterprises, such as the French coal mining industry, 
as well. The Treaty does not affect the power of the member states 
to regulate enterprise ownership according to their own stand-
ards.513 e 
B. PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AGAINST COLLECTIVE 
RESTRAINTS OR ADULTERATIONS BY ENTERPRISES 
I. NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROTECTION 
a. Sources and Types of Anticompetitive Actions and 
Practices in General 
(I) Sources of proscribed actions and practices. Since 
a spontaneously functioning competitive market is deemed to be, 
ender normal conditions, the best means for achieving the Com-
munity objectives, the Treaty endeavors to shield the competitive 
process against various kinds of deleterious impairment. Such inter-
ference may either stem from outside sources, i.e., "measures" by 
the member states or the Community organs, or come from within, 
""' E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 79, 8o. For details see especially Grassetti, Rob lot, Daig, 
Lagrange, van Heeke and Weber, La Communaute et les enterprises, 4 ACTES OFFICIELS 
7 If. Associations of Community enterprises, as specified in arts. 78, 8o, may be forl'!led 
and are subjected to certain rights and duties by virtue of art. 48. They may resbrt to 
the Court of the European Communities for judicial relief within the limits available 
to individual enterprises, E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 33, para. 2. 
618 E.C,S.C, Treaty art. 83. 
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i.e., "practices" by the market enterprises themselves. The Treaty 
contains more or less detailed provisions directed against various 
impairments from both classes of sources,514 but this section deals 
only with anticompetitive practices by enterprises in the market. 
( 2) Types of anticompetitive practices of enterprises 
envisaged by the Treaty. The Treaty classifies anticompetitive 
conduct of enterprises under four main headings: (a) collective 
restraints or adulterations of competition, 515 (b) concentrations or 
abuses of monopolistic power, 516 (c) discriminations, 517 and (d) 
pricing practices, dictated by monopolistic aspirations or unfair for 
other considerations.518 The legal sanctions against, and the powers 
of the Community organs with respect to, practices falling within 
one of these classes may vary substantially, according to what 
particular category is involved. 
Unfortunately, however, it is easier to state the difference in 
labels than to indicate the exact content of each of these categories 
which have fluid boundaries and may overlap in numerous circum-
stances. As a result, the interrelation between the various parts of 
the Treaty relating to anticompetitive practices by enterprises has 
been the subject of much uncertainty and discussion.519 There is 
no escape from the conclusion that the Treaty has not followed 
sharply defined and consistent criteria of classification, but has ap-
proached the protection of competition in a pragmatic and rather 
unsystematic way,520 leaving it to practice and theory to weld the 
dispersed provisions into a coherent and workable scheme. This 
applies with particular force to the differentiation between the 
""Impairment may also result from practices by enterprises not subject to the market 
discipline. In such case the Treaty by its very nature is confined to indirect and limited 
counter-measures, e.g., as specified in art. 63. 
515 E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 4(d), 65. 
516 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 66(I-6) and (7). 
517 E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 4(b), 6o(I) (2). 
518 E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 6o( I) (I). 
519 See KRAWIELICKI, DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMAN PLAN (I952); REUTER, LA 
COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 202/f. (I953); KERN, DAS RECHT 
DER UNTERNEHMENSZUSAMMENSCHLUSSE IN DER MONTANUNION (I955); WEEBERS, CON-
TROLE OP INTERNATIONALE KARTELS I35 (I957); Bayer, Das Privatrecht der Montan-
union, I7 ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INTERN AT. PRIVATRECHT 325 ( I952); Roblot, Les rela-
tions privies des entreprises assujetties a Ia Communaute Europienne du Charbon et 
de I' A cier, I7 DROIT SociAL 561 ( I954) ; Abraham, Les entreprises com me sujets de 
droit dans Ia Communa~te Charbon-Acier, 4 CAHIERS DE BRUGES 255 (I954); Prieur, 
La notion de concentratzon d'entreprises au sens de /'art. 66 du Traite instituant Ia 
C.E.C.A., 82 }oURN. DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 8o6 (I955); Di Cagno, La discip/ina delle 
intese e delle concentrazioni nel trattato istitutivo della C.E.C.A., 3 Riv. DI DIR. CIV. 
759 (1957); Roblot, Droits et devoirs des entreprises de Ia Communaute-Sanctions, 4 
ACTES 0FFICIELS 19. 
520 To the same effect REUTER, op. cit. supra note 5I9, at 202. 
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formation of cartels (Article 6 5) and concentrations (Article 
66),521 and the delimitation between prohibited pricing practices 
(Article 6o) and concerted restraints (Article 6 5) .522 
b. Treaty Provisions dgainst Restraints and 
Adulterations by Enterprises 
(I) Text of the pertinent Treaty provisions 
(a) Article 4 (d) : 
The following are recognized to be incompatible with the 
common market for coal and steel, and are, therefore, 
abolished and prohibited within the Community under the 
conditions specified in this Treaty: ' 
(d) restrictive practices tending towards the division or 
the exploitation of the markets. 
(b) Article 65(1)-(3): 
r. All agreements among enterprises, all decisions of as-
sociations of enterprises, and all concerted practices, 
tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder, restrict or 
adulterate 523 the normal operation of competition 
within the common market are prohibited, and in par-
ticular those tending: 
(a) to fix or determine prices; 
(b) to restrict or control production, technical devel-
opment or investments; 
(c) to divide markets, products, customers or sources 
of supply. 
521 Most authors seem to agree in the conclusion that the criterion which differentiates 
an accord creating a cartel within the meaning of art. 65 from an agreement con-
stituting a concentration within the meaning of art. 66 lies in the retention of inde-
pendent power over the management of their affairs by the principal parties to the 
transaction, see KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 519, at 55; Bayer, op. cit. supra note 
519, at 372; REUTER, op. cit. supra note 519, at 216, 217; Rob lot, Les relations privies 
des entreprises assujetties a Ia C.E.C.A., 17 DROIT SOCIAL 561, at 571, 575; Prieur, 
. op. cit. supra note 519, at 809; but contra Demaria, Le systeme des prix et Ia con-
currence dans le marc he commun, 6 AcrEs 0FFICIELS 7, at 103, n. 24 ( 19<;7): "What 
seems to distinguish essentially the concentration from the cartel is the policy pursued 
and not the property arrangement or the mode of the accord." Professor Reuter defines 
concentration as "an operation which places two or more enterprises under a common 
control over the entirety of their affairs." 
522 About the overlap between the prohibitions of art. 6o and art. 65 see REUTER, 
op. cit. supra note 519, at 218. Another question, much discussed in the early stages of 
the common market, concerned the problems as to how far the High Authority may 
establish price controls to counteract the effect of existing cartels in the coal and steel 
market. See the references in MASON, THE EUROPEAN CoAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY 85, 
n. 33 (1955). 
523 The French text is "fausser," which may be rendered in English as "fal~ify" or 
"adulterate." Some translations have employed the expression "distort." In this dis-
cussion "adulterate" is used as the nearest English equivalent. 
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2. However, the High Authority shall authorize agree-
ments to specialize in, or to engage in joint buying or 
selling of, specified products, if the High Authority 
finds: 
(a) that such specialization or such joint buying or 
selling will contribute to a substantial improve-
ment in the production or distribution of the 
products in question; 
(b) that the agreement involved is essential to achieve 
these results, without being more restrictive in 
character than is necessary for that purpose; and 
(c) that it is not capable of giving the interested en-
terprises the power to determine prices, or to con-
trol or limit the production or marketing of a 
substantial part of the products in question within 
the common market, or -of withdrawing them 
from effective competition by other enterprises 
within the common market. 
If the High Authority should find that certain 
agreements are strictly analogous in their nature and 
effects to the above-mentioned agreements, taking into 
account in particular the application of this section to 
distributing enterprises, it shall likewise authorize such 
agreements, provided that it finds that they satisfy the 
same conditions. 
Authorizations may be granted subject to specified 
conditions and for a limited period. In that case the 
High Authority shall renew authorizations once or 
several times if it finds that at the time of renewal the 
conditions stated in paragraph (a) to (c) above are 
still satisfied. 
The High Authority shall revoke or modify an au-
thorization if it finds that as a result of a change in 
circumstances the agreement no longer satisfies the con-
ditions specified above or that the actual consequences 
of the agreement or its application are contrary to the 
conditions required for its approval. 
Decisions granting, renewing, modifying, denying 
or revoking an authorization shall be published to-
gether with the reasons therefor; the restrictions 
specified in the second paragraph of Article 47 shall 
not apply in such cases. 
3· The High Authority may obtain, in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 47, any information neces-
sary for the application of this article, either by a 
special request addressed to the interested parties or 
by a general regulation defining the nature of the 
agreements, decisions or practices which must be com-
municated to the High Authority. 
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( 2) Scope and interpretation. In analyzing the signifi-
cance and scope of the controlling text it might be worth noting 
at the outset that its general scope, apart from reflecting clearly 
the influence of the Havana Charter, resembles most the contem-
porary French statutory provisions and drafts. The Commissariat 
au Plan, which played such an important part in the preparation 
of the plan subsequently announced so dramatically by Mr. Robert 
Schuman, was at the same period engaged in the drafting of do-
mestic legislation for the suppression of anticompetitive prac-
tices.524 That work culminated in the government bill for the con-
trol of cartels, no. 9·9 5 I, which was introduced in Parliament 
three days after the publication of the Schuman proposal.525 Other 
legislative proposals of similar character were introduced at the 
same time by representative Henri Teitgen, who later assumed 
an active role in the Common Assembly,526 and by the members of 
the socialist party.527 In comparing the tenor and phraseology of 
these drafts with the formulation of Article 6 5 the great similarity 
between them becomes strikingly discernible. Especially the notion 
of protecting competition against adulteration (fausser), which is 
employed in the E.C.S.C. Treaty, can be found not only in the 
Belgian and Luxemburgian legislative language, as noted before,528 
but occurs likewise in the French discussions of that period.529 
In analyzing the range of the prohibition it is worth noting that 
it consists (a) of a general clause which proscribes all agreements, 
decisions, and other concerted practices which "tend," directly or 
indirectly, to hinder, restrict, or adulterate the normal operation of 
competition in the common market, and (b) of a catalogue of 
three special categories of practices, that is, price-fixing, restric-
tion or control of production, technological development, or invest-
ment, and division of markets, products, customers, or supplies. 
The exact elements of the practices proscribed by the general 
clause and the significance of the addition of the catalogue of 
specifically named practices have been the subject of numerous 
""'See Moreau, Les ententes professionnelles devant Ia loi, at n8 in DocUMENTATION 
FRAN<;'AISE, ENTENTES ET MoNOPOLES DANS LE MONDE (I 9 53}. 
"""Reprinted in Moreau, op. cit. supra .note 524, at 121 . 
... France, Assemblee Nationale, Doc. Pari., Annexe No. 8.967, Sess. Jan. 13, 1950; 
discussed by Moreau, op. cit. supra note 524, at n5. 
6!11 France, Assemblt\e Nationale, Doc. Pari., Annexe No. 10.223, Sess. June 8, 1950; 
discussed by Moreau, op. cit. suPra note 524, at 122. 
"""See supra Part II, sections D and E . 
... See especially the counter-project of the Commission of Economic Affairs of the 
National Assembly, reprinted in Moreau, op. cit. supra note 524, at 124. 
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doubts and controversies.530 Thus the meaning of the phrase "tend 
to" has been much debated, and in particular there seems to be a 
question of whether the specific practices listed are meant to be 
per se violations for which anticompetitive tendency needs no fur-
ther proof. At any rate, there seems to be agreement that the 
practices enumerated are proscribed only if they relate to and 
affect the common market. Price-fixing of pure export cartels is not 
prohibited.531 Another important controversy pertains to the ap-
plicability of Article 6 5 to vertical agreements. While Professor 
Reuter has advanced the thesis that Article 6 5 covers only hori-
zontal agreements, Dr. Krawielicki, Professor Roblot, and Dr. 
Daig have argued for its application to vertical agreements.532 The 
High Authority seems to tend toward the latter view. In response 
to an inquiry by a member of the Common Assembly relative to 
the grant by the collieries of France and the Saar of an exclusive 
sales franchise to a Belgian coal distributor, it declared that such 
agreements might fall under the prohibitions of Article 6 5.533 
It is, however, most important to note that the prohibitions of 
Article 6 5 ( I ) are not all absolute in character. Article 6 5 ( 2) 
empowers the High Authority to authorize specialization agree-
ments with respect to specified products and arrangements estab-
lishing joint purchase or sales agencies and analogous agree-
ments provided that such arrangements have particular beneficial 
effects and do not result in excessive control over the market. 
Cartels or other restrictive agreements which have been entered 
into after the initiation date of the common market for the partic-
ular type of product 534 (new cartels) are not effective until authori-
zation has been obtained. Whether such authorization has retro-
530 See especially KRAWIELICKI, DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMAN PLAN, 12 (1952); 
REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, 209 (1953); Roblot, 
Les relations privies des entreprises assujetties a Ia Communaute Europeenne du Char-
bon et de l'Acier, 17 DROIT SoCIAL, 561, at 570; Roblot, Droits et Devoirs des Entre-
prises, in 4 AcrEs OFFICIELS 28 (1958); Daig, Discussion, id. 332, at 334-
531 KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 530, at 22; REUTER, op. cit. supra note 530, 
at 211, 237; Rob lot, Les relations privies etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 572. Accord-
ingly, the High Authority refused to interfere with the so-called Bruxelles Entente, 
the export cartel of West European steel producers, see Rosen, The Brussels Entente: 
Export Combination in the World Steel Market, ro6 U.PA.L.REv. 1079 (1958); Di 
Cagno, La disciplina delle intese e delle concentrazioni nel trattato istitutivo della 
C.E.C.A., 3 Rrv. or DrR. Crv. 758, at 764 n. 34 (1957). 
'"'"KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 530, at 12; REUTER, op. cit. supra note 530, at 21o; 
Roblot, Les relations privies etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 571; Roblot, Droits et 
devoirs etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 28; Daig, op. cit. supra note 530, at 335· 
633 Response of March 13, 1954, [1954] ]'L OFF. 301, 
534 See supra notes 495-497. 
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active effect is controversial.535 Cartels and other restrictive agree-
ments which existed at the date of the initiation of the common 
market for the particular product remained unaffected by the 
prohibition of Article 65(1) until August JI, I95J,"~'; and even 
after that time and until the actual rejection of an application 
for approval, if such application was filed prior to the date indi-
cated.537 The High Authority has used this power of authoriza-
tion, as well as that of a modification thereof, in a substantial num-
ber of cases both in the coal and the steel sector.r.as 
(3) Discrimination as anticompetitive practice. Of par-
ticular complexity and importance is the question as to the cir-
cumstances under which discriminatory actions by enterprises are 
deemed to be anticompetitive practices and therefore prohibited. 
At the outset it must be recalled that Article 6 5 constitutes only a 
segment of the intricate and balanced market discipline of the 
Treaty and that it must· be read in context with the broad prohibi-
tions of Article 4 (b) and (c) ,539 as well as with the special regula-
tion of pricing in Article 6o 540 and the provision against the abuse 
of a dominant position in the market in Article 66 ( 7). Accord-
ingly, prohibited discriminatory practices may consist not only in 
the imposition of unequal terms on purchasers in comparable posi-
tions (as under the American Robinson-Patman Act), but also in 
the unwarranted refusal to deal with particular parties, especially 
535 See Roblot, Les relations Privees etc., op. cit. supra note 530, at 573, n. 69 (with 
references). 
536 Date fixed by the High Authority's decision No. 37-53, [1953] ]'L OFF. 152. 
537 Decision of the European Court of Justice 1-58, 10 WuW 70 ( 1960). 
538 For details see E. C. S.C., High Authority, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT 146 ( 1959) ; 
EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 185, 202 (1960). For important recent decisions see decision 
No. 14-60 of June 2, 1960, rejecting the application for authorization of the Dutch 
Scrap Dealers' Cartel, [1960] }'L OFF. 869, and the decision No. r6-6o of June 22, 1960, 
rejecting the application for consolidation of the three Ruhr Coal Sales Cartels, [1960] 
}'L OFF. 1014. 
539 Reprinted p. 297 supra. 
540 Art. 6o ( r) provides: 
"Pricing practices contrary to the provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 are prohibited, and 
in particular: 
-unfair competitive practices, in particular purely temporary or purely 
local price reductions which tend toward the acquisition of a position of 
monopoly within the common market; 
-discriminatory practices involving within the common market the ap-
plication by a seller of unequal conditions to comparable transactions, espe-
cially according to the nationality of the buyer. ' 
After consulting the Consultative Committee and the Council, the High 
Authority may define the practices covered by this prohibition." 
Pursuant to the power given to it by paragraph 2 of this section the High Authority, 
in 1953 and 1954, issued regulations defining certain "differentiations" in sales terrils 
as discriminatory, Decision No. 30-53 modified by Decision No. r-54, [1953] }'L OFF. 
109, [1954] }'L OFF. 77· 
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where such action rests on criteria or motives which aim at, or re-
sult in, effects inconsistent with the spirit and objectives of the 
common market. 
An illustrative example of a suppression of the latter type of dis-
crimination occurred in I956 in connection with the authorization 
of three sales cartels for corresponding groups of coal-mining cor-
porations in the Ruhr district.541 The applicants had stipulated that 
the cartel would supply only such wholesale distributors who-
inter alia- (a) had sold at least 40,000 tons of solid fuel in their 
territory during the preceding year, (b) had procured at least 
I 2,500 tons of the solid fuel sold from the cartel, and (c) had 
procured at least 25,000 tons of the solid fuel sold from the Ruhr 
coal mines. The High Authority, however, while approving the 
other conditions,542 refused to authorize the third of these require-
ments for the reason that it would entail a discrimination both 
between the wholesale distributors and against the coal producers 
outside the Ruhr district. The Court of Justice sustained this de-
cision. 543 It held specifically that discriminatory practices within 
the meaning of Article 4 of the Treaty may at the same time con-
stitute anticompetitive practices within the meaning of Article 
6 5 (I) of the Treaty and that therefore stipulations of such char-
acter were not capable of being authorized under Article 6 5 ( 2). 
2. SANCTIONS AGAINST AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
TREATY PROHIBITIONS 
a. Enforcement by Community Agencies 
(I) Text of governing provisions. The Treaty itself, as 
well as the Convention on Transitional Provisions, includes various 
541 High Authority decisions Nos. s-s6, 6-s6, 7-s6, [1956] j'L OFF. 29, 43, s6. These 
three separate sales cartels (named GEITLING, PRii.SIDENT and MAUSEGATT) were estab-
lished as successors to a comprehensive cartel of the whole Ruhr coal mining industry 
known as GEORG, which was dissolved in 1956. An attempt to reestablish an analogous 
carte!Aailed because of the opposition of the High Authority, see supra note 538. An 
appeal against the decision is pending, [1960] ]'L OFF. 1181. 
..,. For later modifications and extensions of the status of the Ruhr coal sales cartels 
see High Authority decisions Nos. 10-57, 11-57 and 12-57, 6 [1957] ]'L OFF. 159, 160, 
161; High Authority decisions Nos. 16-57, 17-57, 18-57, [1957] ]'L OFF. 319, 330, 341; 
High Authority decisions Nos. 24-57, 25-57, 26-57, [1957] ]'L OFF. 629, 631, 633; High 
Authority decision No. 17-59, [1959] }'L OFF. 279; High Authority decision No. 36-59, 
[1959] ]'L OFF. 736; High Authority decision No. 48-59, [1960] ]'L OFF. 57; High Au-
thority decision No. s-6o, [1960] ]'L OFF. 153; High Authority decision No. 7-6o, [1960] 
]'L OFF. s86; High Authority decision No. 9-6o, [1960] J'L OFF. 601; High Authority de-
cision No. 10-60, [1960] ]'L OFF. 618; High Authority decision No. 11-6o, [1960] ]'L 
OFF. 751; High Authority decision No. 17-60 [1960] ]'L OFF. 1028 . 
... Geitling et a!. v. High Authority, Docket No. 2-56, 3 Rec. 9 ( 1957) ; but cf. Nold ,., 
High Authority, Docket No. 18-57, [1959] }'L OFF. 421 (1959); 10 WuW 75 (1960), 
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sections regulating the sanctions against violations and the en-
forcement of the prohibitions against anticompetitive practices by 
enterprises. The most important ones are Article 64 ( 4) and ( 5) 
of the Coal-Steel Treaty and Section I 2, paragraphs I-3 of the 
Transitional Convention. 
Article 6 5 ( 4) provides : 
Agreements or decisions prohibited by virtue of Sec-
tion I of the present article shall be null and void and may 
not be invoked before any tribunal of the member states. 
The High Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction, 
subject to review by the Court, to pass on the conformity 
of such agreements or decisions with the provisions of this 
article. 
Article 6 5 ( 5) adds : 
The High Authority may impose upon enterprises: 
which have concluded a void agreement; 
which have applied or attempted to apply, by way of 
arbitration, forfeiture, boycott or any other means, a 
void agreement or decision or an agreement for which 
approval has been refused or revoked; 
which have obtained an authorization by means of in-
formation known to be false or misleading; or 
which engage in practices contrary to the provisions 
of Section I, 
fines and daily penalties not to exceed twice the proceeds 
from the actual turnover of the products which were 
the subject of the agreement, decision or practice con-
trary to the provisions of this article; however, if the 
purpose of the agreement is to restrict production, techni-
cal development or investments, this maximum may be 
raised to IO percent of the annual turnover of the enter-
prises in question, in the case of fines, and 20 percent of 
the daily turnover in the case of daily penalties. 
Section I 2 of the Transitional Convention specifies further: 
Any information about the understandings or organ-
izations referred to in Article 6 5 shall be communicated 
to the High Authority under the terms of Section 3 of the 
said article. 
In those cases where the High Authority does not 
grant the authorization provided for in Section 2 of Arti-
cle 6 5, it shall fix reasonable time limits at the expiration 
of which the prohibitions provided for in Article 6 5 shall 
come into effect. 
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In order to facilitate the liquidation of the organiza-
tions prohibited under Article 65, the High Authority 
may name receivers who shall be responsible to it and 
shall act under its instructions. 
( 2) Intervention by Community agencies. As the quoted 
text of the Treaty and the Convention on Transitional Provisions 
indicates, the High Authority has the exclusive responsibility for 
the direct enforcement of the prohibitions of Article 65. It possesses 
extensive investigatory powers and may impose fines and daily penal-
ties, as well as compel the dissolution of prohibited organizations by 
the appointment of receivers. The decisions of the High Authority 
are directly enforceable in the member states, in accordance with 
the procedure governing the execution of local instruments.544 Its 
decisions are subject to review by the Community Court of Jus-
tice.545 Cases have come before the High Authority either follow-
ing an application or on its own initiative.546 In a number of cases 
where authorization has been sought, it was granted only after 
lengthy negotiations involving substantial revision of the original 
agreement. In some instances authorization of particular pro-
visions has been denied.547 
b. Sanctions by Virtue of the Legal Systems of the 
Member States 
( 1) Controlling Treaty provtstons. One of the most 
difficult problems in the application of the provisions against anti-
competitive practices by enterprises subject to the discipline of the 
Coal-Steel Community Treaty is the question as to the possible 
legal consequences of violations according to the individual legal 
systems of member states.548 Article 6 5 itself contains only two 
5
" E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 44 and 92. See the comments by Spaak, Problems of Com-
petition and Restrictive Trade Practices in the European Coal and Steel Community, 
FEDERAL BAR Ass'N INSTITUTE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 118, 
at 129 (1960) . 
.., Depending upon the measures taken by the High Authority review will be availa-
ble either in proceedings for annulment, under art. 33 para. 2 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, 
or in proceedings for full review, under art. 36 of the Treaty. In proceedings of the 
latter type which are available against monetary sanctions and penalties the Court 
may not only reverse their imposition but also reduce their amount, cf. Acciaierie 
Laminatoi Magliano Alpi v. High Authority, Docket No. 8-56, 3 Rec. 179 (1957). In 
cases of a failure to intervene, injured third parties might proceed against the High 
Authority in a damage action based on administrative tort under E.C.S.C. Treaty 
art. 40. 
546 See the table in E.C.S.C. High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 202 (1960). 
547 See the action by the High Authority vis-a-vis the three Ruhr coal sales cartels, 
discussed supra. 
548 For European discussions of this question see especially Bayer, Das Privatrecht 
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mandates in that respect. On the one hand, it ordains that agree-
ments and decisions violative of Article 6 5 ( r) are absolutely void 
and incapable of being invoked in any tribunal of the member 
states. On the other hand, it provides that the High Authority 
and, on review, the Court of Justice have the sole jurisdiction over 
determinations of the conformity of agreements and decisions with 
the rules of Article 6 5. 549 
Accordingly, it is clear that national tribunals may not lend their 
arm to the enforcement of anticompetitive agreements and decisions 
by parties thereto and must refer the matter to the High Authority 
if in such controversy the enforceability is contested. More difficult, 
however, is the question of whether and in what way national courts 
may grant affirmative relief to third parties claiming to be aggrieved 
by anticompetitive practices by others. Since Article 6 5 reserves the 
determination of the illegal character of challenged agreements, 
decisions, or concerted practices 550 to specified Community agencies, 
it has been held that national courts are barred from issuing tem-
porary injunctions. 551 The issue arose in consequence of a resolution 
of the Coal Distribution Cartel for the Upper Rhine Region, 
adopted in 1953, according to which coal consumers of annual 
amounts of 30,000 tons and more were to procure their supply 
directly from the cartel instead of buying from wholesale distribu-
tors. The new arrangement caused disadvantages not only for the 
excluded wholesale dealers, but also for the consumers as it de-
prived the latter of certain quantity discounts. Therefore eight 
large consumers and four wholesalers of coal brought suit for a 
temporary injunction on the ground that the execution of the cartel 
resolution violated Article 6 5 of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty. 
The court ruled that the complaint was subject to dismissal for the 
der Montanunion, 17 ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INTERN. PRIVATRECHT, 325 at 359 (1952); 
KRAWIELICKI, DAS MONOPOLVERBOT IM ScHUMANPLAN, 44 (1952); Matthies, Das 
Recht der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kokle und Stahl und die nationalen 
Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten, 9 ]URISTENZEITUNG 305 (1959); BALLERSTEDT, fiBER-
NATION ALE UNO NATIONALE MARKTORDNUNG (1955); Steindorff, Der Begri/f der 
Preisdiskriminierung im Recht der EGKS, 21 ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INTERN. PRIVATRECHT, 
270 at 317 (1956); Mylord, Zur Frage des Rechtsschutzes "Driller" im Rechtssystem 
der EGKS, 7 WuW 483, at 485 (1957) • 
... Art. 65 (4) para. 2. In addition art. 41 provides that only the Court of Justice 
may decide on the validity of actions of the High Authority, if such validity is 
challenged in a litigation pending before a national tribunal. 
..., Art. 65 (4) para. 2 does not mention concerted practices in ad,llition to agree-
ments and decisions, but this omission apparently is only an oversight of the draftsmen. 
661 City of Stuttgart et al. v. Oberrheinische Kohlenunion, judgment of Landgericht 
Stuttgart, Aug. 10, 1953, reprinted in 4 WuW 140 ( 1954) ; Sirey, Jur. Part IV, I 
(1954), with note by Philonenko; 
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reason that Article 6 5 required a decision by the High Authority on 
the merits and that prior to such determination a national court 
could not grant temporary relief.552 
( 2) Implementation and supplementation by national 
laws. The rule that deprives a national tribunal of jurisdiction for 
determining whether or not an enterprise has engaged in anticom-
petitive practice does not, of itself, bar such a court from imposing 
civil liability on any enterprise either after the High Authority has 
found the same to be in violation of the prohibitions of Article 6 5 
or if such violation is not contested. The Treaty is silent as to the 
possible tort liability for contraventions against Article 65. Thus 
the questions arise as to whether the national legal systems may 
attach and actually have attached civil liability to the perpetration of 
the anticompetitive practices as defined and prohibited by the 
Treaty. 
There is nothing in the general policy of the Treaty which would 
support a conclusion to the effect that a member state is forbidden 
to declare a violation of the prohibitions of Article 6 5 to be a tort 
rendering the perpetrator liable in damages, so long as the imposi-
tion of such liability is not discriminatory.553 The problem therefore 
reduces itself to the question whether the national legal systems 
actually should be interpreted that way. The answer, of course, may 
vary according to which one of the six national legal systems is in-
volved. 
In German law, for instance, liability in damages of a violator of 
the mandates of Article 65 ( 1) conceivably could be based on one of 
four broad and overlapping categories of torts: 
r) intentional or negligent invasion of the absolute right of a 
person to his established and conducted enterprise (Civil 
Code, Section 823 I); 554 
502 Actually the court requested a determination by the High Authority, but the latter 
replied that its investigation was still in process. The High Authority, in fact, did not 
approve the cartel until 1957, and then only after drastic structural changes, Decision 
No. 19-57, July 26, 1957, [1957] ]'L OFF. 352. For the subsequent history of the status 
of this purchase cartel see E.C.S.C. High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 192 
(1960). 
668 Accord REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 214 
(1953); Matthies, Das Recht dur Europiiischen Gemeinscha/t fiir Kohle und Stahl 
und die nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten, 9 }URISTENZEITUNG 305, at 307 
(1954); Steindorff, Der Begriff der Preisdiskriminierung im Rechte der EGKS, 21 
ZEITSCHR. F. AUSL. & INT. PRIVATRECHT 270, at 317 (1956); Roblot, Les relations 
privees des enterprises assujetties a la C.E.C.A., 17 DROIT SociAL 561, at 567 and 574 
(1954) . 
... About this tort under German law see 2 RGR Kommentar zum BGB § 823 Anm. 
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2) intentional or negligent violation of a law enacted for the 
protection of others (Civil Code, Section 823 II); 
3) intentional and unethical infliction of damages (Civil Code, 
Section 826) ; 
4) unethical business conduct for purposes of competition (Law 
against Unfair Competition, 1909, Section I). 
Similarly, in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg such liability 
would result if engaging in anticompetitive practices contrary to the 
Treaty were deemed to fall within the sweeping contours of tortious 
conduct marked by the French Civil Code, Articles 1382 and 
I 3 83.555 
There is some judicial authority supporting such results. In Ger-
many the District Court of Stuttgart, in the aforementioned de-
cision of 1953,556 stated, by way of dictum, that a cartel action, 
taken in violation of Coal-Steel Community Treaty Article 65, en-
titles injured parties to damages under Sections 823 I and 823 II 
of the German Civil Code. A similar conclusion was reached by the 
District Court of Essen in an order of November 4, 1953.557 That 
case arose as a consequence of a resolution of the then-existing six 
sales agencies for Ruhr coal which decided to discontinue the direct 
supplying of wholesale coal dealers having an annual sales volume 
of less than 48,ooo tons. An aggrieved dealer brought suit for de-
claratory judgment to the effect that the challenged action entitled 
him to damages. The Court conceded that damages could be de-
manded if the action in question violated the prohibitions of Article 
6 5 and continued the proceedings 558 until a determination of this 
question by the High Authority.559 
However, more recent and authoritative judicial authority has 
shown reluctance to consider every prohibition of the Treaty to be 
a law for the protection of others within the meaning of Section 
8 23 II of the German Civil Code. In a far-reaching decision of April 
9 (10th ed. 1953). For recent decisions by the German Supreme Court see 12 NJW 
479 (1959); 12 NJW 934 (1959). 
6155 This conclusion is adopted as correct by Roblot, op. cit. supra note 553, at 574, 
text at n. 75; see in general Roubier, Theorie genera/e de I' action en concurrence 
diloyale, 1 REV. TRIM. DE DR. CoMM. 541 (1948). 
566 Supra note 551. 
557 8 BETRIEBS-BERATER 991 (1953). 
558 The decision is criticized on that score by Spengler, A bgrenzungsfrag(/n aus der 
Obergangszone zwischen Kartell- und Montanunions-Recht, 4 WuW 753, at 768 (1954). 
559 The High Authority declared the prohibitions to be inapplicable and its deter-
mination was sustained by the Court of Justice, see supra note 537· 
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14, 1959,560 the German Supreme Court held that the prohibi-
tions against price discriminations, contained in Articles 4 (b) and 
6o ( 1) of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, do not constitute laws 
for the protection of the injured customers or competitors within 
the meaning of Section 823 II of the German Civil Code. A similar 
question confronted the Court of Appeals of Celle 561 in a suit in-
stituted by a wholesale dealer in lignite against the sales subsidiary 
of a lignite producer as a result of the latter's determination to 
discontinue a direct supply of the plaintiff and to accord exclusive 
sales franchises to other dealers. The Court left open the question 
of whether the plaintiff was entitled to relief in a national tribunal 
as a result of a violation of Coal-Steel Community Treaty Article 
4b and determined the litigation on the basis of the provisions of 
the German Law against Restraint of Trade, in particular those gov-
erning enterprises with dominant market position. 
The latter Court thus proceeded on the theory that the national 
laws against anticompetitive practices remain applicable to the en-
terprises subject to the discipline of the Coal-Steel Community 
Treaty so long as there is no conflict between the two sets of rules. 
Absence of tort liability under national law for violations of the 
prohibitions of Article 6 5 accordingly would not mean freedom 
from any liability, if, and to the extent that, such conduct is also in 
contravention of national legislation. 
C. PROTECTION AGAINST ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND 
MisUsE OF DoMINANT MARKET PowER 
I. CONTROL OF NEW CONCENTRATIONS 
a. Genesis and Purpose of Article 66 
As has been mentioned before, the Treaty includes not only pro-
hibitions against cartelization and concerted practices (Article 6 5) 
but, in addition, contains provisions designed · (a) to curb new con-
centration of economic power through total or partial integration 
of enterprises (Article 66(1-6) ), and (b) to suppress misuses of 
dominant market power by enterprises which have or acquire such 
position (Article 66 ( 7)). 
560 30 BGHZ 74 ( 1959). The decision is criticized by Janssen van Raay, Een beslissing 
van het Bundesgerichts-hof over E.G.K.S.-recht, [1960] NEDERLANDS }URISTENBLAD 437• 
561 Court of Appeals of Celie, Sept. 1, 1958, 9 WuW 290 (1959). 
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Provisions for administrative control of misuses of dominant 
market power, such as are contained in the last section of Article 66, 
were traditional with some of the European antitrust legislation 
and could be found in the German Cartel Ordinance of 1923 and 
the Dutch Cartel Ordinance of I 941, as amended in I 942.562 Their 
inclusion in the market discipline of the Treaty, therefore, was not 
novel. 
Limitations on economic concentration by integration, however, 
were unknown to European cartel legislation and were inserted 
in the framework of the Treaty, at least in a large measure, it 
seems, upon the insistence of the Allied Occupation Authorities 
in Germany who desired a legal palliative against future untram-
meled reconcentration in the German coal and steel industry, which 
had been subjected to drastic deconcentration just at the time of 
the negotiations of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty.563 
The Treaty did not aim at a re-structuring of the common market 
as it existed at the time the Treaty became operative, but it subjects 
any new concentration of enterprises to the control of the Commu-
nity agencies, thus forestalling the formation of giants with market 
power deemed to be excessive. 
b. Method and Scope of Control 
( 1) Form of control in general. Article 66 ( 1) of the 
Treaty requires prior approval by the High Authority for every 
transaction which, directly or indirectly, effectuates within the com-
mon market a concentration, as understood by the Treaty, involv-
ing at least one enterprise that is engaged in coal or steel production 
or in distribution except retail trade. Article 66 ( 2) makes it manda-
tory for the High Authority to grant such approval, unless the en-
suing concentration gives the enterprises involved excessive power 
over the market according to a set of criteria specified by the Treaty. 
The High Authority is empowered by Article 66 (I) to determine, by 
way of regulation, the factors which constitute control for the pur-
poses of a concentration within the meaning of that Article. More-
over, the High Authority, by way of regulation, may also exempt 
662 See supra part II, sections A and C. 
"""See supra text at note 509. For a discussion of the deconcentration of the West 
German coal and steel industry under Allied High Commission Law No. 27 of 
May 16, 1950 (AHC Off. Gaz. No. 20, 299) and the interrelation between this 
program and the negotiation and ratification of the E.C.S.C. Treaty see Office of 
the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany [FINAL] REPORT ON GERMANY, 1949-1952, 
at 108-113 (1952); Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 6TH QuAR-
TERLY REPORT, 83 (1951); 7TH QUARTERLY REPORT, 15, 52, 109 (1951). 
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certain types of transactions resulting in concentration from the re-
quirement of prior approval if their effects are certain not to be 
harmful to competition (Article 66 (3)). The High Authority has 
issued regulations both as envisaged by Article 66 ( 1) 564 and Arti-
cle 66 (3) .565 
(2) Concept of concentration within the meaning of 
Article 66; scope of applicability. Unfortunately Article 66 does 
not contain a direct definition of the concept of concentration. How-
ever, it is possible to glean its criteria from various elements of that 
complex provision. Accordingly, a concentration within the mean-
ing of the Treaty (a) occurs ((between enterprises," one of which 
must be a producer of or wholesale dealer in coal and steel products, 
(b) is the direct or indirect effect, within the common market ter-
ritory, of an operation consisting in the act of a person or enterprise, 
or a group of persons or enterprises, (c) is accomplished by merger, 
acquisition of stock or assets, loan, contract, or other means of con-
trol. The essence of concentration, then, is the establishment of a 
common control over the equipment or management of an enterprise 
subject to the general discipline of the Treaty and that of another 
enterprise operating in the common market.566 The concept includes 
cases of both horizontal and vertical arrangements. 
The High Authority, with the advice of the Council of Ministers, 
has issued a detailed regulation specifying the proprietary or con-
tractual arrangements which, under appropriate factual conditions, 
may confer power to control production, pricing investments, pro-
curement, sales, or distribution of profits and thus constitute ele-
ments of control as envisaged in the definition of concentration.567 
The acquisition of stock by banks in connection with the formation 
of corporations or the issuance of new stock for purposes of resale 
does not constitute control as long as the right to vote such shares 
remains unexercised. 568 
... Decision No. 24-54, May 6, 1954, [1954] }'L OFF. 345· 
565 Decision No. 25-54, May 6, 1954, and No. 28-54, May 26, 1954, [1954] }'L OFF. 
346, 381. 
566 For a discussion of the concept of concentration see also KRAWIELICKI, DAS 
MONOPOLVERBOT IM SCHUMAN-PLAN, 55 (1952); REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE 
DU CHARBON ET DE L'AciER, 215 ( 1953); Roblot, Les relations privees des entreprises 
assujetties a la C.E.C.A., 17 DROIT SociAL, 561 at 575 ( 1954) ; Prieur, The Concept of 
the Concentration of Enterprises within the Meaning of art. 66 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty, 
82 ]OURN. DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 807 (1955); KERN, DAS RECHT DER UNTER-
NEHMENSZUSAMMENSCHLUSSE IN DER MONTANUNION 37 ( 1955), review thereof by J erusa-
Jem, 8 NJW 1430 (1955). 
507 Decision 24-54, [1954] ]'L OFF. 345 and comments thereon, Prieur, op. cit. supra 
note 566, at 817 ( 1955); Kern, op. cit. supra note 566, at 52. 
""'Decision 24-54, art. 2, [1954] ]'L OFF. 345· 
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Article 66 (I) requires previous approval for "operations" ef-
fecting concentration. The question has been posed whether concen-
trations resulting from an operation of law, such as intestate suc-
cession, are included within this term or whether it is equivalent 
with, and limited to, the concept of transaction. Authors who have 
taken the former view have pointed out that in any case the ac-
ceptance of the inheritance may be subject to prior approval.569 The 
controversy obviously will require final resolution by the Court. 
Apart from exceptions no longer material, the regime of the 
Treaty applies only to new concentrations, i.e., operations taking 
effect after the date at which the Treaty went into force. The re-
quirement of prior approval, moreover, affects only transactions 
subsequent to the promulgation of the pertinent regulation.570 
(3) Conditions for refusal of approval. The grant of 
the approval is mandatory unless the High Authority finds that the 
contemplated concentration affords the participants excessive mar-
ket power with respect to products subject to its jurisdiction. That 
condition is deemed to exist if the parties are capable either (a) of 
determining the price, of controlling or restricting the production or 
distribution, or hindering the maintenance of an effective competi-
tion, in a significant part of the market for such products, or (b) of 
escaping the Treaty rules governing competition, especially through 
the establishment of an artificial position of privilege which affords a 
substantial advantage in the access to sources of supply or outlets. 571 
The Treaty provides expressly that the High Authority, in mak-
ing the requisite determination, is bound to observe the basic princi-
ple of non-discrimination and therefore to take account of the size of 
other enterprises of the same type operating in the Community, to 
the extent that it considers justified in order to avoid or correct 
disadvantages which flow from a disparity in competitive position.572 
In practice the High Authority has exercised its powers over con-
centrations with extreme caution and in a restrained case-by-case 
approach. Up to the present it has seen no occasion for refusing any 
of the applications processed so far. 573 As a result the Common As-
56" REUTER, op. cit. supra note 566, at 216; Rob lot, op. cit. supra note 566, at 575· Contra 
KRAWIELICKI, op. cit. supra note 566, at 57· That author, however, concedes that a 
concentration by operation of law may be subject to the High Authority's power, of 
deconcentration under art. 66 ( 5) ( 2). 
67° Convention on Transitional Provisions sec. 13, paras. I & 2. 
671 Art. 66 ( 2) para. I. 
672 Art. 66 ( 2) para. 2. 
673 See the survey in the High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE CoMMUNITY, 203 (196o). For an expose of the criteria applied by the High 
Authority in the disposition of applications for authorization of concentrations see its 
reply to the written interpellation No. 2r-6o [r96o] ]'L OFF. 1078. 
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sembly has pressed for the development of a more articulate and 
energetic policy in that field. 574 The pending application for au-
thorization of a concentration reuniting August Thyssen Hiitte AG 
and Phoenix-Rheinrohr AG (the two most important enterprises 
carved from the former Thyssen combine), however, has met with 
considerable opposition from the High Authority. 
c. Enforcement and Sanctions 
Article 66 accords the High Authority broad powers of investi-
gation 575 and of enforcing the observance of the discipline of the 
Treaty with respect to concentrations.576 Article 66 ( 5) differenti-
ates between two categories of concentrations accomplished in con-
travention to the provisions of the Treaty: (a) those which are 
irregular because they lack the requisite prior authorization but for 
which such authorization would have been mandatory; (b) those 
which are illegal because they result in excessive market power as 
defined by Article 66 ( 2) . 
In the first alternative the primary sanctions consist of fines im-
posed upon the persons responsible for the operation. The maxi-
mum amounts of these fines are fixed by Article 66 ( 6). Only if 
the fines remain unpaid, may the High Authority proceed to decon-
centration of the enterprises involved in the irregular concentration. 
In the second alternative the High Authority must first make a 
finding as to the excessive market power resulting from the concen-
tration. After a hearing which permits the interested parties to 
present their arguments the High Authority may order the steps 
appropriate for severing the concentration and restoring the nor-
mal conditions of competition, such as divorcement, dissolution, 
and divestiture. In case of non-compliance with its mandates the 
High Authority itself may proceed to the execution of the measures 
specified, by making the appropriate orders or requesting the ap-
pointment of a receiver. 
The determinations of the High Authority are subject to the usual 
review by the Community Court, with the qualification, however, 
that there is an appraisal de novo on the issue of excessiveness of 
the resulting market power.577 
57
• The policy of the High Authority has been reviewed in two successive reports 
on the concentration of enterprises in the Community by members of the Common 
Assembly for the later's Commission: viz. by Mr. Henry Fayat, Common Assembly, 
Doc. No. z6 (1956-1957) and by Mr. Lapie, Common Assembly, Doc. No. 16 (1957-
1958). 
676 Art. 66(4). 
676 Art. 66(5). 
677 Art. 66(5) para. 2, 
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In the case of unauthorized concentrations the Treaty refrains 
from ordaining nullity ab initio, as it does in the case of cartels and 
other restrictive agreements. 
2. CONTROL 0¥ THE CONDUCT OF ENTERPRISES WITH 
DOMINANT MARKET POWER 
Since Article 6 5 applies only to collective practices and since Arti-
cle 66 ( 1-6) concerns only new concentrations, the framers of the 
Treaty felt that additional safeguards for the competitive mecha-
nism of the market were necessary with respect to anticompetitive 
practices by single enterprises with dominant market power which 
had attained this status either by unassailable pre-Treaty concen-
tration or had acquired or were going to acquire it in a manner other 
than by concentration. As has been mentioned-before, such approach 
corresponds to significant precedents in European cartel legislation. 
Accordingly, Article 66 ( 7) grants the High Authority additional 
powers over enterprises in the coal and steel industry, whether pub-
lic or private, which by reason of legal or factual circumstances 
possess a dominant position with respect to their products in a sig-
nificant part of the common market. If such enterprises engage in 
practices which are inconsistent with the basic policies of the Coal-
Steel Community Treaty, such as the principle against non-discrimi-
nation, the High Authority may address appropriate recommenda-
tions for remedying the situation to the enterprise in question.578 
If the latter persists in its conduct, the High Authority may impose 
upon it specific rules for doing business. 
D. PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE 
As has been pointed out above in Section B, I a (I), the Treaty 
not only protects the common market against anticompetitive prac-
tices by enterprises but also liberates and shields it from govern-
mental measures that interfere with the forces of competition. One 
of the bases of action by Community organs in such cases, though 
somewhat perplexing in scope and modest in thrust, is Article 67. 
578 A famous instance of a recommendation under art. 66(7) was that of July u, 
1953, [1953] ]'L OFF. 154, directed to the Oberrheinische Kohlenunion, the exclusive 
distributor for South and Southwest Germany of coal produced in the Ruhr, Saar, 
Lorraine and Aix-la-Chapelle districts. It recommended to take all measures proper 
to prevent practices contrary to art. 4· The addressee was a cartel which possessed 
a dominant position in the market, but held a lease on life until the termination of 
proceedings under art. 65 by virtue of sec. 12 of the Convention on Transitional 
Provisions, see supra text at note 537· See also notes 551 and 557· 
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This article concerns itself with "measures of member states that 
are capable of exerting substantial influence upon the competitive 
conditions in the coal industry." The Treaty differentiates between 
two great classes of such measures: 
(a) those which are capable of producing severe economic imbal-
ance by significantly augmenting the differences in production 
costs in a manner other than by increasing productivity; 
(b) those which decrease the differences in production costs by 
according special advantages to or imposing special burdens 
upon domestic coal and steel enterprises as compared with 
other domestic industries. 
In cases of interferences of the latter type the High Authority is 
authorized, after having consulted with the Council and the Con-
sultative Committee, to address the appropriate recommendations 
to the respective state.578a 
Another and seemingly much more comprehensive and effective 
source of power for the Community organs is Article 88 of the 
Treaty. It authorizes the High Authority to initiate certain pro-
ceedings and take certain measures whenever it finds that a member 
state has failed to live up to its treaty obligations and, in particular, 
to observe the sweepmg mandates of Articles 2-4. The High Au-
thority has resorted to the procedure under Article 88 in two cases 
involving official, or officially sanctioned, organisms possessing a 
monopoly over coal imports, the Office Comm~rcial du Ravitaille-
ment in Luxembourg and A.T.I.C. in France. )'he former contro-
versy became moot when the Luxemburgian government rescinded 
the provisions governing the importation of solid fuels. 578b The 
A.T.I.C. dispute is still in the stage of negotiations between France 
and the High Authority 578c and has involved the latter in a damage 
suit brought by a Belgian dealer on the ground that the High Au-
thority has failed to perform an official duty.'578d 
67 
.. For a more detailed discussion of the purpose and scope of Article 67, see Reuter, 
op. cit. supra note 566, 196. 
578
• See E.C.S.C., High Authority, SIXTH GENERAL REPORT 92 ( 1958). 
678
• See supra note 185 and E.C.S.C., High Authority, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT 195 
(1960). 
678
d Societe Commerciale A. Vloeberghs S.A. c. Haute Autorite, [1960] }'L OFF. 8o8. 
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IV. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
A. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION WITHIN THE 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMUNITY 
STRUCTURE 
I. FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF THE GENERAL 
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 
a. From the European Coal and Steel Community 
to the European Economic Community 
(I) Functional and institutional changes in Community 
organization. When the governments of the six nations forming the 
European Coal and Steel Community decided 579 to take the long 
step from a partial economic integration, restricted to the coal and 
steel industry, to a general economic integration encompassing the 
whole field of production and distribution, by the establishment of 
a new European Economic Community, it became clear that the pat-
tern of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty would have to be signifi-
cantly modified, both as to functional and institutional aspects. 
While a detailed comparison of the legal framework of the two 
communities would go far beyond the scope of this discussion, 580 
it is necessary to underscore a few basic likenesses and differences. 
There is no question that the architects of the new European 
Economic Community relied heavily on the experience and structure 
of the European Coal and Steel Community as the starting point 
for their blueprint. As Professor Reuter has put it so adroitly: "In 
579 For the background of this decision, see supra Introduction. 
580 For a general discussion of the politico-economic and legal structure of E.E.C. 
(with or without comparison with E.C.S.C. and Euratom), see Carstens, Die Errich-
tung des gemeinsamen Marktn in der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Atom-
gemeinschaft und Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl, I8 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES 
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 459 ( I958) ; Catalano, LA COMMUNITA Eco-
NOMICA EUROPEA E L'EURATOM (I957); Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique 
Europeenne, I958 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN, 6 (No. I), x6I (No.3), 310 (No. 6); 
Soule, Comparaison entre les dispositions institutionnelles du Traite CECA et du Trait/ 
GEE, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN, 95 (No. 2), 208 (No. 4); Le Marchi Commun 
et ses problemes, I958 REVUE n'EcoNoMIE PoLITI QUE, Numero Special; Les Aspects Juri-
diques du Marche Commun, 8 COLL. SCIENT!FIQUE DE LA FACULTE DE-DROIT DE L'UNIV. DE 
LIEGE (I958); Aspects du Marchi Commun, 3 BIBLIOTHEQUE DE LA SOCIETE RoYALE 
D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE DE BELGE (I958). For an article-by-article explanation of the 
Treaty see von der Groeben and von Boeckh, KoMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, (2 vols. 
1958, 1960); WOHLFAHRT, EVERLING, GLAESNER, SPRUNG, DIE EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTS-
GEME!NSCHAFT, KoMM!lNTAR ZUM VERTRAG ( I960). 
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a large measure E.E.C. is an extrapolation of the European Coal ·t~ 
and Steel Community." 581 Both organizations are fashioned as 
Communities of the member nations; 582 both Communities depend 
upon the institution of a common market, i.e., a market freed from 
all national barriers, at least against a free circulation of goods 583 
as a principal means for the attainment of the community goals. 
However, while the common market is the "basis" and sole 
mechanism of the Coal-Steel Community,584 the E.E.C. Treaty adds 
the gradual approximation of the economic policies of the member 
states as an additional instrument of E.E.C.585 Moreover, the com-
mon market of E.E.C. is surrounded by a uniform customs wall 586 
and developed by a common commercial policy vis-a-vis other na-
tions,587 while the Coal-Steel Community does not provide for such 
an arrangement.588 Conversely, only the Coal-Steel Community 
Treaty accords the Community agencies extensive "dirigistic" or 
regulatory powers over the market in circumstances where economic 
developments render a reliance on its auto-mechanism unfeasible.589 
The E.E.C. Treaty does not duplicate this scheme and entrusts the 
Community, acting through the Council of Ministers, only with few 
and narrowly circumscribed direct powers of economic controJ.590 
Needless to say, these changes in function were caused not only by 
the differences in economic structure and magnitude of the two mar-
kets, but also, and perhaps primarily, by the realistic respect of the 
drafters for national sensitivities, the resurgence of economic lib-
eralism, and certain other developments in the general political 
climate.591 The same considerations produced corresponding 1Jlodi-
fications in the institutional framework. The framers of the new 
Treaty avoided provocative terms such as "supranational" or "High 
681 Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 8. 
582 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. I; E. E. C. Treaty art. I; cf. Carstens, op. cit. supra note 
58o, at 46o. 
1588 About the relativity of the notion of a common market, see also Carstens, op. cit. 
supra note 580, at 460 . 
... E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. I and 2 para. I, 
""'E.E.C. Treaty art. 2. While, accordingly, the economic policies of the states are 
to be "harmonized," but, generally speaking, remain within the province of the 
individual states, a more extensive integration is adopted with respect to foreign 
commerce. It is to become a matter of Community policy at the end of the transitional 
period, E.E.C. Treaty, art. Ill. See Carstens, op. cit. supra note s8o, at 495, 497, and 
507, but contrast the skeptical comments by Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 9. 
""'E.E.C. Treaty arts. 18-29. 
587 E.E.C. Treaty arts. no, n6. 
1588 E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 72. 
589 E.g. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 59· 
6110 E.g. E.E.C. Treaty art. 103. 
""'See the discussion by Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 9 and II. 
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Authority" and strengthened the participation of both the Council 
of Ministers and the Assembly, transforming at the same time the 
role of the Commission. 592 
( 2) Changes in the normative technique of the respective 
treaties. The difference in scale of the two markets and the impossi-
bility of foreseeing and providing with precision all economic meas-
ures that might become necessary in the larger setting, no less than 
the exigencies of political realities, resulted also in a significant 
change in the normative technique employed by the framers of the 
E.E.C. Treaty from that utilized by the draftsmen of the older in-
strument. The E.E.C. Treaty, much more than the Coal-Steel Com-
munity Treaty, is merely a "framework treaty." 593 In many of its 
portions it is confined to a stipulation of programs and principles, 
leaving the implementation to further normative procedures by the 
Community agencies, in particular by the Council of Ministers. In 
other words, the E.E.C. Treaty is of much lesser normative "den-
sity" than its counterpart of more ancient vintage. Accordingly, 
the E.E.C. Treaty relies to a much greater extent than the Coal-
Steel Community Treaty on legislative or, at least, quasi-legislative 
action by the Council 594 which, as the case may require, is either 
directly applicable to individuals or requires further concretization 
by legislation on the part of the Member States.595 Corresponding 
to this change in normative technique is a significant modification in 
terminology evident from a comparison between Coal-Steel Com-
munity Treaty, Article 14, and E.E.C. Treaty, Article 189. The 
latter expressly adds the further categories of "regulations" and 
"directives" to the categories of decisions, recommendations, and 
opinions defined by the former. 
b. Legal Characteristics of the Common Market 
(I) Unification without uniformization. The legal na-
ture of the Common Market depends in the first place and most of 
502 See Soule, op. cit. supra note sSo, at 98 (comparison of the respective functions 
of the Councils of Ministers, of the High Authority, and of the Commission), 100 
(comparison of the roles of the Assembly) ; Reuter, op. cit. suPra note 580, at 310; 
Catalano, op. cit. supra note s8o, at 19-32. For the position of the Court of Justice, 
see Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der 
Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft mit vergleichenden Hinweisen auf die Europiiische 
Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl, 83 ARCH. OFF. R. 132 (1958). 
"""Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at 161. 
594 See Reuter, op. cit. supra note s8o, at 161; Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die 
Organe der Europiiischen Gemeinschaften, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER, 127 ( 1959) ; Everling, 
Die ersten Rechtsetzungsakte der Organe der Europiiischen Gemeinschaften, 14 
BETRIEBS-BERATER, 52 ( 1959). 
""" E.E.C. Treaty art. 189, paras. 2 and 3· 
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all on the character and degree of integration of the Community 
which it serves. As has been stated before, the objective of the 
Treaty of Rome is the achievement of European integration on a 
predominantly economic rather than on a primarily political level. 
Thus, the European Economic Community "is founded upon a cus-
toms union," 596 entailing a fusion of the markets included therein, 
but without exhausting itself solely in that feature. Rather the Com-
mon Market, as instituted, is to evolve under the aegis of a common 
and unified commercial policy 597 and of harmonized policies of the 
Member States covering other economic matters. 598 In other words, 
in the latter respects the individual Member States retain their sepa-
rate though greatly tempered jurisdictions.599 Accordingly, the Com-
mon Market is conceived as a unified but, speaking legally, not uni-
form market. 
The fusion of the markets is to be achieved by a successive re-
moval of all internal barriers against (a) the free exchange of 
goods, 600 (b) the mobility of the labor force, 601 (c) the exercise of 
a trade by citizens of the other Member States,602 (d) the right to 
work of non-resident citizens of the other Member States,603 and 
(e) the transfer of capital from one Member State to another.604 
The Common Market includes agriculture, but the Treaty estab-
lishes a separate discipline for that sector. 605 The coherence of the 
Common Market is safeguarded by provisions for a common trans-
portation policy.606 However, the Treaty has not unified the cur-
rency of the Member States. 
( 2) Reliance on the auto-mechanism of the market. The 
discipline of the Common Market, especially after the expiration 
of the transitional period, is inspired by a liberalistic approach.607 
The market is to be shaped by its own auto-mechanism as governed 
by the forces of normal competition. Therefore, the framers of the 
Treaty concentrated primarily on the removal of obstacles to, and 
506 E. E. C. Treaty art. 9· 
697 E.E.C. Treaty art. IIO, para. 2, art. III (r); see Carstens, op. cit. supra note 580, 
at 495-500. 
698 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 2, 104, 145; see also art. 103 (policies regarding cyclical 
fluctuations) and art. 105 (policies regarding currency questions). 
599 See Carstens, op. cit. suPra note 580, at 497, 498. 
000 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 12-17, 3o-37. 
001 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 48-51. 
002 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 52-58. 
603 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 59-66. 
""'E.E.C. Treaty arts. 67-73. 
606 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 38-47. 
006 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 74-84. 
007 See Reuter, op. cit. supra note 580, at II. 
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the protection of, sound competition. Only a few cautious provisions 
permit direct Community intervention in the processes of the mar-
ket. The establishment of the European Investment Bank, formed 
by the Member States,608 and the creation of the European Social 
Fund 609 may be cited as mild forms of "dirigistic" tendencies. 
Powers to take more drastic measures are conferred only with vague 
contours in the matrix of the provisions for the development of 
concordant policy by the individual states with respect to cyclical 
fluctuations. 610 
2. PATTERN OF THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION IN 
THE E.E.C. TREATY 
a. Structure and Interrelation of the Treaty 
Provisions in General 
Since the European Economic Community relies so preponder-
antly on the competitive auto-mechanism of the Common Market 
for its progress and the achievement of its aims, the framers of the 
Treaty took particular pains in providing for appropriate conditions 
and safeguards needed to assure a proper functioning of the com-
petitive process. 
Not only does Article 3 (f) specify that one of the principal activi-
ties of the Community consists in "the establishment of a regime 
which assures that competition in the Common Market is not adul-
terated," but this program is implemented by a series of detailed 
provisions to that effect. It may even be, as Professor Reuter 
claims,611 that the drafters have belabored this subject too much and 
that their afterthoughts have resulted in defective formulations. 
Theory and arrangement of the Treaty proceed on the basis that 
such deleterious restraints or adulterations of competition may re-
sult either (a) from anticompetitive practices engaged in by private 
or public enterprises operating in the market, or (b) from direct 
and open restrictions or discriminatory burdens imposed, or com-
petitive advantages granted, by the Member States, or (c) reper-
cussions on the market structure of existing or contemplated dif-
ferences and inequalities in the general legal systems of the Member 
States. Accordingly, the Treaty contains not only regulations per-
006 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 129, 130. 
609 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 123-128. 
610 E.E.C. Treaty art. 103. 
ll1l See Reuter, op. cit. supra note sSo, at 8. 
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tammg to anticompetitive practices by enterprises,612 but, in addi-
tion, an array of provisions dealing with anticompetitive measures 
by the Member States relating to public enterprises or enterprises 
with special franchises, 613 dumping,614 state subsidies,615 discrimi-
natory exactions,616 and harmonizations of the legal systems.617 
This list shows in stark relief that the anticompetitive practices 
by enterprises are only one facet of the total legal framework de-
signed to assure a common market with a truly competitive mech-
anism and that the major preoccupations of the framers of the 
Treaty focused on the distortions of the competitive process re-
sulting from specific measures of the Member States or from the 
repercussions of the divergencies in the different national legal sys-
tems. Needless to say, the comprehensive scope of the provisions 
and, at the same time, delicate task of protecting competition in the 
Common Market is reflected in the activities and attitudes of the 
Community agencies.618 
b. Protection of Competition and Protection 
Against Discrimination 
Protection of competition and protection against economic dis-
crimination are twin policies, although, on occasion, they may come 
into perplexing conflict, as any person familiar with American anti-
trust law will confirm. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Treaty 
intertwines the two principles. However, it does not lay down a 
broad proscription of all discriminations of an economic nature. On 
the one hand, it elevates the prohibition against discrimination on 
grounds of nationality to one of the cardinal principles of the Com-
munity 619 and reiterates it specifically with respect to state measures 
relative to (a) the supply of consumers by commercial state monopo-
lies 620 and (b) activities of public enterprises and enterprises with 
612 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 85-89. 
612 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 90 and 37· 
614 E.E.C. Treaty art. 91. 
615 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 92-94-
616 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 95-99. 
617 E.E.C. Treaty arts. roo-ro2. 
618 See especially von der Groeben, Probtemes de la politique europeenne de concur-
rence, [1960] BULLETIN DE LA CEE No. 3, at 5· Verloren van Themaat, Fiinf Grundsiitze 
der europiiischen Wirtschaftspolitik, 2 EuROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 535 (1959); Verloren 
van Themaat, Competition and Restrictive Business Practices in the European Eco-
nomic Community, FEDERAL BAR Ass'N. INSTITUTE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 99 (1960). 
619 E.E.C. Treaty art. 7, para. 1. 
020 E.E.C. Treaty art. 37(1). 
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special franchises. 621 On the other hand, the Treaty contains only 
a few cautious prohibitions against other discriminatory practices 
of economic import, that is, prohibitions against the imposition of 
discriminatory business terms on sellers or buyers either by enter-
prises acting in concert 622 or by enterprises with dominant positions 
in the market. 623 
c. Comparison of the Protection of Competition in 
the E.E.C. and Coal-Steel Community 
In comparing the structure and form of the protection of com-
petition in the E.E.C. Treaty with that of the Coal-Steel Commu-
nity Treaty, a few basic points become evident. On the one hand, 
the pattern and formulation of a number of the respective pro-
visions in the two Treaties have many common traits and, accord-
ingly, present analogous problems of interpretation and applica-
tion. On the other hand, there are marked fundamental differences. 
The E.E.C. Treaty, because of the comprehensive scope of the 
market and the abstention from vesting vast overriding powers 
over the market in the Community organs, focuses much more than 
the Coal-Steel Community Treaty on all facets of a balanced basis 
for competition. Conversely, the E.E.C. Treaty attributes a some-
what more modest range to the principle of non-discrimination 6~4 
and deletes all barriers against economic concentrations, confining 
itself merely to the control of abuses of monopoly power. 
B. THE PROTECTION OF COMPETITION AGAINST 
CoLLECTIVE ANTICOMPETITIVE CoNDUCT oF 
ENTERPRISES 
I. STRUCTURE, APPLICABILITY, AND SCOPE OF THE 
PROHIBITION AGAINST COLLECTIVE 
ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
a. Structure of the E.E.C. Treaty, Article 8 5 
The E.E.C. Treaty, Article 85,625 following the example of the 
Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article 65, 626 contains a specific pro-
621 E.E.C. Treaty art. 90(1). 
622 E.E.C. Treaty art. 85(1) (d). 
623 E.E.C. Treaty art. 86(c) . 
... See Reuter op. cit. supra note s&o, at 12. 
"25 For the text, see supra part I, Sec. A, I. 
""'For the text, see supra part III, Sec B, a (I). 
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hibition against collective anticompetitive conduct by enterprises. 
A comparison between the two Articles shows unmistakably that 
the former is an extrapolation of the latter. Both Articles proscribe 
collective anticompetitive action in the nature of "agreements be-
tween enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and con-
certed practices"; both Articles designate the anticompetitive char-
acter of the prohibited conduct with the terms "hinder, restrain or 
adulterate ... competition"; both Articles are couched in the 
form of a general clause followed by a list of specific categories of 
anticompetitive practices; both Articles, finally, envisage exemp-
tions from the prohibition. But there are numerous significant dif-
ferences in the two provisions relating to (I) the formulation of 
the general clause, ( 2) the classes of anticompetitive practices spe-
cifically enumerated, and ( 3) exemptions. 
(I) Formulation of the general clause of the prohibition. 
While the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article 6 5 (I), encom-
passes all enterprise actions of the specified collective nature which 
"tend," directly or indirectly, to be anticompetitive within the Com-
mon Market, the general clause of E.E.C. Treaty, Article 8 5 (I), 
applies to the defined collective enterprise actions only if they (a) 
are capable of affecting [adversely J 627 the commerce among the 
Member States and (b) have the designated anticompetitive char-
acter within the Common Market "as their object or effect." In 
other words, the prohibition of Article 8 5 (I) covers only such col-
lective conduct of anticompetitive purpose or effect which is not 
purely intra-national but adversely affects commerce between Mem-
ber States within the Common Market. 628 It is perhaps worth not-
ing in passing that the E.E.C. Treaty does not refer to "normal 
competition" as its predecessor does but merely to "competition" 
pure and simple. 
( 2) Specified categories of anticompetitive conduct. The 
E.E.C. Treaty, as compared with the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, 
expands the number and, in part, the scope of the categories of anti-
627 The addition of the adverb "adversely" is based on the German, Italian and 
Dutch version of the controlling texts. It is not required by the French version. How· 
ever, the Commission's Directorate General for Competition and the government ex· 
perts on restrictive practices seem to endorse the reading given in the text. Whether a 
given practice is capable of affecting commerce among the Member States must be 
determined on the basis of the indications available at the time that decision is made, 
E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT No. 140 (1960) . 
... According to the Commission and the government experts, the term "common 
market" refers to it as a geographical unit, 1959 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY, 38 (No.2, May 1959) i E.E.C. Commission THIRD GENERAL REPORT No. 140 
(1960). 
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competitive practices specifically listed following the general pro-
hibitory clause. The Coal-Steel Community Treaty lists only three 
special classes of such practices, price-fixing, limitations of produc-
tion, technological development, or investments, and division of 
markets or sources of supply. The E.E.C. Treaty adds two further 
categories: (a) discriminations against customers in comparable 
positions, with resulting competitive disadvantages for them, and 
(b) the insistence on tying clauses not warranted by the nature of 
the tied-in matter or commercial custom, apparently following the 
example of the analogous provisions of a French ordinance.629 
Under the E.E.C. Treaty, as under the Coal-Steel Community 
Treaty, there exists the problem as to the correct relationship be-
tween the elements of the general prohibitory clause and the defini-
tions of specified anticompetitive practices in the catalogue follow-
ing it. It seems to be beyond question that the enumerated practices 
are proscribed only if they are capable of affecting adversely the com-
merce between Member States.629a It is, however, an open question 
whether, in addition, it must be shown that they have an anticom-
petitive character as their object or effect, or whether such nature is 
conclusively presumed for the classes singled out by the Treaty. The 
answer must await further clarification in practice.629b 
( 3) Possibility of exemptions from the prohibition. Fol-
lowing the example of Coal-Steel Community Treaty, Article 
65(2), and of the French cartel decrees of 1953-1958, the E.E.C. 
Treaty provides for exemptions from the sweeping prohibition of 
Article 8 5 ( r) .630 These exceptions cover those agreements between 
enterprises, decisions of associations of enterprises, and concerted 
practices of enterprises, which the framers of the Treaty deemed 
to be capable of an over-all salutary effect. Accordingly, authoriza-
tion of an exemption is predicated on the fulfillment of four cumula-
tive conditions, namely, that the agreements, decisions or practices 
in question 
(a) contribute to the improvement of the production or distri-
bution of products, or to the promotion of technical or economic 
progress; 
629 Ordinance No. 45-1483, art. 37(a) and (c) as amended. See supra note 188 and 
text at that note; cf. also Fabre, Les Pratiques commerciales restrictives et le Traite 
de Marchi Commun, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN, 260 (No. 5). 
629
• Accord, E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT No. 140 ( 1960). 
629
• See infra, text at note 654. 
636 E.E.C. Treaty art. 8 5 ( 3) • 
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(b) leave an equitable share of the resulting gain to the con-
sumers; 
(c) refrain from subjecting the enterprises involved to restraints 
which are not indispensable for the attainment of those goals; 
(d) do not give those enterprises the power of eliminating com-
petition for a substantial portion of the products in question. 
It would seem, therefore, that the E.E.C. Treaty employs greater 
latitude in the matter of exemptions from the prohibition against 
collective anticompetitive practices than the Coal-Steel Community 
Treaty which accords such privilege only to a few designated cate-
gories of cartel agreements. 
Moreover, the former Treaty permits greater flexibility in the 
administration of the exemptions than the latter, which requires the 
High Authority to grant approval to cartel agreements whenever 
the delineated standards are met and confines the High Authority 
to a case-by-case procedure. According to E.E.C. Treaty, Articles 
85(3) and 87(2) (b), the dispensation seems to be discretionary, 
and its availability may be determined in detail by general regula-
tions, including regulations which accord blanket exemption in ad-
vance to specified categories of restrictive agreements or practices 
deemed to meet the requisite standards. 
Until the issuance of these general regulations, the appropriate 
authorities of the Member States are empowered to decide on the 
applicability of the exemptions,631 apparently by following a case-
by-case approach. 632 Finally, it should be noted that the prohibitions 
of Article 8 5 ( 1) apply to agricultural products only to the extent 
that will be determined by the Council. 633 
b. The Problem of Immediate Applicability 
E.E.C. Treaty, Article 87, requires the Council to issue regula-
tions for the purpose of implementing the prohibitions and dispen-
sations provided for in Article 8 5. In particular such regulations 
should pertain to : 
631 E.E.C. Treaty art. 88. 
682 The German Cartel Office has employed the power flowing from art. 88 in 
connection with art. 85 ( 3) and has granted a temporary dispensation for restrictive 
patent licensing agreements. Bundeskartellamt, Bericht iiber seine Tiitigkeit in Jahre 
1959, Deutscher Bundestag, 3· Wahlperiode, Drucksache 1795, 55 (1960). For one 
of these decisions see Federal Cartel Office, Adjudication Division, Order of Feb. 19, 
1959 (thread-cutting machinery), 9 WuW 259-305 (1959). 
633 E.E.C. Treaty art. 42. 
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I) measures of constraint appropriate to assure the observance 
of the prohibitions; 
2) the details governing the application of the provision for pos-
sible exemption; 
3) the scope of applicability of Article 8 5 with respect to particu-
lar branches of the economy; 
4) the delineation of the relative functions of the Court and the 
Commission in the application of these regulations; 
5) the determination of the relation between the national legal 
systems and the rules governing competition contained m 
either the Treaty or the implementing regulations. 
In view of the importance and the scope of the regulations so 
envisaged a veritable literary battle has been fought as to whether 
or not the prohibitions and possible dispensations provided in Arti-
cle 85 constitute directly and immediately applicable rules of law, 
even prior to the issuance of the regulation under Article 87.634 
63
' Of the copious literature, mention may be made of the following: Brijnen & 
Wertheimer, De Interpretatie van de Kartelbepalingen in het EWG-Frrdrag (with 
postscript by Verloren van Themaat), 5 SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 253 (I957); 
Coing-Kronstein-Schlochauer, Das F erhaltnis des deutschen Kartellrechts zu den 
kartel/rechtlichen Forschriften des EWG Fertrags, 7 SCHRIFTEN DES INST. F. AUSL. & 
INTERN. WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (I958); Dei Marmo!, Marchi commun et ententes in-
ternationales, [I957] FABRIMETAL 492; PLAISANT AND LASSIER, ENTENTES ET MARCHE 
COMMUN (Comite d'Action et d'Expansion Economique, 1960); Deringer, Zwei Jahre 
europiiische Kartel/politik, 3 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 43-47, 66-68 (I96o); Fabre, 
Les Pratiques Gommerciales Restrictives et le Traite de Marche Gommun, I REVUE 
DU MARCHE CoMMUN 260 (I958); van Geldern, Le prob/Cme de l'applicabilite directe 
des regles de concurrence dans la GEE, 5 NED. T!JDSCHR. VOOR INTERNATIONAAL R. 
366 (I958); Giinther, Die Regelung des Wettbewerbs im Fertrag zur Griindung der 
Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 7 WuW 275 ( I957); Koch, Das F erlzaltnis der 
Kartellvorschriften des EWG Fertrages zum Ges. geg. Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, 
I4 BETRIEBS-BERATER 24I ( I959) ; Obernolte, Die Wettbewerbsbedingungen im 
Gemeinsamen Markt, 3 EuROP.iiiSCHE WIRTSCHAFT 93-95, I62-164, 183-184 ( 1960) ; Pe-
ters, Die W ettbewerbsbestimmungen fur den Gemeinsamen M arkt, I EUROPXISCHE WIRT-
SCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 126, I46 ( I958) ; Reuter, Ententes et cartels (Apropos de /'appli-
cation des art. 85 et suiv.), I959 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 46 (No. 10); Schumacher, 
La Politique de la GEE en matiere d'ententes, I959 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 207 
(No. I4); Schumacher, Enthalten die Artt. 85 und 86 des EWG Fertrages bereits in 
den Mitgliedstaaten geltende Rechtsnormen? 8 WuW 779 (I958); Spengler, Die 
F ertragsbestimmungen iiber die Wettbewerbsregeln im Gemeinsamen Markt, 2I DER 
BETRIEB 75 (I959); Spengler, Abgrenzung zwischen GWG und EWG-Fertrag, in 
Miiller-Henneberg & Schwartz, GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN, Anh. zu 
§ IOI, No. 3 (I958) and in 8 WuW 73, 461 (1958); SPENGLER, DIE WETTBEWERBS-
REGELN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT, BUNDESVERBAND DER DEUTSCHEN 
INDUSTRIE, (Drucks. No. 46) ( I957) ; Steindorff, Das F erbot von Wettbewerbs-
beschrankungen in der Anfangszeit der EWG, I3 BETRIEBS-BERATER 89 (I958); 
Strickrodt, Geltungskraft und Geltungsumfang der W ettbewerbsregeln im F ertrag 
iiber den Gemeinsamen Markt, DER BETRIEB, 3 (Beilage Nr. 9l57); Snetens, De 
mededingingsregeling voor ondernemingen in het F erdrag der Europese Ekonomische 
Gemeenschap, 23 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 954 (I960); Verloren van Themaat, De 
Kartelpolitiek in der Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 5 SocrAAL-EcoN. WETGEVING 
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There is little point in reviewing the arguments pro and con or in 
discussing the many nuances of the divergent views advanced, but 
a brief survey of the practical developments and of the present 
status of the issue should be useful. 
The controversy over the legal status of the rules governing corn-
petition of enterprises in Article 8 5 and the following articles pre-
cipitated lengthy debates in the Dutch Parliament on the occasion 
of the ratification of the E.E.C. Treaty.635 The government took 
the position that the interrelation of the various provisions in these 
articles warranted the conclusion that the rule of Article 8 5 ( 2), 
which declared agreements or decisions prohibited by that article to 
be null and void, did not become operative until the enactment of the 
regulations envisaged by Article 87. This position was enshrined in 
a bill purporting to execute Article 8 8 of the Treaty. The bill was 
enacted into law on December 5, 1957.636 It provides that arrange-
ments regulating competition, as mentioned in E.E.C. Treaty, Arti-
cle 8 8, shall be unexceptionable and no misuse of a dominant posi-
tion in the Common Market, as mentioned in said Article, shall be 
deemed to be made so long as, and to the extent that, the appropri-
ate Dutch authorities have not interceded by virtue of the Cartel 
Ordinance of 1941 or the Economic Competition Act of 1956. The 
applicability of the Act was limited to a period beginning with the 
entry into force of the E.E.C. Treaty and ending with the issuance 
of the regulations under Article 87. 
The constitutionality of this legislation was drawn into issue in 
I 9 58 in a much-noted litigation pending in the District Court of 
Zutphen.637 Plaintiff and defendant had entered into an agreement 
dividing between them the Belgian and Dutch markets for a particu-
lar product. Upon the entry into force of the E.E.C. Treaty, the 
defendant, a Dutch corporation, claimed that the agreement had be-
come null and void and refused further compliance. Plaintiff sued 
for specific performance. The Court granted the relief prayed for. 
224 ( 1957) ; Verloren van Them a at, Fiinf Grundsiitze der europiiischen W ettbewerbs-
politik, 2 EUROPAISCHE \VIRTSCHAFT 335 (1960); Weebers, Kartelcontrole op de Euro-
pese Gemeenschap/ijke Markt, 35 DE NAAMLOOZE VENNOOTSCHAP 86 (1957); Thiesing 
in I GROEBEN-BOECKH, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, comments to art. 85 (1958); 
WoHLFAHRT-EVERLING-GLAESNER-SPRUNG, KoMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG comments 
to art. 85 (1960). 
686 Proceedings of the Second Chamber, Oct. 1-4, 1957; Proceedings of the First 
Chamber, Dec. 3 and 4, 1957. 
636 Staatsbl. (No. 528, 1957). 
637 S.A. Tuberies Louis Julien w. N.V. Van Katwijk's Papier en carton verw. Ind., 
1958 NED. JURISPR. 984, noted by Schumacher, 8 WuW 779 (1958), Steindorff, 13 
8ETRIEilS-BERATER 931 (1958). 
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It held that the act of December 5, I957, supported the complaint 
and that the act was not invalid because of inconsistency with 
the Treaty since Article 8 5 ( 2) could not be considered to be directly 
applicable prior to the issuance of the regulations under Article 
87.638 
In Germany the problem of the immediate and direct applicability 
of Article 8 5 (I) and ( 2) was raised in two suits to enjoin violations 
of retail price maintenance systems brought by manufacturers 
against retailers.639 In both cases, however, the courts saw no neces-
sity for passing on the issue since they found that the price-fixing 
schemes in question did not adversely affect commerce between the 
Member States. The German Cartel Office, however, has held that 
Article 8 5 (I) and ( 3) is immediately applicable and must be con-
sidered in applications to the Cartel Office for approval of patent 
licenses with restrictive clauses, submitted under Section 20 ( 3) of 
the German Restraints of Competition Act. 640 
The position of the German Cartel Office was endorsed by the 
government experts on cartels (who studied the principal problems 
arising from Articles 8 5-90 in a series of conferences convened by 
the staff of the Commission), as well as by the latter body itself and 
by the Parliamentary Assembly.641 According to the conclusions 
688 The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeal at Arnhem, 6 NED. TIJDSCHR. 
V. INTERN. RECHT 408. 
639 Court of Appeals of Dusseldorf, Order of Oct. 21, 1958, 2 W 47/58, 4 WETTBEWERB 
IN RECHT UND PRAXIS 382 (1958); 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1110 (1958); District Court of 
Frankfurt, Order of Feb. 13, 1959, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER 210 at 213 ( 1959). 
040 Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1959, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 3· Wahlperiode, Drucksache 1795, at 55 ( 1960). See Thread-cutting ma-
chinery case, Cartel Office, Adjudication Division, Order of Feb. 19, 1959, 9 WuW 
305 ( 1959). In that and the other cases dispensation was granted under E.E.C. Treaty 
85 ( 3) in conjunction with art. 88. 
641 As of May r, 1960 seven conferences of the national cartel experts had been held. 
The first of them met on Nov. 18-19, 1958 and was followed by others taking place 
on Jan. 15-16, 1959; April 14-15, 1959; June 29-30, 1959; October 8-9, 1959; Decem-
ber 15-16, 1959; March 16-17, 1960. These conferences have deliberated consecutively: 
upon the effect of articles 85 and 86; the functions of the national authorities and 
the Commission under articles 88 and 89 in the present enforcement of the rules on 
competition; the cases falling within the categories specifically listed in art. 85 ( 1); 
the characteristics of a dominant position; the impact of existing or proposed national 
procedures on the procedures to be followed on the Community level; the effect of 
art. 90 on the position of public enterprises and enterprises operating under a public 
franchise; the procurement of requisite data. For the conclusions reached see Com-
munaute Economique Europeenne, Commission, PREMIER RAPPORT GENERAL, III, 59 ff. 
(1958); DEUXIEME RAPPORT GENERAL, 85 (1959); THIRD GENERAL REPORT, III, 32-38 
(1960); BULLETIN OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Engl. ed. 26 (No. 1-58), 
37 (No. 2-59), 47 (No. 3-59); French ed. 24 (No. 1-59), 40 (No. 1-6o), 38 (No. 3-6o), 
39 (No. 4-6o); Germ. ed. 45 (No. 4-59), 49 (No. 5-59). For resumes of the con-
clusions of the first three conferences of the national experts see 9 WuW 445 ( 1959) ; 
for information on the succeeding four conferences see EuROfE, EuRATOM & MARCRE 
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reached by these authorities the wording and the interrelation of 
the various pertinent articles have the result that 
1) the prohibitions of Article 8 5 ( 1) and the provision for dis-
pensations of Article 85 (3) are immediately and directly op-
erative legal rules; 
2) the national authorities, under Article 88,642 and the Com-
mission, under Article 89,643 are jointly charged with their 
current application, the principal responsibility for this task 
resting with the national authorities; 
3) the Member States are obligated to designate the proper 
agencies for, and to regulate the applicable procedure in, the 
performance of the functions entrusted to the national au-
thorities by Article 88. 
As Italy/44 Belgium, until May 27, 1960, and Luxembourg had 
no legislation sufficient to constitute a compliance with their duty 
in that respect, the Commission addressed a letter to these three 
governments inviting them to take the necessary steps.645 
The Commission has taken great pains to point out that its posi-
tion has no necessary bearing on, and leaves still unsolved, the 
question of whether the illegality and invalidity of the prohibited 
practices, as established by Article 8 5 ( 2), can be invoked prior to 
COMMUN, DAILY BULLETIN No. 446 (June 27, 1959) j No. 528 (Oct. 16, 1959); No. 
577 (Dec. 14, 1959); No. 624 (Mar. 15, 1960). 
642 Art. 88 provides: "Until the time when the regulations issued under Article 87 
go into effect, the authorities of the Member States pass on the permissibility of 
collective practices and on the misuse of a dominant position in the Common Market 
in conformity with the law of their countries and the provisions of Article 85, in 
particular paragraph 3, and of Article 86." 
643 Art. 89 provides: "(1) Without prejudice to Article 88, the Commission, from 
the assumption of its functions, shall watch over the execution of the principles laid 
down in Articles 85 and 86. Either upon request by a Member State or upon its own 
initiative, and in conjunction with the appropriate authorities of the Member States 
which are bound to render official assistance, it shall investigate the cases in which 
infractions of these principles are suspected. If an infraction be found it proposes the 
measures appropriate to terminate the same. (2) If the infraction does not cease 
the Commission shall find the existence of such infraction in a reasoned opinion. It 
may publish that decision and authorize the Member States to take the measures 
necessary for remedying the situation, specifying their terms and details." 
"''The Italian legislature, when authorizing ratification of the E.E.C. Treaty, em-
powered the government to issue the decrees "necessary ••. to effectuate the measures 
provided by article ••• 89 ••• , [and] to accord, consistent with the combined 
content of articles 85 and 88 of the E.E.C. Treaty, the dispensations envisaged by 
art. 85 (3) of said Treaty." Law No. 1203 of Oct. 14, 1957, Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 317 
of Dec. 23, 1957 (supp. ord. 2) • 
... BULLETIN DE LA COMMUNAU:TE EcoNOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 27 (No. 1-58). In the 
interest of uniformity the Commission has expressed preference for the designation of 
administrative agencies as appropriate authorities for the per:f'~rmance of the functions 
under art. 88. C.E.E., Commission, DEUXIllME RAPPORT GENERAL 88 (1959). 
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an intervention by the appropriate authorities under Articles 8 8 and 
89.646 In other words, the issue which was actually before the Dis-
trict Court in Zutphen is still unresolved and requires ultimate clarifi-
cation by the Court of Justice.647 
c. Scope of the Prohibitions 
As might be expected, the broad formulae of the prohibitions of 
Article 8 5 (I) have shown, and are bound to show in the future, a 
marked proclivity to spawn delicate problems of interpretation re-
specting their scope. The Council sensibly has hesitated to issue the 
supplementary regulations envisaged by Article 87. As far as the 
broader contours are concerned, however, a prevailing trend of 
opinion is in the state of crystallization with a reasonable prospect 
of governing the practice. 
Generally speaking, the conduct of enterprises in order to fall un-
der the proscription of Article 8 5 (I) must possess three character-
istics. It must: 
I) be capable of adversely affecting the commerce between mem-
ber states; 
2) be of collective nature; 
3) possess anticompetitive characteristics within the meaning of 
the governing provisions. 
(I) Capability of adversely affecting the commerce be-
tween Member States. It has been observed before that only conduct 
which is capable of adversely affecting the commerce between Mem-
ber States falls under the prohibition of the Treaty. Practices which 
remain wholly intra-national in their effect remain outside the regula-
tion of Article 8 5. 648 Conversely, restrictive agreements which cover 
only the foreign commerce of a Member State without producing 
anticompetitive repercussions in the domestic market, and which for 
that reason may be permissible under national cartel laws, are never-
theless prohibited by the Treaty if they are capable of affecting the 
... C.E.E., Commission, DEUXIEME RAPPORT GENERAL 89 ( 1959) . 
... E.E.C. Treaty art. 177 requires that issues pertaining to the interpretation of the 
Treaty that are necessary for a decision by a national court of last resort must be 
certified for determination to the European Court of Justice . 
... Thus the recent short-lived German Coal and Fuel Oil cartel, formed in order to re-
lieve the technological depression of the coal industry, 'was approved by the German 
Minister of Economic Affairs on Feb. 17, 1959, by virtue of his emergency powers 
under the German Restraints of Competition Act, only after an express finding, 
pursuant to E.E.C. Treaty art. 88, to the effect that the cartel did not adversely 
affect the commerce between Member States, i.e., did not have anticompetitive effects 
outside Germany. (See the text of the decree, 9 WuW 385.) Cf. also similar findings 
by the Dusseldorf Court of Appeal and the Frankfurt District Court in the two 
opinions, supra note 63 9· 
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commerce of other nations. Export cartels, consequently, are no 
longer immune unless the effect of their operations does not spill 
over into the area of the Common Market.649 
( 2) Types of collective action reached by the prohibi-
tions. Although the wording of the prohibitions of Article 8 5 (I) is 
not entirely free from ambiguity, there seems to be a widespread 
acceptance, both in doctrine 650 and in practice,651 of the interpre-
tation which does not restrict their application to horizontal ar-
rangements but includes those of a purely vertical character. As has 
been pointed out before, a similar construction prevails for the 
analogous provision of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty.652 An 
opposite conclusion would outlaw vertical restrictive agreements 
only if they are concluded by an enterprise possessing dominant mar-
ket power. 
As a result of the prevalent view, price maintenance schemes, ty-
ing agreements, exclusive dealing and requirement contracts, etc., 
may fall under the sweep of Article 8 5 (I). The prohibition applies, 
however, only if such agreements are of an anticompetitive char-
acter within the meaning of Article 8 5 and if they are capable of 
adversely affecting the commerce between Member States. The lat-
ter element usually will be absent if such agreements, as frequently 
is the case, are confined to the national market.653 
(3) Anticompetitive character within the meaning of 
Article 8 5 (I). Finally, collective practices are prohibited only if 
they have anticompetitive character as defined in Article 8 5 (I). The 
general clause considers practices as anticompetitive if they have 
"the object or effect of hindering, restraining or adulterating com-
petition" within the Common Market. Ordinarily, therefore, a find-
ing of the presence or absence of this element will depend on an eco-
... C.E.E., Commission, PREMIER RAPPORT GENERAL, III, 59 If. (1958); Bericht des 
Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahre 1959, op. cit. supra note 640, at 
55· See also Verloren van Themaat, De Kartelpolitiek in de Europese Economische 
Gemeenschap, 5 SociAAL EcoNOMISCHE WETGEVING 224, at 227 (1957) . 
...,Verloren van Themaat, op. cit. supra note 649, at 227 (1957); Giinther, Die 
Regelung des W ettbewerbs im 1" ertrag zur Griindung der Europ. Wirtschaftsgemein-
schaft, 7 WuW 275, at 280 ( 1957); Schwartz, E.W.G.-1" ertrag und vertikale Bin-
dung en, DER MARKENARTIKEL 317 (1959); but see Guglielmetti, Les exclusivites de 
Vente, in LA LIBRE CONCURRENCE DANS LES PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN (Journees 
d'etudes de Caen, May 8-10, 1959), 1959 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN, 38, at 41 
(Suppl. to No. 16). 
861 See the decisions by the two German courts, supra note 639, and the decisions 
by the German Cartel Office in the thread-cutting machinery case and their licensing 
agreements, supra notes 632 and 640. 
662 See supra part III, text at notes 532 and 533· 
"""See the discussion of this point by Giinther, Marketing und Preisbindung der 
zweiten Hand, 9 WuW 843, at_847, 848 (1959). 
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nomic analysis of the pertinent market conditions. Whether, how-
ever, such procedure is needed even in those classes of cases which 
are specifically enumerated is subject to considerable doubt. The 
government experts on cartels apparently have not reached a definite 
agreement on that point. 654 
Particular doubts have been voiced about the status of exclusive 
dealer franchises, whether territorially circumscribed or not, and of 
requirement contracts.655 It is not clear whether or not such agree-
ments or certain types of them are included within the special cate-
gory of Article 8 5 (I) (c), covering the division of markets or 
sources of supply. If not, such arrangements would be considered as 
anticompetitive only on the basis of their object or their likely effect 
on the market. At any rate, frequently they should constitute proper 
instances for a dispensation under Article 8 5 ( 3) and Article 8 8. 
2. ENFORCEMENTS: SANCTIONS AT PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE LAW 
a. Sanctions at Public Law 
The enforcement of the prohibitions of Article 8 5 by public au-
thorities has already been discussed in various respects. Basically the 
Treaty of Rome adopts a system of decentralization, at least until 
the issuance of regulations under Article 87. It differs sharply in 
this respect from the regime of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty 
which vests the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence of a 
violation of its anticartel provisions in the High Authority. 656 The 
national authorities, whether administrative agencies or courts im-
posing penalties, employ their own methods of procedure and sanc-
tions, so far as made applicable, but they determine the legality or 
illegality of the conduct in issue by reference to the prohibitions and 
dispensations of Article 8 5 (I) and ( 3). 
The form and scope of judicial review are likewise determined by 
the national legal systems,657 with the qualification, however, that 
relevant questions as to the interpretation of the Treaty must be 
resolved by the Court of Justice prior to a decision of a national 
court of last resort.658 
""'See the report on the 5th meeting of the government cartel experts, BuLLETIN 
OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 46 (No. 4-59), 49 (No. 5-59). 
665 See the report by Guglielmetti, Les exclusivites de vente, at the Caen meeting, 
and the discussion thereof, op. cit. supra note 6 so, at 41 and 54; see also Schwartz, 
op. cit. supra note 6so. 
658 E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 65{4), para. 2. 
""7 Nebolsine, The 'Right of Defense' in the Control of Restrictive Practices under 
the European Community Treaties, 8 AM. J. CoMP. L. 433 at 444 (1959). 
"""E.E.C. Treaty art. 177. 
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b. Private Law Consequences of f'iolations 
Unquestionably the most perplexing problems in the application 
of the Treaty rules on competition for enterprises concern the pri-
vate law consequences of infractions. Generally speaking, such con-
sequences may be of two principal types: 
I) unenforceability (invalidity) of a proscribed transaction; 
2) civil liability in tort for the proscribed practice (whether or 
not constituting a transaction). 
(I) Invalidity of anticompetitive agreements. Article 
8 5 ( 2) declares flatly: "Agreements and decisions which are pro-
hibited by this article are absolutely void." Despite the categorical 
nature of this clause, its meaning and effect have been the object 
of violent arguments, as was pointed out in the previous section.659 
The heart of the conflict as it remains 660 concerns the question of 
whether this section applies unqualifiedly under the regime of Arti-
cles 88 and 89, i.e., prior to the issuance of regulations under Article 
87, or whether during this period agreements remain enforceable 
as long as the appropriate authorities have not determined their 
illegality on the combined basis of Article 8 5 ( I) and ( 3). 661 If 
unenforceability can be predicated only on an intervention by the 
appropriate authorities, the further question arises as to whether 
a finding of a violation by these authorities depends exclusively on 
an extremely delicate interpretation of the Treaty. No conclusive 
solution can be suggested until the Court of Justice has spoken. 
( 2) Tort liability for participation in anticompetitive 
practices. Even greater mystery surrounds the question as to the 
possible tort liability of enterprises which actively participate in col-
lective restrictive practices. Like Article 6 5 of the Coal-Steel Com-
munity Treaty, Article 8 5 and the following Articles of the E.E.C. 
Treaty contain no direct rules on the civil responsibility attendant 
upon infractions. Hence the answer must depend on the complex 
and delicate issue of how the Treaty discipline governing the com-
petition of enterprises is interlaced with the general fabric of na-
tional law. 
Certainly the indicated enigma will plague the profession until 
the issuance of regulations under Article 87. Whether that Article 
empowers the Council to determine the matter on a supranational 
level is difficult to predict. Article 87 ( 2) (e) envisages the adoption 
659 See supra text at note 634-
600 See supra text at note 646, 
661 See the careful analysis of the various positions and arguments by Schumacher, 
La politique de Ia GEE en matiere d'ententes, 1959 REVUE nu MARCHE CoMMUN 207. 
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of rules "for the purpose of defining the relation between the na-
tional legal systems on the one hand and the provisions contained in, 
or enacted pursuant to, the article." This may imply that the Coun-
cil could specify whether or not violations constitute a tort under 
national laws. If such an interpretation were rejected, the Treaty 
provisions relative to the harmonization of the national legisla-
tion 662 might be the proper avenue for reaching uniformity. 
Prior to such action, however, the situation is quite perplexing. 
If the view is followed that the transitional regime of Articles 88 
and 89 requires intervention by the public authorities before the 
prohibitions of Article 8 5 (I) can be invoked by private parties, no 
tort liability for violation under national laws could ensue, except 
after disregard of such repressive action. Conversely, if the position 
is taken that the invalidity of collective anticompetitive transactions 
can be invoked by private parties directly and immediately, it would 
be consistent to conclude that the same rule applies to the assertion of 
illegality. Whether, however, such illegal conduct actually amounts 
to a tort which entitles injured private parties to redress is a further 
question which still would require additional analysis of both the 
nature of the Treaty provisions and the basis of tort liability under 
national laws. 
In Germany, for example, as has been pointed out before,663 tort 
liability in such cases conceivably may be rested on four statutory 
grounds (Civil Code, Sections 823 I, 823 II, 826, and Law Against 
Unfair Competition, Section I), among which the second is the 
most important one. It predicates liability in damages upon any 
culpable violation of a "law, enacted for the purpose of protecting a 
third party." The question thus reduces itself to the issue of whether 
Article 8 5 is such a law or whether it is merely a regulation enacted 
in the interest of guaranteeing a sound market policy. Since the 
German Supreme Court has differentiated in that way even with 
respect to various sections of its own national Restraint of Compe-
tition Act 664 no answer to the problem can safely be predicted at 
this time. 
662 E.E.C. Treaty arts. 10o-102. For a good discussion see Barmann, Die Euro-
piiischen Gemeinschaften und die Rechtsangleichung, 14 }URISTENZEITUNG 553 (1959). 
663 See supra part II sec. A, zb and part III, sec. B, 1b. 
004 Thus the German Supreme Court has based tort liability vis-a-vis competitors 
on the establishment of unregistered resale price maintenance schemes {Eau de 
Cologne case, decision of Oct. 8, 1958, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1075, at IOJ9 (1958)) 
and on discriminatory exclusion from a trade association (decision of Feb. z5, · 1959, 
14 BETRIEBS-BERATER 356, 357 (1959)). Conversely, it has denied the quality of "a law 
enacted for the protection of a third party" to the provisions of the Restraint of 
Competition Law governing requirement contracts (decision of Oct. zo, 1959, 14 
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It must clearly be understood, however, that a position according 
to which a violation of the provisions of Article 8 5 is not a tort 
in and by itself by no means compels the conclusion that all such 
conduct is immune from civil responsibility. Rather, liability will be 
entailed if such practice constitutes a private wrong by the separate 
standards of national law. 
C. PROTECTION AGAINST MISUSE OF DOMINANT 
MARKET PowER 
I. SCOPE AND EFFECT OF ARTICLE 86 
a. Scope of Prohibition 
Like the Coal-Steel Community Treaty (in its Article 66(7)) the 
E.E.C. Treaty (in Article 86) includes a special prohibition against 
the abusive exploitation of a dominant position 665 within the Com-
mon Market or a significant part thereof by one or several enter-
prises, with, however, the important qualification that this injunction 
applies only to the extent that such misuse is "capable of adversely 
affecting the commerce among the Member States." 
Again, as in Article 8 5 ( 1), the general clause of the prohibition 
is followed by a catalogue of four types of practices in which such 
misuse may consist in particular. These practices are: 
I) the direct or indirect imposition of inequitable purchase or 
sales prices or other business terms; 
2) the limitation of production, outlets, or technical develop-
ment to the prejudice of the consumers; 
3) the application, vis-a-vis other parties in business deals, of 
unequal terms for equivalent goods or services, thereby in-
flicting upon them competitive disadvantages; 
4) predicating the conclusion of contracts upon the condition 
that the other parties accept supplementary goods or services 
which neither by their nature nor business usage are related 
to the object of these contracts. 
BETRIEBS-BERATER 1229) and to the rules against price discrimination in the E.C.S.C. 
Treaty (decision of April 14, 1959, 30 BGHZ 74). 
666 The Commission and the government experts on cartels, at their sth Conference 
on restrictive practices of enterprises, studied the criteria and data by which the 
existence of a dominant position ought to be determined. It was decided to embark 
on a statistical inquiry covering various economic sectors in which special conditions 
exist, such as the public utilities field, banking and insurance; see the reports in 
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 46 (No. 4-59), 49 
(No. 5-59); EUROPE, DAILY BULLETIN, EURATOM & MARCHE COMMllN No. 528 (Oct. 
16, 1959). 
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As can be seen, therefore, Article 86 in its structure is quite analo-
gous to Article 8 5 (I). Accordingly, the same general problems as 
to the interrelation of the various clauses arise.666 There is, how-
ever, one important difference. Article 86 does not provide for dis-
pensation from the prohibition. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that Article 87 does authorize the issuance of regulations "for the 
purpose of defining the scope of applicability of Article 86 for par-
ticular branches of the economy." 667 
b. Practical Significance 
Article 86 can hardly be expected to be of paramount practical 
significance especially if, as commonly assumed, Article 8 5 (I) is 
to be construed to apply to purely vertical restrictive agreements 
falling within the categories specifically defined in that article. In 
such cases Articles 8 5 and 86 will be largely overlapping. 
Nonetheless, it would be a grave mistake to conclude that there 
cannot or will not be important types of situations in which Article 
86, particularly its general clause and its first two classes of specially 
proscribed practices, will furnish the only palliative against anti-
competitive actions by enterprises with dominant market power. 
This will be the case, in the first place, in all instances where such 
enterprises create artificial scarcities or in other ways misuse their 
economic power, without acting by means of agreements or in con-
cert with other enterprises. In the second place, the special classes 
defined in Article 8 5 (I) (a) and Article 86 (a) resemble one 
another only in a most superficial fashion and actually cover quite 
different matters. To be sure, both may relate to purely vertical 
666 See the conclusions to that effect reached at the 5th Conference of government 
experts on cartels, BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 49 
(No. 5-59). 
667 A possible limitation of the applicability of art. 86 flows from the special pro-
vision of art. 90 (2). Art. 90 (I) prescribes in general terms that the Member States 
shall not take or retain measures in conflict with this Treaty and, in particular, with 
arts. 7 and 85 to 95 in respect to public enterprises or enterprises to which they have 
accorded special or exclusive rights. Art. 90 (2), however, adds the following qualifica-
tion: "Enterprises charged with the management of services of general public interest 
or possessing the character of a fiscal monopoly are subject to the provisions of this 
Treaty, especially the rules of competition to the extent that the application of these 
provisions does not prevent, legally or factually, the performance of the tasks con-
ferred upon them. The development of trade must not be impaired in a degree which 
contravenes the interest of the Community." The interpretation of Art. 90( I) and 
(2) has been the subject of study by the Commission's Directorate General for Com-
petition and the government experts on reMrictive practices and of discussions with 
the Member States, E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT III, 37 (I96o); 
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN EcoNOMIC COMMUNITY, Germ. ed. 50 (No. 5-59); Engl. 
ed. 38 (No. 4-60). 
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stipulations relating to prices and other business terms. But Article 
8 5 ( 1 ) (a) concerns the fixing of prices or business terms which the 
other party to the agreement must observe in its dealings with third 
persons, while Article 86 (a) applies to bargains which the enter-
prise with dominant market power is able to exact from its suppliers 
or customers for its own benefit. 
2. SANCTIONS AGAINST, AND PRIVATE LAW 
CONSEQUENCES OF, MISUSE OF 
DOMINANT MARKET POWER 
Little needs to be added with reference to the sanctions against, 
or the private law consequences of, misuses of dominant market 
power. In every important respect the situation is parallel to that 
existing relative to the collective restraints on competition. 
Until enactment of the regulations under Article 87 the national 
authorities and the Commission are jointly responsible for the sup-
pression of misuses of dominant market power.668 Although Article 
86 declares flatly that the misuse defined thereby is prohibited, the 
questions of whether, under the regime of Articles 88 and 89, agree-
ments constituting such misuse are unenforceable without previous 
intervention by the authorities and whether practices falling under 
that article render the perpetrator liable in tort under national laws 
will require answers depending on the same considerations and 
reaching the same results as were discussed in the previous part of 
this chapter. 
D. PROTECTION AGAINST DUMPING 
The treaty provisions against anticompetitive practices and meas-
ures, especially as contained in Articles 8 5-90, are supplemented 
by Article 9 I which establishes a separate regime for the suppres-
sion of dumping, applicable during the transitional period. Accord-
ing to Article 9 I (I), if the Commission, upon request by a Member 
State or an interested party, finds that a private enterprise or public 
entity engages in dumping practices within the Common Market, 
it shall direct a recommendation to cease and desist to the respon-
sible person or persons. If the parties persist in the dumping prac-
... The Commission and the national authorities have worked out a consultation 
procedure which must be followed prior to any decision under Articles 85 and 86 
on the national level, E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT III, 36 ( 1960) ; 
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, French ed. 49 (No. I-6o); Bericht 
des Bundeskartellamtes iiber seine Tiitigkeit im Jahrr 1959, Deutscher Bundestag, 3· 
Wahlperiode, Drucksache I79S, at S7 ( 196), 
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tices, the Commission shall authorize the injured Member State 
to take the appropriate countermeasures as determined by the Com-
missiOn. 
In order to arrive at a proper application of the mandates of 
Article 91 (I), the Commission, on June 25 and 26, I9591 con-
vened a conference of government experts from the six Member 
States. As the Treaty does not expressly define the term dumping 
practices, it was decided to utilize the definition given in General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) Article VI as a 
suitable working basis. 669 
Article 92 ( 2) establishes a further palliative against dumping, 
by making it unattractive for the parties to engage in such prac-
tices because of a device described as "boomerang." Article 9 2 ( 2) 
provides that, from the entry into force of the Treaty, goods that 
have been produced or have been in free circulation in one country 
and have been exported to another country may not be subject to 
customs duties, quantity restrictions or equivalent measures, if they 
are re-imported to the country from which they were exported. The 
details are left to a regulation of the Council. The pertinent regu-
lation was issued on March 1 I, I 960.670 
660 For details regarding the interpretation and enforcement of Article 91 (I) see 
E.E.C. Commission, THIRD GENERAL REPORT III 38-40 (1960). 
670 [1960] J'L OFF. 597· 
Chapter XI 
Taxation 
J. van Hoorn, Jr. and L. Hart Wright* 
INTRODUCTION 
This study on the foreign and United States tax implications 
encountered by American industry in rendering services, or dispos-
ing of products, in the European Common Market is designed for 
the benefit of those who have little or no understanding of the 
subject matter. While this analysis constitutes the most compre-
hensive published integrated study of the subject, it falls far short 
of answering every question with which a specialist in foreign tax 
affairs must ultimately come to grips. After all, the economies 
of the six nations which make up that market are almost as sophis-
ticated as that in the States, and this means that their tax structures 
will be almost equally complicated. While those nations do not 
publish rulings and regulations in a degree comparable to the 
Federal practice, and thus do provide less raw interpretative data, 
nevertheless, one cannot expect in a few hundred pages to develop 
in meaningful sequence all of the known variations in their tax 
patterns, particularly if room is required to accommodate inte-
gration of relevant American tax principles and costs. The aim here 
does not go beyond providing detailed orientation to a degree that 
*Most of the basic data concerning foreign taxes was prepared in the form of a 
rough draft by Mr. J. van Hoorn, Jr., in cooperation with the International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation (Herengracht 196, Amsterdam) of which he is the managing 
director. Mr. van Hoorn also serves as a tax consultant and is co-author of a three 
volume treatise in Dutch on the principles of taxation, "Het Belastingrecht Zijn 
Grondslagen En Ontwikkeling," (L. J. Veen's Uitgeversmij. N.V., Amsterdam, 1954, 
zd ed.). In addition to authorship of other tax articles, he is director of the tax 
volumes in the twelve volume series, "Recueils Pratiques du Droit des Affaires dans 
les Pays du Marche Commun." 
Revision of this Chapter into a final manuscript and original development of the 
materials dealing with American tax implications were the responsibilities of Pro-
fessor Wright (Professor of Law, University of Michigan; formerly Professor of 
Tax Law, Advanced Training Center, Internal Revenue Service (1954-1956}; Con-
sultant to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1956, 1959-1960}; author, "Basic 
Income Tax Law For Internal Revenue Agents and Office Auditors," Internal Revenue 
Service ( 1957) ; and author of various tax articles.) 
343 
344 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
one may formulate tentative plans and identify those questions 
which must then be referred to the specialist. To this end, the study 
is divided into six PARTS, the sequence being geared generally to 
the evolutionary stages through which an American business might 
logically expand its foreign operations. 
PART I contains a country-by-country survey of the tax systems 
employed by the Common Market countries; it provides back-
ground essential to a true understanding of the tax differentials 
later dramatized by functionalized comparisons in PARTS II, III, 
and V. The discussion in PART i of each country's tax structure 
has been arranged according to a more or less common pattern. 
Consideration of a particular country's income and enterprise taxes 
is followed by an analysis of its property and turnover taxes. With 
respect to income taxes, immediately following a description of the 
overall tax pattern and the rate structure applicable to individuals 
and corporations, the focus shifts to the prevailing notion of gross 
income including the treatment of capital gains. An analysis of 
deductions and certain special problems follows. Included in the 
latter are accounting problems, the matter of taxable years, and 
differences in tax treatment where an American company establishes 
a foreign subsidiary, as distinguished from a permanent establish-
ment in the nature of a branch. 
The truly functionalized comparative study, including integration 
of American tax principles and costs, begins in PART II with 
an analysis of the overall tax effects encountered by an American 
company when it first seeks to enter the Common Market through 
development of direct exports to customers situated there. The 
first prime concern in that setting involves the extent to which 
promotional and sales activity can be carried on in the Common 
Market itself without subjecting any part of the export profits to 
their income taxes. Compared also are the turnover taxes which 
would be imposed by each member nation, including some indica-
tion of the way these may multiply, depending on the manner in 
which the sale is handled. Integration of these into the American 
tax pattern is followed by a consideration of the circumstances in 
which exports can be immunized from the manufacturers' excise 
tax. The direct export story then concludes with an analysis of the 
considerations which affect the competitive tax position of American 
exporters when compared to other exporters as well as with pro-
ducers in the Common Market itself. 
For a variety of reasons, an American exporter may conclude 
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that those products destined for foreign markets should actually 
be manufactured abroad, in whole or in part. Execution of a 
licensing and "know-how" agreement between the American com-
pany and an established European firm may be preferred by the 
less venturesome as against establishment abroad of an American 
owned manufacturing facility. A complementary motive may be to 
assure a ready outlet for certain components which will continue to 
be manufactured at home. In any event, second only to the develop-
ment of direct export trade-where also little capital, if any, is 
ventured abroad-direct licensing arrangements enjoy the least 
complicated foreign tax effects. Accordingly, it seemed appropriate 
that the fairly simple comparative foreign income and turnover tax 
effects, including integration of American tax costs, should also be 
dealt with in PART II, immediately following analysis of the ex-
port situation. 
Put off for discussion in PART III are the more sophisticated 
sales and licensing arrangements, involving use of the same or-
ganizational devices which might house a manufacturing facility, 
specifically a foreign permanent establishment in the nature of a 
branch or a foreign subsidiary. In order to facilitate comparison 
of the foreign tax effect on these in each of the member nations, 
the discussion in PART III proceeds first, in Sections B and C, on 
the assumption that a facility is to be established to serve only one 
member nation. Comparison is made in Section B of the total direct 
tax load (income, enterprise, and property taxes) which each 
country would impose if it were chosen as the locale. Integration 
in Section C of the American tax costs also provides the occasion 
for a basic analysis of the reasons why, and instances where, there 
are differences in the overall or combined tax costs of doing busi-
ness through a foreign branch as distinguished from a subsidiary. 
Emergence of a differential which generally favors the subsidiary 
arrangement is traced, leading, inter alia, to a more or less com-
plete discussion of the provisions regarding the deductien and 
credit for foreign taxes allowed by the United States in the setting 
of a single-tier foreign facility. Discussion of the limitations of the 
credit will serve, illustratively, to explain-in terms of preferred 
tax locales-why a country like Belgium, which relies primarily on 
an income tax, enjoys a relative advantage over a country like 
Germany which looks also to annual net wealth taxes on corpo-
rations as well as on individuals for a significant part of its direct 
tax revenue. 
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The foreign and American tax ramifications of the next stage in 
the life line of an expanding Common Market facility, i.e., the cir-
cumstance where it begins to engage in direct exports to customers 
in other member nations, is taken up in Section D of PART III. 
An analysis of the bilateral income tax treaties among nations of 
the Common Market is followed in that Section by an indication of 
the arrangements which serve to whittle down the likelihood of 
multiple turnover taxes. The Section concludes by supplying the 
reasons behind an admonition bearing on the tax considerations 
which should be taken into account in choosing a locale for that 
facility which will export into other member nations. 
The succeeding Section E examines the further foreign and 
American tax ramifications which will arise if the operating facility 
in one member nation intensifies its development of markets in 
other member nations by establishing therein its own branch or 
a sub-subsidiary. Discussion of the extent to which there will be 
two foreign income taxes on the second facility's profits-the likeli-
hood depending on the organizational nature of the facility and the 
choice of locale, is followed by an examination of the way the 
American credit for foreign taxes would respond to such a two-tier 
arrangement. 
Compared with the foregoing, in the following Section F, are 
the tax implications which would be associated with the American 
parent company's own establishment of "sister" branches or sub-
sidiaries. 
Widespread and expanding operations of that type logically 
focus attention, in Section G, on the tax advantages which could be 
achieved if a foreign holding or "base" company were superimposed 
on the operating facilities, provided, of course, a favorable tax 
climate for the holding company could be found. The importance 
of this latter condition is highlighted by comparing, as possible 
locales, certain Common Market countries with certain so-called 
"tax havens" located adjacent to that market, the indication being 
that the Netherlands and in a lesser degree, Luxembourg, provide 
a tax regime as favorable as any. 
PART III then concludes with an indication of the tax implica-
tions encountered where a foreign facility in the Common Market 
exports directly to customers outside the Community. 
It seemed unwise to interrupt PART III's evolving and inte-
grated tax story of an expanding and ever more penetrating foreign 
operation with diversions into certain American tax matters which, 
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together, might be subsumed under a tax accounting label. Accord-
ingly, the methodology and timing aspect, as they relate to con-
version of foreign profits into American dollars, are covered in 
PART IV in the setting of blocked as well as unblocked foreign 
currencies. Also dealt with there is the conversion problem as it 
relates to the American credit for foreign taxes. 
Even the most simple penetration of a foreign market, a direct 
export arrangement, may lead an American company to assign cer-
tain American employees abroad as promotional representatives. 
The likelihood is even greater if a permanent establishment or sub-
sidiary is created in the Common Market. The function of PART 
V is to compare the foreign tax loads which would be imposed on 
such persons, indicating at the same time the way in which Ameri-
can tax law responds to the situation. Foreigners employed by the 
Common Market facility, as well as Americans stationed there, 
may be expected to make brief business visits to the States-com-
bined perhaps with a vacation. Other Americans, normally sta-
tioned in the States, may also make brief business trips abroad. 
The ensuing tax complications and the degree to which the inter-
ested nations have avoided double taxation in these circumstances, 
are also subjects of discussion in PART V. 
Whereas the first five PARTS are concerned with the tax 
pattern existing in July 196o,l PART VI attempts to survey 
changes which might be expected in the future with respect to 
Common Market taxes and such American tax principles as affect 
companies interested in the market outlet provided by the Euro-
pean Economic Community. 
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PART I. THE TAX SYSTEMS OF 
COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES 
(A Country By Country Survey) 
SECTION A. BELGIUM 
SUBSECTION I. INCOME TAXES 
(a) In general.-Unlike the single federal income tax uti-
lized by the United States, the Belgian national government employs 
a series of different income taxes. Income of individuals and juridical 
entities is first divided by reference to its type into three primary 
categories, each of which is subjected to a different tax. A fourth 
tax, applicable only to individuals, is superimposed on these sepa-
rately scheduled assessments; it is applied to the aggregate income 
from the three primary sources. A fifth tax, enacted during the 
critical days of the 1930's and known as the Contribution Nationale 
de Crise, is imposed on selected items of income belonging to two 
of the three primary categories, as well as on distributed profits of 
some juridical entities. 
The first of the prime categories comprises income from all real 
property situated in Belgium. Whereas gross income for American 
tax purposes would normally include the actual income from such 
property, only an estimated amount has been included in Belgium. 
This estimate, made according to a Land Register (cadastre), 
is often much less than the actual income. Once made by reference 
to average net yield, the estimate thereafter remains constant for 
a period of 20 years. The contemplated periodic revision of the 
estimates has not been undertaken in recent years, though a new 
estimate-expected to be much closer to actual income-is under 
considerationY This "income" is subject to a modest flat rate na-
tional tax (Contribution Fonciere) ; to this is added the progressive 
rate of the national crisis tax and substantial local surcharges. 
Another, but different, flat rate tax (Taxe Mobiliere) applies to 
actual income from investments in personal property, though here 
'"This method has the advantage that the tax will be the same, irrespective of 
whether the property is used by the taxpayer himself or leased, 
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variations in the flat rate do exist, depending on whether the income 
item is a dividend, interest, royalty, etc. It applies also to income 
from real property situated abroad. Where such an investment is 
made by a silent partner of a partnership or of a Belgian private 
company, the income is subject also to the national crisis tax and 
at progressive rates. Foreign partnership or private company in-
come is subject to Yard of the ordinary rates of this latter tax.2 
A graduated tax, known as the Taxe Professionnelle, is applied 
to the third basic type of income, i.e., to that derived from the 
conduct of a trade or business, including also professions, voca-
tions, or an employment. Corporations with outstanding shares may 
avoid the greater part of this progressive tax by distributing their 
profits. But in such case, a flat rate tax under the selective Contribu-
tion Nationale de Crise is assessed against the corporation by refer-
ence to the amount of the gross dividend. At that same point the 
shareholder would be assessed under the basic, separately scheduled 
and previously described, flat rate Taxe Mobiliere. 
A final type of tax (Impot Complementaire Personnel) is ap-
plicable only to individuals. It is designed to apply a graduated rate 
to the individual's aggregate income from the three basic sources 
first mentioned (real property, personal property, and business or 
employment activity). 
A more detailed analysis of the cumulative effect of these various 
taxes follows. 
(b) Taxes on estimated income from realty.-Apart from 
the progressive tax on an individual's aggregate income from all 
sources, at least three different taxes are applied to administratively 
determined advance estimates of "imputed" income derived by 
juridical entities or individuals from ownership of real property. 
The first, a national 6% flat rate, is complemented by the graduated 
national crisis tax, the progressive rates of which range from 2 to 
15%. Local units then surcharge the national flat rate imposition, 
and these surcharges are said to approximate an average rate 
of about 36%.3 Table I A indicates the cumulative effect of the 
three rates. 
One procedure, very similar to that followed by American states 
in imposing real property taxes, has served in practice to cushion 
what might seem to be a rather high cumulative rate pattern. The 
• For the tax treatment of foreign income, see sub-topic ( j), infra. 
• This average differs from that given in a Belgian official publication, where a 
figure of 30% is used. 
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TABLE I A 
REAL PROPERTY RATE SCHEDULE 
Estimated Income 
o/o re the /1 dditional Tax 
Belgian Frann Dollar.< o/o re Flat National (Local Gov't) 
From To From To Rate Tax Crisis Tax Average o/o Total o/o 
0 2,999 $ 0 $ 59 6 2 g6 44 
g,ooo 9.999 6o 199 6 3 g6 45 
10,000 2-h999 200 499 6 4 36 46 
zs,ooo 49.999 soo 999 6 6 36 48 
50,000 99.999 1,000 1,999 6 8 36 so 
100,000 149.999 2,000 2,999 6 10 36 52 
ISO,ooo 199.999 3,000 3.999 6 12-5 g6 54·5 
200,000 and over 4,000 and over 6 15 36 57 
administratively determined amount of estimated income from each 
piece of real property remains unchanged for long periods of time. 
Because the economic criteria used in fixing the present effective 
base pre-dates the Second World War, the amount of estimated 
income assigned to any given piece of real property is not nearly 
as high as the present true annual use value. The effective base, 
according to one authority, constitutes not more than one-fifth of 
the true amount. This compensating factor is offset in part, but only 
in the case of real property used in connection with industrial 
activity, in that the base otherwise determined is increased by 
one-half. 
Accordingly, if the true annual use value of a small factory 
building and the tract of land on which it is situated approximates 
$6,ooo (B.Frs. JOO,ooo), the taxable estimated income is not 
likely to exceed $I,8oo ($6,ooo X Yo X I~) for which the typical 
stated cumulative average rate is so% or $900, which means an 
effective rate of I 5%. 
(c) Taxes on income from investments in personalty.-The 
Taxe Mobiliere, generally collected on a withholding basis, in-
corporates different flat rates for various types of income derived 
from investments in personal property. Dividends received from 
companies, the capital of which is divided into shares, are taxed at 
30% while debenture interest and royalties are taxed at I 8% 
though this latter rate is reduced approximately to I 2.2% if the 
debtor, rather than the creditor, actually bears and pays the tax.4 
• Profits distributed to a silent partner of a partnership are taxed at zso/o under the 
Taxe Mobiliere and at 2% to 15% under the national crisis tax. 
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Assessment of this tax against stockholders with respect to 
dividends is complemented by a flat rate national crisis tax, assessed 
against the corporation, on the same gross dividend. Moreover, if 
the shareholder is an individual, the dividend will be aggregated with 
his other income in fixing the base against which a third tax, the 
progressive Impot Complementaire Personnel, is applied. These 
two additional taxes are considered in more detail below. 
The Taxe Mobiliere is also applicable to income from foreign 
real property, but, as is true in the case of income from foreign 
personalty, the rate is reduced to a flat 12%. 
(d) Taxes on retained income from trade or business ac-
tivity.-The Taxe Professionnelle applies a graduated rate to in-
come derived from a profession, employment, or from trade-or-
business activity carried on by corporations, partnerships, or in-
dividuals. It differs from the American federal income tax in two 
major respects. First, income from investments in personal prop-
erty, such as stocks or bonds, as well as any imputed income derived 
from real property is beyond the reach of this particular tax. 
Second, in the case of corporations and partnerships, this exaction 
is only applied to undistributed profits. The type of taxes applied 
to distributed profits depends, as is later noted, upon the character 
of the distributing juridical entity. Because these latter taxes do 
serve as a substitute for the Taxe Professionnelle in the case of 
distributed profits, a credit arrangement has been worked out to 
accommodate those situations where retained profits which have 
been subjected to the Taxe Professionnelle are distributed in a 
later year, at which time they become subject to the other taxes. 
The progressive rate schedule of the basic tax applicable to un-
distributed business profits of juridical entities appears in Table I B. 
TABLE I B 
On That Part of Taxable Income: 
Belgian Francs U.S. Dollars Rate 
From o to 150,000 From$ oto $ 3,000 25.0% 
From 1 so,ooo to soo,ooo From 3,oooto Io,ooo 3o.o% 
From soo,ooo to I,ooo,ooo From 101000 tO 20,000 35.o% 
From I,ooo,ooo to Io,ooo,ooo From 2o,ooo to 200,000 37·5% 
From IO,ooo,ooo and over From 200,000 and over 4o.o% 
In appraising this schedule, account should be taken of two ad-
ditional factors. First, the Taxe Professionnelle is actually levied 
on the income of businesses and liberal professions in the year 
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following the year in which the income was derived, and in principle 
the amount, as distinguished from the rate, of tax is increased by 
20%. But this increase may be avoided en toto if the ultimate tax 
was accurately estimated and paid in advance, i.e., before the 15th 
day following the first half of the taxpayer's taxable year (account-
ing year). Again, the increase will amount only to 10% if an ac-
curate estimate was made and paid before the I 5th day following 
the close of the taxpayer's taxable year. Absent advance payment, 
or where the amount paid in advance is less than the tax ultimately 
due, the amount which has not been paid in advance is increased by 
20%. In effect, the portion of the income not reflected in the esti-
mates would, if otherwise subject to the 40% rate, suffer a 48% 
rate. 
Second, unlike the American income tax, on the final due date 
in the year succeeding the taxable year, the professional tax be-
comes a deduction in computing the taxable profits of that same 
succeeding year. The effect of this feature can be illustrated by 
reference to that part of any yearly profits subjected to the stated 
40% ceiling rate. In the first year in which an enterprise operates, 
that ceiling rate would, of course, be the effective rate on income 
falling in the top bracket. In the second year, the stated 40% rate 
on such income would become an effective 24% rate, and in the 
succeeding years, the stated 40% rate would be tantamount to a 
shifting effective rate ranging between 30% and 28%. 
The quite different rate schedule, applicable under the Taxe 
Professionnelle to the net business or employment income of an 
individual, is presented in Table I C. 
TABLE I c 
RATES ON NET INCOME AFTER ITEMIZED OR 
STANDARD DEDUCTIONS 










1,ooo,ooo and over 
$ 
Frum To 




20,000 and over 
Tax Rate 





The remuneration of corporate directors who are members of 
the board of control and do not have a regular job with the com-
pany is subject to the normal rates with a 20% surcharge. 
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This surcharge is independent of, and its application will precede, 
the quite different and previously discussed additional tax of zo% 
which is applied against the amount ultimately due if the latter was 
not paid in advance either through withholding or estimated pay-
ments. Illustratively, if a corporate director's basic rate under the 
regular income tax is 30%, the special surcharge added with refer-
ence to remuneration received as a director will increase the rate 
to 36% ( zo% X 30% = 6%), and this will be increased again by 
another zo%, bringing the rate to 43.2% ( 20% X 36% = 7.2%), 
if not paid in advance. 
Generally, the tax on salaries and wages (including those paid to 
company directors) is withheld at the source, the exception being 
the tax payable by managers (working partners) of the so-called 
socihes de personnes (partnerships, limited partnerships, and 
closely held corporations). 
(e) Taxes on distributed profits of an enterprise.-As pre-
viously noted, the Taxe Professionnelle applies only to undistrib-
uted business profits. Selection of the particular taxes which apply 
to distributed profits turns on the character of the distributing 
juridical entity. 
Entities, the capital of which is divided into shares, pay a flat 
national crisis tax of 20% on gross dividends. Viewed separately, 
this would mean that a corporation would need a profit of $120 in 
order to distribute a $roo gross dividend. However, since the $20 
is not itself distributed, the corporation will also be burdened with 
the Taxe Professionnelle, which at the maximum 40% rate, would 
give rise to an additional tax of $8 on the $20 of retained earnings. 
The overall maximum effect is that a corporation must enjoy a 
profit of $r28 in order to pay a $roo dividend.5 The two taxes just 
described will then be complemented by the previously discussed 
personal property income tax (Taxe Mobiliere), assessed on a 
withholding basis, against the shareholder, the rate being a flat 
30% against the gross dividend of $roo. Apart then from the yet 
separate progressive tax on an individual's aggregate income from 
all sources, that part of a corporation's profits which is distributed 
will suffer a maximum tax of approximately 45% eo+ 8 + JO ). 
128 
Where the capital of a jointly conducted enterprise is not divided 
5 It must be understood that this is the maximum possible effect. As the share of 
current profits which are distributed increases, the likelihoood that the enterprise will 
reach the stated rate of 40% under the Taxe Professionnelle decreases. Moreover, 
that part of the Taxe Professionnelle attributed to retained profits used to pay the na-
tional crisis tax will become a deduction in computing a later Taxe Professionnelle. 
This would whittle the true effective cost to a figure below $8. 
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into shares, any portion of the profits distributed to active partners 
is subject to two different progressive taxes. The first involves the 
progressive rates under the Taxe Professionnelle applicable to 
individuals, the second being the complementary personal tax which 
applies a graduated rate to an individual's aggregate income from 
all sources. Distributions to silent partners of such an enterprise are 
subject, on the other hand, to three different taxes, the personal 
property income tax (Taxe Mobiliere) at a flat 25% rate, a gradu-
ated national crisis tax ranging from 2 to I 5%, and the regular 
progressive income tax applicable to an individual's aggregate in-
come. However, the first two of these taxes constitute deductions 
in arriving at the tax base of the third. 
(f) Complementary progressive tax on individual's aggre-
gate income.-In addition to the three separate taxes on income 
from personal property, real property, and business, individuals pay 
a graduated tax with respect to the aggregate income from all of 
these sources. However, the three separately scheduled taxes as well 
as any overall complementary progressive tax paid during the 
period are deducted from gross income in arriving at the tax base 
against which the overall progressive tax is applied. These de-
ductions, together with certain deductible personal items to be dis-
cussed later, are important in appraising the actual impact of the 
graduated rates in Table I D. 
TABLE I D 
TAXABLE INCOME 
Francs Dollars Rate 
First 50,000 $r,ooo o.5% 
Next 50,000 1,000 3 % 
Next 50,000 r,ooo 5 % 
Next 50,000 ! 1000 IO % 
Next 50,000 1 1000 14 % 
Next 50,000 1 1000 20 % 
Next 300,000 6,ooo 24 % 
Next 200,000 4,000 26 % 
Next 200,000 4,000 28 % 
Balance 30 % 
(g) The Belgian concept of gross income.-The types of 
income embraced by the various basic taxes have been previously 
described. Since most of the previously mentioned income taxes 
relate to narrowly defined items, the practical meaning of gross 
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income need be considered only in the setting of the more far rang-
ing progressive tax on business income and the complementary 
progressive tax on an individual's aggregate income. Compared to 
American standards, the most unique principle relates to the treat-
ment of capital gains and income which is not ordinary business 
tncome. 
Generally speaking, such gains do not constitute a part of gross 
income. The range of this immunizing principle is limited, how-
ever, by the fact that any gain realized from the sale of specific 
business assets is considered a business profit and is taxed under 
the applicable rate schedules as such. There is some recognition 
that such gains are illusory to the extent they are products of a 
piecemeal inflation which started in Belgium following World War 
I. The formula used in determining the amount of gain allows the 
vendor first to increase the historical cost basis by a coefficient, the 
amount of which depends on the year in which the asset was ac-
quired. From the sum thus determined, depreciation previously 
allowed for tax purposes is deducted in arriving at the net basis. 
Table I E presents a schedule of the coefficients. 
With reference to the Taxe Professionnelle, as well as the com-
plementary progressive tax on income derived by individuals from 
TABLE I E 
Date of Acquisition 









I927 to I934 inclusive 
I935 
1936 to I943 inclusive 
I 944 to I 948 inclusive 
1949 

















• These coefficients apply only to industrial or commercial buildings and equipment, 
as well as to securities held for more than five years. 
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all sources (Impot Complementaire Personnel), a further immunity 
has been granted, but only temporarily-i.e., during the calendar 
years 1959 to 1963 or counterpart fiscal years, if the realized gain 
from the disposition is reinvested within a certain period. Satis-
faction of the prescribed standard leaves only %th of the gain sub-
ject to tax. And none of the gain will be recognized if the reinvest-
ment is made in certain districts which have suffered particularly 
serious economic dislocations. . 
The fact that gain realized on the disposition of business assets 
is generally includible for tax purposes also has significance in the 
instance where a proprietorship is converted into a limited liability 
company. The gain, determined by subtracting the net basis just 
described from the fair market value of the shares received, will 
be taxed unless the owner himself ceases all trade. In the latter 
event, only the profit stemming from the transfer of goodwill 
(clientele) is reached. 
\V"ith reference to a business's income, it will be recalled that only 
income from actual business activity is subject to the professional 
tax. Dividends received by enterprises (other than those which 
operate in the financial field as such) are subject to the personal 
property income tax (Taxe Mobiliere) but are excluded 7 from 
both retained or distributed income of the enterprise for the pur-
pose of computing its other taxes. In other words, dividends re-
ceived by an enterprise are taxed under a complementary progres-
sive tax only to its shareholders. The same applies to other invest-
ment income as well as to royalties (except where the enterprise 
mainly or exclusively exploits patent rights) and to income from 
immovable property (again, except in the case of a building society 
or the like) the estimated amount of which is subject to previously 
described special taxes. Finally, it bears repeating in connection 
with the professional tax that only retained profits are taken into 
account. 
(h) The Belgian concept of ((taxable" income.-Deductions 
which may be taken from gross income in arriving at the tax base 
are primarily important only in connection with the tax on business 
or employment income, and with respect to the complementary tax 
paid by individuals on their aggregate incomes. While the special 
tax on income from personal property is also geared to a concept of 
net income, the fact is that expenses in such settings-illustratively 
7 This method is similar to the dividends received deduction allowed in the United 
States, only the percentage is 100 instead of 85. 
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with respect to dividends-are not frequently incurred. But where 
expenses are suffered in acquiring such income, e.g., banker's fees, 
they may be deducted. On the other hand, the special tax on "esti~ 
mated" income from real property is not geared to actual income, 
gross or net. As a consequence, actual expenses may not be deducted 
from the tax base fixed by the administrative authorities. 
The net income concept employed by the special tax on business 
income is quite similar to that used in the United States. Permissible 
deductions include wages, salaries, rent paid for the use of personal 
property, interest-including any reasonable amount which a sub-
sidiary pays a parent in connection with a loan, indirect taxes, such 
as those on sales, and depreciation. 
The provisions regarding depreciation are not, however, quite 
so favorable as they are in the United States. Accelerated deprecia-
tion methods which are available in America are not generally 
allowed, though in particular cases, for example in the case of 
ships, the useful life over which the property may be written off is 
relatively short. Depreciation is generally based on the straight line 
method as applied to historical cost, though other methods may be 
used as long as they follow the diminishing value of the asset. De-
preciation on the basis of replacement value is not allowed except 
that the historical cost of certain assets has been hiked by a formula 
in that instance where the asset was acquired before World War II 
and was still in use thereafter. 
For the calendar years I 9 so and I 960, and counterpart fiscal 
years, a type of investment allowance has been created with respect 
to the Taxe Professionnelle, but not for purposes of the complemen-
tary graduated tax on individuals. This allowance, applicable only 
to certain investments, amounts to 30%, and is to be spread evenly 
over a 3-year period. 
The treatment of closing inventories corresponds roughly to 
practices followed in the United States. Normally closing inven-
tories must be valued at cost or market, whichever is lower. How-
ever, in identifying the goods on hand, neither LIFO nor the base 
stock method may be used. 
The most striking d~parture from American practices involves 
the provision which permits taxes on business income to be de-
ducted in the year finally due in computing the business income of 
that year. The degree to which this practice reduces the impact of 
a theoretical rate structure has been previously considered. 
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In the case of individuals on salary or wages and others engaged 
in the exercise of a liberal profession, a standard deduction, set 
at ~ th of the gross income, is allowed to accommodate their 
business expenses. However, the standard deduction includes a 
ceiling. It may not exceed B. Fr. 6o,ooo ($1,200) plus deductible 
taxes. 8 To a void this ceiling, a taxpayer is required to itemize his 
deductions and must be prepared to submit appropriate evidence 
that they do in fact exceed the standard allotment. Though this 
tax ( Taxe Professionnelle) is imposed on business income, certain 
personal deductions as well as credits for dependents are allowed. 
These are identical to those applicable in the case of the comple-
mentary tax on an individual's aggregate income. 
The personal deductions common to both taxes involve premiums 
paid for life insurance and old age pensions. And, in both cases, a 
credit against taxes payable on the first B. Fr. 250,000 ($5,000) 
may be taken with respect to dependents. These credits range from 
5% of the tax in the case of one dependent to 100% in the case of 
8 dependents.9 
Since the complementary tax on an individual's aggregate income 
is intended to reach only his aggregate net income, deductions 
allowed with respect to the other three separately scheduled basic 
taxes are in effect also allowed. In addition, a deduction may be 
taken against his gross income for the amount of those separately 
scheduled taxes as well as for the aggregate income tax paid in that 
year. A deduction is also allowed for interest paid on non-business 
loans and for alimony. Finally, 15% of business or employment in-
come, otherwise subject to the Taxe Professionnelle, may be de-
ducted, to a maximum of B. Frs. 30,ooo ( $6,ooo). 
(i) Payment and the taxable year.-All of the previously 
described taxes are assessed on a yearly basis. Only in the case of 
the tax on business income may losses of one year be carried for-
ward to offset gains of a later year. This carryover, limited to 5 
years, is not complemented by provisions regarding carrybacks. 
. The taxes on estimated income from real property and on actual 
income from personal property (Contribution Fonciere and Taxe 
Mobiliere) are paid in the year in which the income is realized. For 
example, the income tax against a stockholder, deducted at the 
8 In the case of company directors, the standard deduction equals s% of their gross 
income plus deductible taxes. 
0 10% for 2 dependents, 20% for 3 dependents, 30% for 4 dependents, 50% for 5 
dependents, 70% for 6 dependents, 90% for 7 dependents. 
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source on the distribution of a dividend, is the tax for the year in 
which the dividend is received. The tax on business income (Taxe 
Professionnelle), on the other hand, is not due in a final sense until 
the year immediately following the taxable year. However, as pre-
viously noted, unless payment is made in advance, the taxpayer will 
suffer a substantial increase in the effective rate. For example, in 
early I 960 a corporation must estimate its profits for that year and 
also anticipate the amount which will be distributed. Assuming a 
calendar year taxpayer, the tax on the anticipated undistributed 
profits must be paid before July I5 of I96o; otherwise the first 
of the previously described increases in the tax will take effect.10 
It is important to understand that the advances are truly pre-
payments. For example, when it is said that the Taxe Profession-
nelle is a deduction in computing the profits for a given year, the 
deduction in our example would take place in the succeeding year, 
I 96 I, when the tax is finally due, not in the year in which payment 
was made on account. The tax administration recognizes, as an 
extra-statutory concession, that taxes paid may be deducted even if 
the taxpayer has not yet received an assessment. 
(j) The relevance of residency, and the comparative cost 
of retaining and accumulating income.-Only in the case of the tax 
on income from real property situated in Belgium (and the national 
crisis tax applicable thereto) is the reach of the tax law the same 
with regard to residents and non-residents. 
Residents and entities domiciled in Belgium are reached by the 
other taxes without regard to the place from which the income 
originated. But where the income originated and was taxed abroad, 
a reduced rate is applied. On business income of this type, the rate 
under the Taxe Professionnelle is 7tth of that normally applied. 
And where a corporation distributes such foreign earned income, its 
own national crisis tax is only 7tth of the normal 20% rate. Also, 
instead of the regular 30% rate applied to the recipient share-
holder, a flat I2% is assessed on dividends distributed out of such 
foreign income. Again, the graduated rate of the national crisis tax 
normally applicable to silent partners with regard to such distrib-
uted profits is reduced to Yard of the normal rate. 
The place from which income originated is also important in the 
case of non-residents and corporations domiciled outside of Bel-
gium. As is generally true of other countries in such circumstances, 
10 The increase, 10% of the amount otherwise payable, is hiked to zo% if payment 
is delayed beyond the I 5th day following the close of the taxable year. 
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Belgium asserts its jurisdiction only with reference to income which 
has its source there. 
But assuming for the moment that Belgium is the source of in-
come derived from business activity, the particular business form 
in which that operation is conducted can also make a great deal of 
difference in the way in which three significant taxes are applied. 
Assume, for example, that an American enterprise also plans to 
operate a facility in Belgium. If that facility is housed in a sub-
sidiary corporation domestic to Belgium the business profits-so 
long as they are retained-will be subject only to the graduated 
Taxe Professionnelle, the stated rates ranging from 25% to 4o%Y 
However, because the amount of such tax due in one year is de-
ducted in computing the business profits of that year, any profit 
which falls in the stated 40% rate will not, following the first year, 
be taxed at an effective rate in excess of 30%. 
A corporation which desires to use its profits for expansion may 
capitalize those earnings 12 by distributing stock dividendsY These 
are not considered taxable income in Belgium. However, the capi-
talization will be more expensive than leaving the profits in the 
form of surplus, for certain registration duties and fees are en-
countered. 
On the other hand, where profits of a subsidiary are distributed 
in cash, the effective combined ceiling rates of the various taxes will 
be one third higher, i.e., will be 45·3% determined as indicated in 
Table I F. 
TABLE I F 
TOTAL TAXES ON DISTRIBUTED PROFITS 
OF SUBSIDIARY 
Stated rate of national Stated ceiling rate Stated flat rate of Effective combined 
crisis tax against sub- of Taxe Profes- Taxe Mobiliere, ceiling rate of all 
sidiary; payable from sionnelle, applied against the share- taxes. 
undistributed profits, against that part of holder on w /h 
and applied to gross undistributed profits basis re gross div-
dividend. used to pay na- idend. 
tiona! crisis tax. 
zoo/o 40% X zo% = 8% 30% 20 + 8 + 30 
45·3 o/o 
128 
11 Of course, the tax on any estimated income from real estate will be applied whether 
or not profits are distributed and without regard to the form of the enterprise. 
12 It should be noted that Belgium does not have any penalty taxes on accumulated 
profits. 
13 These should generally be issued in a later year than that in which the profits 
have been made. 
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If profits are to be distributed instead of being ploughed back 
for expansion purposes, there will be some tax saving to the sub-
sidiary as well as to the parent if the investment is represented in 
part by loans reflected in a bond issue to the parent. Interest, but 
not beyond a reasonable amount, constitutes a deductible expense 
to the subsidiary, and the tax to the parent on interest is I 8% 
(I 2.2% if the subsidiary bears and pays the tax), contrasted with 
the 30% tax on dividends. 
If the facility is operated as a branch of the American parent, 
rather than through a subsidiary, the very form of the operation 
rules out "dividends" as such. The parent will own the profits of 
the branch as they come into being. Thus the national crisis tax 
and the Taxe Mobiliere, which normally apply to dividends, are 
rendered inapplicable. The foregoing is another way of saying that 
in this setting the question of whether profits are retained or dis-
tributed is immaterial. The Taxe Professionnelle reaches the entire 
profit in either case. But instead of the graduated rate applicable to 
local corporations, in this instance Belgian law applies a stated flat 
rate of 40%. But again, the fact that the professional tax due in 
one year is deducted in computing the business profits of that year 
means that, in the second and succeeding years, the effective rate 
will not exceed 30%. 
Nonresident individuals suffer the progressive tax on aggregate 
income only where they hold a dwelling house situated in Belgium 
or exploit a permanent establishment located there, and then only 
to the extent income is derived from these sources. 
(k) Disposition of an enterprise.-As in the United States, 
the Belgian tax provisions relating to the disposition of an enter-
prise are rather complex. Accordingly, only a general comment can 
be made here. If a corporation disposes of its assets, any realized 
gain to it is, in principle, taxable income. However, the bases of the 
assets are multiplied by a coefficient before determining the amount 
of its gain. If the proceeds are then distributed to the stockholders 
(or to silent partners in the case of the sociitis de personnes), the 
distributed amount will be subjected to three taxes (national crisis 
tax, personal property income tax, and the complementary progres-
sive tax) to the extent the stockholder's basis (the capital originally 
paid in), multiplied by a coefficient, is exceeded by the distribution. 
However, the impact of the first two of these is cushioned by what 
is tantamount to a credit equal to that tax paid by the enterprise on 
that business income which in turn is being distributed. 
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SUBSECTION 2. OTHER SIGNIFICANT TAXES 
(a) Belgian taxes on capital and property.-Belgium does 
not utilize a property tax as such. But if real estate is transferred 
for consideration in money or ·money's worth, a so-called registra-
tion duty is payable. The rate normally depends on the character of 
the person to whom the transfer is made and on the nature of the 
real estate transferred. The normal rate of I I% of the selling price 
or value is whittled down, in the case of sales to charitable institu-
tions, to 6% and in some cases to 1.5%. The rate is also 6% with 
reference to sales of small lots and modest dwelling houses. 
Incorporation of assets or subsequent increases in paid-in capital 
also give rise to fairly significant registration duties, the rate being 
1.6% in the case of Belgian companies. Nonresident companies 
which have a "permanent establishment" in Belgium must also be 
registered there and must pay . 1% on total paid-in capital with a 
ceiling, however, of I,ooo,ooo Belgian francs ( $zo,ooo) and a 
minimum of rS,ooo francs ( $360). With reference to its real 
estate, a registration duty of 1.6% is levied. 
Belgium also employs a gift tax, but, unlike the arrangement in 
the United States, the complexion of the tax is similar to that of the 
Belgian inheritance tax. The latter is levied not on the estate as 
such, but on each individual acquisition by heirs or legatees. In the 
case of both taxes, the rates depend on the relationship between 
the donor (deceased) and the donee (heirs or legatees) as well as 
on the value of the acquisition. Both taxes are generally imposed 
only where the donor (deceased) is domiciled in, or is a resident 
of, Belgium. However, real estate constitutes an exception to this 
rule; donative or testamentary transfers of such are reached if the 
property is situated in Belgium. 
(b) Taxes on turnover.-Income taxes are supplemented in 
a most significant way by turnover taxes on transfers of unfinished 
as well as finished products and on licensing, royalty, and many 
service contracts. 
The general turnover tax (Taxe de Transmission), normally 
carrying a rate-except for luxury items-of 5%, is a multiple stage 
arrangement in that it applies to each transfer which may take 
place in the course of developing a finished product, the only im-
portant exemption relating to a transfer to the ultimate individual 
consumer. The importance of this exemption is not to be discounted, 
for the product at that point will have reached its maximum value. 
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Since the tax on each successive vendor, in the chain of those 
who contribute to the finished product, includes the value on which 
his predecessor had paid as well as the value added, goods which 
are converted by one taxpayer from the basic raw material into the 
finished product will normally suffer less tax cost than will goods 
which have to go through several hands.14 
In the case of imports, the tax is first assessed at the point of 
importationY However, presumably for the purpose of facilitating 
exports, an exporter may acquire unfinished goods free of the tax 
and may also export the finished product free of the tax. 
The other turnover taxes are complementary to the Taxe de 
Transmission (luxury tax and similar taxes), and include taxes on 
the rendition of services, royalties, transport, etc. 
(c) Other miscellaneous levies.-Among other miscellane-
ous taxes are (I) stamp duties which are levied on instruments and 
documents, ( 2) excises imposed on the production or importation 
of certain commodities such as beer, wine, and tobacco, and ( 3) 
amounts levied annually by reference to the horse-power of pas-
senger or freight motorcars. 
SECTION B. FRANCE 
SUBSECTION I. INCOME TAXES 
(a) In general.-Since I948, the over-all income tax ar-
rangement regarding individuals has differed from that applicable 
to corporations, though in the case of profits derived from industry 
and commerce a more or less common tax base has been used. 
Until I9 59, individuals were subjected to two different income 
taxes. The first, a proportional income tax (Taxe Proportionnelle), 
was geared to a system of separate schedules which differed in that 
each reached a different type of income. Though the tax was sepa-
rately applied to each of the various sources, after I 948 a more or 
less common rate had been used. The second tax (Surtaxe Progres-
sive) was a surtax levied on the individual's aggregate income from 
all sources and at progressive rates. 
For this dualistic individual income tax system, a reform in 
December I959 substituted a single general tax on income. Gen-
u On 31 goods, there is a special non-multiple tax. This contractual transmission tax 
is designed to avoid differences which would otherwise arise depending on the number 
of hands through which they pass. 
1.5 Details regarding the application of turnover taxes to imports are more fully con-
sidered in Section A of PART II, infra. 
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erally speaking, this new tax is assessed according to those rules 
which had governed the old progressive surtax. For budgetary and 
psychological reasons, the old proportional tax with its separate 
schedules was not abolished outright. In other words, the reform is 
to be implemented in stages. At the moment, the proportional tax 
temporarily survives under the name of "Taxe Complementaire," 
but at a considerably reduced rate. The rates of the old progressive 
surtax, operating now under its new name ( lmpot sur le Revenu 
des Personnes Physiques) , were increased. Also special measures 
were taken to see that income previously exempt from the old pro-
portional tax (e.g., wages and salaries) will now be fully taxed. 
On the corporate side, generally speaking, there is only one in-
come tax ( lmpot sur les Societes) , and it is imposed at a flat rate. 
Partnerships ( socihh en nom collectif) may also elect this treat-
ment instead of one which would subject the individual partners to 
individual income taxes on their respective distributive shares. 
A third arrangement ( versement forfaitaire), applicable to every 
business enterprise, is intimately related to the income tax scheme. 
Before the recent reform, instead of requiring that wages and 
salaries be included in one of the proportional tax schedules filed 
by employees, employers themselves suffered an assessment geared 
to three different rates, the choice depending on the total amount 
of annual remuneration paid a given employee. This arrangement 
survived the reform. Moreover, as before, employees will continue 
to include wages and salaries for purposes of the separate progres-
sive surtax. 
Employers will pay the versement forfaitaire at the rates as 
shown in Table I G. 
TABLE I G 
SCHEDULE 
Remuneration 
New Francs Dollars 
0 to JO,OOO 
Jo,ooo to 6o,ooo 
Excess over 6o,ooo 
$o to 6,ooo 
6,ooo to I 2,ooo 
Excess over I 2,ooo 
Rate Ap-





In any case where an employer does not suffer the versement 
forfaitaire, e.g., with reference to wages paid French employees 
by foreign employers, the employee himself pays this tax. 
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The question of whether a company director's remuneration is 
assessed against him or is instead assessed as a charge against the 
employer-company by reference to the above described rates of the 
versement forfaitaire, turns on whether his duties go beyond those 
normally performed by directors and are such as to give rise to the 
additional relationship of employer and employee. In this connec-
tion, managing directors are generally considered employees. In 
the case of private companies ( sociitis a responsabilite limitee), 
special rules exist. 
By statute all dividends are subject to a 24% withholding tax 
which normally serves as a credit against the recipient's general 
income tax. A bilateral treaty with the United States reduces the 
rate to I 5% in the case of dividends paid residents or entities in 
the United States, and when the recipient is an American parent of 
a French subsidiary, this will normally constitute the final levy 
against the parent. 
A statutory withholding pattern similar to that above applies to 
interest paid foreigners, except that the withholding rate on interest 
from French industrial bonds is only I 2%. 
(b) The progressive surtax on an individual's income.-
The income tax, levied on an individual's aggregate income from 
all sources (including wages or salaries subject to the versement 
forfaitaire), conforms to the graduated rates as in Table I H. 
TABLE I H 
Rate Ap-
Aggregate Taxable Income plicable to the 
New Francs Dollars Portion Indicated 
0 to 2,200 $o to 440. 5% a 
2,200 to J,soo 440. to 700. IS% a 
J,soo to 6,ooo 700. to I,200. 20% a, b 
6,ooo to 9,000 I,200 to I,Soo. 25% a, b 
9,000 to I5,000 I,8oo to J,OOO. 35% a, b 
I 5,000 to JO,OOO J,OOO to 6,000. 45% a, b 
30,000 to 60,000 6,000 to I 21000. 55% a, b 
Excess over 6o,ooo Excess over I 2,ooo 6 5% a, b 
• For salaries and wages etc. subject to the versement forfaitaire, rates are o%; 
ro%; rso/o; zoo/o; 30%; 40%; soo/o; 6oo/o, respectively. 
• An additional surcharge of ro% of the tax otherwise computed is applied if tax-
able income exceeds 6,ooo N.F. or $r,zoo. 
The effect of the foregoing rate schedule is cushioned by an ar-
rangement which is applicable to married persons or those with 
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dependent children and is similar to the "split-income" arrange-
ment allowed under American law. In the case of a married couple 
without dependent children, the figures for a given income bracket 
are doubled though the rate remains constant. One dependent child 
counts just one-half as much as a spouse. Whereas the coefficient 
for a married couple is 2, it is zY2 for a married couple with one 
child and would, by way of further example, be 3 if they had two 
children. Accordingly, the graduated scale reflected in the schedule 
set forth in Table I H would be modified in the case of a married 
couple with one dependent child, the coefficient being 2 Y2, as shown 
in Table I I. 
TABLE I I 
Aggregate Taxable Income 
New Francs Dollars 
o to 5,500 $o to 1,100 
5,500 to 8,750 11 100 to 1,750 
8,750 to 15,000 1,750 to 3,ooo 
15,000 to 22,500 3,000 to 4,500 
22,500 to 37,500 4,500 to 7,500 
37,500 to 7 5,000 7,500 to 15,000 
75,000 to 150,000 15,000 to 30,000 
Excess over r 50,000 Excess over 30,000 
• See footnotes a and b re previous schedule. 
Rate Ap-
plicable to the 









(c) The complementary tax on individuals.-While this 
modern flat rate version of the old proportional tax is deemed to 
be only a temporary levy for the years 1959 and 1960, it may 
remain in force for a longer period. Though it reaches the majority 
of income items, salaries, wages, pensions, and. the like are ex-
cluded. The rate is 9% for 1959, and 8% for 1960. Certain types 
of income enjoy a basic exemption of $6oo ( J,ooo new Francs) 
or $88o (4,400 new Francs). 
The impact of this tax is reduced by an arrangement which 
,permits the amount of tax in one year to be deducted from the 
taxpayer's income of the following year in computing his general 
income tax. 
(d) Cumulative effect of complementary and progressive 
income tax on individuals.-The cumulative effect of the two income 
taxes applicable to individuals can be best illustrated, as in Table 
I J, by the case of a married couple (neither of whom is on salary 
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or wages) who have one dependent child, their taxable income 
(appropriate deductions have been taken) being 37,soo N.F. 
($7,soo). 
TABLE I J 
New New 
Francs Dollars Francs Dollars 
Taxable Income 37.SOO $7,soo 
I. The 8% complementary 
tax 3,000 6oo 3,000 $6oo 
2. Amount subject to general 
tax 34.SOO 6,900 
3· General tax Computation 
s% on s,soo N.F ..... 27s N.F. 
IS% on next 3,2so N.F. 487.so N.F. 
20% on next 6,2so N.F. 1,2so N.F. 
25% on next 7,soo N.F. 1,87s N.F. 
3S% on next 12,000 N.F. 4,2oo N.F. 
34,500 N.F. 8,087·SO 
10% surcharge 8o8.7 s 
8,826.2S 1,779 
4· Total tax (effective rate of about 32%)a II,896.2S $2,379 
• The effective rate of 32% relates to taxable income; because of certain standard 
deductions, it will actually be lower. 
(e) Corporation income tax.-The French corporate in-
come tax ( Impot sur les Societes) reaches the aggregate net income 
in a manner similar to that of the United States corporate tax. The 
two most notable distinctions between the two systems involves, 
first, the rate structure; France applies a flat so%. Second, it 
reaches only income derived from French sources. 
Another major distinction involves the treatment of dividends 
received by one corporation from another in which the former holds 
shares. In evaluating this arrangement, it must be remembered that 
the distributing corporation's own profits will be subject to the flat 
so% corporate income tax. Then when it declares a dividend from 
that profit which is left after taxes, it must withhold a tax which 
represents an assessment against the recipient corporation, the 
amount normally being 24% of the gross dividend. Even so, the 
dividend is includible in the gross income of the recipient corpo-
ration for the purposes of computing its regular so% corporate 
tax though at that point it enjoys a credit for the 24% previously 
TAXATION 369 
withheld. When the recipient corporation itself declares a dividend 
to its shareholders, it too must withhold a 24% tax. And those 
shareholders, if individuals, will also suffer the previously described 
income tax on individuals, the 24% withholding tax being treated 
as a credit. 
In one circumstance, the multiple impact suffered under the 
regular corporate tax as a result of inter-company arrangements is 
largely eliminated. That circumstance involves the case where the 
recipient corporation is French and owns at least 20% of the share 
capital of the original distributing corporation.16 The recipient 
corporation will first receive a dividend-received deduction, much on 
the order of that allowed in the United States, in computing its own 
regular corporate tax. Limitation of the deduction to 7 5%, in-
stead of allowing a full IOo%, represents an attempt on a standard 
basis to accommodate the fact that a part of the recipient corpora-
tion's general expenses will have been attributable to dividends re-
ceived. Secondly, while the 24% dividend tax must be withheld by 
the recipient corporation when it declares a dividend, this with-
holding principle is not applied to the extent its declaration is out 
of dividends which it earlier received from the original distributing 
corporation. 
(f) The French concept of gross income.-With regard 
to business income derived by individuals or corporations, the con-
cept of gross income is similar to that in vogue in the United States, 
the three prime differences being noted below. 
The first difference relates to capital gains which are not taxed 
in France unless (a) they are regularly and professionally made by 
the taxpayer or (b) they involve business property. But even in the 
circumstance related in (b), the gain will not be recognized if it 
is reinvested within a specified period. 
Where the gain is reached, ordinary rates are applied except 
where the gain is realized in connection with the termination of the 
business through liquidation or merger. In the latter event, lower 
rates are applied. 
If a given capital gain would fall into the taxable category, the 
taxpayer may use a system of coefficients to upgrade the historical 
cost which would otherwise be used in computing his gain, the aim 
being to neutralize in some measure the effect of changes which have 
taken place over the years in the value of the franc. The schedule 
16 Pursuant to the reform of 1959, the tax authorities may grant the same privilege 
to corporations which own less than zoo/o of the participating rights. 
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of coefficients with datelines representing possible points of pur-
chase appears in Table I K. 
TABLE I K 
Year Coefficient* Year Coefficient * 
I 9 I 4 and prior years 204.I I937 36. I 
I915 ....... 142·9 1938 31.9 
I9I6 108.9 I939 30·7 
1917 - ..... 74·9 T940 24.6 
I9I8 6I.2 I94I 22.5 
I919 ........... 59·1 I942 20.4 
1920 40.8 1943 14·9 
I92I 61.2 1944 13·7 
1922 65·9 I945 6.8 
I923 51 1946 4·3 
1924 ....... 43·5 1947 3·4 
1925 ......... 38·7 1948 1.9 
1926 ....... 29.8 1949 1.6 
I927 ........... 32·7 1950 1.4 
I928 32·7 1951 1.05 
1929 33·3 1952 1.05 
I930 .......... 37·5 I953 I.IO 
I93I . . . . . . . 40.8 I954 I. I 5 
I932 ...... 47·7 1955 I. I 5 
1933 ......... 52·4 1956 1.10 
I934 ....... 54·4 1957 1.05 
1935 ........ 61.2 I958 I 
I936 ....... 51 
(*Fixed by Decree No. 59-289 of 14th February, 1959.) 
That portion of any gain which is immunized from the regular 
corporate income tax only because of the impact of the above co-
efficients, i.e., because of revaluations in the currency, must be re-
flected on a balance sheet as a special revaluation reserve and 
presently suffers a special 3% tax. The ordinary withholding tax 
applies, however, if that reserve is distributed, though in some cases 
the withholding rate is reduced to I2%. 
A second major difference between French and United States 
concepts of gross income arises in the circumstance where a branch 
is shifted into a subsidiary. In France, one-half of any difference 
which exists between the book value and the current fair market 
value of the branch's assets is subjected to the ordinary corporate 
tax rates, provided the branch existed for less than 5 years. For 
older branches, only 10% of the gain is reachedP 
17 The rate is only 6.6% in the case of private enterprises. 
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A third prime difference between the two systems with regard to 
the meaning of gross income involves private enterprises with 
relatively small turnover. In France, these may be taxed on the 
basis of a presumptive profit. 
(g) The French concept of ((ta."<:able" income.-In a business 
setting, the deductions which may be taken from gross income under 
French law, in arriving at taxable income, are similar to those 
allowed in Belgium and the United States. In other words, the aim 
is to reach only net income and is accomplished through allowance 
of deductions for those expenses incurred in properly carrying on 
the enterprise, provided, of course, that the expenditure did not 
involve an increase in inventory or capital equipment. For example, 
interest on loans is deductible, even if paid by a subsidiary to a 
parent, provided the loan relates to the commercial aspects of the 
enterprise and the interest is fair and reasonable.18 Again, in prin-
ciple the indirect taxes suffered by an enterprise are deductible in 
computing taxable income. 
The annual French "amortization" ( amortissement) deduction, 
designed to take account of normal wear and tear arising out of 
use of buildings, equipment, etc., differs in one major respect from 
the American depreciation allowance. Because of marked changes 
which have taken place in the actual value of the franc, France has 
found it necessary to make standard modifications in the historical 
cost against which depreciation would otherwise be computed. The 
procedure involves use of the coefficients previously described in 
connection with the discussion of capital gains. After applying the 
appropriate coefficient for the year of purchase to historical cost, 
previous depreciation-computed on the basis of historical cost for 
purposes of the current computation-is multiplied by the coeffi-
cients appropriate for the years of earlier write-offs. Following 
subtraction of the re-valued earlier depreciation from the re-valued 
historical cost, the normal rules regarding depreciation are applied, 
i.e., the balance is spread over the remaining useful life of the 
property. As in the States, determination of "useful life" ultimately 
depends on the way the taxpayer will use the property; extraordi-
nary usage, for example, will be taken into account in making the 
determination. Certain general rate patterns have also been issued 
by the government to accommodate typical cases, and in some in-
stances, for example with reference to hotels, quite detailed sched-
ules have been promulgated. Until the recent tax reform, only the 
18 However, interest paid to a parent or other shareholders is onlv deductible to the 
extent the loan does not exceed soo/o of the subsidiary's capital, . 
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straight line method was permitted, except in the instance where 
some additional depreciation was allowed to facilitate moderniza-
tion of equipment. Now, however, the declining bal"ance method 
may also be used with reference to a majority of investments. 
Inventory is valued at cost or market whichever is less. It is not 
possible, however, to use the LIFO inventory method. 
In the case of individuals, certain standard deductions may be 
taken in lieu of itemizing business expenses. The standardized 
figure for those working for salary or wages is ID% of the salary 
or wage; for commercial travelers, such as a salesman, the figure 
is 37%. In computing the general income tax, the taxpayer may also 
deduct his flat rate complementary tax, if any, and any versement 
forfaitaire which he may have suffered as an employer of domestics. 
Other items of an equally personal sort which are deductible in-
clude a limited amount of life insurance premiums on policies con-
tracted before 1959, charitable contributions with a ceiling of .s% 
of taxable income, and alimony paid pursuant to the French civil 
law. 
In addition to the foregoing deductions (including the standard 
business expense deduction), an abatement of zo% is allowed for 
salary and wage earners. 
(h) Payment and the taxable year.-While the calendar 
year is usually the taxable year, an enterprise may elect a different 
fiscal year comprising not more than 12 months. However, losses 
of one year may generally be carried forward for a period up to 
5 years. 
While the tax due in one year relates to the income of the 
preceding fiscal year, in most cases a system of pre-payment exists. 
Generally, a choice does not exist as to the matter of accounting 
methods. Special rules and regulations govern the matter of timing 
as it relates to different types of items, but in general the accrual 
basis constitutes the proper accounting method. 
(i) The relevance of residency as it affects individuals.-
As to resident-individuals, France asserts a less sweeping jurisdic-
tion in assessing its flat rate complementary tax than it does with 
reference to the general income tax. Applicability of the former 
tax rests, in general, on a principle of territoriality, the tax apply-
ing only to that part of a resident's income which has its source in 
France. The only major exceptions relate to dividends and interest 
which, absent treaty provisions, are included regardless of source. 
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The general income tax, on the other hand, quite generally reaches 
all of a resident's income, without regard to source. A combination 
of these divergent general jurisdictional principles means, except for 
dividends and interest, that the foreign "sourced" income of resi-
dents suffers a smaller total tax than does domestic income.19 
Nonresidents enjoy an even more favorable status. Since they 
suffer either tax only with reference to income which has its source 
in France, the residency of an individual under French law may 
assume considerable importance. Normally a foreigner ·residing in 
France will not be treated as a resident unless he has transferred 
his sphere of interest to France or remains there for at least 5 
years. Until one or the other of these tests is satisfied, the foreigner 
will suffer tax only on his French income, though in the absence of 
such he will be taxed on an amount five times the rental value of 
his dwelling. When one of the alternative tests for residency is 
finally satisfied, the foreigner may still be immune from the general 
income tax with reference to non-French income if he is able to 
demonstrate that he is properly taxed on such by the country of 
which he is a citizen. 
(j) The relevance of residency as it affects corporations. 
-In general, the corporate tax follows the principle of territori-
ality with reference to domestic as well as foreign corporations. 
Thus both are taxable generally only on profits deemed to have 
a source in France. In the case of a foreign corporation, this in-
cludes income arising from a complete cycle of economic trans-
actions in France as well as those earned there by a foreign-owned 
permanent establishment.20 
Since even a French corporation will suffer the regular corporate 
tax on its foreign income in only rare circumstances, the most im-
portant difference between French and foreign corporations relates 
to the separate 24% tax which it must withhold as a charge against 
stockholders on gross dividends. The French corporation must 
withhold this tax without regard to the geographical source from 
which it derived the income from which the dividend was paid. The 
non-French corporation, on the other hand, must withhold the 24% 
tax only on that part of the dividend which corresponds to its 
French business. 
19 Accordingly, there is less pressure in France for unilateral tax relief in the case of 
foreign income than would otherwise be the case. 
"'Pursuant to a bilateral tax treaty with the United States, the industrial and com-
mercial profits earned by an American corporation will be taxed in France only if 
it has a "permanent establishment" there. 
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Section B of PART III, infra, indicates two modifications of the 
foregoing pattern as it affects American residents and entities. 
First, the withheld dividend tax, payable illustratively on dividends 
distributed by a French subsidiary to an American parent, is re-
duced by a bilateral tax treaty to 15%. Second, while the French 
subsidiary will also have previously paid its own so% corporate tax, 
the latter is the only income tax suffered if an American company 
conducts its affairs in France through a permanent establishment 
in the nature of a branch located there. In that event, the base 
would consist of income properly attributable to the permanent 
establishment, as is more fully explained in PART III, infra. 
(k) The comparative cost of retaining and distributing cor-
porate profits.-In Belgium, it will be recalled, distributed profits 
encountered a different corporate tax pattern than undistributed 
profits. This is not so in France. Distributed and undistributed 
profits are taxed alike. France does not even employ the type of 
additional penalty tax which may be encountered in America with 
regard to unreasonable accumulations. In this connection, a flat 
unavoidable temporary levy of 2% on reserves-an outgrowth of 
the extraordinary expenses incurred in Algeria-was terminated at 
the close of I 9 58. 
While the corporate tax itself remains the same, whether or not 
profits are distributed, it must be remembered that the corporation, 
upon distribution, will be required to withhold, as a charge against 
stockholders, the 24% tax on dividends, a figure which is reduced 
to 15% in the case of payments to American residents or corpo-
rations. 
A French corporation which decides to retain certain earnings 
may capitalize them, without prejudice to the stockholders, by dis-
tributing a stock dividend. Only if the recipient stockholder later 
receives a liquidating dividend will his earlier receipt of the stock 
dividend have any tax significance to him. For tax purposes, the 
nominal (par) value of his original shares will have been spread 
in proper proportion to include also the dividend shares. Illus-
tratively, if his original shares carried a par value of $roo, receipt 
of a 100% stock dividend would lead, for tax purposes, to a new 
allocation of a $50 par value to each of his original and dividend 
shares. And only that amount could be recaptured tax free at the 
point of liquidation. 
(l) Disposition of an incorporated enterprise.-If a corpo-
ration sells its assets as a preliminary step to liquidation, that part 
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of the gain, if any, attributable to capital assets will be taxed at the 
special rates previously indicated, i.e., at 10% on gain from any 
such assets held for over 5 years and at so% on one-half of the gain 
realized from any such assets held for a lesser period. Then on 
distributing the after-tax balance, the corporation must withhold 
the 24;~ dividend tax. 
A merger out of which stockholders derive new shares of stock 
is not treated as a liquidation; gains which would have otherwise 
been taxed on liquidation enjoy an immunity in the case of merger, 
the distinction resting on the fact that here there is a continuity of 
interest on the part of all concerned. The constituent corporation 
which is absorbed in the merger will, however, file a separate cor-
porate tax return covering the ordinary profits of the partial year 
concluded by the merger. 
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER FRENCH TAXES 
(a) Taxes on capital and property.-France does not im-
pose taxes on capital or property simply because of its ownership. 
However, fairly significant amounts may be exacted when property 
is transferred. If the transfer is for money or money's worth and 
the deed must be registered, a registration duty must be paid. This 
registration fee, upon the sale of real property, is apart from a 
low tax and must be paid at the rate of 16.6%. However, the rate 
is only 2.2% when real property is brought into a corporation. On 
the establishment of a corporation a different fee of 1.6% is levied 
on the share capital. 
(b) French turnover taxes.-An unusual type of turnover 
tax is actually more important to the French government than the 
income tax. The former tax differs markedly from the turnover 
taxes of other member nations. Most countries impose a tax on each 
transfer, measured by the delivery price. As a consequence, an 
integrated company may have a real advantage over a non-
integrated company. In France, however, the net effect is to tax 
only that value which each successive entrepreneur adds to the 
product, thus depriving integrated companies of the advantage they 
enjoy in other countries. While the French tax base is smaller than 
that of other countries, it will also later be noted that the rate in 
France is somewhat higher. 
In effect, the technique by which only the added value is reached 
involves two separate steps. First, the full effective rate is applied 
against each vendor on the delivery of goods, the amount of the tax 
being separately reflected by him on the invoice which is delivered 
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to the buyer. Before paying the tax, as a second step, the vendor 
deducts the amount of turnover taxes reflected on invoices which 
he received covering his purchase of components, services, and 
equipment (including such things as machinery and industrial build-
ings). The practical effect, if the rates are always the same,~1 is that 
the manufacturer, e.g., will usually pay a tax on ·the difference be-
tween his selling price and the lesser sum which he paid for raw 
materials, etc. 
The turnover tax is also applied at the point goods are imported. 
However, at the point of export, any tax paid at import or with 
respect to intermediate domestic transfers is wholly refunded. 
The normal French rate is stated to be zo%, but since the base 
against which it is applied includes the tax itself, the normal 
effective rate which is reflected on an invoice is 25%. Transfers 
of certain types of goods call for special rates, some higher and 
some lower than the normal rate. The stated rate for services is 
8.5%,22 the effective rate being 9.23%. 
While these rates are higher than those of most member nations, 
thus neutralizing in one degree or another the use by the French 
of a smaller base, account must also be taken of two other consider-
ations in reckoning the total impact of its turnover taxes. One of 
these involves the immunity of the retailer's mark-up from this 
tax. In other words, retail vendors-normally the last in a chain 
of successive vendors-are exempt from the added value turnover 
tax. Indeed, in some significant circumstances, wholesalers are also 
exempt. However, the exemption of retailers is itself in part neu-
tralized by local turnover taxes levied on the entire retail sales price 
at a stated rate of 2.75%, the effective rate being 2.83%. The 
difference between the tax load borne by retailers and that borne 
by others is not as great as one might suppose. The tax on the re-
tailer covers the entire price, not just the value added. In other 
words, he is not permitted to deduct earlier turnover taxes paid by 
those from whom he acquired his merchandise. 
(c) Miscellaneous taxes.-French business is subject to a 
number of taxes in addition to income, conveyancing, and turnover 
taxes. One involves the previously described "versement for-
faitaire" which is assessed against employers with respect to 
salaries and wages paid employees. Another is closely akin to a 
21 The rate will not always be the same, particularly with reference to services. 
201 This same rate normally applies to royalties. However, under certain bilateral tax 
treaties, including one with the United States, royalties derived by nonresident in-
ventors are usually exempt. See PART II, infra. 
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business license tax (contribution des patentes), the amount being 
dependent upon four factors: (a) the scale of the business; (b) 
the location or municipality in which the business is located; (c) 
the rental value; and (d) the number of employees. 
Special duties are also levied on certain types of consumers' 
goods, such as wine, meat, coffee, and tea. On the other hand, con-
trolled monopolies have taken over the sale of certain other prod-
ucts, such as tobacco, explosives, and matches. 
Motor vehicles are also subject to a special tax, one which differs 
from that levied on freight carriers. The latter also enjoy freedom 
from the turnover tax. 
SECTION C. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
SUBSECTION I. INCOME AND NET WEALTH TAXES 
(a) In general.-The basic pattern of income taxation in 
Germany, as it affects individuals, differs substantially from the 
previously described Belgian system. Whereas the latter country 
generally exacts two different income taxes from individuals, Ger-
many imposes only one 23 ( Einkommensteuer), with progression in 
the rate structure rising to a ceiling of 53%. A limited exception to 
this unified arrangement involves a separate substitute withholding 
tax on income from certain kinds of bonds. Though that substitute 
exaction may be a final levy, under certain conditions a taxpayer 
is permitted to aggregate this type of bond income with other 
types of income in computing the more general income tax, the 
amount previously withheld being treated in such case as a credit. 
Other withholding taxes, such as those on wages and dividends, are 
generally treated as integral parts of, and serve as credits against, 
the general income tax. 
Germany's corporate income tax differs from the previously de-
scribed counterpart found in France. It will be recalled that the 
latter does not discriminate at the corporate level between distrib-
uted and undistributed earnings; its flat rate tax is imposed uni-
formly, for the year income is earned, without regard to dividend 
policy. Germany, like Belgium, does discriminate at the corporate 
level. While the former imposes only one corporate income tax, 
the rate on distributed profits is much lower than the rate on those 
corporate profits which are not currently deflected to stockholders. 
23 The important churches are permitted to levy a church tax as a surcharge on the 
income tax, but in an amount not exceeding 8o/o of the income tax. 
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However, as later explained, the impact of this differential on cer-
tain smaller corporations which must look to internal financing for 
expansion has been whittled down through application of a special 
rate structure. In either case, however, distributed profits will suffer 
another tax in the hands of shareholders, as in Belgium and France. 
Corporations as well as individuals are also subject to a flat rate 
tax on net wealth (V ermogensteuer) though only individuals may 
deduct this tax in computing the general income tax base. In 
addition, enterprises, whether owned by a corporation or individ-
uals, suffer a municipal enterprise tax ( Gewerbesteuer), which uses 
income as one of the factors in fixing the amount of the exaction. 
The amount of this tax constitutes a deduction for both individuals 
and corporations in determining that income subject to the general 
income tax. 
(b) Income, enterprise, and net wealth taxes on individuals. 
-The income tax on individuals caters to married persons and, 
up to a point, progressively also to those with children. 
The split-income system which is normally utilized by married 
persons in the United States is also available in Germany. The tax 
on a married couple is twice the amount which would otherwise 
be due on one-half of the combined income of the two spouses. 
Where the two spouses earn different amounts, the effect is to 
spread their incomes equally between the two, confining the income 
to lower rate brackets. 
Taxpayers who file a separate return enjoy a personal allowance 
of $400 (DM I ,680); husbands and wives who file a joint return 
have two such allowances. There is also a modest allowance for 
old age; single taxpayers over 50 years of age may deduct $200 
( DM 840) from gross income; those over 70 enjoy an additional 
allowance of $8 5 ( DM 360), this amount being doubled in the 
case of married persons. 
Allowances for children, accommodated through deductions from 
gross income, are progressive in amount up through the third child, 
at which point they level off-as follows: 
First child 
Second child 









The significance of the personal allowances and the right of 
married persons to split their incomes on filing a joint return can 
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be illustrated by the case of a male taxpayer whose total earned 
income, all being derived from employment, is $9,524 (DM 40,-
ooo). As a single person, he would pay $3,060 (DM I2,843), 
the effective rate being 3 2% compared with an effective rate of 
25% if, as a married taxpayer, he filed a joint return, and with 
22% for married taxpayers with two dependent children. Those 
who reside in Berlin would also enjoy a 20% tax reduction. 
Individuals also suffer a flat I% deductible tax on net wealth. 
This means that a taxpayer whose income is derived from a stock 
portfolio will suffer larger cumulative taxes than will a taxpayer 
who does not own property but derives from employment a like 
amount of income. The difference can be illustrated by the previ-
ously mentioned single taxpayer whose total net income equalled 
$9,524 (DM 4o,qoo). Whereas his effective rate was 32% when 
all of such income was derived from employment and subject only 
to the income tax, the cumulative effective rate of both taxes would 
be 39% if one-half of his income had been derived from stocks 
valued at $I19,047 (DM 5oo,ooo). 
The net wealth tax, like the general income tax, applies whether 
the individual is a property-owning employee or is engaged in the 
operation of a business. However, the businessman also incurs a 
three-factor municipal enterprise or trading tax, the rates of which 
vary among municipalities. The basic rate is progressive up to 5% 
on profits and is .2% on net worth and wages. Surcharges with 
respect to profits and net worth reach a maximum of twice the 
basic charge, increasing the tax to I 5% on profits and .6% on prop-
erty. Surcharges with respect to the tax on wages may, on the 
other hand, increase that basic levy tenfold. This three-factor tax 
is deductible, however, in computing taxable income for purposes 
of the general income tax, and may be treated as a debt in cal-
culating the net amount of property owned. Inter alia, the foregoing 
principle means that the trade tax which is paid is deductible in com-
puting that portion of the trade tax which turns on profit, for that 
net income which is used in computing the general income tax is also 
the income which is used in computing the trade or enterprise tax. 
(c) Income, net wealth, and enterprise taxes on juridical 
entities.-The corporate income tax ( C.I.T. Korperschaftsteuer) 
reaches the aggregate net income of all juridical entities (Aktienge-
sellschaft, Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H aftung, etc.), the prime 
rate being a flat 51%. However, this is reduced to IS% with 
respect to that portion of the income which is currently distrib-
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uted. 24 Except in one instance, however, distributed profits are 
further subject to a 25% withholding tax against stockholders who 
apply it as a credit against their own general income tax.25 The one 
exception is intended to avoid multiplication of the tax load in the 
case of certain inter-corporate dividends. If the distributee is an-
other German corporation which has shares outstanding and which 
owns 2 5% or more of the stock interest of the distributing cor-
poration, the latter is not required to withhold the dividend tax. 
Nor will the recipient corporation be required to include the divi-
dend in its own gross income, provided that dividend is immediately 
distributed to its own stockholders. In such case, it will, however, 
withhold the 25% dividend tax. Moreover, if it retains the divi-
dend, it must pay a special tax of 36% ( 5 I% less I 5%). This 
special levy was designed to prevent avoidance of the 5 I% rate 
where profits of a subsidiary are not effectively distributed to the 
ultimate equity owners, i.e., stockholders of the parent. Absent this 
special arrangement, it was thought that subsidiaries might avoid 
the 5 I% tax by distributing dividends to a parent which, instead of 
distributing the profit to its own shareholders, might then loan 
the funds back to the subsidiary. 
Because of the marked differential between the normal corporate 
rates on distributed and undistributed profits, a special cushion has 
been designed to facilitate internal financing by small corporations 
which have a net worth not exceeding $I,I85,ooo (DM 5,ooo,ooo), 
provided their shares are in registered form and are owned, to 
the extent of 76% or more, by individuals. In such case, a progres-
sive rate-the maximum charge being 49% on a profit of $II,850 
( DM 50,000), is applied to the undistributed profit. But the tax 
on distributed profits of such a corporation is 26.5% instead of 
the normal I 5%. 
Juridical entities also pay the flat I% tax on net wealth as well 
as the special municipal enterprise tax on their profits and net 
wealth. The basic rates and surcharges of the latter are similar to 
those described above in the setting of individuals. Also, as in the 
case of individuals, there is a 20% rate reduction in taxes for 
enterprises in West Berlin. 
(d) Combined impact of corporate and individual direct 
taxes.-In calculating the cumulative effect of direct taxes imposed, 
.. The Is% rate is applied to the so-called "beriicksichtigungsfiihige Ausschiittungen." 
Literally translated, this means "distributions that may be taken into account." In 
effect, the low rate will apply only to those distributions which are made pursuant to a 
resolution adopte<l. at a shareholders' meeting. 
25 Applicable only to distributions by German corporations. 
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for example, on a manufacturing corporation and its stockholders, 
account must always be taken of three taxes on the corporation 
(general income tax, trade or enterprise tax, and net wealth tax) 
and, if any profits are distributed, of two taxes on the individual 
stockholders (income and net wealth taxes) . It does not follow, 
however, that a constant percentage of corporate profits will al-
ways be absorbed by these five taxes. Because the normal corporate 
rate of 51% differs from the reduced 15% corporate rate on those 
profits actually distributed, there will be differences in the total tax 
load depending on whether all, part, or none of the corporate 
profits, after taxes, are distributed. Moreover, if it is contemplated 
that all of the profits, after taxes, of various corporations will be 
currently distributed, there will still be differences in the degree to 
which those profits are absorbed by direct taxes. In the first place, 
the ratio between corp'orate net wealth taxes and corporate profits 
will not be the same for all industries. Nor, with reference to the 
net wealth tax on stockholders, will the ratio between stock values 
and dividends be constant. Again, the ratio of the corporate trade 
or enterprise tax to corporate profits will vary among municipalities 
because of differences in rates applied to the three base factors; 
variation with reference to this tax will also exist among corpo-
rations within a municipality because of differences in ratio between 
two of the contributing factors (net wealth and wages) and cor-
porate profits. Finally, with reference to the general income tax 
itself, there is a difference in the rate structure for those small 
corporations which pay 26.5% on distributed profits and others 
which pay 15%, just as there are differences in the progressive rate 
applicable to stockholders who enjoy varying amounts of income. 
Only if one indulges in certain assumptions is it possible even to 
measure the cumulative effect of the 3 direct corporate taxes. For 
example, if it be assumed ( 1) that all corporate profits (after 
corporate taxes) are currently to be distributed, ( 2) that the cor-
poration's profits before taxes bear a 10% ratio to its net wealth 
which, in turn, is subject to the non-deductible net wealth tax, ( 3) 
that the normal corporate income tax rate structure (51% with 
a reduced rate of 15% on distributed profits) is to be applied, and 
(4) that the municipal trade tax is levied at more or less maximum 
rates on profits and net wealth ( 15% and .6% respectively), it is 
possible, through application of a complicated formula, to predict 
that direct corporate taxes will absorb 53.04% of the company's 
profits, leaving 46.96% of such profits for distribution. In the fore-
going circumstance, of the total corporate tax of 53%, approxi-
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mately I 8.2% is attributable to the municipal enterprise tax, 10% 
to the net wealth tax, and 24.8% to the corporate income tax. That 
the corporate income tax absorbed almost 2 5% of the profits, as 
computed before taxes, may come as something of a surprise in 
view of the assumption that all profits, after taxes, were distributed 
and that one rate on distributed profits was only IS%· However, 
the latter rate is applicable only to that portion of corporate profits 
actually deflected to stockholders; in effect the 5 I% rate is applied 
to that portion of the profits absorbed by the tax collector. 
Using the same assumptions, except that now 40% of the profits 
after direct taxes will be distributed, the tax collector would absorb 
through direct corporate taxes almost 65% of the corporate profits 
as contrasted with almost 70% if none of the profits were to be 
distributed. 
The minimum separate impact of a distribution on stockholders 
can be illustrated by returning to the case where all of the after-
tax corporate profits (47% of pre-tax profits) were distributed. If 
the stock yields only 4% on its value, the I% tax on the share-
holder's net wealth will absorb 25% of the dividend. And if it be 
further assumed that the taxpayer is single, ·and that he derives all 
of his modest income 26 ( $2,380 or DM Io,ooo) from dividends, 
his personal exemption and deductions will convert the first bracket 
income tax rate of 20% into an effective rate of I o. 7 4% of the 
dividend. Thus in this case, corporate and individual direct taxes 
would have the following cumulative effect: 
Corporate profits 
Less corporate taxes 
Dividend 
Less individual direct taxes: 
Net Wealth Tax 
-25%X47% =II.75 
Income Tax 
- I0.74% X 47 = 5.05 
Church Tax 
- 8% X 5.05 .40 






(e) German concept of gross income.-As a general propo-
sition, the gross income of an individual includes all of his profits, 
with certain exceptions the most important of which relates to 
"'The standard deduction for expenses has been taken into account (DM ISO), 
The property tax is deductible as a personal expenditure, 
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capital gains. While these are generally excludable, the immunity 
does not extend to three frequently recurring situations. Profits 
derived from sales of property used in an enterprise, such as office 
equipment or obsolete machinery but not land, is considered a busi-
ness profit and must be included. Speculative gains, if they equal 
$238 (DM r,ooo) or more a year, are also includible. A gain is 
deemed speculative if it is realized from the sale of immovables 
held for less than 2 years or from movables held less than three 27 
months. Finally, profit in excess of a certain amount, derived from 
the sale of certain corporate shares, will be taxed, though at special 
rates, even though such shares do not constitute a part of the normal 
trading assets of the taxpayer. This principle is applied in the in-
stance where the taxpayer actually or constructively owned a "con-
siderable interest" in the corporation. The taxpayer will be treated 
as though he owned such an interest if, immediately before the sale 
or within the 5 preceding years, he, his wife, fiancee, or certain 
relatives owned more than 25% of the nominal paid in capital. 
The special rates are fixed by the tax authorities and range from 
ro% to 30%. Usually a rate equal to one-half of the rate applied 
to the taxpayer's total income will be used. While profits of this 
type are taxed only if they exceed a certain amount, that minimum 
standard varies and depends on the portion of the enterprise's 
capital which is sold. 
With one prime exception, all profits realized by a corporation 
are taxable, including capital gains. The one exception relates to 
the previously discussed immunity extended to inter-corporate divi-
dends where a recipient German corporation holds at least 25% 
of the shares in a distributing German corporation. However, as 
previously noted, the recipient corporation will be required to pay 
a 36% tax if it does not make a current distribution of the dividend 
to its own shareholders. A corporation may also transfer a branch 
to a subsidiary without recognition of gain, if any, provided the 
subsidiary continues to reflect the assets at the value at which they 
were carried on the parent's balance sheet.28 
With certain modifications, the income factor of the municipal 
enterprise tax is also calculated according to the profits concept of 
the general income tax. The modifications relate to deductions as 
well as inclusions. For example, interest paid on long-term debts 
""A tax reform bill will extend this period to six months. 
28 Whether this applies to a foreign corporation with a German branch has not been 
settled. The statute is not wholly clear on this point, and there are no interpretative 
decisions. 
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and salaries paid to shareholder-managers who own a significant 
interest ( 2 S% or more) must be restored to income. On the other 
hand, income from foreign permanent establishments may be ex-
cluded. In keeping with the philosophy of the first of the foregoing 
modifications, involving restoration to income of interest paid on 
long-term debt, it should also be noted that the long-term debt itself 
is treated as a part of the company's net worth for purposes of 
the separate net wealth factor. 
(f) German concept of utaxable" income.-ln the case of an 
individual, deductions from gross income include personal as well 
as business expenses. 
Personal or non-business expenses (Sonderausgaben) which may 
be itemized, apart from the previously described basic exemptions 
allowed for the taxpayer and his dependents, are of three types. 
First, the entire net wealth and church taxes paid by an individual, 
as well as interest on personal loans, may be deducted. Second, up 
to a certain maximum amount, deductions may be taken for pre-
miums for social security as well as life, health, and accident in-
surance, and subject to a separate maximum limitation-amounts 
contributed to charity and the like. In lieu of itemizing these first 
two types of personal expenses, the taxpayer may take a standard 
personal deduction. If his total income is derived wholly or partly 
from employment or consists of periodic payments, the standard 
minimum is $ISO (DM 636); in other cases it is $48 (DM 200). 
Finally, so-called extraordinary charges associated with illness, 
death, etc., are separately deductible to the extent they exceed a 
minimum amount. Even extra expenses for a housekeeper may be 
fitted into this category under certain conditions. The minimum 
amount which a taxpayer must absorb without benefit of a deduc-
tion varies, depending upon the taxpayer's income and family st~tus. 
Itemization of an individual's business expenses can also be 
avoided by his election to take certain standard business deductions. 
For wage and salary earners, a minimum amount of $IJS (DM 
s64) is allowed. With respect to income from capital, the standard 
deduction is $3S (DM ISO) or twice that amount for a married 
couple, and for periodic payments the standard is $48 ( DM 200). 
The categories of business expenses which may be itemized are 
quite similar to those in the United States, and include wages, 
salaries (but not remuneration paid directors 29 ), rents, depreci-
29 In German law, the term, "directors," may refer to "Vorstandsmitglieder" (man-
aging directors) or to "Aufsichtsratsmitglider" (members of the board of directors). 
Only the latter group is meant here. 
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ation, interest (including reasonable interest charges paid to a 
parent company or other shareholder), excise duties, turnover 
taxes, and the enterprise tax. The net wealth tax is deductible, how-
ever, only by individuals and as a personal item; it is not deductible 
by corporations. 
Enterprises may compute depreciation by straight-line, acceler-
ated, or other methods, depending on which is the more suitable, 
but subject to certain legal limitations. Beginning with I958, a de-
duction under the accelerated method cannot exceed 25% 30 of the 
base nor can it be more than 250% of that which would be allowed 
under the straight-line method. Perhaps because of its rapidly ex-
panding economy, Germany does not presently complement its 
regular depreciation allowances with additional first-year incentive 
allowances. 
Inventory valuation must generally conform to the so-called 
"Niederstwertprinzip," i.e., cost or market whichever is lower. 
Although it was thought that the law permitted taxpayers to reflect 
inventory at cost even though the replacement market price was 
lower, court decisions have reached a contrary result. In any event, 
generally speaking, valuation of assets for tax purposes must con-
form to those valuations reflected on balance sheets for commercial 
purposes. 
Also with reference to the matter of inventory, the Supreme 
Tax Court has determined that the taxing statute does not permit 
the use of LIFO or the base stock method. This limitation may not 
be particularly important in the German setting, for there has been 
little inflation in recent years. Nevertheless Section 5 I of the taxing 
statute authorizes the Minister of Finance to promulgate regula-
tions, with the approval of Parliament, allowing the creation of 
replacement reserves. Such a reserve is authorized only where there 
has been a price increase of 10% or more in the taxpayer's replace-
ment market during the year. Moreover, within a period of six 
years the reserve must be restored to profit. 
(g) Payment and the taxable year.-The tax must gen-
erally be computed by reference to a period of I 2 months, and most 
taxpayers use the calendar year. However, in order to accommodate 
cases of fluctuating income, commercial losses of one year may be 
carried forward, if need be, into each of the 5 succeeding taxable 
years-offsetting the income of those years. Carrybacks are not 
permitted. 
30 A tax reform bill will limit this to zo%. 
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Most businesses are required to reflect their incomes according 
to an accrual method of accounting. 
Much of one's tax is paid currently, either through withholding 
or quarterly estimated payments. In general there are two types 
of withholding. The first relates to the Jo% withholding rate 
( Kapitalertragsteuer) applied to interest on certain bonds, a levy 
not ordinarily applied to nonresidents. The taxpayer may elect to 
treat the amount withheld here as a final payment, in which case the 
interest itself is excluded from his aggregate income in applying 
the progressive rates of the general income tax. The other with-
holding taxes on income, such as that applicable to wages (Lohn-
steuer) or to income derived from other forms of capital ( Kapi-
talertragsteuer) are thought of as integral parts of the general 
income tax itself, serving as credits. This is particularly important 
with reference to the withholding tax on dividends, for a flat 25% 
is withheld. In the case of nonresidents, however, this latter figure 
is usually the final levy. 
While the withheld wage tax is generally treated as a credit, in 
one instance it too may constitute the final levy.31 This will be so 
where the taxpayer ( r) derives compensation (or a pension) from 
only one employment, ( 2) the amount is not in excess of $5,700 
( DM 24,000), and ( 3) his income from sources other than em-
ployment does not exceed $190 (DM Soo). 
A special director's tax (Aufsichtratsteuer), applicable only to 
nonresident members of a company's board of control, is also 
handled on a withholding basis. Resident directors, however, handle 
their fees under the general income tax; indeed, such fees are not 
even subject to the general withholding tax on wages. 
(h) The relevance of residency.-The tax base of a resi-
dent of Germany includes income derived from without as well as 
that derived from within the country, without regard to his na-
tionality. However, a unilateral provision, much like an arrange-
ment in force in the United States, serves to avoid double taxation. 
Foreign income taxes paid on amounts derived from without Ger-
many may be taken as a credit against the German tax. 
Nonresidents are subject to taxation only with reference to in-
come derived from German sources. Aside from this jurisdictional 
limitation, the principles which govern the calculation of a resi-
dent's gross income generally apply to a nonresident. A variation 
31 However, there may be adjustments at the end of the year. The arrangement is 
called Lohnsteuerjahresausgleich, for it involves annual averaging of the wage tax. 
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exists, however, with respect to one of the three exceptional cases 
where capital gains suffer tax incidence. In the case of a nonresident, 
so-called speculative capital gains ai:e taxed only where derived 
from the sale of land. 
Except in two primary instances, a minimum 2 5% tax rate applies 
to nonresidents. This minimum is not applicable to wage earners 
who are taxed by reference to the normal tables. Also, in lieu of 
the regular minimum, nonresident corporate directors pay a flat 
30% tax on their remuneration as a final levy. 
(i) The comparative costs of retaining and distributing 
corporate profits.-Sub-topic (a), supra, points up the difference 
which exists in the rates applied to distributed as distinguished from 
undistributed profits. In effect, this difference ( I 5% on distributed 
profits compared with 5 I% on undistributed profits) constitutes a 
penalty tax on the use of undistributed profits for purposes of ex-
panswn. 
There is only a slight variation on the foregoing theme in the 
instance where a German facility is owned directly or indirectly 
by an American corporation. If the facility is operated as a branch, 
a progressive rate, ranging up to 49%, is applied without regard 
to whether the profits are transferred to the United States. If all 
of the profits are to be distributed, it may be less expensive, tax-
wise, to operate through a subsidiary. In that event the subsidiary 
will pay at the I 5% rate (as distinguished from the 5 I% if the 
profits are retained) and will withhold a dividend tax which is 
limited by a tax treaty to I5%.32 These two levies will not, how-
ever, represent exactly 30% of the subsidiary's profits. In the first 
place, that portion of the subsidiary's profits which is absorbed by 
the corporate levy will be taxed at the rate of 5 I%, for to that 
extent the profit is not actually distributed to stockholders. Secondly, 
the I 5% dividend tax is applied, not to the subsidiary's total profit, 
but only to that part (subsidiary's profit after taxes) of the profit 
actually distributed to stockholders. There is one other basic tax 
difference between operation through a branch and through a sub-
sidiary. Even if a branch could be financed through loans from the 
American parent, any so-called interest would not be deductible by 
the branch. A subsidiary, however, may obtain such a deduction in 
computing its taxable jncome for income tax purposes, but not for 
purposes of the municipal enterprise tax. 
•• A change in the existing Germany-U.S. treaty is being negotiated, the German aim 
being to restore the withholding tax on intercorporate dividends to 25%. 
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(j) Disposition of an enterprise.-Where a corporation 
disposes of its business, the income tax will be applied to the differ-
ence between the adjusted basis and the selling price of the assets. 
And upon liquidation of the corporation a shareholder will suffer 
a tax on his realized gain if he has a significant interest ( 2 5% or 
more) in the corporation or, in the case of residents, if his gain 
fits into the so-called speculative category (holding period 3 months 
or less). 
While the foregoing suggests that a disposition of an enterprise 
is generally a tax reckoning event, under certain conditions it is 
possible to effect a merger of corporate enterprises without im-
mediate income tax cost but in effect, of course, tax incidence is only 
postponed until a later tax reckoning event-such as a liquidation. 
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER GERMAN TAXES 
(a) German taxes on capital and property.-In the case 
of resident corporations and individuals, the previously described 
net wealth or property tax (Vermogensteuer) is applied to property 
wherever situated. Nonresidents are reached only with respect to 
property situated .within Germany. While the rate is normally I%, 
a minimum base of $23,8Io (DM IOO,ooo) is assumed for a cor-
poration and $4,762 (DM 2o,ooo) is assumed for a private com-
pany ( Gesellschaft mit beschrankter H aftung). All enterprises also 
pay the previously described enterprise or trade tax. There is also 
a very modest land tax ( Grundsteuer) running from . 5% to I% 
of the rental value of the property. To this, surcharges may be 
added. 
A registration duty ( Grunderwerbsteuer) is also payable upon 
the transfer of real estate for money's worth-the normal rate 
being 7%. While this registration duty is avoided in the case of a 
gift, such a transfer will be subject to a gift tax which is integrated 
with the German death duty (Erbschaftsteuer )-common princi-
ples being applicable to inter vivos and testamentary transfers. The 
rate is progressive, running up to 6o% on gifts in excess of $2,380,-
ooo (DM IO,ooo,ooo) where the donor and donee are strangers. 
(b) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-Revenue from the 
German income tax is supplemented substantially by a multiple stage 
turnover tax which is applied to the rendition of services as well 
as to each transfer of goods in the course of developing a finished 
product. While every turnover is taxed, the normal rate of 4% is 
reduced to I% in the instance where one entrepreneur transfers an 
item to another entrepreneur without changing its nature. 
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Laying aside the matter of tariffs, imports might be said to enjoy 
a tax advantage, for a flat 4% tax is applied at the point of im-
portation regardless of the number of stages through which the 
imported product may have previously gone.33 In certain cases, how-
ever, this rate may be increased up to a ceiling of 6%. 
Export transactions enjoy even more favorable treatment. In 
order to make German products more competitive in the world 
market, these have been exempt. In fact, at the point of exporta-
tion, refund may be obtained-according to certain fixed standards 
-of any turnover taxes paid on prior transfers. The formula 
which governs such refunds is not, however, always generally 
thought to be sufficiently generous to accommodate the entire actual 
amount of turnover taxes previously paid. 
While the turnover tax rate for luxury goods is the same as for 
other goods, special excise duties do exist with reference to a num-
ber of products, e.g., tea, beer, coffee, sugar, tobacco, playing cards, 
etc. On the other hand, some products, such as bread, are immune 
from the turnover tax. 
(c) Registration duty on capital contributions .-When new 
capital is contributed to a corporation or is devoted to a branch 
of a foreign corporation, a registration duty ( Gesellschaftsteuer) 
of 2.5% must be paid. On issuance of bonds, a similar 2.5% levy 
(Wertpapiersteuer) is imposed. 
(d) Miscellaneous.-Other taxes utilized by Germany in-
clude those on motor vehicles (differentials frequently being geared 
to cylinder volume or weight) and testamentary transfers. The 
latter is geared to a progressive rate schedule which looks to the 
value transferred as well as the character of the relationship be-
tween the decedent and the beneficiary. It applies if a resident-
beneficiary receives property from a nonresident as well as where 
the decedent was a resident. If neither party is a resident, it applies 
if the property is situated in Germany. 
SECTION D. ITALY 
SUBSECTION I. INCOME TAXES 
(a) In general.-The Italian income tax system is quite 
similar to that of Belgium in that it consists of a series of different 
income taxes. Income of individuals and juridical entities is first 
divided by reference to its type into four prime categories, each of 
83 This matter, as it relates to exports from the United States to Germany, is more 
fully covered in PART II, infra. 
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which is subjected to a different tax rate. The four separately 
scheduled assessments relate, respectively, to (I) estimated income 
from rural property, ( 2) income from the active conduct of an 
agriculture or farm enterprise, (3) estimated income from urban 
property, and (4) income from labor, from movable capital (in-
cluding interest but not dividends), and from industrial and com-
mercial activity. 
Superimposed on these separately scheduled assessments is a fifth 
tax, applicable only to individuals, covering aggregate income. A 
sixth tax, applicable only to corporations, is more closely akin to an 
excess profits and property tax than to an income tax. 
On behalf of municipalities, a family tax is also imposed on the 
aggregate income of all members of a family. Municipalities, 
provinces, Chambers of Commerce, and certain others may also 
levy surcharges on other taxes, and these will differ from place to 
place. 
A more detailed analysis of the cumulative effect of these various 
taxes follows. 
(b) Separately scheduled taxes on income from rural prop-
erty.-The first separately scheduled tax relating to rural property 
(Imposta sui Terreini) is applied to imputed income, determined 
by reference to values reflected in a land register, rather than to 
actual income. Because the base itself is quite unrealistic, the land 
register not having been brought up to date after a substantial 
monetary devaluation, the rate applied to the base is very high. 
The basic rate of 10% is multiplied by a coefficient of I 2; sur-
charges by various units may increase the resulting rate to I467% 
of imputed (not actual) income. 
Assuming the owner does not use the property in the active con-
duct of farming or, alternatively, in industrial or commercial oper-
ations, his actual income from the property, as distinguished from 
the imputed income, will not be assessed under any of the other 
separately scheduled assessments, though it will be subject to the 
complementary personal tax on aggregate income or to the corpo-
rate excess profits tax, as the case may be. On the other hand, if 
the owner uses the property in connection with industrial or com-
mercial activities, the imputed income is not subject to the first 
separately scheduled assessment but the actual amount will be sub-
ject to the fourth separately scheduled tax on industrial and com-
mercial activity, as described below in sub-topic (d). · 
A second and quite distinct tax on rural property actually relates 
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to income from the active conduct of farming operations (Imposta 
sui Reddito Agrario). While the basic rate is ro% multiplied by a 
coefficient of r 2, surcharges by various units may increase the 
total to 300% of imputed (not actual) income. If the land is rented 
instead of being actively used by the owner, neither party will pay 
this tax. The owner will pay the previously described tax on im-
puted income from rural property not actively used by him, and 
the lessee will pay the fourth separately scheduled assessment on 
income from industrial and commercial activity, described-as 
noted above-in subtopic (d) below. 
(c) Separately scheduled tax on income from urban prop-
erty.-The separately scheduled tax relating to urban property 
(Imposta sui Fabbricati) is applied to the actual income therefrom, 
though imputed income is sometimes used as an audit yardstick. 
Surcharges added to a basic rate of 5% can run the total to as high 
as 3 I% of the actual income. 
This tax does not apply to income from urban property oc-
cupied by an enterprise engaged in industrial activity, the building 
being used to house machinery and the like. In that circumstance, 
but only that circumstance, the income will be reached by the fourth 
separately scheduled tax relating to industrial activity. In all cases, 
however, the complementary personal tax on aggregate income or 
the corporate excess profits tax will be applied. 
(d) Separately scheduled tax on income from certain capital, 
labor, and industrial or commercial activity.-The separately sched-
uled tax on income from capital and/or labor (Imposta sui Redditi 
di Ricchezza Mobile), generally known as R.M., is further divided 
into four basic classes. 
Class A includes only that income which is derived from capital, 
i.e., interest 34 and the like, but excluding dividends. Surcharges 
increase the basic rate of 23% to 26.32%. 
Class B includes income from a combination of capital and labor, 
usually relating to commercial and industrial profits. In the case 
of individuals and partnerships, the first $387 ( 24o,ooo Lire) of 
this income is exempt; from $387 to $I 548 ( 96o,ooo Lire), the 
federal rate is 9%; on income from $1548 to $6840 an I 8% rate 
is applied; any excess over $6840 suffers a 20% rate. A flat rate of 
I 8% is applied to the first $6840 realized by corporations; any 
excess is subject to a 20% rate. However, both corporations and 
"The .26.32% rate is temporarily reduced by one-half with respect to interest paid by 
corporatiOns. 
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individuals suffer additional local taxes and surcharges, the effect 
being to increase the top rate of 20% to 31.23%. 
Class C-I covers only income from liberal professions. Again, 
the first $387 ( 24o,ooo Lire) is exempt. Income in excess of that, 
up to $I 548 ( 96o,ooo Lire), suffers a 4% rate. The top federal 
marginal rate of 8% on the balance is further increased by addi-
tional local taxes and surcharges, rising to I3.95%. 
Class C-2 covers income from employment in other than a liberal 
profession. While the exemption and basic rate structure applicable 
to the latter is carried over to this fourth class, additional local 
taxes and surcharges here increase the top 8% rate only to 9· I 5%. 
The employer is responsible to withhold this tax. 
(e) The complementary progressive tax on. an individual's 
aggregate income.-ln computing an individual's aggregate income 
for the purpose of determining the complementary progressive 
tax, a general personal allowance of $3 87 ( 24o,ooo Lire) is first 
deducted from gross income. Another deduction of $8 I ( so,ooo 
Lire) is allowed for each dependent. Life insurance premiums as 
well as the previously described separately scheduled taxes may 
also be deducted from gross income. In the end, the progressive 
complementary tax will not actually be charged unless the individ-
ual's aggregate income, before the foregoing allowances, exceeds 
$I I6I (72o,ooo Lire). 
The progressive scale on the amount actually subject to tax begins 
with a basic rate of 2% (increased by surcharges, etc., to 2.24%) 
on taxable amounts up to $387 ( 240,000 Lire), and extends up-
ward to so% (increased by surcharges, etc., to 54%) on taxable 
amounts in excess of $8o6,4 52 ( soo million Lire). Progression 
is not nearly as intense as in America for moderate incomes. For 
example, the marginal basic rate (before surcharges) for $25,000 
(ISY:! million Lire) is approximately 10%, and for $5o,ooo (3I 
million Lire) it approximates I4 %. 
(f) The complementary tax on corporate excess profits and 
capital.-The corporate tax which complements the separately 
scheduled assessments is not a typical income tax nor are the rates 
progressive. It is more closely akin to a combined capital and excess 
profits tax. First, a rate of . 7 5% is imposed on capital and reserves. 
Coupled with this is a IS% tax on those profits which exceed 6% 
of the capital and reserves. In computing these profits, the previ-
ously described separately scheduled assessment ( R.M.) on, busi-
ness income is deductible. 
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In the case of foreign corporations, the capital levy only reaches 
investments in Italy. 
(g) Cumulati'Ve effect of taxes imposed on distributed busi-
ness income of corporations.-While income derived by a corpo-
ration from the conduct of business suffers a separately scheduled 
corporate assessment as well as the complementary tax imposed on 
corporate enterprises, dividends received by individual sharehold-
ers are not subject to another separately scheduled assessment. 
They are subject, however, to the complementary progressive tax 
imposed on individuals. The same immunity from a second separ-
ately scheduled assessment applies if the shareholder is a corpora-
tion; but the dividend will be included in the recipient corporation's 
profits for the purpose of computing its complementary excess profits 
tax, if any. American parent companies would not even pay this 
tax, however, with respect to dividends received from an Italian 
subsidiary. 
If it be assumed that the distributing corporation's taxable profits 
equalled 10% of its capital and reserves, its tax load would be com-
puted as in Table I L. 
TABLE I L 
Separately scheduled assessment 
-Effective rate under Category 3 (R.M.) 35 31.23% 
Capital tax 
-Effective rate on capital 
-Ratio of capital to profits 
-Effective rate on taxable 




-rs% of o/io of profits; effective rate 




Since an individual does not suffer a separately scheduled tax 
on dividends, the tax impact on him, as distinguished from the cor-
poration, depends on the moderately progressive rates of the com-
plementary tax on his aggregate income. Subjection of dividends to 
but one tax in the hands of individuals has the net effect, if the 
corporate tax is ignored, of creating a substantial tax differential 
between dividend income and other forms of income. The differ-
35 It will be recalled that this rate applies only to income in excess of $6480; lower 
incomes are subject to a basic rate of 18%, increased by surcharges to 27.85%. 
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ence is particularly striking in the case of low and moderate in-
comes. The substantial character of the differential in these settings 
arises out of the fact that the effective rate of the additional separ-
ately scheduled assessments on other types of income, e.g., employ-
ment income, begins with a higher rate and rises more quickly than 
the progressive rates of the complementary tax on aggregate in-
come. Illustratively, the cumulative effect of both taxes on employ-
ment income of $2,640 ( 11h million Lire) earned by a single tax-
payer is 7.22% contrasted with an effective single tax rate of 2.89% 
for a like amount of dividend income. A married taxpayer with 
two children, on like amounts of income, would suffer a total 
effective rate of 6.8o% on employment income and only 2.47% on 
dividend income. 
(h) Italian concept of gross income.-The gross income 
concept is roughly similar to that in the United States with two 
prime exceptions. First, income from rural property is always based 
on an estimate as is other income in the absence of adequate records. 
Second, capital gains are not always included in the tax base. For 
example, an investment purchase of one house followed shortly 
thereafter by a sale will not lead to inclusion of any of the realized 
gain. But the converse will be true if the taxpayer regularly specu-
lates, i.e., regularly buys and sells houses, securities, etc., and in 
such case the ordinary rates are applied. This speculative element is 
always implied in the case where an enterprise sells fixed business 
assets. With respect to those entities taxed on the basis of their 
balance sheets, capital gains may be taxed before they are realized, 
i.e., earlier-when and if entered in their accounting records. 
(i) Italian concept of "taxable" income.-Permissible de-
ductions from gross income in arriving at taxable income are similar 
to those in the United States. Special comment need be made only 
with reference to the deductions for taxes, interest, and depreci-
ation, together with the treatment of inventory. 
In computing taxable income for purposes of the corporate or 
individual complementary taxes, deduction may be taken for the 
separately scheduled assessments (including the R.M. tax) as well 
as indirect taxes incurred in the production of income. 
Interest actually paid on loans associated with the production of 
income is quite generally deductible, even where paid to a parent 
company, provided the charge does not exceed a reasonable amopnt. 
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Depreciation is generally computed by the straight line method, 
suggested rates having been worked out by the Finance Department, 
in consultation with industry and commerce, for various types of 
items. Accelerated depreciation may also be used in connection with 
construction of new plants or modernization of old plants. Indeed, 
allowances in addition to normal depreciation may be taken in the 
first four years up to a total of 40% of cost, but not exceeding 
IS% in any one year. 
Inventories are valued at cost or market, whichever is lower. 
Identification may be made according to LIFO as well as other 
methods. 
(j) Payment and the taxable year.-While income is cal-
culated on a yearly basis, Italy now allows operating losses to be 
carried forward, if need be, into the five succeeding years. Carry-
backs are not permitted. 
Income is generally reported according to the calendar year, 
though entities which report their income on the basis of balance 
sheets use their respective accounting years. 
The tax is levied in two installments, a provisional levy designed 
to facilitate current reporting, and then a definitive levy. The pro-
visional levy uses the past experience of the taxpayer as a yard-
stick. For example, in the case of individuals and partnerships, the 
provisional tax for I 96 I is determined by reference to that income 
which was produced in I959 and declared in March, I96o. The 
definitive tax is then assessed on the actual income of I96I, as 
declared in I962. Corporations which are taxed on the basis of their 
balance sheets, according to their accounting year, use more recent 
past experience in computing the provisional tax. The provisional 
tax for I 96 I is determined by reference to income produced in I 960 
and declared in I96r. But again the definitive tax for I96I will be 
that year's actual income, as declared in I 962. 
(k) The relevance of residency.-The principle of terri-
toriality governs the basic separately scheduled taxes (income from 
rural and urban property, from farming, and the R.M. tax). These 
reach only income derived from sources in Italy, the residence of 
the taxpayer being irrelevant. However, in the case of an Italian 
business enterprise, for the purposes of these basic taxes the entire 
income will be deemed to have its source in Italy, except to the 
extent it is earned by a foreign permanent establishment which has 
its own administration and accounting system. Income earned by 
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a permanent establishment located in Italy is deemed, of course, 
to have its source there. 
A slightly different theory of jurisdiction governs the comple-
mentary progressive tax on individuals and the excess profits tax on 
corporations. Resident citizens of Italy are subject to the former 
tax with respect to their entire income, regardless of origin. Resi-
dent aliens, on the other hand, initially suffer this tax only with 
respect to income having its source in Italy, but income from foreign 
sources will be reached when remitted. 
The excess profits tax on corporations, like the complementary 
progressive tax on individuals, reaches the entire income of Italian 
corporations without regard to the place of origin. On the other 
hand, foreign corporations and other entities with a permanent 
establishment in Italy are subject to this tax only with respect to 
their income from the establishment. 
(l) The cost of retaining versus the cost of distributing 
profits to an American enterprise.-Because of the cumulative ef-
fect of two principles, Italian direct taxes will generally be the same 
whether an American enterprise conducts its affairs in Italy through 
a branch (permanent establishment) or through an Italian sub-
sidiary. The first contributing principle is to the effect that the cor-
porate tax in Italy is unaffected by the question of whether or not 
profits are distributed. The second involves the fact that, by treaty, 
American corporations are free from direct taxes with respect to 
any dividends received from an Italian subsidiary. Accordingly, 
with reference to I tal ian direct taxes, the form in which the Ameri-
can enterprise conducts its affairs in Italy, and the question of 
whether it plans to have the foreign facility retain or distribute 
profits, are not material considerations. Because of the neutral 
position reflected by the Italian tax system toward these matters, 
Italy does not need, nor does it have, a penalty tax on unreasonable 
accumulation of profits. 
If the foreign facility is housed in a subsidiary corporation, its 
retained profits can be capitalized without direct tax costs through 
the issuance of stock dividends. Such shares would not be deemed 
income even under Italian national law. Nor would there be a 
direct tax on such shares at the point of disposition or liquidation, 
for Italy does not reach such capital gains.36 However, capitaliza-
36 This relates only to the shareholder. A corporation would be taxable according to 
the ordinary rates if it realized a capital gain in the course of winding up its affairs. 
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tion would lead to certain indirect tax costs in the forms of registra-
tion fees and stamp duties. 
( m) Disposition of an enterprise.-Disposition and liquida-
tion of a corporate enterprise can give rise to three different gains. 
Realized gain by the corporation, on the sale of fixed assets will 
normally be deemed taxable speculative gain. Any hidden reserves 
must also be restored to profit in computing the corporation's in-
come. Finally, the shareholders, on relinquishing their shares, will 
be deemed to realize taxable income but only if the gain fits in the 
previously described speculative category, i.e., was enjoyed by a 
taxpayer who frequently buys and sells securities. Also only in this 
latter case would a merger result in any tax on shareholders. 
Death of an individual who owns all or a part of an enterprise 
(proprietorship or partnership) does not serve to terminate the 
enterprise and will not be deemed a taxable disposition where the 
business is carried on by his surviving heirs or partner. 
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER SIGNIFICANT TAXES 
(a) Taxes on capital and capital transfers.-There are 
only two taxes in Italy which resemble a property tax, and these 
have a limited sweep. The most general of them relates to the com-
plementary tax on corporations. It will be recalled that one of the 
factors associated with that tax involves a . 7 5% flat rate tax on 
the corporation's capital and reserves. 
The second and a more limited type of property tax involves 
a flat rate .05% annual levy on industrial bonds issued by Italian 
corporations. 
\Vhile Italy does not have a general property tax, documents 
which must be registered, and these include those involving the 
transfer of property for money's worth, are subject to registration 
duties or fees. The general rate is 4%. 
Italy also employs a gift tax, using rates identical to those 
associated with succession duties which are applicable to inherit-
ances. Testamentary transfers are also subject, however, to an 
estate tax. In terms of jurisdiction, the gift tax is imposed on all 
gifts made within Italy, and this includes all of those which are 
registered in that country. Succession duties and the estate tax, on 
the other hand, are imposed only on property situated within Italy 
at the time of the decedent's death, his domicile, residence, and 
nationality being irrelevant. 
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(b) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-Italy relies upon 
indirect taxes to a much greater degree than most western countries. 
And the Imposta Generale Sull' entrata (gross receipts tax) is the 
most important of its indirect taxes. The normal rate is 3-3% 
though retail sales are fully exempt. Since some tax is imposed on 
each transfer of goods (except at retail) and rendition of services 
for money's worth, the effect is to increase the total tax load by 
reference to the number of enterprises through which goods pass in 
the course of developing and disposing of a finished product. In 
many of the cases where this cumulative principle would provide 
integrated companies with a substantial competitive advantage, 
Italy, like Belgium, has selected one common type transfer as the 
point of impact for a single turnover tax. 
To whittle down at least some of the tax advantage which im-
ports might otherwise enjoy (laying aside the matter of tariffs), 
the turnover tax is first imposed at the point of importation.37 On 
the other hand, to neutralize the effect of the tax on export trade, 
exports are freed from the tax. In fact, turnover taxes previously 
charged in connection with the development of the exported item 
are refunded. 
In addition to the foregoing general turnover tax, special excise 
duties have been placed on certain consumers' goods, such as liquor, 
sugar, tobacco, and mineral oils. Moreover, the state has monop-
olized the tobacco and salt industries. 
(c) Other miscellaneous taxes.-Miscellaneous revenue 
measures include fees for the registration of all types of legal docu-
ments and stamp duties on the instruments themselves. There is 
also a motor vehicle tax, imposed on the basis of horsepower or 
deadweight. 
Most important to local units is the Imposta di Famiglia. This 
tax is levied on the total income of a family, the progressive rates 
ranging from 2 to I 2% (I 6% with surcharges). 
SECTION E. LUXEMBOURG 
SUBSECTION I. INCOME, NET WEALTH, AND 
ENTERPRISE TAXES 
(a) In general.-During World War II, Germany con-
verted Luxembourg into a province, and the latter's tax system 
31 This matter, insofar as it relates to exports from the United States to Italy, is 
covered more fully in PART II, infra. 
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was redesigned so as to conform closely to that prevailing in Ger-
many. While Luxembourg made some post-war changes, the two 
systems are still quite similar today, the most striking difference 
being that Luxembourg does not discriminate between distributed 
and undistributed profits in determining a corporation's income tax. 
Generally speaking, individuals are only subject to one national 
income tax, the progressive rates of which are applied to aggregate 
income and, in the case of single persons, reach a maximum effective 
rate of 54%. The remuneration of a corporate director (member of 
board in control) is also subject, however, to a second special tax. 
In addition, individuals pay a general property tax, the rate being 
.5% of net wealth. Finally, businessmen suffer a three-factor munici-
pal enterprise tax, geared to profits, net wealth, and payroll.38 This 
assessment is deductible in computing taxable income for federal 
purposes as well as in computing the profit factor associated with 
this same tax. 
Corporations are also subject to a national income tax. With the 
exception of small enterprises, however, a flat rate is used. This is 
complemented also by a flat rate tax on net wealth and by the 
deductible three-factor 39 municipal enterprise tax. 
While corporate dividends are also generally subject to the na-
tional income tax, an effort has been made to reduce the degree of 
multiple taxation of corporate earnings by freeing inter-corporate 
dividends from tax in those instances where the receiving corpora-
tion holds a substantial interest in the distributing company. 
(b) Income, enterprise, and net wealth taxes on individuals. 
-The general progressive income tax on individuals (Impot sur le 
Revenu des Personnes Physiques) reaches all types of ordinary in-
come except for a limited exclusion in cases where a total of $6o 
(L. Fr. J,ooo) or less is derived from incidental services. While 
remuneration received for performing the role of corporate director 
is subject to a separate flat rate 20% withholding tax, in effect, the 
net amount of remuneration received-i.e., the remuneration less 
the withheld 20% tax-is also separately subject to the progressive 
rates of the general income tax or, in the case of a nonresident 
director, to a flat 8% general income tax, provided the remunera-
tion does not exceed $I,o6o (L. Fr. SJ,OOo). In effect, while a 
38 Not all municipalities use the third factor, payroll, though a number of the im-
portant ones do. The basic rate is .2% and surcharges increase this to an average total 
of 1.2%. 
89 Ibid. 
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director's remuneration is subject to both taxes, the special flat 
20% tax itself is deductible from gross income in computing the 
taxable base of the general income tax. If all of a resident director's 
gross remuneration would fit, say, into the 40% bracket of the 
general progressive tax, the privilege of treating the additional 
flat 20% as a deduction from gross income has the effect of reducing 
the added impact of the special tax to 1 2%. This effect is to be 
contrasted with that which stems from other withholding taxes 
which are integral parts of, and serve as credits against, the 
general income tax itself. 
Built into the tables reflecting progression in the rate structure 
are allowances for married men and additional amounts for those 
with children. The table of effective rates, appearing in Table I M, 
indicates the significance of those allowances and the degree of 
progressiOn. 
TABLE I M 
Married Married Married Married 
Single Married and and2 and4 ands 
Income Taxpayer Taxpayer I Child Children Children Children 
$ 720 
Fr. 36,000 .56% 
$ 1,000 
Fr. 50,000 6.oo% 2.oo% 
$ 2,000 
Fr. 100,000 14·73% 8.76% 6.57% 4·33% 
$ 4,000 
Fr. 200,000 24.08% 15-32% 12.6o% 10.12% 5-96% 4.10% 
$ 6,ooo 
Fr. 300,000 30.01% 19.81% 17·36% 14.88% 10-74% 8.81% 
$ 8,ooo 
Fr. 400,000 34·33% 24·45% 22.22% 19-95% 16.o3% 14.21% 
$ 1o,ooo 
Fr. 500,000 37·71% 28.43% 26.45% 24·44% 20.89% 19-24% 
$ 15,000 
Fr. 750,000 43·94% 36.o5% 34·53% 32·99% 30.24% 28.92% 
$ 20,000 
Fr. 1,ooo,ooo 47·71o/o 40.82% 39·68% 38.52% 36·45% 35-47% 
$ 25,000 
Fr. 1,25o,ooo 49·51% 44-06% 43-23% 42-22% 40-56% 39·79% 
$ 30,000 
Fr. 1,5oo,ooo 50-42% 46-48% 45·72% 44·95% 43·57% 42-92% 
$ 35,000 
47.62% Fr. 1,750,000 50·94% 48.27% 46-96% 45·77% 45-22% 
Individuals also pay a flat .5% tax on net wealth (Impot sur 
la Fortune). The consequent extent to which the national direct 
tax load on income from capital exceeds that on earned income 
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(e.g., from employment) can be illustrated by a case where a tax-
payer derives his entire income from capital which yields 10% on 
its market value. In this circumstance, absent other considerations, 
the .s% tax on net wealth would be equivalent to an additional 
5% tax on the income therefrom. 
In addition to the two foregoing taxes, those engaged in the 
conduct of a business are also subject to a three-factor municipal 
enterprise tax (Gewerbesteuer).40 Basic rates of 4% on profits in 
excess of $4,000 (L. Fr. 200,000) for individual proprietors, and 
in excess of $1,600 (L. Fr. 8o,ooo) for companies, have been sur-
charged in varying amounts, increasing the municipal tax on profits 
to between 5. 5% and 8 ·4% and the tax on net wealth to between 
.28% and .42%. However, the ultimate impact of this tax is re-
duced by the fact that it is deductible in computing the base of the 
national income tax and may also be a debt in determining one's 
net wealth. 
(c) Income, net wealth, and enterprise taxes on corpora-
tions.-All juridical entities (e.g., societe anonyme and the societe a 
responsabilite limitee) are subject to a national income tax ( Impot 
sur le Revenu des Collectivites) on aggregate income, the normal 
rate being 40%. Progressive rates are applied, however, to enter-
prises with small incomes. Because the applicable rate in the pro-
gressive schedule is applied to the small company's entire income, 
not just to that portion falling within a given bracket, it was neces-
sary to add a marginal relief schedule in order to even out rate 




I. $8,ooo (Fr. 40o,ooo) 
2. In excess of $8,ooo (Fr. 
40o,ooo) but under 
$2o,ooo (Fr. 1 ,ooo,ooo) 






Tax Shall Not Exceed 
20% 
JO% $1,6oo (Fr. 8o,ooo) plus 
so% of profit over $8,-
000 (Fr. 40o,ooo) 
$6,ooo (Fr. JOO,OOO) 
plus 72% of profit over 
$2o,ooo (Fr. I,ooo,ooo) 
The basic rates of the three-factor 41 municipal enterprise tax 
(4% on profits and .2% on net wealth) and the varying surcharges 
"'Ibid. 
n Ibid. 
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are the same for corporations as individuals. Since corporations, 
like individuals, may deduct this tax in computing the general in-
come tax base, the prime difference between the two relates to the 
fact that only individuals enjoy an exemption for the first $Io,ooo 
(L. Fr. 500,000) in computing the net wealth factor. 
Also in the case of corporations and private companies (societe 
a responsabilite limitee), for purposes of the net wealth tax, mini-
mum property holdings are assumed, the respective assumed 
amounts being $Io,ooo (L. Fr. 500,000) and $4,000 (L. Fr. 
2oo,ooo). 
(d) Combined impact of corporate and individual direct 
taxes.-As noted earlier in the setting of Germany, certain variables 
affect the degree to which corporate earnings will be absorbed by 
direct taxes on corporations and their stockholders. The progressive 
character of the income tax's rate structure, as applied to individ-
uals (and small corporations), is one such variable. Differences in 
the amount of surcharges added by various municipalities to the 
basic rates of the municipal enterprise tax is another. Further vari-
ables, associated with net wealth taxes on corporations and indi-
viduals, include· the relationships of corporate net wealth to corpo-
rate earnings and of stock values to dividends. These will vary from 
industry to industry and among corporations within an industry. 
The cumulative effect of direct taxes on distributed corporate 
earnings can be measured, however, and compared to the tax load 
on an individual's earned income, by making certain assumptions. 
Those indulged in here are similar to those made in discussing the 
tax loads of other countries and include an individual with modest 
income ($2,380 or L. Fr. II9,ooo), municipal enterprise tax rates 
of ·4% on net wealth and 8% on profits, and a corporation which 
earns 10% on its net wealth while its stock yields 4% on its market 
value. 
Under the foregoing circumstances, the corporation would have 
to earn approximately $4,925 (L. Fr. 246,203) in order to pay a 
dividend of $2,380 (L. Fr. I 19,000), the effective total rate of the 
three taxes (income, net wealth, and enterprise) on its earnings 
being 51.67%. 
An unmarried individual whose entire income was derived from 
a dividend of $2,380 (L. Fr. II9,ooo) on stock worth $59,500 (L. 
Fr. 2,97 5,000) would pay a property tax of $287.50 (L. Fr. 14,-
37 5), an amount equal to I 2% of his dividend, and an income tax 
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of $379.10 (L. Fr. 18,955),42 this being 15.9% of his dividend. 
But when his personal tax load is treated as a percentage of the 
original corporate earnings, rather than a percentage of his divi-
dend, the following cumulative effect emerges. 
Total corporate direct taxes $2,545· (Fr. 127,203) 
Individual direct taxes 
Property tax 288. (Fr. 14,37 5) 
Income tax 379· (Fr. 18,955) 
$3,212. (Fr. 160,533) 
Total direct tax load $3,212. (Fr. 160,533) 65.2% 
Original corporate earnings $4,925 (Fr. 246,203) 
The cumulative effect of direct taxes on this type of capital may 
be compared with an individual who earns $2,380 (L. Fr. 119,000) 
from employment. His total tax of $345 (L. Fr. 17,237) 43 would 
be only 14% of his income. 
(e) The Luxembourg concept of gross income.-In prac-
tice, gross income, as such, is not actually computed. The aggregate 
income against which the rates are applied actually consists of the 
net incomes from each of the various sources. 
In the case of individuals, exclusion of capital gains is much more 
significant than the one other common tax free benefit, specifically, 
an amount not in excess of $6o (L. Fr. 3,ooo) derived from in-
cidental services. The immunity accorded capital gains, such as those 
derived from the sale of stock or a home, is lost, however, if the 
transaction is deemed speculative in character. And that characteri-
zation is applied, except for certain exceptions relating to shares in 
Luxembourg corporations and indebtedness running against resi-
dents, whenever movables are held less than 1 year or, in the case 
of immovables, less than 2 years. Also included in the taxable cate-
gory are profits derived from the sale of assets used in the tax-
payer's business, such as office equipment. In fact, even the con-
version of a proprietorship into a limited liability company is 
deemed a taxable event except where the realized gain is less than 
$2,000 (L. Fr. 10o,ooo). Finally, as is true in Germany and the 
Netherlands, gains derived by an investor from the sale of domestic 
42 The standard deduction for personal expenses ($8o) was taken into account. 
43 The standard deductions for personal expenses and business costs were taken into 
account, being, respectively, $So and $r2o, 
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or foreign corporate stock will be taxed if the individual holds a 
"considerable interest" in the corporation. Such an interest will be 
deemed to exist if the taxpayer or certain related parties owned 
more than 25% of the nominal paid-in capital either at the moment 
of sale or at any point during the preceding 5 years. But even in 
such cases, small profits are ignored; the gain will not be taxed 
if not more than I% of the corporation's capital stock is sold and 
the amount of the resulting gain falls below a certain figure. Even 
where capital gains are taxed, in the case of individuals, a special 
rate is applied, ranging from I2% to 27%. Normally a rate equal 
to one-half of that applied to the taxpayer's ordinary income will 
be used. 
There are two significant instances where corporations depart 
from the profit concept applicable to individual businessmen. First, 
corporations reflect all of their capital gains just as they reflect in-
come from regular business activity. Second, the so-called Schachtel-
privileg permits dividends received by a corporation to be excluded 
if the recipient holds at least 2 5% of the stock in a domestic dis-
tributing corporation. 
The profit concept utilized by the various municipal enterprise 
taxes is quite similar to that associated with the national income 
tax. The prime differences, in the case of the enterprise tax, relate 
(I) to the non-deductibility of interest on long-term indebtedness 
and of salaries paid to corporate managers who have substantial 
stock interests ( 2 5% or more), and ( 2) to the permitted exclusion 
of income from foreign permanent establishments. 
(f) The Luxembourg concept of <<taxable" income.-In 
computing the income tax base, individuals are allowed to deduct 
certain personal expenses, such as interest. Also up to a certain 
amount, individuals may deduct premiums paid on life, health, and 
certain other types of insurance. Finally, deduction is allowed for 
certain extraordinary personal expenses (illness, death, etc.) in 
excess of a minimum amount which depends upon the taxpayer's 
income and family status. Instead of itemizing the personal ex-
penses, the taxpayer may elect to take a standard deduction of $8o 
(L. Fr. 4,000) plus the allowance for extraordinary charges. Also 
in lieu of itemizing business expenses, wage and salary earners may 
take a second standard deduction of $I 20 (L. Fr. 6,ooo). 
Deductible business expenses are very similar to those in the 
United States, and include wages, salaries, rent, interest-including 
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reasonable amounts paid to a parent company or other shareholder, 
excise duties, enterprise taxes, and depreciation. 
Prime differences between the two systems in the business expense 
area relate to the non-deductibility under Luxembourg law of di-
rector's fees and property taxes (on net wealth) and to certain 
differences in the treatment of depreciation and inventories. 
While depreciation is usually computed by the straight line 
method, in some cases the declining balance method is permitted. 
As previously noted, upon the sale of business assets, the differ-
ence between book value and the selling price is generally taxed. 
To compensate for earlier inflation, however, it has been necessary 
to adjust the basis by reference to a system of coefficients. Table 
I N sets forth the table of coefficients which apply both to historic 
cost and to its adjustment for depreciation previously taken. 
TABLE IN 
Accounting Accounting 
year closed in Coefficients year closed in Coefficients 
I9I~ or 
26.57 3.86 prevrous years I937 
I9I9 I2.09 I938 3·75 
I920 6.47 I939 3·77 
I92I 6.63 I940 3·46 
I922 7· I I I94I-I944 2.23 
I923 6.oi I945 1.78 
I924 5·35 I946 1.42 
I925 5. I I I947 1.36 
I926 4·3 I I948 1.28 
I927 3·42 I949 1.2 I 
I928 3.28 I950 1.17 
I929 3·05 I95I 1.08 
I930 3·- I952 1.06 
I93I 3·35 1953 1.06 
I932 3.86 I954 1.05 
I933 3·87 I955 1.05 
I934 4.02 I956 1.05 
I935 4.IO I957 and 
I936 4.08 succeeding 
years 1.00 
Apart from regular depreciation, a special additional allowance 
was authorized for investments in new plant and equipment during 
406 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
the years I 9 59 and I 9 6o. A total additional allowance equal to 
20% of cost, up to a maximum deduction of $Ioo,ooo (L. Fr. 
5 ,ooo,ooo), could be spread over a minimum 4-year period. 
While inventories must generally be reflected on the basis of 
historic cost, the listed selling price of an entire stock may be used 
if it is lower than cost. Generally, too, goods on hand will be identi-
fied by reference to FIFO, though LIFO is an available alternative. 
(g) Payment and the taxable year.-While income must 
generally be determined by reference to the calendar year and the 
accrual method, businesses may select a fiscal year coinciding with 
their accounting year. Provision has also been made for a two-year 
carry-forward, but no carry-back, in the case of operating losses. 
Two devices are used to keep payments on a current basis. A 
system of quarterly provisional payments, which serve as credits 
against the later definitive assessment, is complemented by pro-
visional withholdings in the case of certain types of income. Tax 
is usually withheld on interest at the rate of 5%, on dividends 
(lmpot sur les Revenus des Capitaux) at the rate of 15%, and on 
wages ( Impot sur les Salaires) according to a progressive table 
which takes account of personal allowances and the two standard 
deductions ($8o or L. Fr. 4,000 for personal expenses and $I20 
or L. Fr. 6,ooo for business expenses). The regular withheld wage 
tax is treated as a final levy only where the taxpayer has but one 
source of employment or pension income which does not exceed 
$2,800 (L. Fr. 14o,ooo) and then only if his income from other 
sources does not exceed $roo ( L. Fr. 5 ,ooo). 
(h) The relevance of residency.-Residents of Luxem-
bourg, corporate or individual-and in the latter case without 
regard to nationality, are liable for income tax on income from 
without as well as that from within the country. The only unilateral 
provision dealing with double taxation involves allowance of the 
foreign tax as a deduction in computing the income tax base. Pe-
culiar to the Luxembourg system is the notion that certain persons 
will be treated as residents for tax purposes though they do not 
live within the country. This category includes owners, managers, 
and deputy managers of corporations resident in Luxembourg. It 
also includes any director who is also actively associated with a 
management function. 
Nonresidents are only taxable on that income which is deemed 
to have its source in Luxembourg. This includes income derived 
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from domestic agricultural enterprises, from non-agricultural per-
manent establishments or through a representative, from renting 
domestic property, from the independent exercise of a profession 
or other employment within Luxembourg, and income derived from 
movable capital, such as shares and debentures of Luxembourg 
corporations and indebtedness against other residents-including 
also profit from the sale of shares where (a) the vendor owned 
a "considerable interest" in the corporation or (b) the profit fits 
into the so-called speculative category. The nonresident is also 
reached with reference to any income mentioned in § 22 of the 
Income Tax Act insofar as tax is withheld at the source or where 
speculative gain is derived from the sale of land. 
Subject to the foregoing jurisdictional differences, those princi-
ples which determine a resident's income also apply to nonresidents. 
Illustrative are the previously mentioned special rules relating to 
capital gains. Nonresidents who are other than wage earners are 
subject, however, to a minimum income tax of 12%. This is also 
the percentage withheld on royalties. Nonresident directors' fees 
are subject to the special 20% director's tax as well as the regular 
income tax. Accordingly, to the withheld 20% special tax, Luxem-
bourg has added an additional 8%, the total amount withheld be-
ing 28%. 
With reference to the net wealth tax, nonresidents pay only on 
that property situated in Luxembourg, such as immovables or assets 
associated with a permanent establishment located there. 
(i) The comparative costs of retaining and distributing 
profits.-In contrast to the situation in Germany, a corporation's 
own taxes will be the same whether it retains its profits for ex-
pansion or distributes them to stockholders. Luxembourg does not 
even have a penalty tax, like that in the United States, relating to 
unreasonable accumulation of profits. Since that part of the profits 
which are distributed will normally be taxed to the stockholders, it 
is less expensive to expand out of profits than to have those share-
holders contribute additional capital from dividends which they 
have received. For example, where a parent company in the United 
States holds the shares, the subsidiary's use of its own profits for 
expansion will serve to avoid the 15% withholding tax (Impot sur 
les Revenus des Capitaux) imposed by Luxembourg on dividends 
distributed to an American parent company. Where the subsidiary's 
profits are ploughed back in this fashion, the total tax load imposed 
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by Luxembourg will equal that which would be imposed had the 
expanding facility been operated as a branch of the American 
corporation. The Luxembourg tax load will be different, however, 
at that point when profits are no longer needed for expansion and 
are to be extracted by the parent. Profits of the branch will be taxed 
only once, in the year earned. A subsidiary will have suffered a 
like tax, and, in addition, dividends distributed to the parent will 
suffer a second tax, 15% of the dividend being withheld. This 
disadvantage of the subsidiary arrangement can be partially offset 
if the parent company's original capital contribution consisted, in 
part, of loans. The subsidiary could deduct the annual interest pay-
ments in computing its income tax base, but not its municipal enter-
prise tax base. A branch, of course, could not enjoy such a deduction 
under either tax. 
(j) Disposal of an enterprise.-Disposition by a corpora-
tion of its assets is a taxable event, the difference between its ad-
justed basis and the amount realized being includible in gross in-
come. Upon liquidation of the corporation and distribution of the 
proceeds, any gain enjoyed by a shareholder, measured by the differ-
ence between the adjusted basis of his shares and the amount 
realized, will be taxable if he has a "considerable interest" ( 2 5% 
or more) in the corporation or, in the case of residents, if his gain 
fits into the so-called speculative category. Corporate shareholders 
must also include such gains in their income. 
Normally, a merger is also deemed a taxable event, the amount 
realized by the corporations again being the difference between the 
adjusted bases and fair market value of their assets. But under 
certain conditions, if it can be guaranteed that this differential will 
suffer a tax later on, the gain realized at the point of amalgamation 
will not be recognized for tax purposes. 
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER LUXEMBOURG TAXES 
(a) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-The general turn-
over tax is a multiple stage arrangement in the sense that it is ap-
plied to each transfer of goods which may take place in the course 
of developing a finished product. To reduce the impact on middle-
men, i.e., on entrepreneurs who deliver merchandise to another en-
trepreneur without changing its basic nature, the normal rate of 2% 
is reduced to .s%. Retail sales to consumers, however, bear the 
regular rate. Indeed, big retail stores which enjoy a 7 5% retail 
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turnover pay 2¥2%, provided their previous year's turnover reached 
$8oo,ooo. 
The turnover tax applies pretty much across the board. Services 
bear the same rate as goods. But certain goods, e.g., a common 
necessity like bread, are taxed at a reduced rate of I%. While 
transfers of luxuries normally suffer only the regular 2% rate, 
separate excise duties are imposed on certain products such as beer, 
tobacco, etc. 
Tax equality between domestic and foreign products is achieved 
in some degree by imposing the regular rate on imports at the point 
of importation.44 To make domestic products more competitive on 
the world market, export transactions themselves are free of the 
tax. But no attempt is generally made to refund turnover taxes 
previously paid in connection with earlier stages of production or 
distribution. Metallic products, such as wagons and machinery, are 
exceptions; a refund of . 5% is allowed. 
(b) Registration and stamp duties.-A number of trans-
actions are subject to a registration duty (Droit d'Enregistre-
ment).45 These include the issuance of corporate bonds, shares, and 
the sale or donation of real estate. While a flat 6% is applied to 
sales of real estate, donations suffer a progressive duty, running 
from 1.5% to I2%. 
Companies also pay an annual tax on their share capital and 
indebtedness (Droit d' Abonnement). A number of documents also 
suffer special stamp duties. 
(c) Miscellaneous taxes.-Three of the most important 
miscellaneous taxes involve levies on motor vehicles, measured by 
weight or horsepower, succession duties, and a communal land tax. 
The death duty (Droit de Succession) is imposed upon the heirs 
of a person deceased in Luxembourg, and is measured by the net 
value received. Progressive rates, dependent upon the relationship 
between the parties and the amount acquired, run from o to I 5%. 
Where the decedent is a nonresident, a different tax (Droit de 
Mutation par Deces) with about the same rate schedule is imposed; 
it reaches the gross value of his real estate in Luxembourg. 
The communal land tax ( Impot F oncier) is measured by the 
.. This matter, insofar as it relates to exports from the United States to Luxembourg, 
is more fully considered in PART II, infra. 
45 Registration duties and the like are more fully considered in Section G, PART III 
infra, in connection with the consideration of Luxembourg as the site for a holdin~ 
company. 
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value of real estate, and carries basic rates which vary from .5% 
to I%. Local surcharges on this rate also vary. 
SECTION F. NETHERLANDS 
SUBSECTION I. INCOME AND NET WEALTH TAXES 
(a) In general.-Contrary to the case in Belgium and 
France, individuals in the Netherlands are generally subject to but 
one income tax, the progressive rates of which are applied to aggre-
gate income and reach a maximum effective rate of approximately 
70% for single persons. Only the remuneration received by a mem-
ber of a corporate board of directors is subject to a special income 
tax, and it is in addition to the regular tax. Except in the case of this 
tax, amounts which are withheld in connection with the system of 
current payment are generally integrated with the regular income 
tax, serving as credits. 
Because earned income was not given preferential treatment in 
the income tax legislation itself, the Nether lands have for years 
imposed a separate flat rate property tax. It differs from that tra-
ditionally used by local units in the United States in that the base 
consists only of net wealth, rather than the gross value of items in 
which the taxpayer has an equity. 
Corporations are subject to what is generally a flat rate income 
tax, though slightly more modest rates are applied in the case of 
those with little income. While dividends are also generally taxable 
in full, extreme multiple taxation is avoided by immunizing one 
type of inter-corporate dividend, specifically one received by a cor-
poration which has substantial interest in the distributing company. 
(b) Income and net wealth taxes on individuals.-The gen-
eral progressive income tax on individuals (Inkomstenbelasting) 
reaches all types of ordinary income. While any remuneration of a 
corporate director 46 is also subject to an additional flat 30% with-
held tax on amounts in excess of $263 (Fl. I ,ooo) plus another 
20% on amounts in excess of $I ,J I 5 (Fl. 5 ,ooo), only the net, 
after that special tax has been withheld, is actually included in the 
general income tax base. This reduces, of course, the actual degree 
to which the special director's tax is an additional burden. For 
example, if the gross remuneration would have otherwise fitted into 
.. The word "director" (commissaris) is used here to refer to any member of the 
board in control (commissarissenbelasting), not to the single so-called managing di-
rector ( directeur). 
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the 40% bracket of the general income tax, allowance of what is 
tantamount to a deduction for the special director's tax is equal to a 
reduction of the latter's 30% rate to 18%. 
Personal allowances for married persons and those with de-
pendent children are built into the general progressive rate sched-
ules which, in the case of single persons, reach a maximum effective 
rate of 70.5% on that part of one's taxable income in excess of ap-
proximately $2o,ooo (Fl. 76,ooo). Table I 0 provides some idea 
of the impact of the tax and the degree of progression. 
TABLE I 0 
Total Income Approximate Effective Rate on Total Income 
I II lll/I Ill/2 lll/4 III/6 
Dollars Fl. Single Married M+z M+2 M+-1- M+6 
$ 394 fl. 1,500 1.5 % 0 0 0 0 0 
526 z,ooo 4·5% 0 0 0 0 0 
656 2,500 6.o% 2.9% 0 0 0 0 
789 3,000 8.8% 4-7% 2.o6% 0 0 0 
1,578 6,ooo 16.3 % n.oo/o 8.7% 6.5% 2.7% 0 
2,367 9,000 21.1 % 14-9% 12.8% 10.8% 7-1% 3-75% 
3,156 12,000 25.1 % 184% 16.5 % 14.6% 11.0% 7·65% 
3.949 15,000 28.7% 21.8% 20.1 % 18.2% 14-75% 11.4 % 
5,260 20,000 33·7 % 26.9% 25-2 % 23-4% 20.3 % 17.25% 
6,575 25,000 38.2% 31.2% 29·9% 28-4% 25·7 % 22-9% 
7,898 30,000 47·8% 34-8% 33·5 % 32·3% 29.8 % 27·5% 
10,520 40,000 46·9% 4o.o% 39-0% 38.1% 36.0% 34·1 % 
13,150 50,000 50·7% 43-9% 43-1 % 42.2% 40·5% 38.8% 
19,725 75,000 56·7% 50.6% 50.0% 49-4% 48.2% 47·0% 
26,300 100,000 60.04% 54·9% 54-4% 53-9% 53·0% 52.0% 
While a separate net wealth tax has usually been imposed at a 
normal rate of .5%, this has been temporarily increased to .6% 










Laying aside the matter of exemptions for the moment, if it be 
assumed that the taxpayer's capital yields only 4% on its market 
value, the .6% tax on net wealth would be equivalent to 15% of 
net income. And this entire amount constitutes an additional burden, 
for in contrast to certain other Common Market countries, the net 
wealth tax is not deductible in determining the regular income tax 
4 I 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
base. There is then a significant difference between the tax loads 
borne by earned and unearned income in the Netherlands. 
(c) Income tax on juridical entities.-The corporate income 
tax (Vennootschapsbelasting) is also applied to aggregate income, 
the usual rate being 47%. A lower rate is applied only where the 
total income is less than $IJ,I50 (Fl. 50,000) in which case the 
first $I o, 5 I o (Fl. 40,000) is taxed at 44% with the remaining 
$2,640 (Fl. Io,ooo), if any, being taxed at 59%. 
While dividends are generally includable in gross income, an 
exception is made in that case where inter-corporate dividends are 
received by a corporation which owns at least 25% of the dis-
tributing company's shares. This immunity is extended even to 
dividends received from foreign corporations (in contrast to the 
practice in Germany and Luxembourg), provided the distributing 
foreign corporation was itself subject to a foreign income tax. An 
investment company (holder of a so-called investment fund) is 
entitled to this privilege even though it holds less than a 2 5% inter-
est, provided the company meets certain conditions. The Minister 
of Finance is authorized to grant the same privilege to other cor-
porations which have small holdings, and usually does if the dis-
tributing corporation is engaged in a line of business related to that 
of the corporate stockholder and the particular stockholder-corpo-
rate relationship is deemed to be in the public interest. 
(d) Combined impact of corporate and individual direct 
taxes.-While certain variables affect the degree to which corpo-
rate earnings will be absorbed by direct taxes on corporations and 
their stockholders, the number of such variables is not as great in 
the Netherlands as in certain other countries. This is due to the fact 
that a multiple-factor separate enterprise tax does not exist in the 
Netherlands nor is its net wealth tax applicable to corporations. 
Consequently, variables in the ratio of corporate assets to corporate 
earnings are not material. The prime variables involve a stockhold-
er's particular income tax bracket and-in taking account of the 
personal net wealth tax-the changing ratios between the market 
value of his stock and its yield, as well as the relative significance 
of the exemptions to his total portfolio. 
In order to neutralize these variables, Table I P assumes that 
the stockholder's shares yield 4% on market value and that his 
entire income is derived from these shares. Column 7 reflects the 
combined impact of corporate and personal taxes, and may be com-
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pared with column 8 which reflects the percentage which would be 
absorbed by direct taxes if income equal to that earned by the 
corporation had been earned by a single individual through em-
ployment. 
TABLE I p 
Company's Corpo- Per-
Net ration In- sonal In- Property Total 
Income come Tax Dividend come Tax Tax Tax 
Total Tax 




I 2 ] 4 5 6 7 8 
$ 1,000 $ 470 $ 530 $ 19 4+ 533 53.30% 9.82% 
2,000 940 1,060 IIO 123 1,173 58.65% 16.91% 
10,000 4,700 5,300 1,726 759 7,185 71.85% 45.16% 
20,000 9,400 10,600 4,900 1,554 15,854 79.27% 56.42% 
5o,ooo 23,500 26,500 15,822 3,939 43,261 86.52% 66.o9% 
100,000 47,000 53,000 34,521 7,914 89,435 89-44 o/o 67.66% 
I,ooo,oco 470,000 530,000 370,806 79,464 920,270 92.o3o/o 70.22o/o 
(In the above example deductions for old age premium have been taken into account. 
$1. =fl. 3.8) 
(e) The Netherlands concept of gross income.-In prac-
tice, gross income, as such, is not determined. The tax base is cal-
culated by aggregating the net incomes from each of the various 
sources, and from this amount certain allowable personal expenses 
and losses are deductible. 
The previously described immunity for certain inter-corporate 
dividends constitutes the most significant exclusion for corporations. 
The latter do not enjoy, on the other hand, the most fundamental 
exclusion allowed individuals, that relating to capital gains. Even 
the gain technically realized by a corporation on shifting the assets 
of a branch into a newly created subsidiary is normally taxed. In 
contrast, the immunity extended to individuals embraces even specu-
lative capital gains, though gains of two other types are includable. 
First, it was easy to jump from the notion, that all profits made 
by a business-including, e.g., even interest and dividends-ought to 
be included, to the conclusion that profits from the sale of fixed 
business assets were also includable. By statute, however, gain 
realized on the sale of immovables belonging to an agricultural 
enterprise are not taxed provided such sales do not constitute a 
part of the enterprise's regular business activity. 
The second major type of taxable capital gain is intimately re-
lated to the first. It involves gain derived from the sale of corporate 
shares by an individual investor who owns a considerable interest 
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in the corporation, domestic or foreign. Sale of shares in that cir-
cumstance has a practical resemblance in some degree to sale of 
business assets. Accordingly, the profit is taxable if at the moment 
of the sale or during the preceding five years the stockholder or 
related parties owned more than 2 5% of the nominal paid in capi-
tal. Such profit is not aggregated, however, with his other income; 
nor are the regular progressive rates applied. Instead, a separate 
tax is imposed, with rates ranging from 20% to 40%, depending 
upon the size of the taxpayer's other income. 
(f) The Netherlands concept of utaxable" income.-Busi-
ness expenses incurred by individuals serve as deductions in arriv-
ing at the tax base. Itemization of these may be avoided by wage 
and salary earners (including also those in the so-called liberal 
professions) through election to take a flat standard business 
deduction of $26 (Fl. 100). If it can be demonstrated that the 
actual expenses did at least exceed that amount, the standard 
jumps to 5% of taxable income but in any case not in excess of 
$I 58 (Fl. 6oo) . Business deductions by wage or salary earners in 
excess of that amount are dependent upon itemization. In any event, 
certain personal expenses may also be deducted, including life an-
nuity premiums to a maximum amount of $94 7 (Fl. 3 ,6oo), charit-
able contributions the maximum deduction for which depends upon 
the size of the individual's income, and finally so-called extraordi-
nary charges (illness, death, etc.) in excess of a minimum amount. 
As previously noted, additional personal allowances peculiar to 
married persons and those with dependent children are reflected 
in the rate tables, an extract from which appears in sub-topic (b), 
supra. 
Business deductions enjoyed by individuals or corporations en-
gaged in the active conduct of an enterprise are quite similar to 
those in the United States, and include wages, salaries, rent, inter-
est-including reasonable amounts paid to a parent company or 
other shareholders, losses, charitable contributions up to a certain 
percentage of income, turnover taxes, and excise duties, but not 
income or property taxes. Particularly favorable arrang~ments for 
depreciation and the treatment of inventory deserve added com-
ment. 
Basic depreciation allowances are determined on the basis of 
historic cost, and, peculiar to the Netherlands, the first period 
may begin with execution of a purchase contract. Taxpayers are 
given considerable leeway in fixing the rate of depreciation, pto-
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vided a consistent and sound policy is followed. Frequently the 
matter is handled through agreement with the tax inspector. Both 
fixed and variable rates, geared either to original cost or the ad-
justed basis (cost less depreciation previously taken), and depend-
ent, for example, upon intensity of use, have been authorized. 
Provision has also been made for accelerated depreciation and 
a special investment allowance. Originally, accelerated depreciation 
took the form of an initial deduction of %rd of the cost price in 
the year an item was ordered or bought. However, the Minister of 
Finance has regularly used a complementary power to require that 
this initial allowance be spread over a longer period. In most cases 
he presently requires a four-year spread, not more than 7bth of 
the cost price being deductible in the first year. Accelerated de-
preciation in the case of buildings is restricted to 6% a year, and may 
not be applied at all to office furniture or passenger cars. 
A so-called investment allowance is quite distinct from the ac-
celerated depreciation provision. The latter, but not the former, 
serves to reduce the book value of an asset. This incentive allow-
ance, serving in effect to exempt rather than postpone the tax on 
income, was intended to promote industrial activity and incidentally 
compensate for some decline in the purchasing power of money. In 
this latter connection, the Nether lands does not utilize the system 
of coefficients used elsewhere. 
The constantly changing provisions regarding the investment 
allowance now authorize a deduction, spread over two years, of 
w% of historic cost. 
As in the case of basic depreciation, taxpayers have consider-
able leeway in their treatment of inventories provided the method 
chosen is consistently followed and sound in terms of business prac-
tice. Valuation may be at cost, market, or at cost or market, which-
ever is lower. LIFO or the base stock method may be used as well 
as FIFO. 
(g) Payment and the taxable year.-A system of current 
payment is accomplished through withholding taxes and provisional 
payments. The withholding tax on dividends (Dividendbelasting) 
is at the rate of 15%; withholding on wages (Loonbelasting) is 
geared to progressive tables which take account of deductible social 
security contributions. These two withholding taxes, like provisional 
payments and in contrast to the withheld tax on corporate directors' 
remuneration, generally serve as credits against the later definitive 
income tax assessment. The withholding tax on wages is itself the 
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final levy, however, where income from employment (including 
pensions) does not exceed $I ,8 I 5 (Fl. 6,900) 47 and income from 
other sources is not in excess of $53 (Fl. 200). 
While the calendar year normally serves as the taxable year, 
businesses may elect a fiscal year corresponding to their regular 
accounting year. The provisions regarding net losses are also quite 
favorable. Generally they may be carried back one year and carried 
forward 6 years, if need be. Moreover, losses incurred by new 
business during the first six years of operation may be carried for-
ward indefinitely. 
In terms of accounting methods, only very small businesses may 
use the cash basis; others must use the accrual method. The exist-
ence of effective accounting records has assumed special tax signifi-
cance in that only then may certain privileges be availed of, such as 
those regarding investment allowances and the unlimited carry 
forward permitted new enterprises. 
(h) The relevance of residency.-The basic jurisdictional 
principle regarding residents (corporate or individual, and with-
out regard to nationality) calls for inclusion in gross income of 
income derived from without as well as that derived from within 
the country. But this notion has been restricted in sweep, except 
for interest, dividends, and royalties, by unilateral provisions de-
signed to avoid double taxation. Roughly speaking, these serve to 
exempt foreign income arising from personal labor performed 
abroad or that derived from commercial and industrial activities 
performed by· a foreign permanent establishment, provided the in-
come was subject to tax in the foreign country. That the foreign 
income did not actually suffer a foreign tax is not decisive; it may 
have been sufficiently low to be covered by exemptions. The pivotal 
question is whether it was subject to a foreign tax. Exempt income 
will be aggregated, however, with a taxpayer's domestic income in 
determining the place his domestic income fits into the progressive 
rate brackets. Corporations will suffer very little from this require-
ment, for, practically speaking, a flat corporate rate is used in the 
Nether lands. 
In contrast to the sweeping basic premise regarding residents, 
a nonresident is generally subject to the Netherlands income tax 
only with reference to income deemed to have its source there. 
In the case of a business, this embraces profits derived from an 
agricultural enterprise in the Netherlands, or those from a non-
HThis amount will probably be increased to $r,96r (Fl. 7450). 
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agricultural enterprise if derived through a permanent establish-
ment or regular representative located there. Included also in this 
latter category is any profit from the sale of shares in a Dutch 
corporation, provided the shareholder had a so-called "consider-
able interest" therein. 
With reference to personal services, a nonresident must include 
income from employment in the Netherlands, including that derived 
from service as a manager or as one of the directors of a Dutch 
corporation and any periodic payments received from a Dutch 
governmental unit or from the State Civil Pension Fund. Income 
from the independent exercise of a liberal profession will be 
reached, however, only if carried on through a permanent estab-
lishment located there. 
A nonresident's investment income will also be reached to the 
extent it consists of (I) interest on debts secured by a mortgage 
on Netherlands realty, ( 2) a share in the profits of a business or 
profession which has its seat in the Netherlands, and ( 3) dividends 
and interest from a Dutch corporation but only if the nonresident 
has a so-called "considerable interest" and the securities or obliga-
tions do not constitute a part of the nonresident's business property. 
While securities and obligations owned by a nonresident corpora-
tion will always be deemed to be a part of that corporation's busi-
ness property, any immunity thereby achieved will be lost if in fact 
the securities and obligations belong to a Netherlands permanent 
establishment of the foreign corporation. Even where this is not 
the case, a nonresident corporation will always suffer a flat I 5% 
withholding tax (Dividendbelasting) on dividends received, except 
where provision is made otherwise by treaty. 
Except for the above differences relating to source, the question 
of whether a particular gain is income is determined for a non-
resident in accordance with the same principles which govern resi-
dents. Illustrative are the various principles relating to capital 
gams. 
The jurisdictional standards relating to the separate net wealth 
tax on individuals have a practical effect similar to that associated 
with the income tax. The initial premise is that the net wealth tax 
applies to all of a resident's property, without regard to location. 
But again, unilateral provisions and double taxation treaties restrict 
that general principle so that in many cases only property deemed 
situated in the Netherlands is reached. While, as expected, nonresi-
dents suffer this tax with respect to real estate situated in the 
4 I 8 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Nether lands and businesses carried on there, the securities which 
they hold in Dutch corporations are free of the tax. 
(i) The cost of retaining versus the cost of distributing 
profits to an American enterprise.-Because of the cumulative 
effect of two circumstances, direct taxes imposed by the Nether lands 
will be the same whether an American enterprise operates its facil-
ity there as a branch (permanent establishment) or through a 
foreign subsidiary. First, in contrast to the arrangement in Belgium, 
a corporation's own direct taxes in the Netherlands will remain 
the same whether or not its profits are distributed. The Netherlands 
does not even impose a penalty tax on so-called unreasonable ac-
cumulations of earnings and profits. Second, dividends paid to an 
American parent by a Netherlands subsidiary are freed from the 
withholding tax otherwise applied in the Netherlands to dividends 
received by certain nonresidents, such as parent corporations domi-
ciled in Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg. 
The primary exception to the rule, that the Netherlands will 
impose the same total direct taxes on branch and subsidiary oper-
ations, involves the circumstance where the American parent's in-
vestment is represented in part by loans to a subsidiary (other than 
loans secured by immovable property) . Advances to a branch oper-
ation will not be treated, of course, as loans. But a subsidiary will 
be allowed to deduct interest paid, up to a reasonable amount, as 
an expense. The interest received by the parent company-wher-
ever situated-will not, on the other hand, be subjected to a 
Nether lands tax. 
If a subsidiary desires to retain its profits to facilitate expansion, 
the profit can be capitalized through issuance of a stock dividend. 
Dividends of this sort, received by parent companies in America, 
France, Italy, or the Netherlands, will not be subjected to tax. But 
if any part of such dividend is paid to individual stockholders in 
the Nether lands, a tax will be imposed by reference to the nominal 
or par value of the dividend shares. And if such a dividend is paid 
to parent companies in Belgium, Germany, or Luxembourg, the 
same rate as that applicable to ordinary dividends will be assessed, 
IS%· 
(j) Disposition of an enterprise.-A sale by a corporation 
of all of its assets is a taxable event, gain, if any, being the difference 
between the adjusted basis of the assets and the amount realized. 
And if the corporation is then liquidated, the stockholders will be 
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deemed to have received a taxable dividend to the extent the amount 
received exceeds the paid-in capital. 
Generally, too, a merger involves a taxable transaction to the 
corporation, gain again being the difference between the adjusted 
basis of the corporate assets and their real value. Only if a guaran-
tee is made that the tax will be paid later on (e.g., where the newly 
formed corporation is actually to be liquidated) will gain not be 
recognized at the point of the merger. 
SUBSECTION 2. OTHER NETHERLANDS TAXES 
(a) Turnover taxes and excise duties.-The Netherlands 
employ multiple stage turnover taxes, the normal rate of 5% being 
exacted on each transfer of goods which may take place in the 
course of developing a finished product. Generally speaking, this 
means that an integrated company which converts basic raw ma-
terials into a finished product has an advantage over those which 
depend upon suppliers to do part of the processing. One transfer, 
however, is exempt-that from a retailer to an individual consumer. 
Transfers directly from a manufacturer to a consumer do not enjoy 
this exemption; a reduced rate of 4% is applied, however, on the 
premise that this rate will produce the same amount of tax as that 
which would have been produced by a 5% tax if the goods had 
been transferred to a retailer. This premise assumes that the cir-
cumvented transfer to a retailer would have been at a smaller price, 
allowing room for a 20% retail mark-up. On the other hand, it 
ignores the fact that there is also a . 7 5% tax on transfers by one 
dealer of finished goods (e.g., a wholesaler) to another dealer. 
Because the turnover tax was designed to be an internal con-
sumption tax, the regular 5% rate, and sometimes an even higher 
rate, is imposed at the point of importation.48 Export transactions, 
on the other hand, are exempt, and this exemption is coupled with 
a refund of tax levied at earlier stages, the amount of the refund 
normally being a percentage fixed by Royal Decree. The effect of 
this overall pattern is to deprive imports of any advantage over 
domestically produced items, and to make the latter, if exported, 
competitive on the world market. 
A number of basic necessities, such as bread, milk, etc., are im-
mune from the turnover tax. On the other hand, at the manufactur-
ing level, certain luxury and semi-luxury goods suffer a turnover 
•• This matter, insofar as it relates to exports from the United States to the Nether-
lands, is more fully dealt with in PART II, infra. 
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tax in excess of the normal rate. Moreover, special excise duties 
are levied on the production or import of such products as beer, 
wine, tobacco, etc. Finally, services, including those rendered by a 
business representative, are taxed at 4%. 
(b) Land tax and registration duty on transfers of realty. 
-The previously described net wealth tax on individuals was an 
indirect device designed to give preferential treatment to earned 
income, such as that from employment. In contrast to its base-the 
net value of one's equity, a separate land tax is imposed on the 
rental value of all improved and unimproved real estate situated 
in the Nether lands. The rental values utilized fall far short of the 
current market, however, for they are still based on estimates made 
in the 19th century. 
In addition to the foregoing, there is a registration duty on 
transfers of real estate for money or money's worth, the rate being 
s%. While donative transfers are free of this exaction, they are 
subject to the gift tax described below. 
(c) Succession duty and gift tax.-The succession duty is 
not levied on the estate as such, but on individual acquisitions by 
heirs and legatees of those who die domiciled in the Netherlands. 
The rate is progressive depending on the relationship of the parties 
as well as on the value acquired. 
A nonresident decedent's property situated in the Netherlands 
is free of the succession duty except with respect to real estate on 
which a flat 6% rate is levied. 
Provisions covering the succession duty also include a gift tax on 
inter vivos transfers. The structure and rates of this tax correspond 
to those associated with the succession duty. 
(d) Miscellaneous taxes.-Other taxes include one imposed 
annually on motor vehicles, the assessment being based on weight, 
and stamp duties levied on diverse types of instruments and docu-
ments. 
PART II. OVERALL TAX EFFECTS RE DIRECT 
EXPORTS AND SIMPLE LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS 
SECTION A. INTRODUCTION 
Many American manufacturers first introduced their products to 
foreign countries through sales to New York purchasing offices of 
foreign import companies. Thereafter, direct orders from overseas 
were received from others who had seen the product in foreign 
markets. Further exploitation may then have been attempted 
through arrangements entered into with foreign independent com-
mission agents or brokers. As a substitute for the latter, or to com-
plement their activities, promotional representatives may have been 
sent from the United States to one or more countries, and these may 
or may not have opened display offices. 
The discussion which follows deals first with the overall tax 
effects of these simple export arrangements. Comparative tax ef-
fects in the Common Market countries will be integrated with the 
domestic tax implications. Put off for discussion in PART III, 
however, are the more sophisticated sales arrangements, involving 
use of a foreign sales office with general contracting powers or cre-
ation of a foreign sales subsidiary. 
Eventually, and for a variety of reasons, an American exporter 
may conclude that those products destined for foreign markets 
should actually be manufactured abroad, in whole or in part. The 
prime motive may run all the way from avoidance of freight costs 
to avoidance of customs duties and minimization of foreign turn-
over taxes-all of which would affect pnces. An alternative to con-
struction of its own facilities in a member nation is the opportunity 
to conclude a licensing arrangement with an established European 
firm. Such an arrangement might actually be entered into for the 
purpose of stimulating export sales, rather than as a complete sub-
stitute for them. The aim, for example, may be to provide a better 
and more certain outlet for special parts or components to be manu-
factured in, and exported from, the United States, the ultimate 
product to be finished by the licensee. 
Again, inadequacy of capital or an unwillingness to risk available 
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capital in a foreign country may be the prime motive for entering 
into a royalty-producing licensing arrangement instead of construct-
ing a foreign facility. It might be further contemplated that the 
American company, in consideration of additional periodic pay-
ments, would keep the licensee abreast of any newly acquired tech-
nical knowledge and methods, instructing the licensee's employees in 
such "know-how" to the extent necessary. 
Discussion of licensing arrangements in this PART will be lim-
ited, as in the case of exports, to simple arrangements, involving 
taxpayers who seek to avoid significant activity on foreign soil. 
PART III, infra, will take account of the more complex and some-
times more advantageous tax effects which follow when a license 
and "know-how" agreement are complemented by creation of a 
foreign subsidiary. 
SECTION B. CoMPARISON oF FoREIGN TAxEs ON 
DIRECT ExPORTs 
(a) Foreign income taxes.-Unilateral statutory provisions 
preceded bilateral conventions in fixing the extent to which Euro-
pean income taxes would reach profits made by a nonresident, such 
as an American enterprise, on exports into Common Market coun-
tries. The statutes of three member nations (Germany, Luxem-
bourg, and the Nether lands) specifically provide that such profits 
are reached by their respective income taxes only if made through 
a "permanent establishment" located there. While the domestic 
laws of the other three members have been construed with more or 
less similar effect, treaties with a like thrust-between the United 
States and five of the members 1-actually do more than codify in 
permanent form this established principle. The treaties serve the 
additional function of establishing bilaterally acceptable standards 
with respect to the meaning of "permanent establishment" in, inter 
alia, export settings. 
On the one hand, the definitional aspects of the term, "permanent 
establishment," had already been resolved in some measure in most 
countries. That expression was thought in general to relate to a 
fixed place utilized by the nonresident in carrying out his profitable 
activities. But not all subscribed to so limited a view.2 Moreover, 
1 A tax treaty has not yet been concluded with the sixth country, Luxembourg. 
• For instance, according to the national laws of Italy and France, the standard was 
satisfied whenever a nonresident person regularly or habitually performed activities 
which constituted a complete cycle of business. 
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there were important "grey" areas, just as there are instances where 
one cannot be sure under American law whether a given nonresident 
will be deemed to be "engaged in a trade or business in the United 
States." Though the language in the treaties does not provide a 
ready answer to all export situations, the provisions do constitute 
an improved point of departure in resolving definitional difficulties. 
According to all five treaties, the mere fact that an American 
enterprise handles its European sales through a bona fide inde-
pendent commission agent or broker, acting in his regular capacity 
as such, will not, standing alone, lead to the taxation of its export 
profits. Indeed, all five recognize that an American enterprise's own 
employed representative in the Common Market will not himself 
be deemed a permanent establishment, though engaged in sales 
promotion work, provided he (I) does not have, nor habitually 
exercises, "general authority to negotiate and conclude contracts on 
behalf of" the American enterprise, and ( 2) does not have "control 
over a stock of merchandise from which he regularly fills orders 
on behalf of such enterprise." 
Four of the treaties do not specifically deal with the case where 
a mere sales promotion representative also has a small stock to 
accommodate emergency cases or for display purposes. Such a 
person would not be "regularly" filling orders; nor would he 
necessarily have, or be "habitually" exercising, general authority to 
negotiate and conclude contracts on behalf of the American enter-
prise. These considerations were sufficiently impressive to lead the 
American government to publish an interpretation favorable in the 
reverse setting to some nonresidents who send promotional repre-
sentatives to the United States.3 Foreign governments, however, 
'United States regulations pertaining to its treaty with Belgium are perhaps the 
most informative with respect to the American interpretation of treaties falling in this 
group. T.D. 6r6o, Section 504.104{b) {8) (ii) provides: "If the enterprise has an 
agent in the United States who has power to contract on its behalf, but only at fixed 
prices and under conditions determined by the enterprise, it does not thereby necessarily 
have a permanent establishment in the United States. The mere fact that an agent of 
a Belgian enterprise-assuming he has no general authority to negotiate and conclude 
contracts on behalf of his principal-maintains samples, or occasionally fills orders 
from incidental stocks of goods maintained, in the United States does not of itself mean 
that the enterprise has a permanent establishment in the United States. The mere fact 
that salesmen, employees of a Belgian enterprise, promote the sale of their employer'• 
products in the United States or that a Belgian enterprise transacts business in the 
United States by means of mail order activities does not mean that the enterprise has 
a permanent establishment in the United States." Section 504.105(b) adds: "Similarly, 
if during the taxable year, the enterprise were to secure orders in the United States 
for such merchandise through its sales agents whose sole function in the United States 
is sales promotion, the orders being transmitted to Belgium for acceptance, then the 
profits arising from such sales would not be includible in gross income and would be 
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seldom publish general interpretations. At an extreme point, it must 
also be remembered that three of the above mentioned four 
treaties do go on specifically to state that a "warehouse" does 
constitute a permanent establishment, and the other would probably 
subsume that characterization under the shotgun expression, "or 
other fixed place of business." Thus, in the case of a stock of goods 
kept on hand for emergencies, at some point one will encounter 
the supplementary question: How large a stock can be on hand, 
and how frequently can resort be made to it, before the storage 
arrangement will be characterized as a warehouse? In this setting, 
not much comfort can be derived from the further fact that two 
treaties (Germany and Italy) specifically exclude the "casual and 
temporary use of mere storage facilities" from the definition of a 
permanent establishment. 
The fifth treaty, one with Germany, stands alone in specifically 
mentioning the matter of displays. But there, displays are first con-
junctively associated with a sales office in a proscription to the effect 
that a "permanent display and sales office" will be deemed a per-
manent establishment. It then goes on to say that a warehouse 
maintained "for convenience of delivery and not for purposes of 
display shall not of itself constitute a permanent establishment." 4 
In the case of most countries, one may be more secure in relying 
on information obtained from tax authorities in the country con-
cerned or, in the case of emergency stocks, arrange to have such 
exports remain under customs seal in that country. While published 
rules do not exist even with reference to the immunity of this prac-
tice, it is not believed that such stocks would be deemed a perma-
nent establishment. Moreover, with reference to all exported items, 
this arrangement provides added advantages in connection with the 
matter of turnover taxes, a matter discussed under the next sub-
topic. 
Finally reference should be made to PART III, infra, for con-
exempt from United States tax." United States regulations relating to the treaty with 
the Netherlands also adopt a liberal interpretation for the benefit of foreigners, provid-
ing as follows: "The mere fact that an agent (assuming he has no general authority 
to contract on behalf of his employer or principal) maintains samples or occasionally 
fills orders from incidental stocks of goods maintained in the United States will not 
constitute a permanent establishment within the United States." T.D. 5778, § 7.853 (a). 
Regulations relating to the treaty with France are somewhat similar: "However, the 
mere fact that a commission agent or broker through whom a French enterprise carries 
on business in the United States maintains a small stock of goods in the United States 
from which occasional orders are filled shall not be construed as meaning that such 
enterprise has a permanent establishment in the United States." T.D. 5499, § 7·413(a). 
• Art. II(I} (c). 
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sideration of the way income taxes are affected by various organi-
zational arrangements, should an American enterprise desire to 
create a permanent establishment in a member nation in connection 
with export operations. 
(b) Comparative effect of Common Market turnover taxes 
and excises on direct American exports into a member nation.-The 
turnover tax patterns in the Common Market countries are so 
complicated and varied as to preclude doing anything more here 
than provide a general comparative orientation of the way in which 
they might affect direct American exports. 
The country-by-country survey in PART I indica ted that each 
Common Market nation exempts its own exports from its turnover 
tax. Each does, however, impose its tax on imports. Otherwise 
imported items would not suffer the same tax burden as domesti-
cally produced items designed for consumption within the country. 
In keeping with the logic of this theme, a particular import may 
enjoy an exemption or suffer luxury or semi-luxury rates if domes-
tically produced competitive items are so treated. The classification 
of luxury items varies, of course, from country to country. 
In comparing the turnover taxes of member nations, it will be re-
called that in four countries (France, Germany, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands), the effective rates of the local turnover tax are 
slightly higher than the stated rates, for the tax is imposed on 
a sales price which includes the tax itself. The cumulative character 
of turnover taxes in all countries but France has also given rise to 
further differentials regarding the turnover tax on imports. A single 
transfer rate, if imposed on certain imported items, would not be 
sufficient to equalize the tax burden with that borne by domestically 
produced equivalents which have gone through more than one tax-
able transfer in the course of development. To compensate for the 
difference, four countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and theN ether-
lands) may impose on certain imports a rate which is greater than 
that imposed on a single transfer of a domestically produced item.5 
Since the difficulty stems from the multiple stage character of turn-
over taxes, the amount of increase is frequently lower for various 
raw materials than for finished or semi-finished products. These 
increased rates are usually imposed irrespective of the country of 
origin, the one exception relating to an immunity from such increase 
of items imported into Belgium from Luxembourg. 
"Luxembourg may also apply increased rates, but rules pertaining to such have not 
yet been issued. 
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Table II A reflects the normal stated and effective rates, the stated 
and effective rates for luxuries, and the maximum by which these 
rates might he increased on certain imports over that rate borne by 
a single transfer of domestically produced equivalents. 
TABLE II A 
Normal Normal Luxury Luxury Max.IJ.mt. by 
Stated Effective Stated Effective Which Other Rates 
Rate Rate Rate Rate May Be Increased 
Belgium 5% 5% 11 or 13% II or 13% 1oo/o 8 
France 2o% 25% 25% 33·33% 
Germany 4% 4·17% 4% 4·17% 2% 
Italy 3·3% 3·3% 8.3% 8.3 o/o 
Luxembourg 2% 2.04% 2% 2.04% 6 
Netherlands 5% 5-26% 18-zo% 22-25% 7 7o/o 
The foregoing rates are normally imposed on the same value as 
that used for the purpose of customs' duties adjusted for certain 
matters, the most important of which is usually the amount of im-
port taxes themselves. 
An American enterprise which makes direct exports to customers 
in member nations. should take account of the possibility that turn-
over taxes might be levied more than once before his product 
reaches the ultimate consumer. 
The first such possibility may be affected by the way in which he 
designs the sale. Except in Belgium and Italy, one turnover tax 
may be levied by reference to the act of import and another on the 
delivery to the customer if the sale, as defined under the member 
nation's law, is deemed to take place there. For example, delivery 
under reservation of title until payment is effected may give rise 
to such multiple taxation. Again, in the Netherlands, title to goods 
shipped from New York via public transport is normally deemed 
to pass upon delivery to the customer, not upon delivery to the 
transport agency. In that country, however, multiple taxation can 
be avoided in two instances. First, tax free delivery in a sea-port is 
permitted, but only in the case of staple commodities. Second, with 
respect to other goods, multiple turnover taxation can be avoided 
by keeping the goods under customs bond until delivery can be 
effected. The double tax problem is much less acute in Germany; 
6 Ibid. 
7 The stated rate for cars is 7%, yielding an effective rate of 7.5%. 
8 In practice, the increase does not exceed 6o/o. 
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actual delivery, as such, is less significant there in determining pas-
sage of title. For example, title to goods shipped from New York 
via public transport, if addressed to the purchaser, is deemed to 
pass upon delivery to the transport agency. 
In those circumstances where multiple turnover taxes are applied, 
first on import and then again on actual delivery, the same rates 
are usually applied to the two events except in the case of the 
Netherlands where the wholesaler's rate of . 7 5% is imposed on 
one of the two events. Indeed, a second tax will not be imposed 
there if the delivery is to a person who buys the goods for his 
private consumption. In the event both circumstances are taxed 
in France, a credit in the amount of the first tax will be allowed 
against the second tax, for in effect France quite generally taxes 
only the value added, not the value transferred. 
The discussion above involved the possibility of multiple turn-
over taxation in effecting delivery to an American enterprise's own 
customer. In analyzing its competitive position, the American enter-
prise must also take account of the fact that its own customer will 
also suffer a turnover tax, though perhaps at a different rate, if it 
holds the goods for re-sale, for that tax will affect the ultimate 
price paid by the consumer. Table II B compares the rates which 
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In Germany and the Nether lands, the foregoing tax can be 
avoided in the case of staple commodities which enjoy immunity at 
the point of delivery in sea-ports and for the first delivery outside 
these sea-ports. In Belgium and Italy, multiple taxation can be 
mitigated for a number of different items with respect to which one 
tax, though usually higher than normal, covers all stages from the 
manufacturer or importer to the consumer. 
As indicated in the country-by-country survey in PART I, each 
member nation imposes certain excise duties, usually at very high 
rates, on specific goods, as distinguished from turnover taxes which, 
in general, apply to transfers of all goods. It is not possible within 
the confines of this study to list all of the goods subject to such 
excises nor all of the rates which are constantly changing. Examples 
include alcoholic beverages, sugar, tobacco, and mineral oils. Italy, 
more than others, impose excises on a very long list, and these are 
equally applicable to imports. 
SECTION c. AMERICAN TAXES RE EXPORTS DIRECT 
To FoREIGN CusTOMERS 
(a) Introduction.-The effect of the federal income tax 
on export profits derived by an American enterprise from direct 
sales to foreign customers turns on two questions. The first involves 
the extent to which such profits are includible in gross income. The 
second relates to the other side of the ledger: To what extent is a 
deduction or credit allowed for any foreign taxes paid with respect 
to such transactions? 
The separate discussion below of these two questions indicates 
that the American income tax affects a simple export arrangement in 
a manner quite similar to that associated with domestic sales. A 
third sub-topic goes on to examine the overall competitive tax posi-
tion of an American exporter, due account being given to the tax 
patterns of the more significant federal excise taxes. 
(b) Gross income as affected by export profits from sales 
direct to foreign customers.-Congress has acknowledged that profit 
from a foreign sale of personal property produced in the United 
States is derived partly from sources within, and partly from 
sources without, the United States.9 But this is primarily signifi-
cant only to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. Beginning 
with the first income tax act passed pursuant to the Sixteenth 
• I.R.C., § 863 {b). 
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Amendment, Congress has required domestic corporations to in-
clude in their gross all income without regard to the source from 
which it was derived.10 
This assertion of world-wide jurisdiction, applicable also to in-
dividual citizens and residents, was sustained by the Supreme Court 
in the face of contentions of unconstitutional discrimination by 
reference to the fact that nonresident aliens and foreign corpora-
tions were required only to include that income which was derived 
from sources within the United StatesY 
As a result of that determination, a domestic corporation's gross 
income from direct exports will not be affected by the question of 
whether title and the risk of ownership changes in the United States 
or in Europe. Its entire profit will be includible in either event. As 
a practical matter, however, this need mean only that the manu-
facturing profit will be within the reach of the Internal Revenue 
Service. All or a portion of the· remaining profit associated with 
the distribution process-getting the product into the hands of the 
ultimate foreign consumer-may be free of the American income 
tax and be subject only to what may be smaller direct taxes of a 
foreign country, thus reducing the total amount of direct taxes 
which the whole process must absorb. 
The extent to which the distribution profit will be immune from 
the federal tax depends on the choice of media through which dis-
tribution is to be handled. Illustratively, sales to an unrelated 
foreign incorporated wholesale export house with a purchasing office 
in New York, or to a foreign import house with a purchasing office 
in a Common Market country, would confine the American vendor 
to the manufacturing profit. Even if both wholesalers consummated 
their purchases in the United States, the distribution profit could 
be placed beyond the range of the federal treasury. Since a foreign 
corporation's profit is includible in American gross income only to 
the extent it is derived from sources within the United States, the 
two wholesalers could avail themselves of the further statutory 
provision which treats profit derived from the purchase of personal 
property within, and its sale without, the United States as derived 
entirely from sources without this country.12 It would be essential 
'"Rev. Act of 1913, § G(a), now I.R.C., § 61. 
"National Paper and Type Company v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373,45 S. Ct. 133 (1924), 
A like result was reached in the case of the foreign income of a citizen resident abroad, 
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 44 S. Ct. 444 (1924), and of an alien resident in the United 
States. Bowring v. Bowers, (2d Cir. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 918, cert. den., 277 U.S. 6o8, 48 S. 
Ct. 603 ( 1928). 
12 I.R.C., § 862(a) (6). 
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to immunity, of course, that the wholesalers' dispositions take place 
outside this countryY 
A somewhat similar effect would be accomplished, but by virtue 
of different principles, if the sale to the ultimate foreign consumer 
is effected by the American vendor through a foreign independent 
commission agent, as distinguished from a foreign merchant. While 
the American vendor's gross would be fully includible in its gross 
income, the sales commission would be deductible as a selling ex-
pense.H And this is so though the foreign agent's distributing com-
mission is free of American tax, suffering instead the direct taxes of 
the appropriate foreign country. 
For at least a period of time, it is even possible for the American 
manufacturer to immunize the distribution profit without dividing 
it with strangers. It could create its own foreign subsidiary. The tax 
advantages associated with this more dramatic penetration into a 
foreign country are considered, however, in PART III infra. With 
reference to the American manufacturer who is not yet quite ready 
to become so involved in foreign soil, it is important to note here, 
however, that the prime tax advantages associated with a foreign 
sales subsidiary are not available to an ordinary 15 domestic sub-
sidiary which might be created to handle direct export sales. This 
latter arrangement would serve only to divide between two domestic 
corporations that gross income which would otherwise be enjoyed 
by the parent. The one advantage in this relates to the possibility 
of creating a second exemption from surtax, the subsidiary's first 
$25,000 of taxable income being subjected only to the normal tax 
rate of 30%.16 Assuming the parent company is in the 52% bracket, 
the consequent 22% yearly saving on the first $25,ooo ($s,soo) 
will be more than offset, however, by the tax on inter-corporate clivi· 
dends 17 if the subsidiary's pre-tax sales profit approximates $135,-
ooo or more. At that point, its after-tax income of approximately 
"' For federal purposes, generally the place where the benefits and burdens of owner· 
ship pass fixes the place of sale. LT. Regs., § r.861-6; U.S. v. Balanovski, (2d Cir. 
1956) 236 F. (2d) 298, cert. den., 352 U.S. 968, 77 S. Ct. 357 (1957); Commissioner v. 
East Coast Oil Co., S.A., (sth Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 322, cert. den., 299 U.S. 6o8, 57 
S. Ct. 234 ( 1936). 
u I.R.C., § 162. 
15 The relevance of the proposed Foreign Investment Incentive Tax Bill of 1960 (the 
so-called Boggs Bill) is mentioned in PART VI, infra. 
16 I.R.C., § 1 r. Even this advantage might be lost under some circumstances, by 
reference to I.R.C., §§ 1551, 269, or 61. E.g., see James Realty Co. v. United States, 
(D.C. Minn. 1959) 59-2 USTC para. 966o; Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. No. 65 (1959). 
11 Inter-corporate dividends are deductible by the recipient only to the extent of 
8s%. I.R.c., § 243. 
TAXATION 431 
$70,000 18 would suffer an inter-corporate dividend tax equal to the 
earlier saving. This tax on inter-corporate dividends can be avoided 
only if the parent files a consolidated return which carries with it 
loss of the added exemption otherwise enjoyed by the subsidiary and 
an additional 2% charge on the total income derived from domestic 
as well as export sales. 
To avoid the difficulties just mentioned, a parent company might 
seek to confine the domestic subsidiary's profits by setting unrealistic 
limitations on its sales commissions or by charging unrealistically 
high prices for items purchased by the subsidiary for re-sale. Ob-
viously the Internal Revenue Service does not, and cannot, officially 
approve such practices whatever a given revenue agent may allow 
in a specific case. The Code contemplates that transactions between 
parent and subsidiary will conform to commercial practices followed 
by those who bargain at arm's length.19 
(c) Deductions or credits for foreign taxes re exports direct 
to foreign customers.-Congress began in 1913 to take account of 
all foreign taxes paid by an incorporated American enterprise, the 
arrangement coinciding with that traditionally associated with state 
and local taxes.20 A deduction from gross income was allowed in 
arriving at the net to which the American rates were to be applied. 
In that day, income taxes imposed by states were more or less de 
minimus.21 World War I costs, however, led foreign countries al-
most immediately to increase substantially their income and excess 
profits taxes. Congressional accommodation of those charges only 
by way of a deduction meant that the federal government absorbed 
only that percentage of the foreign tax equal to a domestic tax-
payer's American rate. The enterprise itself had to absorb the 
balance. In 1918, for the asserted purpose of reducing the "very 
severe burden" which followed the double taxation of foreign 
earned income, Congress created a credit, allowing American enter-
prises to elect to offset the domestic tax itself with any foreign 
"income, war profits, or excess profits taxes" imposed on income 
'"On a gross income of $•3s,ooo, the subsidiary would pay 30% on the first $25,000 
($7,500) and sz% on $uo,ooo ($s7,2oo), a total tax of $64,700 leaving $70,300 
available for dividends. 
10 I.R.C., § 482. 
20 Rev. Act of 1913, § G{b) [s] (fourth). Individuals were not al!owed this benefit 
until 1916. Rev. Act of 1916, § s(a). Cf. Rev. Act of 1913, §(B) [7] (third). Both 
are now accommodated by I.R.C., § 164-
21 The first state income tax was not passed in the United States until 19n, and by 
1919 the total yield in all states approximated only $so,ooo,ooo. HELLERSTEIN, STATE 
AND LOCAL TAXATION 7 (1953). 
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derived "from sources within such [foreign] country." 22 Of course, 
provision was made to prevent an electing taxpayer from doubling 
up by deducting from gross income any tax for which the credit 
arrangement had been elected.23 While the privilege to elect a 
credit was later extended to other types of taxes, this was so only 
where the other tax was imposed in lieu of an income, war profits, 
or excess profits tax otherwise generally imposed.24 
Since an American enterprise engaged only in direct exports to 
customers in the Common Market is not likely to incur foreign 
taxes of a type which satisfy the credit provision, the refinements 
limiting the credit are considered in PART III, infra. That such 
taxes are not likely to be encountered in the circumstance under con-
sideration stems from the fact, as noted in Section B supra, that the 
United States has a bilateral tax treaty with all member nations 
except Luxembourg. And these conventions free "industrial and/or 
commercial profits" of American enterprises from foreign income 
taxes except in the instance where a "permanent establishment" is 
maintained abroad. 
Under this standard, an American enterprise engaged only in 
direct export sales could retain immunity even if the sales arrange-
ment called for the burdens and benefits of ownership to pass in 
Europe, rather than in the United States. As a business matter, how-
ever, this may be neither practicable nor desirable. Moreover, as 
noted in Section B, supra, the effect may be to multiply the number 
of times the foreign country's turnover tax will be applied, once at 
the point of import and again on delivery. While such taxes would 
be deductible in computing gross income for American purposes, the 
credit provision would not apply 25 with the consequence that the 
manufacturer's competitive position might be prejudiced. 
Providing for the benefits and burdens of ownership to pass in 
the United States may in one circumstance, on the other hand, en-
trap an American company into double taxation of its export profits. 
Suppose that the American company, while operating under this 
arrangement, sends a promotional representative to a Common 
Market country intending to so limit his function as to preclude the 
foreign government from asserting that a permanent establishment 
22 H. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. II (1918); Rev. Act of 1918, §§ 222(a) (1) 
and 238(a) (1), now, as modified, I.R.C., § 901 et seq. (Italics added.) 
28 Rev. Act of 1918, §§ 214(a) (3) and 234(a) (3), now I.R.C., § 164(b) (6). 
"'Rev. Act of 1942, § 158(£), now I.R.C., § 903. 
25 E.g., Eitingon-Schild Co., Inc. and Subsidiarie~, 21 B.T.A. u63 (1931). Inapplica-
bility of the credit provision to turnover taxes is more fully discussed in Section D, 
infra, in the setting of royalties received from licensing arrangements. 
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has been created there. Later, to accommodate business require-
ments, the promotional representative informally assumes added 
responsibilities to a point where the foreign government, while 
acknowledging that the matter falls into the "grey" area, asserts, 
nevertheless, that a permanent establishment has been created. It 
might go on to assert that profits from the export sales are at-
tributable to that establishment even though the benefits and bur-
dens of ownership passed in the United States. The United States, 
on the other hand, might deny that a permanent establishment was 
created and deny that any credit is allowable against the American 
tax for the asserted foreign income tax. As a general proposition, 
bilateral tax treaties require the United States to grant a credit only 
to the extent provided for in the Internal Revenue Code.26 And in 
an equally general sense, credit for foreign income taxes is allowed 
only where the taxpayer derived income from a foreign source.27 
The American government might contend that passage of the bene-
fits and burdens of ownership in the United States meant that the 
export profit had its source in this country/8 rendering inapplicable 
the credit arrangement. While diplomatic channels might be avail-
able in any effort to conform the foreign country's interpretation of 
the so-called "grey area," this type of remedy may be small comfort 
to a taxpayer whose foreign activities-as viewed by the foreign 
government-have slipped just over the "permanent establishment" 
line. 
(d) Comparing the competitive tax positions of American 
exporters with that of other exporters, and with producers in a 
Common Market country.-The foregoing discussion indicates 
that an American enterprise may export items direct to customers 
in a member nation without incurring any income tax liability under 
the latter's laws, provided only that sales are not handled through 
its own "permanent establishment" located there. The shape of the 
internal laws of the member nations is such that the same result 
would generally follow even in the absence of bilateral tax treaties 
with the United States.29 It follows from this that competitive 
enterprises in other exporting countries can also avoid Common 
"'The usual practice in the treaties is first to freeze the American credit provisions 
as they existed at the time the treaty goes into effect. It is then provided that this shall 
not restrict allowance of any credit otherwise allowed by the national laws of the 
contrasting states. See, e.g., the treaty with Belgium, Articles XII and XX. 
"'I.R.C., § 904. This is discussed more fully in PART III. 
28 See note 13, supra. 
20 However, see note z, supra. 
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Market income taxes even though the exporting country does not 
have bilateral tax treaties with the member nations. On this score, 
the only difference between the position of such an exporting enter-
prise and one in America relates to slight variations which may 
exist between the way "permanent establishment" is defined under 
the national laws of member nations and the way it is defined in 
the American bilateral tax treaties. 30 Generally, however, these 
differences are not likely to have great practical significance. For 
example, where the transactions are handled through an importer, 
both exporters may want to deal only with an independent firm in 
order to avoid any contention that they maintain a taxable perma-
nent establishment in the member nation. 
Nor, with respect to Common Market turnover taxes-standing 
alone, will the competitive tax position of American exporters 
differ from that of other outsiders who export into the Common 
Market. Turnover taxes of member nations do not generally differ 
by reference to the origin of imported items. 
It is the relationship of the outsiders' domestic income tax sys-
tems to their own respective turnover tax systems that controls the 
competitive tax position inter se. Where the former taxes are high, 
the latter will be relatively lower, and vice versa. Accordingly, an 
exporter in an outside country with relatively low income taxes and 
relatively high turnover taxes which are refunded at export will 
enjoy a competitive tax advantage over another outsider from a 
country with an opposite tax pattern, and vice versa. As between 
outsiders from different countries, Common Market taxes will have 
a neutral effect; neither outsider will be subject to the income taxes 
of member nations and both will suffer the same Common Market 
turnover taxes. 
The same domestic relationships generally control the competi-
tive tax positions of exporters from outside the Common Market 
with those from within with respect to exports to other member 
nations. Finally, an outside exporter in a country with a relative 
low income tax and relatively high turnover taxes which are re-
funded at export will enjoy a competitive tax advantage over a 
local producer in a given member nation which, relatively speak-
ing, has an opposite tax pattern. Both will suffer approximately the 
same turnover taxes-hypothetically the low one imposed by the 
member nation, and by hypothesis the local producer is subject to 
the greater income tax. 
30 Cf., e.g., note 2, supra, with the discussion of the treaty provisions in Section B. 
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The foregoing problem is not peculiar to comparisons between 
outside exporters and producers within the Common Market. It 
exists within the Common Market itself. Indeed, from the beginning 
of "Benelux" and the Coal and Steel Community, tax experts have 
worked diligently, without much practical success, to resolve the 
difficulties growing out of the differentials. 
While American industry is burdened with a relatively high in-
come tax and with some non-refundable indirect taxes, at least with 
reference to certain rather widely applied excises it does enjoy a 
position generally comparable to competitors situated in countries 
which immunize exports from turnover taxes and refund those 
previously paid. In this connection, the United States imposes a 
manufacturers' excise tax on the sale of a variety of items, including, 
e.g., automobiles, appliances, refrigerators, musical instruments, 
phonographs, records, radios, television sets, photographic appa-
ratus, light bulbs, pens and mechanical pencils, lighters, and business 
machines.31 The most typical rate is 10%. Until 1958, the practice 
followed under the then existing law with regard to these items 32 
allowed a manufacturer to make a tax-free sale, regardless of the 
number of subsequent intermediate purchasers,33 as long as he had 
advance knowledge that the article was destined for exportation 
before any other use was to be made of it. In one sense, however, 
the tax was only suspended; the manufacturer had to obtain proof 
within 6 months of his shipment or sale (whichever was earlier) 
that the item had actually been exported.34 Many manufacturers 
were concerned with problems associated with proof of eventual 
exportation in that instance where several intermediate purchasers 
were involved.35 Accordingly, beginning with the revision in 1958, 
manufacturers have been permitted in the export setting to make 
tax-free sales only where the sale itself was "for export, or for 
resale by the purchaser to a second purchaser for export . . . " 
prior to any other use.36 This was coupled with another provision 
bearing on the instance where tax had to be charged because there 
would be more than one intermediate purchaser; a refund, the 
benefit of which would actually be enjoyed ultimately by the ex-
porter, could be obtained in that instance, provided the necessary 
31 I.R.C., Chapter 32, § 4061 et seq . 
.. Tobacco products are dealt with separately in I.R.C., § 5704 (b). 
81 H. Rep. No. 2596, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958). 
"'This goes back to an interpretation under the old code (I.R.C. (1939), § 2705) in 
Treas. Reg. 46 (1940), § 316.25 • 
.. H. Rep. No. 481, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1957). 
06 l,R.C., §4221(a) (2), 
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conditions were satisfied.37 One of these conditions traces back to 
an interpretative position taken by the government under earlier 
law, to the effect that sales could be made tax free or refund obtained 
only if the manufacturer had advance notice that the product he 
was selling was ultimately destined for export prior to any other 
use.38 To some, this was an objectionable limitation.39 Others 
thought it served a useful purpose. For example, automobile manu-
facturers urged that only through this advance notice requirement 
would they be in a position to see that an exported automobile was 
properly equipped for driving in the foreign country.40 In the end, 
the limitation in question survived the revision of 1958 as to a host 
of articles, though not all. The rule continues to apply, e.g., in the 
case of automobiles, refrigeration equipment, appliances, radio and 
television sets, and phonographsY 
In spite of the relatively favorable treatment of exports under 
the manufacturers' excise tax, the over-all competitive tax position 
of American exporters will be less favorable than that of an ex-
porter from a low income tax country unless the latter's turnover 
tax provides an inadequate rebate system for exports. Because items 
competitive with American products might come from any one of a 
hundred countries, it is not possible to lay down fixed rules. At the 
moment, the American exporter can do little more than determine 
whether his product would be competitive price-wise under the 
existing price structure within a given member nation. No advantage 
would be derived from shipping goods to one country for re-ship-
ment to a member nation. While the first country's turnover taxes 
could be avoided, the turnover taxes of the country of destination 
would apply just as in the case of direct exports to that country. 
SEcTION D. FoREIGN AND DoMESTIC TAXEs RE SIMPLE 
LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS 
(a) Introductory note.-For any one of the reasons indi-
cated in the Introduction to this PART, an American enterprise 
may eventually choose to have its product manufactured, in whole 
or in part, in one or more of the Common Market countries. Simple 
licensing arrangements and "know-how" agreements with estab-
•• I.R.C., § 6416. 
38 H. Rep. No. 2596, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958) and H. Rep. No. 481, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess. 72 (1957). 
80 See H. Rep. No. 481, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1957) • 
.., s. Rep. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 5 (I 9 58). 
"The limitation survives as to manufacturers' excises imposed by I.R.C., §§ 4061 (a}, 
4111, 4121, 4141, and 4201. See H. Rep. No. 2596, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 8 (1958). 
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lished foreign firms, the over-all tax effects of which are considered 
below, may be entered into as a substitute for establishment by the 
American company of its own facility abroad. Later, in PART III, 
account will be taken of the additional over-all tax advantages which 
may follow when such arrangements are complemented for one or 
more reasons by creation of a foreign subsidiary. 
(b) Comparison of foreign income taxes on royalties from 
licenses.-If the American enterprise licenses its patent to an inde-
pendent European firm, the latter may treat royalties paid as a 
business expense fully deductible from gross income in computing 
its own income tax. For purposes of the German enterprise or busi-
ness tax, however, only one-half the amount is deductible. Again, 
with reference to the income tax properly so-called, in the case of 
dependent corporate licensees (a subsidiary or majority-owned 
company), such royalties are deductible only to the extent they are 
fair in amount and do not represent a "hidden" distribution of 
profits. 
In the absence of a bilateral tax treaty, all member nations ex-
cept the Netherlands would compensate themselves for the loss of 
revenue flowing from the deduction by treating royalties paid to 
nonresidents as taxable income to them. The Netherlands does not 
impose a tax on royalties paid a nonresident except where the latter 
has a Dutch permanent establishment. With respect to the other 
member nations, again in the absence of a treaty, in all but one 
a special income tax rate would actually be applied, and then-
except in Germany-only to the net royalty which remains after 
payment of a turnover tax the rates of which are discussed in the 
next sub-topic. The special income tax rates which would be applied 







Italy 23.62% on% of the 
gross amount 
Luxembourg 1 2% 
The United States has concluded tax treaties with all member 
nations except Luxembourg. These, like similar treaties between 
other countries, generally exempt from the income tax otherwise 
imposed by the licensee's country any royalties paid to a nonresident 
American licensor in consideration, for example, of "the right to 
use copyrights, patents, secret processes and formulae, trademarks, 
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and other analogous rights." 42 In effect then, the American enter-
prise's royalties would generally be subject to a member nation's 
special rates only where the licensee is a Luxembourg firm. 
The immunity otherwise enjoyed is subject, however, to an im-
portant limitation, i.e., that the American firm does not maintain 
a permanent establishment in the member nation in question. The 
consequence which would follow from maintenance of such an estab-
lishment is still open to dispute. One possibility is that the royalty 
will be subject to the special rates set forth above. The other is 
that the royalties will be deemed to be a part of the income of 
the permanent establishment and taxed according to the rates ap-
plicable to its income. The difficulty arises from the fact that all 
five treaties literally exempt only those American firms "not having 
a permanent establishment" in the member nation. Discussions are 
still being carried on with the aim of identifying which result should 
follow under various circumstances. At the moment there seems to 
be a tendency to treat such royalties as part of a permanent estab-
lishment's income only if conclusion of the licensing agreement can 
properly be considered a part of the permanent establishment's busi-
ness activities. 
A somewhat different interpretative difficulty which may arise 
involves possible differences between royalties properly so-called 
and additional payments for providing continuous technical assist-
ance. At some point, the technical assistance to be rendered may 
include an element of service, as distinguished from an act of com-
municating in a practical way the nature of the "right" granted-
for the use of which "right" the consideration is aptly characterized 
as royalty. The foreign income tax problem will not be complicated, 
of course, where the additional service, if any, is performed within 
the United States. In such case, compensation for the service would 
have its source in the United States. But a problem may arise where 
instruction, etc., is to take place abroad. Even in this case, however, 
it must be remembered that normally the treaties do immunize pay-
ments for the right to use secret processes and formulae as well 
as more concrete intangibles such as a patent. And meaningful com-
munication of the "right" is indispensible, i.e., part and parcel, to 
its use. Sterile written instructions may well fall far short of com-
municating the exact nature of the right granted. In the reverse 
.. All of the treaties except that with Germany use language almost identical to that 
quoted. Two of the treaties project the immunity only to one other case; those with 
Belgium and France go on to provide that the term royalties shall be deemed to in-
clude rentals in respect to motion picture films. The other three also include rentals 
and like payments for the use of industrial, commercial, and scientific equipment, 
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situation, where an American company was the licensee and was to 
be given instruction in the United States with reference to the 
foreign licensor's "know-how," the line of reasoning just indicated 
led the Internal Revenue Service to react as follows: 
The essence of the contract is the making available to 
the domestic corporation the technical knowledge, 
methods, experience, that is, the "know-how" of the for-
eign corporation. While manufacturing "know-how" is of 
a rionpatentable nature, it is something that its possessor 
can grant to another for a consideration. The right to use 
such "know-how" is not materially different from the 
right to use trade-marks, secret processes and formulae, 
and, if the right thereto is granted as part of a licensing 
agreement, it becomes, in effect, an integral part of the 
bundle of rights acquired under such agreement. 
The payments made under the contract are applicable 
both to the specific rights therein granted, that is, the 
right to use the "know-how," and to services performed 
abroad in instructing and training the employees or tech-
nicians of the domestic corporation. Such payments should 
therefore be allocated between the license to use the 
"know-how" and the personal services. Since the personal 
services have only nominal value apart from the license 
to use such "know-how," all but a nominal sum should be 
allocated to the license. 43 
As indicated in the next sub-topic, one Common Market country 
has indicated, at least for purposes of its turnover tax, that con-
sideration paid for those practical steps essential to a meaningful 
communication and practical utilization of the right granted will be 
deemed royalty. Notice was given, however, that accessory oper-
ations going beyond that line would not be so classified.44 
(c) Comparison of foreign turnover taxes on royalties from 
licenses.-All Common Market countries treat the benefit rendered 
by the licensor as a service to the licensee, with the consequence 
that the gross amount of the royalty is subjected to a turnover tax. 
The t:ates vary as follows. 
Belgium -s% Italy -3% 
France -8.5% Luxembourg-2% 
Germany -4% Netherlands -4% 
While the French rate is higher than that of others, It IS Im-
portant to note that under an agreement between France and the 
.. Rev. Rul. 55-17, C.B. 1955-I, 388 at 389. 
"Proces-Verbal with France, effective February 15, 1956, CCH Tax Treaties, para. 
2876. 
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United States, an American licensor (company or individual) will 
be completely exempt if the licensor can qualify as the inventor.4" 
It is also significant that a similar agreement exists between France 
and several other countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom). Under the agreements, where an American firm transfers its 
patent to a holding company in, for example, Switzerland, that 
holding company can obtain the exemption if the American. parent 
itself can qualify as the inventor. The extension of immunity in this 
case is subject, however, to approval of the French tax adminis-
tration. 
It may well be that Common Market countries will contend for 
purposes of their turnover taxes that additional payments literally 
earmarked as consideration for furnishing "know-how" should also 
be treated as royalties. The reasoning which might justify such a 
contention, and the limitations applicable thereto, were indicated 
in the preceding sub-topic. In this connection, France, on agreeing to 
immunize royalties paid an American inventor, adopted the follow-
ing line: 
The exemption will cover not only the royalties col-
lected in consideration for the licensing of the right to 
utilization of the inventions mentioned above (para-
graph 1) but also the royalties paid for the whole group 
of steps necessary for the practical utilization of the in-
vention (know-how), for the protection of the invention 
and for the technical assistance which is indispensable to 
the exploitation of the invention (for example, making 
available to the French licensee the American licensor's 
technicians in connection with getting the invention 
started; supervision of the putting into place of the in-
stallations necessary for the exploitation of this invention 
and the utilization of blueprints; instruction of the li-
censee; supervision of the initial manufacturing results). 
On the other hand, this exemption will not apply to royal-
ties relating to accessory operations, such as the hiring of 
labor, the furnishing of supplies, advertising, carried out 
on French territory.46 
(d) American tax treatment of foreign earned royalties. 
-While the Internal Revenue Code attributes to a foreign source 
'"This arrangement was consummated by an exchange of letters between the Treas-
ury and the French Minister of Finance. Prior thereto, and for a long period, France 
had not imposed its turnover tax on royalties paid to nonresident licensors. A de-
cision by the French government to ove\turn this earlier administrative practice was 
followed immediately by protests from American licensors. The above mentioned ex-
change of letters grew out of the negotiations undertaken by the two governments. 
•• Proces-Verbal, effective February 15, 1956, CCH Tax Treaties, para. 2876. 
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any royalties or rentals received by an American company for the 
right to use its patents, secret processes, etc., outside the United 
States,47 such income-like other income from a foreign source-
must be included in its gross.48 Deductions which may then be taken 
in arriving at taxable income will be comparable to those enjoyed 
with reference to a like amount of domestic income. For example, 
in determining the amount of costs amortizable over the useful life 
of a patent, the question of whether such costs will include research 
and developmental expenditures will turn on whether the taxpayer 
invoked the right under § 174 of the Code to deduct research and 
developmental costs in the year incurred. 
Since five of the six Common Market nations are precluded by 
treaty from imposing their respective income taxes on royalties re-
ceived by American companies which do not maintain permanent 
establishments abroad, only those received from Luxembourg would 
require and enjoy the credit against American tax which § 901 
of the Code grants for any "income, war profits, or excess profits 
taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign 
country .... " 
Computation of the amount of credit allowable in this latter 
instance may be more complicated than usual if the licensing agree-
ment also requires the American company, for additional stated 
periodic consideration, to provide intermittent instruction in the 
United States for employees of the foreign licensee with reference 
to the licensor's "know-how." While details regarding the com-
putation of the credit are covered in PART III, infra, it should be 
noted here that credit is generally allowed only for that tax at-
tributable to income which had its source in the foreign country.49 
On this point, Luxembourg might contend that the entire consider-
ation constituted a royalty for the right to use, all of which had its 
source there, and that the United States was simply the place where 
the nature of the right granted was communicated in practical terms. 
In a somewhat related setting, the United States acknowledged 
that "the personal services have only nominal value apart from 
the license to use such 'know-how,'" but went on to indicate that the 
"nominal sum" which should be attributed to the service rendered 
would have its source in the United States,50 the balance being 
allocated to the license and having its source abroad.51 
"I.R.C., § 862(a) (4) . 
.. I.R.C., § 61. 
•• I.R.C., § 904· 
50 See I.R.C., § 861 (a) (3). 
01 Rev. Rul. 55-17, C.B. 1955-1, 388; cf. International Standard Electric Corp. v. 
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With reference to turnover taxes, it is most unlikely that the 
previously quoted language from § 901 of the Code would author-
ize any credit for taxes of this type which five of the six countries 
would always impose on royalties and which France, the sixth, 
would assess except in the instance where the licensor or its affiliate 
can qualify as the inventor. 52 Admittedly the impact of such taxes, 
when imposed on royalties, is equivalent to a tax on gross income. 
But turnover taxes, have an even more general sweep, embracing 
also gross receipts from sales, etc. An over-all perspective regarding 
an earlier French turnover tax which had been applied to American 
exports led the Board of Tax Appeals to conclude that it was some-
thing other than a profits tax. It was deemed an "excise tax on the 
privilege of carrying on in France businesses of the kinds enumer-
ated ... ," and this was thought to be none the less true though 
in reaching gross sales of services the tax was measured by the 
"equivalent of gross income or profits." 53 This same over-all per-
spective constituted one reason why the Internal Revenue Service 
more recently ruled against allowance of a credit for the German 
turnover tax imposed on royalties received by an American firm 
not having a permanent establishment there.54 The Service, how-
ever, had to go on to deal with the question of whether a credit 
was allowable under another provision in the Code which author-
ized such in the case of any foreign tax paid "in lieu of a tax on 
income, war profits, or excess profits otherwise generally imposed 
by . . . [such J foreign country. . . . " 55 The taxpayer claimed 
that it was enough under this language that the royalty would 
suffer only a turnover tax, having been freed by a bilateral tax 
treaty from the reach of a German income tax which was other-
wise generally imposed. The Service concluded, however, that the 
turnover tax was not a quid pro quo for the relief granted against 
the German income tax. The latter relief was simply a concession to 
avoid double income taxation. Consequently, the turnover tax did 
not satisfy the alternative requirement that it be "in lieu of" an 
income tax. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (2d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 487, cert. den., 323 
u.s. 8o3, 65 s. Ct. 56o (1945) . 
.. For details regarding such qualification and the meaning of inventor in a Proces-
Verbal made effective as of February 15, 1956, see CCH Tax Treaties, para. 2876 
et seq. 
58 Eitingon-Schild Co., Inc. and Subsidiaries, 21 B.T.A. 1163, 1174 (r93r) • 
.. Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, 501. 
65 I.R.C., § 903. 
PART III. COMPARATIVE TAX EFFECTS OF CONDUCTING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE THROUGH FACILITIES IN 
THE COMMON MARKET 
SECTION A. INTRODUCTION 
(a) Alternative business arrangements .-An American 
enterprise which has been shipping goods to Europe in response to 
orders received directly from its European customers may believe 
that something more than a promotional representative is needed 
there. From a business standpoint, apart from tax considerations, 
it may favor establishment of a permanent sales office. Or tariff 
walls, together with transportation and comparative production 
costs, may suggest that its goods would be more competitive if 
manufactured or assembled there. Rather than enter into the pre-
viously discussed licensing arrangement with an existing European 
firm, it m;n prefer to establish its own foreign manufacturing 
facility. 
Whether it chooses to establish a sales office or a manufacturing 
facility, it must also decide whether to operate through a permanent 
establishment, in the nature of a branch, or transact its affairs 
through a foreign subsidiary. It must also choose the country in 
which to base its operations and decide whether and how its foreign 
business can be best extended into other member nations. Tax 
considerations may contribute, of course, to the shape of the final 
plan. 
In order to facilitate comparisons, discussion in this PART 
proceeds first on the assumption that a facility is to be established 
in only one country and that trade will be confined within its bound-
aries. Data regarding the tax loads in each of the six countries 
will be compared in the settings of a branch operation and an 
incorporated foreign subsidiary, and then integrated with Ameri-
can tax implications. 
Thereafter the discussion will assume that trade is also to be 
carried on with one or more other member nations. It is in this 
circumstance that the tax implications arising from exports by the 
one foreign facility to the other member nations are compared 
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with those which would arise from creation of yet another facility. 
That second facility might be either a subsidiary or a branch of the 
first. Or it might be a sister branch or subsidiary directly con-
trolled by the American parent. And if it takes on the form of 
a sister subsidiary, the parent may want to create a foreign hold-
ing company to hold the shares of the two different subsidiaries. 
The tax implications of all of these possibilities will be considered 
in turn on a comparative basis, i.e., concurrently in the setting 
of each member nation. Some attention will even be given to the 
way tax costs may be affected if a holding company is established in 
a so-called "tax haven" outside the Common Market. 
Finally, the relative tax costs of exporting goods from within 
the Common Market to non-member nations will be compared 
with the establishment in those non-member nations of permanent 
establishments or subsidaries owned or controlled by Common 
Market corporations. 
(b) Need for caution in assessing comparative data; also 
the varying roles of direct and indirect taxes compared to national 
product.-One must be careful not to place too much stress on 
the type of comparative data which can be reflected in this type 
of study. In this connection, assume that a campany has a gross 
profit of $r,ooo,ooo. The ultimate taxable profit to which com-
parisons must be geared may be quite different depending on 
whether it is located in one country or another. Depreciation ar-
rangements, stock valuation methods, special investment allow-
ances, and loss carry-over privileges are only illustrations of mat-
ters about which there may be differences from country to country. 
Again, the tax on distributed profits may differ from that on un-
distributed profits. There are also varying property taxes, the 
impact of which in terms of a percentage of income will differ 
depending on the ratio between profits and the invested capital 
of the particular business. The danger of being misled through over-
emphasis on the comparative data set forth in this PART will be 
less, however, in the case of those who have studied the country-
by-country survey which appears in PART I. 
Comparative data regarding the total tax load borne by all 
taxpayers in each country can be equally misleading. Much depends 
on the way tax revenues are used by the different governments. Il-
lustratively, part of these may be used by a given country to finance 
social security, whereas another supposedly lower tax country 
may finance old age benefits by direct contributions from those 
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covered, and this may affect wage rates. Again, a country with 
high taxes may provide an excellent system of railroads and high-
ways, whereas a low tax country may have an inferior transporta-
tion system complemented by higher costs in doing business. Indeed, 
in assessing the comparative data which appears in Table III A 
regarding the total tax loads borne in various countries in terms 
of a percentage of national product, account must even be taken 
of differences which may exist among the countries in calculating 
the national product, the income, and the net wealth of its people. 
TABLE III A 
TOTAL TAX BURDEN' 
Tax %of Total 
Revenue Taxes De- % of Total 
as a% rived from Taxes 
Gross Natl. of Gross Income and Derived 
Product Natl. Net Wealth from Other 
Country per Person Product Taxes Sources 
Belgium $1,196} I?% 47% 53% B. Fr. 59.780 
France $ 931} IS% 40% 6o% Fr. Fr. 46 5,400 
Germany $ 969} 20% 53% 47% DM 4,070 




69,410 20% 59% 41% 
Netherlands $ 845} 23% 6o% 40% Fl. 3,210 
In terms of a percentage of gross national product, total rev-
enues derived by the federal, state, and local governments in the 
United States would align it alongside the Netherlands, the latter 
being the Common Market country the taxes of which absorb 
the highest percentage of its product. In this connection, however, 
it must be remembered that the gross national product of the United 
States, per person, is approximately 8 5% more than the amount 
produced by the most productive Common Market country. 
The federal government's tax collections are also about 27'2 
1 MONTHLY BULLE'l'!N OF STATISTICS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Central Bureau of Sta-
tistics, The Hague. 
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times that of states and local units. While it relies far more heavily 
on the income tax than do the Common Market countries, the 
combined yield of this source to all three units would approximate 
the same percentage of total tax revenues as is derived from this 
source by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany. Table 
III B reflects data of a character comparable to that presented 
above with reference to the Common Market countries. 
TABLE III B 
TOTAL TAX BURDEN-UNITED STATES 
Tax 
Revenue 
Gross Nat/. as a% of %of Total Taxes Derived From: 
Product Gross Nat/. Property Other 
per Person Product Income Taxes Taxes Sources 
U.S. Federal govt. $2,58o • 17.6% 3 73-70% 5 - 26.3o% • 
State and local - 6.3%. 10.65% • 46 %" 43·35% 10 
Combined Federal, 
State and local - 24.% 57· %7 10.9% 32.10% U 
• This figure was arrived at by dividing the Federal Reserve Bulletin's estimate of 
the 1959 gross national product ($479,soo,ooo,ooo) by the World Almanac's estimated 
population for the United States in 1959 (177,399,000). Fed. Res. Bull. (March, 1960) 
p. 328 and the World Almanac for 1960 (New York World Telegram and The Sun) 
p. 257· 
3 The ANNUAL REPORT, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (1959), p. 3, indicated 
that federal tax collections in fiscal 1959 amounted to $79,797,973,000. See note 2, supra, 
for the gross national product. 
'The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1960, indicated that state and local tax collections 
in 1959 approximated $29,ooo,ooo,ooo. For the gross national product, see note 2, supra. 
5 See note, 3, supra. 
• This is the figure for the year 1956. The percentage is based on data appearing in 
MICHIGAN TAX STUDY, LEGISLATIVE CoMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1958) 
pp. 40 and 41. It is not likely that the percentage has changed substantially since that 
date. 
7 This involves a combination of the 1959 figures for the federal government and 
the 1956 figures for state and local governments. It is be Iieved, however, that the 
figure would be substantially correct today. 
8 This percentage is based on data appearing in MICHIGAN TAX STUDY, LEGISLATIVE 
COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1958) p. 39· 
0 Excise taxes, including those on alcohol, tobacco, retailers, manufacturers, estates, 
and gifts yielded 15.1% of total federal tax collections. The balance (11.2%) came 
from employment taxes designed mainly to accommodate old age benefits and disability 
insurance. 
10 Of this, 2.4% is derived from "business taxes" of which some resemble an income 
tax in one degree or another. 
11 This combines federal figures for fiscal 1959 with state and local figures for 1956. 
However, it is believed that the figure would be approximately correct today. 
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SECTION B. COMPARING FOREIGN TAX COSTS OF A PER-
MANENT EsTABLISHMENT WITH A SuBsiD-
IARY SERVICING ONE MEMBER NATION 
SUBSECTION I. COMPARING FOREIGN DIRECT TAXES 
(a) Comparing the role of treaties re permanent establish-
ments and subsidiaries: In general.-As previously noted, the 
United States has concluded tax treaties with all Common Market 
countries except Luxembourg with which a treaty is under negotia-
tion. These are intended to limit tax liability to a greater degree 
than would otherwise be the case under national laws. This is 
particularly so in the cases of Italy and France. According to the 
national laws of both countries, a nonresident person becomes 
liable to tax if he regularly and habitually performs activities 
which constitute a complete cycle of business. Under the tax treaties 
with them, as with others, the nonresident individual or corpora-
tion is only taxable if a "permanent establishment" is maintained 
there. National laws relating to jurisdiction remain important in 
such cases only where the treaty creates an ambiguity regarding 
the meaning of "permanent establishment" in a given setting. While 
the treaties generally go beyond national law in sharpening the 
definition of a "permanent establishment," a given nation may be 
inclined to resort to its own historic definition in the event of an 
ambiguity in the relevant treaty. 
The effect of tax treaties on subsidiary companies is quite different 
in character. Generally, the treaties exclude subsidiaries, as such, 
from the definition of a permanent establishment. Under the 
national laws of all countries, profits of a corporation, domestic 
to them, are taxed twice, once to the corporation and then in one 
way or another to the stockholders on receipt of dividends. The 
latter tax is usually withheld at the source, at least in part. The 
tax treaties are designed either to avoid, as in the case of the 
Netherlands, or mitigate, as in the case of France or Germany, 
the second tax, i.e., the one which would otherwise fall on dividends 
received by the American parent company. It is possible for a sub-
sidiary to occupy a dual role, i.e., be fully taxable on its own profits 
and also serve as a "permanent establishment" for the parent. 
For example, a manufacturing subsidiary located in a member 
nation might also serve as sales agent for products manufactured 
by the parent company in the States. The subsidiary's own manu-
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facturing profits and agency fees would be fully taxable to it by 
the member nation, while the American parent company would be 
liable for tax on the profit derived from sales which it made 
through its permanent agent, the subsidiary. 
(b) Comparing direct taxes of member nations on "per-
manent establishments."-Under the tax treaties, an American 
enterprise would not generally be taxable on commercial or in-
dustrial profits derived from trading in a member nation unless 
it transacts business through a "permanent establishment." While 
the enumeration of facilities covered is not always the same, most 
treaties define this to include a branch, factory, office, warehouse, 
workshop, mine, stone quarry, or permanent display and sales 
office, and all close by referring to the most common underlying 
denominator, "or other fixed place of business." 
In only two significant instances does the concept "permanent 
establishment" go beyond that common characteristic. 
The first of these instances was discussed earlier in PART II 
where it was noted that all treaties include an agent who has, and 
habitually exercises, a general authority to negotiate and conclude 
contracts on behalf of the American enterprise or who has a stock 
of merchandise from which he regularly fills orders on behalf of 
the enterprise. However, the concept does not include business 
conducted through a bona fide independent commission agent, 
broker, or custodian acting in the ordinary course of his business 
as such, nor does it include a fixed place used exclusively for the 
purchase of goods. 
The second instance where a treaty goes beyond the concept of 
a fixed place of business involves the arrangement with Germany 
regarding construction projects. Under Germany's national law, 
the notion of "permanent establishment" includes a construction 
or assembly project the duration of which exceeds or is likely to 
exceed 6 months. The treaty serves only to extend the dateline 
to r 2 months. While the national laws of the Netherlands are 
similar to those in Germany, the treaty between the former and 
the United States does not characterize a construction project, 
standing alone, as a permanent establishment with the consequence 
that the matter of timing in that setting is now irrelevant. Luxem-
bourg poses the third alternative. Its national laws are similar 
to those in the Netherlands and Germany. Since the United States 
has not yet concluded a treaty with Luxembourg, a construction 
or assembly project the duration of which exceeds 6 months will 
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be deemed a permanent establishment, the profits of which will 
be taxed by Luxembourg. 
While a permanent establishment is considered separate from 
the American enterprise for the purpose of determining how much 
profit was earned by the facility, that calculated profit is deemed 
to be owned by the American enterprise as it is earned and is, there-
fore, taxable to it without regard to the question of whether the 
profit has been transferred to the States. 
Calculation of the amount of profit which is properly attribut-
able to the permanent establishment, and thus taxable by a mem-
ber nation, is not always easy. Where an American enterprise's fa-
cilities in the United States carry on business with a European 
permanent establishment which in turn carries on business activity 
in a member nation, the total profit must be divided between the 
two, for only that properly attributable to the permanent estab-
lishment is taxable by the member nation. Most treaties face up 
to this problem by attributing to the permanent establishment 
the industrial or commercial profits which it might be expected to 
derive if it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same 
or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and 
dealing at arm's length with the enterprise of which it is a perma-
nent establishment. In keeping with this principle, expenses reason-
ably allocable to the permanent establishment, including a proper 
share of executive or general administrative expenses, are deducti-
ble by it in determining its taxable profit. 
Set forth in Table III C is a comparison of the direct taxes 
which each member nation would impose on a permanent estab-
lishment. 
(c) Comparing direct taxes of member nations on subsidiary 
arrangements.-An American enterprise can create a subsidiary, 
i.e., an independent entity, domiciled in any one of the member 
nations. All would permit its organization as a limited liability 
company or, except in the Netherlands, as a private company (a 
societe a responsabiliti limitee in Belgium, France, or Luxembourg; 
a societa a responsabilita limitata in Italy; a Gesellschaft mit 
beschrankter H aftung, GmbH, in Germany). 
The subsidiary would be taxed by the appropriate member nation 
in the manner described in the country-by-country survey set 
forth in PART I and later summarized on a comparative basis 
in this PART. Bilateral tax treaties with the United States would 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 52 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
member nation's treatment of dividends and interest paid by the 
subsidiary to the American parent company. 
Conceptually speaking, the two primary differences between 
utilization by an American enterprise of a foreign permanent es-
tablishment in the nature of a branch and a foreign subsidiary ap-
pear most dramatically in that circumstance where all profits of 
a new foreign facility are to be retained abroad either to discharge 
indebtedness created in connection with establishment of the fa-
cility or to finance further expansion. In the case of a permanent 
establishment, the Common Market country would include the 
entire profit, as earned, in the gross income of the American com-
pany. The United States would do likewise, though according to 
the discussion in Section C, infra, a credit for the foreign income 
tax would serve to cushion or completely neutralize the effect of 
an otherwise double tax. 
While the profit of a subsidiary would also be taxed in full by 
the member nation, in the absence of a distribution the American 
parent company would not be subjected to the member nation's 
dividend tax, if any, nor would it immediately suffer an American 
tax. Any attempt to compare the income and property taxes which 
would be exacted from such a subsidiary by each member nation 
can be quite misleading, for the reasons outlined in the Introduc-
tion to this PART. This difficulty is minimized, but not eliminated, 
if the comparison is directed to a common fact situation. For ex-
ample, while an assumption that the subsidiary earned $4oo,ooo 
(before direct taxes) on its assumed net worth of $4,ooo,ooo 
( w%) 18 accommodates itself to progressive rate variations or 
to the fact that a given member nation might be exacting its toll 
through two different income taxes with varying rates, such an 
assumed situation ignores differences which may actually exist 
among member nations with regard to depreciation and other de-
ductions which may be taken in arriving at taxable profit. It is also 
difficult to take into account the deductible direct trade or enter-
prise taxes which, as discussed in PART I, are levied in all coun-
tries, except the Netherlands, and are imposed primarily by ref-
erence to profits and net wealth, except in Italy where it constitutes 
a surcharge only on the national income tax. Nevertheless, for 
illustrative purposes, the income and property taxes which would 
be exacted from such a subsidiary by the member nations are 
18 If the ratio is higher than Io%, the tax burden will be relatively lower in Germany 
and Luxembourg and higher in Italy. If the percentage is less than 10%, the reverse 
would be true. 
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compared in Table III D. Insofar as practicable, the figures re-
flecting those taxes have also been adjusted to take account of the 



















for Expansion (apart 
from that retained 
as a consequence of 








19 The figures set forth here and the formulae which appear in notes 20 through 2 5, 
30, and 31, infra, are taken, with the consent of the author and publisher, from INTER-
NATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DocUMENTATION, CoMPANY TAXATION IN WESTEltN EUROPE 
(R. Mees & Zoonen, Rotterdam, 1959). 
20 From PART I, it will be recalled that a Belgian corporation pays the Taxe Pro-
fessionnelle on undistributed profits, a National Crisis Tax on distributed profits, the 
Taxe Professionnelle on that part of the profits used to pay the National Crisis Tax, 
and that the Taxe Professionnelle is allowed as a deduction in determining taxable 
profits. 
The formula for the computation of the tax is as follows: TP = d + p (P- TP- e). 
The symbols in that formula carry the following meaning: TP is the Taxe Profes-
sionnelle; d represents the TP which is levied before reaching the rate applying to 
the next bracket; p is the percentage applying to the next bracket and this is reached 
after deduction of the amount on which d was calculated, and is represented by e. 
The amount on which p is levied is thus equal to the profit (P) less the Taxe Profes-
sionnelle (TP), this being a deductible item, and less e. 
By reference to the rate brackets set forth in PART I, Section A, a tentative tax 





Top bracket: Over $zoo,ooo at 40% 
$3,ooo X zso/o 
7,000 X 30% 
1o,ooo X 35% 






Under the previously stated formula, the value of d is $73,850, p is 40%, and e is 
$zoo,ooo. The formula can then be applied as follows: 
$ 
40 (4oo,ooo- TP- 2oo,ooo) 
TP = 73,8so+-
100 
TP = $153,850- 0.4 TP 
TP = $109,893. (27.47% of the pre-tax profit of $400,000; leaves $290,107 or 72.53% 
in the corporation.) 
:.n The only French tax on corporations is the Impot sur les Societtfs of so% on total 
income, whether or not distributed. 
""The German formula is as complicated as that used in determining the Belgian tax. 
(Footnote continued on nrxt page.) 
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While the comparisons just drawn assumed that none of the 
profits would be currently distributed in the form of dividends, 
some interest on indebtedness running to the parent company may 
have been paid. 
(Footnote continued.) 
Under the Korperschaftsteuer, a German corporation is subject to a 51% tax on 
retained earnings and a 15% tax on distributed profits. The German Gewerbesteuer 
or enterprise tax (3 factor: profits, net wealth, and payroll) is subject to a multiplica-
tion factor fixed by each municipality. The formula below takes account only of net 
wealth and profits, and at maximum rates. Where a municipality does not use the 
payroll factor, rates regarding the other two factors may be somewhat higher. The 
enterprise tax is a deductible item. Finally, the f7 ermogensteuer or net worth tax of 1 o/o 
is also imposed. 
With K, G, and V representing the three above named taxes, and y the total tax, 
the basic formula would be y = K + G + V. That formula becomes the following: 
6 I5 
(I) G = 
1000 
NW + Ioo (P- G) when NW =net worth and P =profit 
G = -
6
- X $• ooo ooo + .!L ($4ooooo G) -IOOO .,., ' 100 ' - -
G = 24,000 + 6o,ooo - ..!L G 
100 
G =$73,043 
(2) V = 1% of NW = $4o,ooo. 
(3) K = _2.!.. (P- G) = ,.i!. (4oo,ooo- 73,043) = $I66,748 
IOO IOO 
y = I66,748 + 73,043 + 40,000 = $279,79I or 69.95% 
There remains in the corporation $120,209 or 30.05% 
$4oo,ooo or I~ 
23 The Italian formula must accommodate the Imposta sui redditi di Ricchezza 
Mobile (R.M.), and the Imposta sulle Societii (I.S.) on profit and net worth. If y 
equals the total tax, the formula would be y = R.M. + I.S. or: 
(I) R.M. = 27.85 X $6,450 + 31.23% X $393.550 = $124,701 
6 
(2) I.S. = ·75% X $4,000,000 + I5o/o (P- ~ 
100 
(3) Tax Amount (44.675% of pre-tax profit) 
NW) = 54,000 
$I78,701 
(4) Profit remaining in the corporation (55.325%) $22I,299 
"'Luxembourg levies the following taxes on corporations: Impot sur le revenu des 
collectivitis (IC); Impot sur Ia fortune (IF); and Jmpot commercial or Business Tax 
(BT) which includes, at maximum rates, a ·4 o/o tax on net worth (NW) and an 8% 
tax on profit (P). Thus the basic formula could be applied as follows: 
(I) y=BT+IF+IC 
(2) BT = ~4- NW + - 8- (P- BT) = - 4-
Iooo Ioo IOoo 
8 
X 4,ooo,ooo + -- (4oo,ooo- BT) 
IOO 
BT = I6,ooo + 32,ooo- o.o8 BT. 
BT= 
IF= - 5- NW = -' - X 4,ooo,ooo = $ 20 ooo 
IOOO IOOO ' 
IC = 40% of (P- BT) = o.4(4oo,ooo- 44,444) = $142,222 
$206,666 
Total tax amounts to $2o6,666 or 51.67% 
There remains in the corporation $I93,334 or 48.33% 
$400,000 1oo.oo% 
"'The Dutch tax is always 47% of total income. But see PART VI, note I, infra, 
with respect to pending legislation calling for reformation of the Dutch tax system. 
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In all countries, such interest would be deductible in computing 
the subsidiary's profit, provided the amount is fair and reasonable 
and does not represent a disguised dividend.26 In the absence of 
a bilateral treaty, the national laws of three of the six member 
countries would make the nonresident parent company liable for 
tax on the interest received. Germany, the Netherlands, and in 
some cases France would immunize the parent company, provided 
the loan was not secured by a mortgage on real property.27 While 
the immunity in France does not cover interest on bonds, by treaty, 
both France and Belgium have agreed to place a ceiling on the 
rate which would otherwise be applied to any interest taxed under 
their respective national laws. Table III E indicates the rate under 








TABLE III E 
National Law Rate 
r8%, or 12.2% if tax 
is paid by the debtor 
Bonds generally, 24% 













The foreign direct taxes associated with the previously de-
scribed subsidiary arrangement may change in two respects when 
the subsidiary reaches the point where some of its current profits 
can be distributed as dividends, say 40% of that which remains 
after allowance for the subsidiary's own foreign direct taxes. 
26 In France the deduction is limited by a ceiling; interest is deductible only to 
the extent the loan does not exceed half of the corporation's capital. Moreover, in 
Germany, interest on long term debts is not deductible for purposes of the business tax. 
27 Immunity under the national laws of the Netherlands would not extend to in-
terest received by one owning 25% or more of the stock of the company except where 
the shares are considered business property of the stockholder. T.he latter exception 
would always apply in the case of a parent corporation. 
28 The treaty provisions relating to interest are limited to cases where the Ameri-
can enterprise does not have a permanent establishment in the Common Market nation. 
29 The treaty with the Netherlands does not limit taxability of interest if the creditor 
owns more than so% of the voting stock in the debtor corporation. However, under 
its national laws, the Netherlands does not normally reach interest received by a 
nonresident shareholder where the shares constitute a part of the latter's business 
property. In such case, interest is taxed only if the loan is secured by a mortgage on 
real property. 
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The first additional tax implication involves the member nation's 
treatment of the American parent company with regard to the 
dividend received by it. In the absence of a tax treaty, dividends, 
as distinguished from interest, would have been reached by the 
national laws of all member nations except Italy. However, by 
treaty three of the other five countries have agreed to reduce their 
withholding tax on dividends to a percentage below that otherwise 
applicable under national law. Rates applicable under national 








TABLE III F 
Withholding Tax 




Ceilings Fixed by Treaty 
(Exemptions in treaty do not 




(Ceiling fixed by treaty is 
higher than the tax actually as-
sessed under local law) 
IS% 
0 
The second additional tax implication arising from distribution 
of a part of the profits involves a change in the income tax load 
which would be assessed against the subsidiary itself in two of 
the six countries. In Belgium, the Taxe Professionelle which is 
applicable only to undistributed profits would be substantially 
reduced, with the National Crisis Tax, applicable only to distributed 
profits, absorbing much of that reduction. In Germany, while the 
enterprise or trade tax would remain more or less constant, as 
indicated in PART I the subsidiary would enjoy a substantially 
reduced rate under the income tax with respect to that part of the 
profit distributed. 
Table III G compares the income, property, and significant 
corporate enterprise taxes which would be levied by each member 
nation on the subsidiary in that year when 40% of its after-tax 
profits are distributed, and the amount of dividends which would 
be received by the American enterprise after paying foreign divi-
dend taxes, if any. 
At some point, the previously described subsidiary may have 
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TABLE III G 
Income Net 
and Prop- With- Divi-
erty Taxes hold- dends 
Payable Profit Re- Profit ing Tax Re-
by the tained for Dis- on divi- ceived in 
Subsidiary Expansion tributed dends 33 U.S.A. 
I 2 3 
%of %of %of %of 
pre-tax pre-tax pre-tax %of pre-tax 
profit profit profit Clm. 3 profit 
Belgium 30 24·9 4S·06 30.04 30. 2 !.028 
France so. 30. 20. IS. I7. 
Germany 31 64.89 2I.066 I4.044 IS. I 1.9374 
Italy 44·67 33·20 22.I3 0 22.I3 
Luxembourg 32 s I.67 28.998 I9·332 IS I6.4322 
Netherlands 47· 3 I.8 21.2 0 2!.2 
30 The formula used in note 20, supra, is more complicated here because of the need 
to take account of the National Crisis Tax (NCT). The formula would run as fol-
lows: • 
(I) y = 0-4 (P- (NCT + TP)), where y is the distributed profit, and NCT rep-
resents the National Crisis Tax of 2oo/o thereon. 
(z) NCT = o.2 y 
( 3) TP = d + p ( P - y - TP - e) 
( 3) TP = $73,8 so + 0.4 ( 4oo,ooo - y - TP - 2oo,ooo) = 109,893 - 0"4 y 
1.4 
Formula (I) becomes: 
(I) y=o.4 [4oo,ooo- {73,8so+o.4(2oo,ooo-y-TP) +o.2 y}J = 
=o.4 [4oo,ooo- (I53,850-0-4 y-o-4 TP+o.2 y)] = 
=o.4 [40o,ooo- (109,893-
04 
y+o.2 y)] = 
I-4 




y = $12o,I63 or 30.04 o/o of total profit 
31 The German formula used in note 22, supra, also becomes more complicated when 
account must be taken of distributed profits. The formula would run as follows: 
(I) y=o.4 {P- (G+V+K)} 
As in note 22 G = $73,043 24 
V=$4o,ooo 
(2) K= ..!i.. Y+ i!._ (P-y-G) = .!..Ly+ ..5.!... (4oo,ooo-73,o43) _.i!... y 
100 IOO IOO IOO IOO 
36 
K = I66,748 -~ y 
By substitution, formula (I) becomes: 
(I) y=o.4 [4oo,ooo- {73,043 +4o,ooo+ (I66,748- .1§_ y)}J = 
IOO 
Y = 0.4 (286,957- I66,748 + _3£ y) = 0.4 (120,209 + ~ y) 
IOO IOO 
Y=$56,I72 or I4.043% of total profit 
33 The figures are pursuant to Luxembourg's national laws, as a bilateral tax treaty 
has not yet been concluded. 
38 See Table F for the withholding tax which would be assessed in the absence of the 
bilateral tax treaty with the United States. 
458 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
discharged its indebtedness and abandoned further plans for 
expansion. Current distribution of all of that part of the $400,000 
in earnings which remain after payment of the subsidiary's own 
tax will serve, as in the immediately preceding case, to change the 
subsidiary's own tax liability in two of the six member nations, 
Belgium and Germany. And for the reasons cited in discussing 
the immediately preceding case, the net change in those two coun-
tries involves· a further reduction, as is indicated in Table III H. 




Taxes Pay- Withhold- dends 
able by the Profit ing Tax on Received 
Subsidiary Distributed Dividends 35 in U.S.A. 
I 2 3 4 
%of pre- %of pre- %of %of pre-
• tax profit tax profit Clm. 2 tax profit 
Belgium 21.34 78.66 30% rate 55·062 
France so. so. 15% rate 42·5 
Germany 53·04 46-96 15% rate 39·9 16 
Italy 44·67 55·33 0 55·33 
Luxembourg 34 SL67 48·33 15% rate 41.0805 
Netherlands 47· 53· 0 53· 
SUBSECTION 2. COMPARING PRIMARY INDIRECT BUSINESS 
TAXES OF MEMBER NATIONS 
(a) Turnover taxes.-Each member nation's turnover taxes 
were discussed in the country-by-country survey in PART I, and 
certain general principles evolving from that discussion were ap-
plied in PART II in connection with an analysis of the tax effects 
of direct exports. The intention in Table III I is to chart a com-
parison of the effective rates which will normally be applied by 
each member nation at various stages of the manufacturing and 
distribution process. Effective, rather than stated, rates are used 
because in all countries except Belgium and Italy the turnover 
tax itself forms a part of the tax base (price) to which the stated 
"'See note 32, supra. 
05 See Table F for the withholding tax which would be assessed in the absence of a 
bilateral tax treaty with the United States. 
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rates are applied. Normal rates only are shown; legislation bear-

























































(*Since the French tax is actually a tax on added value, any such tax paid in earlier 
stages may be deducted by manufacturers or wholesalers except in the instance where 
the wholesaler pays only the local turnover tax of 2.83 %. In fact, the manufacturer 
could even deduct turnover taxes previously paid on acquiring machinery, from 
turnover taxes due on the sale of his products. In case a manufacturer, in the capacity 
of a retailer, sells direct to consumers, instead of paying the 25% on the whole price, 
he may pay 25% on a hypothetical wholesale price plus 2.83% on the whole price.) 
From Table III I, it appears that the amount of tax a consumer 
will ultimately bear depends in some instances on the character 
of the outlet from which his purchase is made as well as on the 
number of times the product has "turned over" prior to his pur-
chase. In order to chart a comparison of the way the variable tax 
impact would affect the total price he would pay for a product from 
each outlet in each of the various countries, certain non-tax constants 
must be assumed. Table III J assumes that the pre-tax price 
charged by each outlet (manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer) 
would include a flat $20 net profit margin, the first such margin 
being included in the manufacturer's net pre-tax price of $100 
to wholesalers. It is further assumed that if a manufacturer or 
wholesaler sells directly to consumers, he will also enjoy the net 
profit margin which would have been normally received by the 
omitted outlets. Thus, a manufacturer selling directly to con-
sumers would contemplate a pre-tax price of $140. 
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TABLE III J 
Manufacturer to Consumer 
Through 
Wholesaler Through 
and Retailer Retailer Only Direct 
Belgium I5 1.25 I46.oo I40.00 
France I74·8o3637 I74·8o 36 172·7 5 36 
Germany I 51.48 I 51.05 I45·84 
Italy I47·37 I43·96 I44·62 
Luxembourg I45·58 I45·36 J42.86 
Nether lands I46.2I I46.3 I I45·84 
(b) Registration and stamp duties.-Each member nation 
imposes registration and/or stamp duties in connection with pay-
ment of capital into a subsidiary or capitalization of its reserves. 
The varying percentages charged on amounts originally paid in are 
reflected in Table III K. 
TABLE III K 
Registration Duty: Stamp Duty: Total: 
Belgium 1.6 % ·7% 2.3 % 
France 1.6 % 1.6 % 
Germany 2.5 % 2.5 % 
Italy I%-2.5 % * $.02-$I.90 
( IO-I,200 Lire) 
Luxembourg .J2% ·4% ·72% 
Nether lands 2.5 % ·75% 3·25% 
*The r% is applied to cash; 2.5% is applied to other capital assets brought into the 
business. 
After formation of the subsidiary, subsequent increases in the 
subscribed or paid in capital may be subjected to somewhat different 
rates. 
Introduction of capital into a permanent establishment, as dis-
•• As previously noted, if the French manufacturer, on the purchase of raw materials, 
auxiliary goods, machines, etc., has paid a turnover tax, he may deduct the amount 
thereof from the tax payable by him on the sale of his product. This means that he is 
able to charge a selling price to the wholesaler (all other things being equal) which 
will be lower than that of his competitors in other countries. The actual consumer's 
price may, therefore, be lower than the amounts stated above. 
37 If the wholesaler pays the local turnover tax of 2.75% (effective rate, z.83o/o in 
lieu of the value added tax (see PART I). the priee will be $173.88, ' 
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tinguished from a subsidiary, is also subjected to somewhat sim-
ilar taxes in two of the six countries, Belgium and Germany. Il-
lustratively, in Belgium the basic rate is . 1% of the nominal paid 
in capital, with a minimum tax of $360 (B. fr. r8,ooo) and a 
maximum of $2o,ooo (B. fr. r,ooo,ooo). 
SECTION C. INTEGRATION OF FoREIGN TAxEs INTO AMER-
ICAN TAXATION OF BRANCHES AND FOREIGN 
SUBSIDIARIES SERVING ONE MEMBER NATION 
(a) lntroduction.-Earlier discussion in Section B of this 
PART indicated that direct taxes imposed by some Common Mar-
ket countries differed by reference to the fornt in which the opera-
tion there was conducted. The difference between carrying on busi-
ness there through a permanent establishment, as distinguished 
from a foreign subsidiary, can also give rise to substantial differ-
ences in the amount of income taxes imposed by the United States 
on any profits derived from abroad. 
One will also discover that the American tax cost associated with 
activities carried on through a foreign subsidiary will vary, just as 
there was a variation in the tax cost imposed by some member na-
tions, depending on whether profits are distributed or are plowed 
back into the operation. 
In order to dramatize the practical significance of these various 
differences in American tax costs and in the total costs imposed do-
mestically and abroad, discussion in this section will be confined, 
like that in preceding sections dealing solely with foreign tax costs, 
to operations which do not extend beyond the boundaries of a given 
member nation. Discussion of American and total tax costs in more 
expansive settings will be dovetailed between later sections which 
look only at the foreign tax costs of the same kind of expanding 
operation. 
The analysis here will be divided into four parts. Discussion of 
the basic differences between American taxation of foreign branches 
and foreign subsidiaries, in terms of income, deductions, and credits, 
will be followed in Subsection 2 by an attempt to integrate the for-
eign and domestic tax costs associated with these two forms. Sub-
section 3 will consider the problem of allocating income and deduc-
tion items between American and foreign operations in the instance 
where the two conduct business with each other. Finally, Subsection 
4 will focus on certain special or unusual problems which may be 
encountered in connection with the credit for foreign taxes. 
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The discussion with reference to all of these matters is based on 
the American tax pattern as it existed in September, 1960. Pending 
legislation which, if adopted, would dramatically alter the existing 
pattern, is discussed in Section B of PART VI, infra. 
SUBSECTION I. BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN 
TAXATION OF FOREIGN BRANCHES AND 
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES 
(a) Introductory note.-The fact that United States taxes 
on profits earned abroad can differ markedly, depending on whether 
an American corporation chooses to conduct its Common Market 
business through a foreign branch or foreign subsidiary, is actually 
due to a quite limited number of conceptual differences in basic tax 
patterns, affecting however, all three parts of the ledger {gross 
income, deductions, and credits). From these few conceptual dif-
ferences spring a host of practical tax differences. 
The discussion below approaches the matter first by reference to 
differences in the amount of American gross income created by the 
two different forms. Analysis of the variation between those two 
settings in deductions and credits allowable for foreign income taxes 
then follows. 
(b) American "gross" income differences between brt_Jnch 
and subsidiary operations.-Differences on the gross income side 
are attributable to four basic tax concepts. The first is jurisdictional 
in nature; a domestic corporation's gross includes income earned by 
every branch or department from all sources, foreign as well as 
domestic.38 Thus, jurisdictionally speaking, a foreign branch's gross, 
like that of a domestic branch, is includible as it is earned, whether 
or not remitted to the home office. 
The second relevant basic tax concept relates only to operations 
conducted through a foreign subsidiary and, generally speaking, in-
volves recognition of it as a taxable entity separate and apart from 
the domestic parent.39 This notion of separateness, coupled with 
""I.R.C., § 6r. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432 (1918). 
39 This basically stems from I.R.C., §II. The concept of separateness here exceeds 
even that applied to a parent and subsidiary in a wholly domestic setting. Contrary to 
the case in the latter circumstance, a parent may not file a consolidated return with a 
foreign subsidiary. I.R.C., § I 504 (b) ( 3). Nor is the 85% dividends received deduction 
allowed. I.R.C., § 243. The one circumstance where the corporate form of a foreign 
corporation is penetrated involves foreign personal holding companies the "undis-
tributed foreign personal holding company income" of which may be taxed to Ameri-
can shareholders even though not distributed. 
TAXATION 463 
the third basic concept-another jurisdictional principle to the ef-
fect that a foreign corporation itself is taxable by the United States 
only on income having its source within the States,40 serves in our 
situation to immunize the foreign subsidiary itself from American 
taxation. However, when the notion that the two corporations are 
separate is coupled with the first mentioned jurisdictional principle, 
the effect will be to swell the domestic parent's own gross by the 
amount of any dividend received from the subsidiary. 
The fourth relevant basic concept involves the matter of account-
ing methods, a much more detailed discussion of which appears later 
in Section B of PART IV. While it is theoretically true, jurisdic-
tionally speaking, that the gross income of a foreign branch is in-
cludible in American gross income, for accounting purposes, i.e., in 
terms of an accounting method, only the branch's separate pre-tax 
net profits-computed according to American standards-need ac-
tually be brought across the ocean in the more usual circumstanceY 
Equally important, but again only as a matter of accounting, com-
putation of those separate net profits may include reflection of any 
shift in the net worth of the branch's current assets by reason of 
changes in exchange rates, though nothing is actually remitted to 
the home office.42 The current asset accounts of a subsidiary, on the 
other hand, are not normally penetrated in this fashion, for it is a 
separate entity.43 
These diverse conceptual patterns can have more than one practi-
cal effect on American u gross" income. 
First, the American gross from a branch operation will nor-
mally exceed the amount which would be included if the foreign op-
eration is conducted through a subsidiary. Even if it is decided that 
a subsidiary will not retain any of its net profits for expansion, the 
dividend which will be included in the parent's gross will relate only 
to that part of the subsidiary's profit which remained after pay-
ment of any foreign income taxes. For example, of a subsidiary's 
pre-tax profit of $4oo,ooo in the Nether lands, only $2 r 2,000 would 
be available for dividends, the balance being absorbed by that coun-
try's 47% income tax. From a branch operation located there, how-
•• I.R.C., § 882(b). 
"O.D. 550, C.B. 2, 61 ( 1920). Also, American Pad & Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304 
(1951), discussed more fully in Section B, PART IV, infra. 
'"Vietor & Achelis v. Salt's Textile Mfg. Co., (D.C. Conn. 1928) 26 F.(2d) 249, 
discussed more fully in Section B, PART IV, infra. 
43 G.C.M. 4954, C.B. VII-2, 293 (1928), cited with approval in American Pad & 
Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304 (1951). Cf. the agreement between the government and 
a taxpayer, reflected in Anderson, Clayton & Co., (Ct. Cl. 1958) r68 F. Supp. 542· 
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ever, the American parent's gross would be enhanced by the branch's 
entire pre-tax profit of $4oo,ooo. 
The ultimate American tax differential in this instance is not as 
great, however, as the difference between the two amounts of Ameri-
can gross income ( $2 I 2,ooo and $4oo,ooo) might suggest. Dis-
cussion in the next subtopic discloses in a branch setting that the 
domestic corporation may treat the foreign income tax of $I88,ooo 
as a deduction from gross income 44 or as a credit against the Ameri-
can tax itself.45 But it is also indicated there that some difference in 
American tax costs will remain even if, under the subsidiary ar-
rangement, all of its after-tax profits are remitted to the parent. 
The exclusion from American gross income of that part of the sub-
sidiary's profit devoted to the foreign income tax is one of the 
contributing factors, for that exclusion is economically equivalent 
to a deduction for the foreign tax. Nevertheless, in addition to that 
exclusion, the parent will enjoy a credit for a part, and in this 
instance a substantial part, of the subsidiary's foreign income tax.46 
In the branch setting, it will be recalled, a choice between the two 
methods of accommodating foreign taxes (deduction and credit) 
had to be madeY 
Going back, however, to the gross income side of the ledger, the 
determination of the amount to be included by the American com-
pany depends, in the case of both forms of operation, on American 
tax concepts, not on those of a foreign country. When applied, how-
ever, this notion gives rise to certain peculiar twists, and whet). com-
mingled with the circumstances where foreign tax law plays a slightly 
different role, it can give rise to a second kind of difference in the 
amount of American gross income, one wholly apart from the dif-
ference attributable to reasons explained in the preceding para-
graphs. 
The basic idea, that the amount to be included in American gross 
income is determined by federal tax concepts, is easy to see in the 
setting of a branch. Theoretically, i.e., at least for jurisdictional 
purposes, all of its transactions are reached at the gross income 
level by § 6 I of the Code.48 Again speaking jurisdictionally, since 
both domestic and foreign operations are housed in one corporate 
.. I.R.C., § 164(a) and (b) (6). 
45 I.R.C., § 901 . 
•• I.R. c., § 902. 
'
7 See note 44, supra • 
.. Since Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 38 S. Ct. 467 ( 1918), it has been 
recognized that American tax statutes have not formally taken gross receipts as the 
point of departure. 
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entity domiciled in the States, after integrating the foreign trans-
actions with domestic ones at the gross income level, deduction for 
expenses on both sides of the water, but only as permitted by Ameri-
can law, would be taken in arriving at a consolidated American 
version of "taxable income." The fact, for accounting purposes, 
that the net profits of a foreign branch are actually computed in the 
usual case separate from those attributable to domestic operations 
means only that integration in fact relates just to the net result, 
not that the latter is computed by reference to something other 
than the American version of "taxable income." 49 
Applicability of this same choice-of-law principle to operations 
housed in a foreign subsidiary is less obvious only because there is 
a difference in the jurisdictional reach of the United States over 
profits earned by the two different forms of operation. Whenever 
a foreign subsidiary does distribute property to its American parent, 
thus bringing the item within the taxing jurisdiction of the United 
States, the extent to which that item will be deemed a "dividend" 
and, therefore, includible in the parent's gross income, depends-
according to § 3 16 of the Code-upon the distributing foreign cor-
poration's "earnings and profits" structure calculated by reference 
to federal rules.50 Illustratively, if a foreign corporation distrib-
utes an amount greater than its earnings and profits as computed 
under foreign tax law, the entire amount of the distribution may 
still be treated as a taxable dividend, fully includible in American 
gross income, if the total amount could be accommodated under 
the American version of that foreign corporation's "earnings and 
profits." 51 But one should not suppose from this that the shape 
of foreign tax law will never affect the amount of American gross 
income. Suppose that the foreign country imposes a 52% corporate 
tax, but that it allows less by way of deductions than would be 
permitted under American law. Since the foreign corporation will 
normally not distribute more than its after-tax profit, foreign 
tax law has had the indirect effect of reducing American gross 
income, for the latter will not include more than the amount of 
dividend actually paid. In a branch setting, however, the differen-
tial just noted would not affect American gross income, though, as 
•• The fact that a foreign branch's operations will usually be conducted in terms of 
a foreign currency does create problems in computing taxable income which are pe-
culiar to foreign operations. But these too are resolved according to American tax 
concepts. See Part IV, infra. 
50 Untermyer v. Comm'r, (2d Cir. 1932) 59 F. (2d) 1004. For the general definition 
of "earnings and profits," see I.T. Regs., § 1.312-6. 
61 Ibid 
466 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
we shall later see, the credit allowed for foreign taxes may be 
affected in both cases. 
The factual situation at the other extreme, i.e., where all profits 
of the foreign operation are to be retained there to discharge in-
debtedness or facilitate expansion, highlights the difference in 
America's taxing jurisdiction and dramatizes the third and most 
striking practical difference in the amounts of American gross 
income which would be derived from the two different methods 
of operation. While the parent would still have $4oo,ooo in gross 
income from a branch-the remission of profits being a neutral con-
sideration, the absence of a dividend in the setting of a subsidiary 
would immunize its foreign profits from the American tax. Some-
thing more than mere deferral for a short period may be involved, 
for dedication of those profits to machinery, bricks, and mortar 
may well mean that those profits are isolated from the reach of 
the American treasury for the entire period during which business 
will be conducted through that subsidiary, though increased profits 
generated by the expansion may lead to larger dividends in the 
interim. 
The opportunity through a foreign subsidiary arrangement to 
isolate foreign earnings from the domestic parent's gross income 
and, therefore, from American tax is most advantageous in a 
country with a tax pattern like that of Belgium. The total Belgian 
and American income taxes suffered by the profits of a permanent 
establishment in Belgium will equal the effective rate of that coun-
try which imposes the greater tax, here the 52% figure, imposed 
by the United States which will then give a credit for the smaller 
Belgian tax. A foreign subsidiary which derived its entire income 
from Belgian sources could, on the other hand, retain more than 
70% of its earnings for further development, suffering only Belgian 
income taxes of less than 30% during the retention period. The 
retained profit would also be sheltered from the American penalty 
tax on unreasonable accumulations; 52 since the foreign profit has not 
yet taken on the complexion of American gross income, it could 
not be "accumulated taxable income" to which this U.S. surcharge 
relates. And this would be so even if the profit were deposited in 
an American bank, provided the foreign subsidiary made the de-
posit without declaring a dividend to the parent. Nor, according 
to the discussion in PART I, do any of the Common Market 
countries have a counterpart penalty tax on unreasonable accumu-
.. I.R.C., § 53 r et seq. 
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lations. Section C of that PART did indicate, however, that Ger-
many's regular corporate income tax imposed a much higher rate 
on a subsidiary's retained profits than on its distributed profits, the 
rate on the former usually being higher than that imposed on a 
branch operation. 
Any advantage enjoyed by a subsidiary arrangement over a 
permanent establishment solely because of the opportunity of 
the former to store up profits free of the American tax necessarily 
becomes less significant as the foreign rate on undistributed profits 
begins to approximate the American rate. Illustratively, if one 
considers only stated comparative rates, the flat 47% Netherlands 
rate on the retained profits of a subsidiary domiciled there is not 
markedly different from the 52% American rate which, being 
the greater of the two, would create a higher, though only slightly 
higher, tax cost for a permanent establishment. The flat so% 
French rate on retained profits is an even more persuasive illustra-
tion of the same principle. 
Going back to the first factual situation, i.e., where all profits 
were currently remitted, it will be recalled that the two forms 
would create different amounts of American gross income only 
because that portion of a subsidiary's profits used by it to pay 
foreign income taxes would not come within the jurisdictional 
reach of the United States, it being otherwise in the case of a 
branch operation. From this principle emerges a fourth practical 
difference in the amounts of American gross income which would 
be derived from the two forms of operation. This fourth difference 
is attributable to the fact that the tax pattern used by a Common 
Market country with reference to permanent establishments may 
differ from that associated with subsidiary arrangements. In both 
cases, the Netherlands imposes only one 4 7% tax. Belgium, how-
ever, again illustrates the effect of a variable tax pattern. A 
Belgian subsidiary distributing all of its after-tax profits would 
suffer a 20% National Crisis Tax on the gross dividend. Whereas 
the foreign subsidiary itself would suffer the more demanding 
30% effective rate of the Taxe Professionnelle only with respect 
to that part of its profits used to pay the lower zo% National 
Crisis Tax, the higher rate of the Taxe Professionnelle would apply 
to the entire income of a permanent establishment. Even in the 
absence of this variation, there would, of course, be a difference 
in the amount of American gross income created by the two 
different forms; as previously noted, that portion of a subsidiary's 
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profits used to pay its own foreign income taxes is not includible 
by the parent, the opposite being true in the case of a branch. 
This constant difference is further affected in degree, however, 
by the variation in the tax imposed directly on the two forms by 
the foreign country. Even so, one should not jump merrily to the 
conclusion that the total Belgian income tax associated with a 
subsidiary arrangement is actually less than that associated with 
a branch in the instance where all profits are distributed. In fact, 
as we saw in Section B supra, the contrary is true. Again assuming a 
foreign pre-tax profit of $4oo,ooo, in addition to the $85,360 
tax borne by the foreign subsidiary itself, Belgium would also with-
hold 30% of the $314,640 dividend as a tax against the recipient, 
this being another $94,392. While the latter tax will not reduce 
American gross income, it will bring the total Belgian tax on the 
subsidiary arrangement to $179,752, compared with $120,000 
assessed against the permanent establishment. But again, it is 
important to distinguish between the effect of the foreign tax on 
American gross income and its quite different effect on the American 
tax itself. Indeed, as we shall later see, because of the peculiar 
way in which the American credit for foreign taxes works in this 
type of case, the total two-country tax associated with the sub-
sidiary arrangement will be less than that borne by the branch 
operation. 
Loss situations furnish a fifth circumstance in which the amount 
of American gross income will be affected by the organizational 
arrangement. Operating losses suffered by a foreign branch will 
serve immediately to offset income earned by the parent in the 
United States. Integration of this type is not permitted, however, 
where the loss is suffered by a foreign subsidiary. Its affairs may 
not even be integrated with that of the parent on a consolidated 
return. 511 Outside of the Netherlands, a subsidiary's operating 
losses can only be used to offset its own income in future years 
through resort to foreign carry-over provisions. As indicated in 
PART I, all Common Market nations permit such a carry-over. 
The usual limitation is 5 years, though Luxembourg confines 
the privilege to 2 years, and the Netherlands extends it to 6 years 
and to an indefinite period in the case of new businesses. The 
Netherlands is also the only member nation which permits the 
loss to be carried back, a refund being available through an offset 
53 1.R.C., §1504(b)(3)· 
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of income of an earlier year. This privilege is limited, however, 
to the year immediately preceding the loss year. 
Also with respect to loss operations abroad, differences in the 
effect of the two forms may arise in the event a foreign facility 
which started as a loss operation continues downhill to a point 
where the American company decides to rid itself of the under-
taking. The character which the Internal Revenue Code would 
assign to losses arising from disposition of a foreign permanent 
establishment's assets would depend upon the exact nature of each 
separate asset.54 Illustratively, inventory losses would offset or-
dinary income realized by the American company from its United 
States operations. Losses from the sale of depreciable equipment 
or buildings might also be treated in this favorable fashion; under 
§ I 23 I, it would seem that these should be packaged with like 
transactions growing out of American operations, and if the net 
effect of all such transactions is a loss, the foreign dispositions 
are not treated as sales or exchanges of capital assets.55 
On the other hand, loss arising from an American company's 
sale of stock in a foreign subsidiary would normally be treated 
as a capital loss, deductible only against the parent's capital gains, 
if any. 56 The one prime exception to this involves the case where 
the stock of an almost wholly owned foreign subsidiary becomes 
completely worthless, in which case the American domiciled parent 
corporation will usually enjoy an ordinary loss deduction in the 
year the stock became worthless. 57 Partial worthlessness, i.e., a 
mere reduction in value below the parent company's adjusted basis, 
cannot, however, be so treated even though realized by a sale of 
the stock. Absent complete worthlessness of the parent's stock, 
the same unfavorable capital loss treatment would follow if the 
foreign subsidiary first sold its assets and then, on liquidation, 
distributed proceeds to the parent in an amount less than the 
latter's adjusted basis.58 Of course, as is sometimes attempted in 
wholly American settings, an effort might be made to liquidate the 
subsidiary prior to disposition of its assets, the thought being 
that those assets would then be sold by the American parent while 
64 This principle goes back to Williams v. McGowan, (zd Cir. 1945) 152 F. (zd) 570. 
65 While the Service has generally recognized that the profits of a branch are to be 
computed separately (see note 41 supra), it is doubtful that it intended, or is free, to 
disregard the mandate of § 1231 in determining the character of income. 
58 I.R.C., §§ I22I and IZI I (a). 
57 I.R.C., § r65(g). 
08 I.R.C., §§ 331 (a) (r) and rzzr. 
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the foreign facility occupies its new status as a permanent establish-
ment. The aim of the parent corporation, to shift what would 
have been a capital loss on sale of stock to the more favorable 
treatment which might be accorded a loss on sale of inventory and 
§ 123 !-property, will not be realized, however, if the added tax 
benefit constituted one of the principal purposes behind the sub-
sidiary's earlier liquidation.59 
If current operating losses are incurred by facilities in the 
United States rather than those in a foreign country, a foreign 
branch's profit, if any, will serve immediately to reduce the loss, 
for it must be integrated into the parent's gross income whether 
or not remitted to this country. But a foreign subsidiary's profit 
will not be integrated so as to offset a part of the operational loss 
in the United States unless it is paid out as a dividend. Using the 
previous illustration of a $400,000 pre-tax profit in the Netherlands 
as an example, a dividend of the subsidiary's after-tax profit of 
$2 I 2 ,ooo would neutralize that much loss in United States op-
erations. While a branch's entire profit of $4oo,ooo would be 
integrated with the American loss, election to deduct the foreign 
income tax of $I88,ooo would lead to a result similar to that which 
followed a subsidiary's distribution of its after-tax profit of $2 I 2,-
ooo. In both cases, losses attributable to the American operation 
would be offset by a net of $2 I 2,ooo. 
(c) Origin of the "deduction" for foreign taxes, and the 
difference in its applicability to subsidiary and permanent-estab-
lishment operations.-The first income tax act passed pursuant 
to the Sixteenth Amendment authorized corporations, but not in-
dividuals, to deduct from gross income taxes "imposed by the 
government of any foreign country." 60 
While something more than foreign income taxes was accom-
modated by this provision, income itself was not thereby confined, 
even in terms of ultimate effect, to taxability by but one country. 
The effect on a corporation which conducted its affairs abroad 
through a permanent establishment was to shift the economic 
burden of foreign income taxes to the federal treasury only to 
59 I.R.C., § 367. 
60 Rev. Act of 1913, Section II, G(b) (Fourth). Like provision for individuals was 
made in Rev. Act of 1916, § s(a) (Third). The present counterpart of the early pro-
vision makes it clear that the deduction would also be available to a corporation in 
the case of taxes imposed by foreign states, provinces, or local units of government 
except where assessed against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of 
the property assessed. I.R.C., § 164(a) and (b) (5). 
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the extent of the corporation's effective domestic rate. Illustratively, 
the highest rate imposed on corporations prior to World War I 
was 2%.61 The over-all ultimate effect then was that a domestic 
corporation, operating a foreign permanent establishment, actu-
ally had to bear all of the American tax load plus 98% of the 
direct taxes imposed by the foreign country. While this was not 
very critical at a time when corporate rates were so low, in the 
following sub-topic we shall see that Congress was to view the 
adequacy of the deduction in a different light as the world moved 
into the higher tax rates required by World War I. 
Where an American corporation chose to operate abroad through 
a foreign subsidiary, it could, of course, deduct any withholding 
tax which the foreign country might impose directly on the parent 
with reference to dividends received from the subsidiary.62 But, 
unlike domestic corporations which housed foreign operations 
in a permanent establishment, the American parent could not de-
duct foreign taxes imposed directly on its subsidiary. Like other 
deductions, this particular deduction then, as now, was generally 
available only to the person or entity upon whom the expense was 
directly imposed.63 As a practical matter, however, it must be 
remembered that the subsidiary would normally confine distribu-
tions to those profits which remained after payment of its own 
foreign taxes. In effect, and contrary to the circumstance in the 
setting of a permanent establishment, that portion of the sub-
sidiary's profits absorbed by foreign taxes was actually excluded 
from American gross income. And this exclusion, available only 
in the case of operations conducted through a foreign subsidiary, 
was just as beneficial as the deduction to which the permanent-
establishment arrangement was then confined. Thus, in terms of 
over-all effect, the deduction provision did not actually discriminate 
against foreign subsidiary arrangements. In fact, insofar as one 
looked only at America's total response to foreign taxes, parity 
between the two different organizational arrangements had been 
achieved as this country approached World War I. 
(d) Parity retained: Denial of a deduction for inter-
corporate dividends received from a foreign corporation.-Ameri-
61 Rev. Act of 1916, § 10. 
6!l It is not always easy to determine whether a dividend tax is imposed on the 
recipient or on the distributor. Illustrative of the difficulty, see Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B. 
1956-1, 321 • 
.. Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 573 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938); Ritter Lumber Co., 30 B.T.A. 
231 (1934); Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B. 1956-1, 321; and I.T. 2235, C.B. IV-2, 82 (1925). 
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ca's entry into World War I and the concurrent increase in rates 
was accompanied by elimination of the double domestic tax which 
fell on those corporate profits earned by domestic subsidiaries.64 
Until I 9 r 7, profits on which a domestic subsidiary had paid a tax 
were again taxed when received as a dividend by the domestic 
parent. The provision adopted in that year, freeing intercorporate 
dividends from the second tax, is now characterized as the 8 5% 
dividends received deduction, meaning that 15% of such dividends 
will not now enjoy immunity at the dividend stage.65 However, 
care was taken then, 66 as now,67 to deny this benefit to dividends re-
ceived from a foreign subsidiary, the reason being that the latter, 
unlike a domestic subsidiary, was not itself taxed by the United 
States with reference to its foreign profits. Looking at the matter 
only in terms of domestic taxation, the double tax difficulty did 
not exist in such case. 
In the instance where a foreign subsidiary distributed all of its 
after-tax profits as a dividend, the foregoing statutory limitation 
served to keep the American tax on a par with that which would 
fall on a permanent-establishment arrangement. The deduction 
which the latter enjoyed with respect to foreign taxes was matched 
by an exclusion of that part of the subsidiary's profits devoted to 
foreign taxes. 
(e) Parity eliminated: Origin and differences between the 
"direct" and ((deemed-paid" credits, and their basic relationship 
to the deduction for foreign taxes.-Because of increased costs 
associated with the conduct of vVorld War I, to a new regular 
corporate rate of 12% in 1918,68 the government tacked on an 
increase in the tax on excess profits, the first bracket of which was 
now subjected to a rate of 30%.69 
On the one hand, because of the deduction allowed for foreign 
taxes, the higher rate schedule meant that the United States 
Treasury would be assuming an increased share of a corporation's 
own foreign tax load. But this was small comfort when account 
was taken of the fact that foreign countries were also tacking 
on much higher war profits taxes, a substantial part of which-in 
"'Rev. Act of 1917, § 4· 
65 I.R.C., § 243. 
""Rev. Act of 1917, § 4 limited the immunity to dividends received from a corpora-
tion "which is taxable upon its net income as provided in this title .... " 
"'I.R.C., § 243 limits the deduction to dividends received from a "domestic" cor-
poration. 
68 Rev. Act of 1918, § 23o(a). 
"'Ibid., § 301 (a). 
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spite of the deduction-had to be borne by the American enter~ 
prise. It was in response to this circumstance that Congress, in 
19 r 8, authorized corporations, as well as individuals, to take a 
credit against their American tax liability for foreign "income, 
war profits, and excess profits taxes" paid or accrued during the 
taxable year.70 
While the new provision did not deprive taxpayers of the right 
to deduct from gross income any foreign tax which, because of 
its type, was ineligible for the credit, benefits with reference to 
qualifying types could not be doubled by also taking the previously 
permitted deduction.71 In fact, the present counterpart of the 
earliest prohibition prevents a taxpayer from availing himself 
of the deduction with reference to qualifying taxes if he "chooses 
to take to any extent the benefits" of the credit.72 While more 
will be said of this matter later, in practice the limitation means 
that taxpayers will deduct qualifying taxes, instead of taking a 
credit, only where they are interested in increasing the amount of 
a current net operating loss which can be carried back for Im-
mediate refund purposes. 
Standing alone, the basic provisiOn regarding the credit did 
not accommodate all of the foreign income taxes which might 
be imposed in connection with a foreign subsidiary arrangement. 
Contrary to the case where the foreign business was carried on 
through a permanent establishment, foreign income taxes im-
posed directly against a subsidiary itself were not taxes, qua taxes, 
against the American parent. Accordingly, the latter, by reference 
only to the basic provision, could have taken a credit only for 
such income taxes, if any, which the foreign government might have 
assessed, and withheld, against the parent in connection with divi-
dend payments. In 1918, however, the Senate Finance Committee 
was also concerned with a second and quite different problem, the 
tentative resolution of which ultimately had an effect on the right 
of a parent to enjoy some credit for a foreign subsidiary's own 
income taxes. 
That committee felt that affiliated corporations, even those 
engaged only in domestic activities, were not properly allocating 
the burdens and benefits of inter-company transactions. Moreover, 
it was thought that the then existing law "put an almost irresistible 
70 Rev. Act of 1918, § 238. See also Section C, PART V, infra re individuals. H. Rep. 
No. 767, 65th Cong., zd Sess. II ( 1918). Italics added. 
71 Rev. Act of 1918, §234(a)(3). 
72 I.R.C., § 164(b) (6). Italics added. 
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premium on a segregation or a separate incorporation of activities 
which would normally be carried as branches of one concern." 73 
Over and above these considerations, it was also felt that "the 
principle of taxing as a business unit what in reality is a business 
unit is sound and equitable and convenient to the taxpayer and to 
the Government." 74 The proposed solution: to require affiliated 
corporations to file a consolidated return under regulations pre-
scribed by the Treasury.75 Since this would have the effect of con-
verting a subsidiary into a branch for American tax purposes, as 
applied to a domestic parent and a foreign subsidiary it was only 
right that the same Committee went on to propose allowance of a 
full credit against the consolidated tax for any qualifying foreign 
taxes of the subsidiary 76 as well as of the parent. Because of this 
credit, though American gross income would have included the 
pre-tax profit of the foreign subsidiary, a further deduction against 
consolidated gross income for qualifying foreign taxes was to be 
prohibited. 77 
For unstated reasons, a conference committee eliminated the 
consolidated return requirement as it related to foreign affiliates,78 
thus freeing that part of a foreign subsidiary's income sourced 
abroad from the reach of the Treasury except to the extent such 
was distributed as a dividend to the parent. But with some revision, 
the committee retained and the Congress adopted the provision 
which authorized the American parent, upon receipt of a dividend, 
to take some credit for qualifying foreign taxes paid by the foreign 
subsidiary.79 This result was accomplished by saying that the par-
ent would be "deemed" to have paid such taxes. 
While that early statute did go on expressly to deny a deduction 
for those same taxes, 80 it completely ignored the fact that elimina-
tion of the consolidated return requirement, of which the pass-
through arrangement as to foreign taxes was originally only a 
part, had the effect of enabling the parties to exclude from American 
gross income that part of the subsidiary's profits used to pay the 
foreign taxes. Thus, if the foreign subsidiary distributed its entire 
'"S. Rep. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 8-9 (1918). 
,. I d. at 9· 
10 See the Senate's version of H.R. 12863, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918), § 240, later 
adopted in Rev. Act of 1918, § 240-
78 Ibid., Senate's bill, § 24o(c). 
77 Id., §234(a)(3). 
78 H. Rep. No. 1037, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919), C.B. 1939-1 (Part 2) 130 at 143· 
711 Ibid. Revenue Act of 1918, § 24o(c). 
80 Rev. Act of 1918, § 234(a) (3). 
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after-tax profit, exclusion from American gross income of that 
part of its profits used to pay its own taxes was the economic 
equivalent of a deduction for those taxes. Moreover, in this factual 
circumstance, the added benefit of the "deemed paid" credit-under 
the provision as originally enacted-apparently related to all of 
the subsidiary's qualifying taxes, subject to one limitation not 
relevant to the present discussion.81 And this was so though that 
part of its profits used to pay the foreign tax was not itself being 
taxed by the United States. Three years later, however, the 
language of the earlier credit provision was changed; under the 
1921 Act, as today, the parent, upon receipt of a dividend, was 
deemed to have paid only that proportion of the qualifying taxes 
as were paid by the subsidiary "upon or with respect to the ac-
cumulated profits of such foreign corporation from which such 
dividends were paid, which the amount of such dividends bears to 
the amount of such accumulated profits .... " 82 
While a very substantial controversy arose thereafter as to the 
reason for this change, and over the question of whether a mean-
ingful change had in fact taken place, the Supreme Court finally 
decided that the law had taken on a new complexion.83 Illus-
tratively, suppose that out of its pre-tax profits of $ 10o,ooo for 
the current year, a foreign subsidiary paid $26,ooo in income 
taxes to a Common Market country, remitting the balance of 
$74,000 to an American parent as a dividend. The American 
Chicle Co. case 84 decided that the pre-dividend "accumulated 
profits" in this situation would amount only to $74,000 with the 
consequence that the fraction mentioned in the statute's propor-
. $74 000 I twnal formula, quoted supra, was$ ' or-. By the same token, 
74,000 I 
the ultimate statutory multiplicand to which this fraction was to 
be applied ("taxes paid by such foreign corporation ..... upon 
or with respect to the accumulated profits from which such divi-
dends were paid") 85 amounted to $26,ooo X $74'000 or $19,240. 
$1oo,ooo 
81 
I d., § 24o(c). See the discussion in American Chicle Co. v. U.S., 316 U.S. 450, 62 
S. Ct. 1144 (1942). 
""Rev. Act of 1921, §238(e), now I.R.C., §902(a). 
83 
One of the difficulties, e.g., was the fact that an explanation on the Senate floor 
was opposite to the specific result which the Supreme Court reached. See statement of 
Senator Smoot, 61 Cong. Rec. 7184 (1921). 
"'This example is similar to one used in the lower court's decision American Chicle 
Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 537, but the result was affirm:d in 316 U.S. 450, 
62 S. Ct. 1144 (1942). 
""Italics added. 
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In other words, $6,760 or 26% of the subsidiary's own income 
tax was paid to the foreign country with respect to something other 
than its "accumulated profits" of $74,000. Specifically, the $6,760 
was linked to that part of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits which 
was absorbed by the foreign tax itself ( $26,ooo). Two countries 
were not, of course, taxing that part; of the $100,000 taxed by the 
foreign country, only $74,000 (the dividend) remained tube taxed 
by the United States. 
Thus, out of the chronology previously related emerged two 
basic ideas which prevail to this day: 
( 1) Time-wise, whereas the permanent-establishment arrange-
ment enables an American corporation to take a direct credit for 
a branch's qualifying foreign taxes in the year the foreign tax is 
paid or accrued and without regard to the matter of remittances 
to the States, the availability of the quite different "deemed-
paid" credit to an American parent of a foreign subsidiary was 
linked to the former's receipt of a dividend; and 
( 2) Using the earlier example again as an illustration, 
whereas a permanent-establishment arrangement would have led 
to an American gross income of $ 10o,ooo with the American 
corporation having a choice between a credit or deduction in 
the amount of the full foreign tax of $26,ooo, the subsidiary 
arrangement gave rise to an exclusion of that same $26,ooo, 
leaving American gross income (a dividend) of $74,000-the 
American tax on which could also be credited with $19,240 or 
74% of the foreign tax which, in its entirety, had been the sub-
ject of the previously mentioned exclusion. 
While it was assumed in the latter illustration that the foreign 
tax was the same under the two arrangements ( $26,ooo), the net 
effect of the foregoing developments on the American tax created 
a difference in the two settings, and because of this the combined 
foreign and domestic income taxes suffered by the two arrange-
ments differed. Assuming a flat 52% American rate, the net Ameri-
can tax in the setting of a permanent-establishment arrangement 
would also be $26,ooo ($10o,ooo X 52% less the direct credit 
for foreign taxes of $26,ooo), and this, coupled with the foreign 
tax of $26,ooo, resulted in combined foreign and domestic taxes 
of $52,000. Where a permanent establishment is used, the com-
bined income taxes will always be 52% in that instance where 
the foreign tax is less than the American tax. 
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A different result is reached, however, in the case of a foreign 
subsidiary which has declared a dividend of all of its after-tax 
profits. Pursuing the original illustration further, the net American 
tax would be only $19,240 ($74,000 dividend X 52%= $38,480 
less the deemed-paid credit of $19,240) as against $26,ooo in the 
permanent-establishment setting. The combined taxes of the two 
countries with reference to the subsidiary's profits and subsequent 
dividend would then be only $45,240 or 87% of that suffered if a 
permanent establishment were used. 
It will be noted that the effective foreign rate in our illustration 
( 26%) was exactly half the American rate (52%). Assuming a 
subsidiary distributes all of its after-tax profits, this particular 
rate relationship represents that point where the subsidiary ar-
rangement will have the greatest tax advantage over the permanent-
establishment setting. The tax advantage of the former arrange-
ment decreases in the assumed situation (full dividend) as that 
rate relationship is changed, up or down. 
If the foreign country does not resort to income taxation at all, 
the effective rate being o, the subsidiary type of organization 
will provide no advantage whatever over a branch arrangement-
assuming again that the subsidiary distributes all of its profits as 
a dividend ( $ IOo,ooo dividend X 52% = $5 2,000 less o deemed-
paid credit). Indeed, pursuant to that same assumption of full 
dividends and laying aside for the moment any comparison to per-
manent establishments, the combined income taxes of the two 
countries on a subsidiary arrangement will be less if the foreign 
country imposes some income tax than if it imposes none at all, 
provided only that its tax is not as great as the tentative (pre-
credit) American tax. 
This startling result stems from the fact that the foreign income 
tax enjoys the equivalent of a deduction (exclusion) as well as 
some credit. 
Returning to the comparison with permanent establishments, and 
to the fact that the subsidiary's advantage during a period of full 
dividends will also be reduced as the foreign country's effective rate 
moves from the mid-point ( 26%) to the other extreme correspond-
ing to the American rate of 52%, it will be noted that a foreign 
tax of 52% will alone equal the combined tax in the setting of a 
permanent establishment, $5 2,ooo. The American tax on a sub-
sidiary's dividend will also be completely neutralized in such case 
( $48,ooo dividend X 52% = $24,960 less a deemed-paid credit of 
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$24,960 computed as follows: $5 2,ooo X $4S,ooo = $24,960). 
$roo,ooo 
The ultimate advantage which the foreign subsidiary type of 
arrangement may enjoy over a branch-the exact degree being 
dependent upon the foreign rate and attributable to the combined 
exclusion and credit allowed for that foreign tax, would be lost, 
of course, if dividends received by an American parent from such a 
subsidiary were "grossed up" by the amount of the foreign income 
tax, full credit for that tax then being allowed as in the case of a 
branch. Present congressional interest in such a "gross up" re-
quirement is dealt with in Section B of PART VI, infra, in the 
setting of other projections regarding possible future changes in 
both foreign and American tax patterns. 
While it appears under the present pattern that the advantage 
of the subsidiary in a period of full dividends gradually decreases 
as the effective rate of the foreign tax moves up or down from a 
mid-point fixed at exactly half of the American rate, equally 
important are two other correlative principles. 
The first of these is most dramatically illustrated in that cir-
cumstance where a subsidiary retains all of its after-tax profits 
in order to discharge long term liabilities or facilitate expansion. 
The deemed-paid credit, since linked to dividends, will not presently 
be available; but neither will there be any American gross income. 
The total current tax liability will be determined solely by ref-
erence to the effective foreign rate. 
In terms of current tax liability, the subsidiary's advantage over 
a permanent establishment increases in the last assumed situation 
(no dividends) as the foreign rate moves downward from 52%. 
In the setting of our original illustration of a 26% foreign rate, 
the current combined tax load on the subsidiary arrangement would 
be just half of that amount suffered by the permanent-establish-
ment arrangement. 
The difference in the amount of advantage enjoyed by the sub-
sidiary arrangement in the absence of dividends, and that enjoyed 
by it even where all after-tax profits are distributed, is whittled 
down if the subsidiary distributes even a part of its after-tax profits, 
retaining the balance. Illustratively, if it distributes half of its after-
tax profits of $74,000, the numerator of the previously quoted 
statutory fraction governing the deemed-paid credit becomes 
. b . $37 ooo dividend 
$37,ooo, the fractiOn then emg $ ' 1 d fi or 74,000 accumu ate pro ts 




or $19,240) which remains unchanged, the deemed-
IOo,ooo 
paid credit allowed with reference to the $37,000 dividend turns 
out to be $9,620 ($I 9, 240 X Y2) which is set off against the 
tentative American tax liability of $19,240 ($37,ooo X sz%), 
producing a net American tax of $9,620 ($19,240 tentative tax 
less deemed-paid credit of $9,620). This, together with the for-
eign tax of $26,ooo, results in a combined current tax for the sub-
sidiary arrangement of $35,620 compared with $52,000 which 
would be assessed in the setting of a permanent establishment. 
The second important correlative principle, discussed more 
fully in the next subtopic, has the effect, inter alia, of foreclosing 
the chance that the credit for foreign taxes might neutralize Ameri-
can tax liability on income which the parent corporation derives 
from sources within the United States. Thus the combined taxes 
can be greater than 52% if the effective foreign rate exceeds the 
effective American rate. 
(f) The per-country limitation.-It was in 1921 that Con-
gress first acted to prevent credits for foreign taxes from off-
setting any part of one's tax attributable to income earned within 
the States.86 While that provision, known as the "over-all" limita-
tion, was later discarded and then revived in 1960, a complementary 
and in some respects more confining ceiling, first enacted in 1932 87 
and characterized as the per-country limitation, has remained intact 
since its inception.88 Its general thrust is to the effect that the total 
credit claimed for qualifying taxes paid or accrued to a particular 
country should not exceed the amount of tax which the United States 
would impose, before credits, on income having its source in that 
foreign country. 
That part of the provision's limiting fraction which is most likely 
to be applied to the taxpayer's pre-credit American tax, the aim 
being to fix a ceiling on the total direct and deemed-paid credits 
otherwise available for taxes paid or accrued to a particular coun-
try, reads as follows: 
"Taxable income from sources within such country" 89 
"Entire taxable income for the same taxable year" 
80 Rev. Act of 1921, §238{a). 
87 Rev. Act of 1932, §131(b). 
88 I.R. c., § 904· 
89 The limiting fraction can never be more than I, for the provision adds, in the 
case of the numerator, that it may never exceed the "taxpayer's entire taxable in-
come," and this latter figure will always correspond to the denominator. 
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This fraction has three main features, the first of which is a 
direction to the effect that the numerator and the denominator 
be determined solely by reference to American tax concepts, for-
eign tax notions being irrelevant. One such concept, expressed quite 
clearly in both elements of the fraction, involves the term "taxable 
. " mcome. 
The requirement, that the computation of this limiting fraction 
be guided exclusively by the American concept of "taxable income," 
comes into play only in calculating the final ceiling on credits, 
and must not be confused with certain other less demanding ideas 
which bear on initial computation of the credit-a matter governed 
by quite different provisions of the Code. Illustratively, one of 
these other provisions is to the effect that a credit will not nor-
mally be allowed in the first instance with respect to any foreign 
tax other than "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes." 
As is later more fully explained in Subsection 4, here too American 
ideas will be used in determining whether a given foreign tax 
measures up to the characterization, "income tax," but in this 
instance the test may be satisfied though the foreign levy does not 
conform precisely 'to American notions regarding gross income 
and deductions. Again, assuming this more general standard is 
satisfied in a given case, the entire amount of foreign income taxes 
paid or accrued may actually enjoy the credit though the foreign 
income tax law allowed more by way of deductions or did reach 
some items of income sourced there which the United States ex-
empted or subsumed under a nonrecognition provision.90 In other 
words, with respect to the credit, it is only after the initial computa-
tion, i.e., when one reaches the limiting fraction of the per-country 
limitation, that the American notion of "taxable income," and its 
precise standards regarding gross income, deductions, exemptions, 
nonrecognition provisions, etc., can affect the amount of the credit, 
and then only by way of establishing the ceiling.91 In the end, 
00 But in practice it has not always been so. A 1936 decision, Hubbard v. United 
States, (Ct. CJ. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 93, cert. denied, 300 U.S. 666, 57 S. Ct. 508 ( 1937), 
was to the opposite effect insofar as the foreign tax was attributable to an item which 
would not have been subject to taxation by the United States. But Helvering v. Nell, 
(4th Cir. 1944) 139 F.(2d) 865, and I. B. Dexter, 47 B.T.A. 285 (1942), acq., C.B. 
1948-2, 1, took a contrary view. And this was adopted for a time by the government 
in G.C.M., 25723, C.B. 1948-2, I3J. Its subsequent modification of that ruling, in 
G.C.M. 26062, C.B. 1949-2, no, was abandoned, however, in Rev. Rul. 54-15, C.B. 
1954-1, 129, on the basis of the Tax Court's decision in James H. Brace, II T.C.M. 
906 (1932). 
91 However, in the case of individuals, estates, and trusts, I.R.C., § 904(b) provides 
that no allowances for personal exemptions can be taken under I.R.C., §§ 151 or 642(b). 
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however, this calculation may turn out to have been in vain, for 
the initially computed credit will stand as the final credit if the 
foreign tax actually paid or accrued turns out to be less than the 
per-country limitation. An illustrative case is one where the amount 
of the foreign tax paid or accrued equalled an effective rate of, 
say, 40%-as determined by reference to American notions of 
taxable income, with the effective rate in the States being higher. 
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the ceiling itself could be 
o. Illustrative would be a case where the foreign operation would 
have operated at a loss except for an income item which, while 
taxed abroad, would be in an exempt class in the United States. 
In this event, the numerator of the limiting fraction would be 
o, with the consequence that the fraction would become o. 
A second American tax concept relates only to the numerator 
of the limiting fraction and is implied from the interdependent 
structure of the Code; it is to the effect that American rules of 
jurisdiction will be employed for the purpose of determining that 
part of the taxpayer's taxable income which will be deemed to have 
its "source" in the particular foreign country.92 For example, prior 
thereto, it was possible that the United States and the foreign 
country would each claim to be the source of the profit made on an 
exported item. While the United States looked to the place where 
title passed in resolving this question, 93 other countries sometimes 
used a different test. And in that event, because of the applicability 
of American standards, it was possible that the numerator of the 
limiting fraction would be o, thus foreclosing the opportunity to 
take a credit for the foreign tax. 94 The importance of this feature, 
in the case of those doing business with five Common Market coun-
tries with which the United States has a tax treaty, has been some-
what reduced by the adoption of those treaties. Pursuant to the 
tax treaties, the five Common Market countries have agreed to 
forego any tax on an American corporation's export profit except 
in the instance where that corporation is engaged in a trade or 
business through a permanent establishment situated in the foreign 
country in question. 95 
In the setting of a foreign-subsidiary arrangement, the two 
92 In effect, I.R.C., § 904 incorporates the source rules of Subchapter N, particularly 
§§ 862 and 863. 
93 U.S. v. Balanovski, (2d Cir. 1956) 236 F.(2d) 298, cert. den., 352 U.S. 968, 77 
S. Ct. 357 ( 1957) ; Comm'r v. East Coast Oil Co., S.A., (5th Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 322; 
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 6o8, 57 S. Ct. 234 ( 1936) . 
.. Burk Brothers, 20 B.T.A. 657 ( 1930). 
"" See PART II, supra. 
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American tax concepts incorporated in the numerator of the limit-
ing fraction ("taxable income" from the foreign country, and the 
domestic rules fixing the source) will have one effect which can 
be easily overlooked as applied to the credit for foreign taxes paid 
on dividends. The Code provisions fixing the source of income in 
a foreign country deal first with the matter of gross income.96 
They then go on to provide that from such gross income, in ar-
riving at "taxable income" from the foreign source, there shall be 
deducted the expenses, etc., "properly apportioned or allocated 
thereto, and a ratable part of any expenses, losses or other deduc-
tions which cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of 
gross income." 97 The Tax Court has insisted that a part of the 
general administrative expenses of the parent corporation must 
be allocated to the dividend in arriving at the numerator of the 
fraction, and in this it has been affirmed on appeal. 98 
Since foreign taxes normally will have been paid with a part 
of the foreign currency received in the course of operations abroad, 
questions relating to timing, as it affects the initial determination 
of income and credits for both cash receipts and accrual taxpayers, 
are considered, together with the conversion problem, in PART 
IV, infra. It should be noted here, however, that the per-country 
limitation creates a separate timing problem. The numerator and 
the denominator are calculated by reference to the accounting 
period used for federal tax purposes, and the limiting fraction is 
then applied to the credit for foreign taxes properly paid or ac-
crued within that period. Because variation between the United 
States and the foreign country with respect to the matter of timing 
could, inter alia, lead the per-country limitation to spring into 
operation where it would not otherwise do so, three steps at the 
federal level have been taken. 
The first involved congressional action; cash basis taxpayers 
were allowed to elect the accrual method for purposes of the 
credit, thus in general permitting such taxpayers to link the credit 
to the year foreign taxable income was earned.99 
The second step was accomplished by administrative action; a 
ruling was designed so as to accommodate the situation where the 
96 I.R.C., § 862(a). 
91 I.R.C., § 862 (b). Italics added . 
.. International Standard Electric Corporation, I T.C. 1153 (1943), aff'd, (2d Cir. 
1944) 144 F.(2d) 487, cert. den., 323 U.S. 803, 65 S. Ct. 56o (1945); South Porto Rico 
Sugar Co., 2 T.C. 738 ( 1943 ). 
00 Rev. Act of 1924, §§ 238(c) and 222(c), now I.R.C., § 905(a). See PART IV, 
Section E, infra. 
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foreign tax was based on a fiscal year different from that of the 
American tax. In such case, those properly using the accrual method 
were permitted to accrue on a pro rata basis the foreign income 
tax for a particular foreign-tax year, allocating that tax between 
the two American tax years in which the foreign year fell. 100 
There were still other timing matters which created fluctuations 
of a type prejudicial to a taxpayer because of the way the per-
country limitation worked. Illustratively, for federal purposes, the 
taxpayer might have elected to report sales on the installment basis 
though such method was not permitted by the foreign government. 
Again, differences between the two countries in inventory practices 
or in depreciation methods could in effect lead to differences in the 
year in which profits would be reflected. The same difficulty could 
be encountered in connection with the fact that only the Nether-
lands permits a carry-back of net operating losses, and even that 
carry-back does not coincide in point of years with the practice 
followed in the United States. As indicated in PART I, most Com-
mon Market countries permit only a carry-over. 
Problems such as these led a congressional committee in 1958 
to conclude as follows : 
Double taxation can occur at present because of the 
manner in which this country-by-country limitation works 
where the methods of reporting income are different in 
the United States and the foreign country. These differ-
ences may result in the same income being reported in one 
year in the United States and in another year in the for-
eign country. When this occurs the foreign tax credit avail-
able will tend to be less than the taxes paid or accrued to 
the foreign country in the year the income is reported in 
that country but not in the United States. In another year 
when this income is reported in the United States but not 
the foreign country, the credit which would be available 
under the limitation will tend to exceed the foreign taxes 
paid or accrued.101 
It was for the asserted purpose of cushioning the impact of 
these difficulties that the committee induced Congress to adopt a 
new provision permitting a carry-back and carry-over of such 
portion of a foreign country's income tax as may exceed the ceil-
100 I.T. 4033, C.B. 1950-2, 52. 
101 
H. Rep. No. 775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1957), C.B. 1958-3, 8n at 837. The Com-
mittee also mentioned differences in fiscal years as an operating difficulty. On the one 
hand, it may have been questioning the vitality of the ruling in note 100, supra, or it 
may have been referring to cash basis taxpayers with respect to whom that ruling is 
inapplicable. 
484 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
ing fixed by the per-country limitation. The excess may be carried 
back successively to the 2 prior years and then forward to the 
5 succeeding years, being used in those years-provided election 
is made to take a credit rather than a deduction-to the extent 
the foreign taxes for such years are less than the amount allowable 
under the country-by-country limitation.102 Carry-backs to years be-
ginning before January r, 1958, are not permitted, however. 
This carry-back and carry-forward was about as attractive as 
any cushion Congress might have provided with respect to an 
American company of the type assumed here, namely, one which 
established a facility in, and suffered the income tax of, only one 
foreign country. In fact, even before the adoption of this cushion, 
in cases where the total foreign effort involved only one foreign 
country, the effect of the per-country limitation was similar to that 
associated with the older, but for a time discarded, overall limitation. 
It was only where the American company, directly or indirectly, 
suffered income taxes of two or more foreign countries that a 
difference could arise with respect to the two types of limitation. The 
overall limitation quite generally permitted taxes of two or more 
foreign countries to be averaged, thus leveling out the highs and 
lows and making it less likely that the effective foreign rate would 
exceed the American rate. The discussion infra, in Sections E, F, 
and G of this PART, indicates that the same was and is true, 
oddly enough, with reference to multi-country operations carried 
on by certain organizational forms which come under the per-
country limitation. That this is not so, however, with respect to 
other forms, and because one limitation is not consistently more 
advantageous than the other, furnished the reasons for the determi-
nation by Congress in 1960 to allow any domestic taxpayer to elect 
to submit its foreign tax credit to an "overall" limitation, rather 
than to the per-country limitation. Since such a shift will actually 
be meaningful only where the American taxpayer's foreign opera-
tions spread across two or more foreign countries, the newly revived 
alternative overall limitation will be discussed later in connection 
with such settings, in Sections E, F, and G, infra. 
SUBSECTION 2. INTEGRATING AMERICAN AND COMMON 
MARKET DIRECT TAXES RE PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENTS AND SUBSIDIARIES 
(a) Introductory note: need for caution ·in assessing com-
parative data.-Section A of this PART indicated the reasons why 
'""Tech. Amendments Act of 1958, § 37, now I.R.C., § 904(c). 
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one should not place too much stress on comparative data which 
can be presented in this kind of study regarding direct tax loads 
imposed by Common Market countries. For those reasons, as 
well as others, like caution is essential with reference to comparisons 
of the integrated direct tax costs, American and foreign, of doing 
business abroad. Assumptions previously made in looking only at 
foreign tax costs, including a specific set of facts, must also be 
availed of here. In addition, because the Internal Revenue Service 
has not published rulings identifying all of those Common Market 
taxes which will be deemed to satisfy the American credit pro-
visions, some assumptions, based on analogy, must also be made 
with reference to this question. 
The comparisons below deal first with the integrated direct 
tax costs incurred by an American corporation which conducts 
its foreign activity through a permanent establishment. The same 
comparison is then made in the setting of a foreign subsidiary 
arrangement. The story concludes with a comparison between 
these two arrangements. 
As in Section B of this PART, it is assumed that the American 
company has only one foreign facility which earned $4oo,ooo 
(before direct taxes) on an investment of $4,ooo,ooo. To fa-
cilitate comparison, it has again been necessary to assume that the 
Common Market countries and the United States would follow 
identical concepts with respect to income and deductions in ar-
riving at the $400,000 in pre-direct tax profit. 
(b) Comparing integrated direct tax costs in the setting 
of a permanent establishment.-Since the income of a foreign 
permanent establishment is included in that of the American cor-
poration whether or not remitted, the effective rate in the United 
States will always fix the minimum integrated direct tax cost of 
this kind of an arrangement. Normally, the total direct tax costs 
would actually exceed this in only two circumstances. 
The first involves that situation where the effective foreign 
income tax rate, calculated as a percentage of the pre-direct tax 
profit of $4oo,ooo, exceeds the effective American rate expressed 
in terms of that same base, in which instance the American tax 
would be completely neutralized by the direct credit which is al-
lowed. 
The second instance where foreign direct taxes may in effect es-
tablish the minimum borne by a permanent establishment involves 
those foreign countries which, in addition to an income tax, impose 
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other types of direct taxes which will not qualify for the American 
credit, being only deductible for U.S. tax purposes. In other words, 
the effective American tax rate fixes only the minimum income tax 
burden; other types of foreign direct taxes which do not qualify 
for the credit will constitute an additional direct tax burden to 
the extent not absorbed by the American treasury as a result of 
the deduction which presumably would be allowed under § I 64 in 
arriving at the American tax base. 
Only if the assumed permanent establishment is situated in 
Germany are both of these circumstances likely to be encountered. 
That both will arise in that setting rests on the two-country effect 
of Germany's three primary taxes, as follows: 
(I) On the one hand, because the three-factor German 
enterprise tax is deductible from the pre-direct tax profit of 
$4oo,ooo in arriving at the amount subject to the regular Ger-
man income tax rate of 49%, the effective rate of the latter, 
as applied to the pre-direct tax profit, is considerably less than 
49%; 
( 2) On the other hand, the profit factor of that three-factor 
enterprise tax is itself an income tax, 103 and more than offsets 
the deductible effect of the whole, thus increasing the effective 
rate of the two-pronged German income tax, as applied to the 
$4oo,ooo, almost to 52% ; and 
( 3) While the other two factors of the three-factor German 
enterprise tax and the separate German 1% net wealth tax 
serve as additions to the final two-country income tax load, they 
also serve as deductions from the $4oo,ooo in arriving at the 
American tax base to which the stated 52% is applied/04 the 
effect being to reduce the effective American rate to a point below 
52% of the $4oo,ooo pre-direct tax profit and below the per-
centage absorbed by the two-pronged German income tax (the 
regular and the profit factor of the enterprise tax). 
As a consequence of the foregoing, the total two-country in-
come tax load is determined by the German pattern, to which must 
be added its net wealth tax and two factors of its enterprise tax, 
leaving less than 33% of the $4oo,ooo remaining after direct 
taxes. 
If the setting is shifted to Luxembourg, that portion of the 
100 See discussion infra, Subsection 4 (d) of this Section. 
'"'Germany's 1% net wealth tax is not deductible, however, in computing that 
country's own income tax base as applied to the permanent establishment. 
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$4oo,ooo absorbed by the American income tax would not be 
exceeded by Luxembourg's two-pronged income tax (regular and 
profit factor of its enterprise tax). And this is so though the non-
profit factors of the latter's enterprise tax and its net wealth tax 
would be deducted from the $4oo,ooo in arriving at the American 
tax base. 105 However, in calculating the total integrated or two-
country direct tax costs, to the effective American rate which fixes 
the minimum income tax load, one must add the two Luxembourg 
direct taxes which fail to satisfy the credit, specifically, the non-
profit factors of the enterprise tax and the net wealth tax, pro-
ducing total integrated direct taxes equaling approximately 57% 
of the $4oo,ooo. 
Presumably, Italy's property tax would also fail to satisfy 
the American credit though it could be deducted from the $4oo,ooo 
in arriving at the American income tax base. In effect, that portion 
not absorbed by the United States treasury through the deduction 
would constitute an additional direct tax burden, for the effective 
American income tax rate would fix only the minimum income tax 
load. The total integrated direct tax costs of the assumed permanent 
establishment, if located in Italy, would then approximate ss% 
of the $4oo,ooo. 
If the foreign permanent establishment is just a sales office, 
the peculiar incidence of property taxes in the three countries 
mentioned above will be markedly reduced or perhaps completely 
eliminated. In the latter event, only the two-pronged German in-
come tax rate schedule is likely to exceed the American rate and 
fix the ultimate total direct tax burden. 
According to the earlier country-by-country survey and the com-
parisons in Section B, supra, the other three member nations, 
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, do not impose significant 
property taxes, and since their effective income tax rates (3o%, 
so%, and 47%, respectively) do not exceed the effective American 
rate, the latter will equal the amount of the integrated direct tax 
costs. :-·T 
(c) Comparing integrated direct tax costs of fore.ign sub-
sidiaries which retain all profits for expansion.-If a foreign 
subsidiary retains all of its after-tax profits in order to facilitate 
expansion or discharge indebtedness, the integrated direct tax 
lOIS Since the profit factor of the Luxembourg enterprise tax is quite similar to that 
in Germany, it is assumed that the Service would consider the profit factor as an 
income tax for purposes of the credit. Cf. Rev. Rul. 59-208, C.B. 1959-1, 192. 
48 8 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
costs will be confined to foreign taxes. In the absence of a dividend, 
the subsidiary's profits will not be included in those of the American 
parent; nor will the latter currently enjoy the deemed-paid credit 
with reference to the subsidiary's own income tax. 
A comparison of the foreign direct taxes which would be im-
posed in this setting, if the facts were like those just assumed in 
the setting of permanent establishments, appears in Section B, 















(d) Comparing integrated direct tax costs of subsidiary 
arrangements where all after-tax profits are distributed.-ln the 
situation discussed above, where a foreign subsidiary retained all 
after-tax profits, Belgium provided the locale where the lowest 
total direct tax costs would be encountered. Subject to one caveat, 
that locale will retain its favorable position even through a later 
period when the subsidiary has matured to a point that all current 
after-tax profits are to be distributed. In contrast to the inter-
country comparisons drawn above, those drawn below with re-
spect to this later stage require an integration of American tax 
costs with the foreign direct tax costs. The isolated significance 
of this will be more discernible and distinctions between the two 
stages in the life-line of a subsidiary will also be more obvious if 
one indulges in the same assumptions here as there, including the 
fact that the subsidiary earns $4oo,ooo in pre-tax profits on 
property worth $4,ooo,ooo.106 
The caveat mentioned earlier with respect to Belgium relates 
to an assumption, which must be made in the absence of a published 
ruling, to the effect that the Belgian withholding tax on dividends 
will be deemed, for purposes of the direct credit provision in the 
Code, to be an assessment against the American parent. 
A combination of two factors continue to favor Belgium: 
( 1 ) According to earlier discussion, an income tax is the 
only really significant direct tax imposed against the subsidiary 
itself, and its effective rate ( 21.34%) comes close to that point 
,. Disregarded also is the fact that administrative overhead of the parent must 
be apportioned in part to the dividend, in computing the per-country limitation on the 
credit. See Subsection I, supra, and Subsection 3, infra. 
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( 26%) where the greatest benefit is reaped from the combined 
deemed-paid credit and exclusion enjoyed by the American parent 
with regard to that amount which the subsidiary devoted to 
foreign income taxes; and 
( 2) While Belgium imposes an even larger withholding rate 
( 30%) against dividends ( 7 8.66% of pre-tax profits), the 
direct credit which presumably would he allowed with respect 
to this entire tax will, when coupled with the deemed-paid credit 
for the subsidiary's tax, approximate the tentative (pre-credit) 
52% tax which the United States would impose on the dividend 
(78.66% of pre-tax profits).107 
As a consequence of the two foregoing considerations, total 
Belgian taxes, approximating 4 5% 108 of pre-tax profits, will come 
very close to being the total direct tax load in our assumed factual 
situation. 
The importance of the first of the two foregoing considerations 
is illustrated by the fact that while the two Belgian income taxes, 
approximating 45% of pre-tax profits, are almost as great as the 
single 4 7% which the Netherlands would impose directly on the 
subsidiary in lieu of any withholding tax against the parent for 
dividends received, the integrated direct tax cost of doing business 
through subsidiaries in the two locales would actually differ by a 
slightly greater amount, provided it be assumed that the same in-
come and deduction concepts prevail in America as well as in those 
two foreign countries. The 47% imposed by the Netherlands comes 
close to one of the extremes (52%) where the combined exclusion 
and deemed-paid credit for foreign income taxes yields the least 
benefit. In fact, after taking the deemed-paid credit, an American 
tax equal to more than 2Y:!% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profit 
will remain, producing an integrated tax which absorbs almost so% 
of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits.109 
France, the third and last country which, for all practical pur-
poses, confines its direct taxes to those on income, would provide 
a less favorable locale, taxwise, than the Netherlands. 
107 Since the dividend is 78.66% of pre-tax profits, the tentative Amercan tax at 52% 
would be 40.9% of the subsdiary's pre-tax profits against which a total credit of 
40.38% of pre-tax profits could be taken. 
108 To the tax on the subsidiary (21.34% of pre-tax profits), one must add the with-
holding tax of 30% on the dividend (30% X 78.66 of pre-tax profits), being another 
23.6% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits. 
'""The American tentative tax (52% X 53% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits) of 
27.56% of pre-tax profits would be offset by a deemed-paid credit (47% X 
53% of pre-tax profits 
IOo% ) equal to 24.9% of pre-tax profits 
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While the deemed-paid credit for the so% tax which the former 
would impose on the subsidiary, when coupled with the direct 
credit for the I 5% withholding tax on dividends, 110 would wipe 
out the American tax liability, the two French taxes-standing 
alone-would absorb around 57% of the subsidiary's pre-tax 
profits.U1 
While Italy ranked next to Belgium in providing a favorable 
direct tax climate during the period when the subsidiary retained 
all of its profits, during a later period of full distribution one 
ultimate consideration serves to eliminate the gap which existed 
in the earlier non-distributive stage between Italy and the then 
lower-ranking Netherlands, the two now being almost side by 
side. Whereas the percentage of pre-tax profits absorbed by 
integrated direct taxes in a Netherlands setting changed very little 
between the two stages, integrated costs associated with an Italian 
subsidiary will increase during the second or distributive stage 
by an amount approximating 7% of pre-tax profits. Responsibility 
for this fairly substantial increase can be traced ultimately to the 
addition of an American tax which will not be completely offset 
by credits even though American income taxes, approximating 
29% of the subsidiary's pre-direct tax profits, 112 will actually be 
less than the total Italian direct taxes of 44.67% of pre-tax profits. 
This ultimate result is in turn traceable to two limitations on 
the credit enjoyed by the American parent: 
(I) While the Italian direct tax costs ( 44.67% of pre-tax 
profits) will remain constant through the two periods, that 
portion attributable to the Italian property tax (equal to 7·5% 
of pre-tax profits) cannot be credited against the American 
tax (approximately 29% of pre-tax profits) of 52% on a dividend 
which equaled 55 ·33% of pre-tax profits; 
( 2) Since Italy does not split its income tax assessments 
between a corporate tax and a withholding tax on dividends, 
imposing just the former, the deemed-paid credit only will be 
applied in offsetting the U.S. tentative tax on the dividend. As 
a consequence, the whole of the Italian income tax (37.17% of 
pre-tax profits) 113 will not actually serve as a credit against 
110 As in the earlier case of Belgium, it is again assumed that this tax will ultimately 
also be deemed a tax against the parent, not against the subsidiary. 
111 A xs% withholding tax on a dividend equal to so% of pre-tax profits is equal 
to a tax on 7.5% of pre-tax profits. 
112 52% on a dividend equal to 55·33% of the subsidiary's pre-tax profits equals 
28.77% of pre-tax profits. 
112 It is assumed that the Italian ex!'ess profits tax will also ultimately qualify for 
the credit. 
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the American income tax, for the deemed-paid credit is limited 
to that portion of the Italian income tax which was actually 
paid with respect to the distributed profit. The net effect: the 
deemed-paid credit 114 will not even neutralize the whole of the 
52% which the U.S. will impose on dividends. 
Luxembourg and Germany, ranking, respectively, fifth and sixth 
during both stages in terms of tax attractiveness, provided account 
is taken of integrated direct tax costs, would share one problem 
encountered by Italy were it not for a compensating consideration. 
Both levy certain significant direct taxes which will not qualify 
for purposes of the credit allowed against the American income 
tax on the ultimate dividend. Nevertheless, in the case of sub-
sidiaries located in those two countries, the total U.S. tax will be 
completely offset by credits. In part, this is due to the fact that, 
unlike Italy, both also levy a rs% withholding tax on dividends 
which, presumably, is fully creditable, dollar for dollar. The rela-
tively high direct tax costs associated with subsidiary arrangements 
in Luxembourg and Germany during a period of full distributions 
is traceable then to their own direct taxes which, according to the 
earlier discussion in Section B, would absorb, respectively, 58.9% 
and 6o. r% of pre-tax profits. These figures may be compared with 
integrated direct tax costs during this stage of approximately 45% 
of pre-tax profits in the case of a subsidiary located in Belgium, 
of approximately so% in Italy and the Netherlands, and of 57% 
where France is the locale. 
In conclusion, it must again be emphasized that the total inte-
grated direct tax costs could change substantially if the subsidiary 
does not own substantial property; in that event, the integrated 
tax problems growing out of the foreign property tax imposed 
by three member nations would be eliminated. 
(e) Comparing integrated direct tax costs of subsidiary 
arrangements where 40% of after-tax profits are distributed.-
The circumstance where a foreign subsidiary distributes 40% of 
its after-tax profits obviously falls between the two previously dis-
cussed situations involving subsidiaries which ( 1) retained all, 
and ( 2) distributed all, current after-tax profits. 
In terms of integrated direct tax costs, all countries but two 
retain the relative rankings maintained in the previously discussed 
m The deemed-paid credit would appear to be only 22.24 o/o of pre-tax profits 
(37.I7o/o X ~-33% o/t ). For the purposes of this formula, the term accumulated 
IOO 0- 7·5 0 
profits would only be 92.5% of pre-direct-tax profits of $4oo,ooo: the other 7-5%· 
represents non-qua Jifying property taxes. 
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stage (full distribution) with reference to tax attractiveness. Italy 
and the Nether lands "swap" places, the former regaining by a 
margin of less than r% the position it held during the first stage 
(no distribution), as the second most favorable locale tax-wise. 
In the case of every country, however, the integrated direct tax 
cost in this third stage falls in between that which would follow 
where all profits are retained and where full distribution is made. 
This is another way of also saying that the factors discussed in 
the previous sub-topic are also at work in this third stage, though 
to a lesser degree. And in this third stage, the integrated direct 
tax costs run from approximately 34% of pre-tax profits where 
the subsidiary is situated in Belgium 115 to 67% where the locale 
is Germany, 116 the Netherlands falling closest to the mid-point at 
48%.117 
(f) Conclusion: Com paring a subsidiary-arrangement's in-
tegrated tax costs in all three stages with that of a permanent es-
tablishment.-As previously indicated, the integrated or two-
country direct tax costs of a permanent establishment would remain 
constant during all three stages, i.e., without regard to whether 
foreign profits are actually remitted. Table III L compares those 
costs with the approximate integrated direct taxes which would 
be encountered in all three stages of a subsidiary arrangement 
provided one indulges in the assumptions previously made. 
115 Since the subsidiary's own Belgian tax is 24.9% of pre-tax profits, a dividend 
equal to 40% of the balance will run to 30.04% of pre-tax profits, and on the latter 
figure a 30% Belgian withholding tax will absorb another 9% of pre-tax profits. The 
U.S. tentative tax (sz% X 30.04% of pre-tax profits= 15.62% of pre-tax profits) 
will be easily neutralized by the total of direct and deemed-paid credits, leaving the 
total Belgian tax of 33.9% as final tax cost. 
116 The German direct taxes on the subsidiary itself ( 64.89% of pre-tax profits) 
leaves a dividend (4o% of the balance) of 14.044% of pre-tax profits out of which 
the 15% withholding tax will absorb 2.1% of pre-tax profits, resulting in a total Ger-
man tax of 67% of pre-tax profits. The U.S. tentative tax of 7·302% of pre-tax profits 
( szo/o X 14.044%) will be neutralized by the total direct and deemed-paid credits 
even though a part of the German direct tax was other than an income tax. 
111 The Netherlands tax on the subsidiary (47%) leaves a dividend (40% of the 
remaining profits) of 21.2% of pre-tax profits on which the U.S. tentative tax (52% 
X 21.2%) would equal n.oz% of pre-tax profits. The deemed-paid credit would 
fall a little short of neutralizing that tentative tax, being only 9.964 o/o of pre-tax 
profits. 
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TABLE III L 
Permanent 
Establish-
Locale ment Subsidiary Arrangement 
40% of 
After- All-After-
tax Prof- tax Prof-
All Profits its Dis- its Dis-
Retained tributed tributed 
Belgium 52. % 27-5% 33-9% 45-5% 
France 52. % so. % 53· % 57-5% 
Germany 67-4% 70. % 67. % 6o. % 
Italy 55.6% 44·7% 47·3% 51.2% 
Luxembourg 57· % 5!.7% 54-6% ss.9% 
Netherlands 118 52. % 47·% 48.% 49-6% 
SUBSECTION 3· ALLOCATING INCOME AND DEDUCTION 
ITEMS BETWEEN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN 
OPERATIONS 
(a) Introductory note.-Where an American enterprise con-
ducts its foreign activities through a branch, i.e., through a non-
separately incorporated permanent establishment, proper allocation 
of income and deduction items between the two operations is 
essential to the determination of the foreign tax base as well as 
the per-country limitation which has been imposed on the American 
credit for foreign income taxes. Except with reference to the 
latter limitation, the allocation problem in the branch setting is 
not usually as important to American taxation as it is to foreign 
taxation. The reason is attributable to the fact that net profits of 
the foreign branch's operation, whether or not remitted, will 
always be commingled with domestic profits in determining "tax-
able income" for federal income tax purposes.119 This is not so, 
however, where the foreign activity is conducted through a foreign 
subsidiary. In that setting, proper allocation can be just as im-
portant in establishing the tax base of the parent for American 
tax purposes, as it is in fixing the tax base of the subsidiary for 
foreign tax purposes. Here, too, the problem can affect the credit 
118 For a description of changes which would take place in the Netherlands' tax 
structure pursuant to a bill now pending, see PART VI, Section A, infra. 
110 See PART IV, Section B for the accounting aspects. 
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for foreign taxes. Indeed, it could ultimately even affect the parent 
company's basis for stock held in the foreign subsidiary. 
Because the problems are slightly different in the two settings, 
and because there is some variation in the basic legal data through 
which the interested countries have sought to police the matter, 
the discussion below deals separately with branch and subsidiary 
arrangements. 
(b) A /location between American operations and non-
separately incorporated foreign permanent establishments.-In the 
case of a foreign branch, the integrity of the per-country limitation 
on the American credit for foreign income taxes can be preserved 
only if the United States has the power to assure proper allocation 
of income and deductions between the domestic operation and 
that of the branch. One of the statutory provisions to which it can 
look is a sweeping catchall, for its allocation principles apply alike 
to divided operations which are wholly domestic, to those which 
are wholly foreign but split between two or more countries, as well 
as to operations partly domestic and partly foreign. Its earliest 
counterpart was inspired to a substantial degree, however, by re-
lated domestic and foreign operations actually conducted through 
a subsidiary rather than through a branch. In 1921, a congressional 
committee called attention to a practice designed to minimize the 
amount of income which would be subject to American rates, noting: 
Subsidiary corporations, particularly foreign subsidi-
aries, are sometimes employed to "milk" the parent cor-
poration, or otherwise improperly manipulate the financial 
accounts of the parent company.120 
The congressional enactment which followed, 121 to the effect that 
the Commissioner could re-allocate income and deductions between 
"related trades or businesses" in order to reflect the true circum-
stances, was the forerunner of § 482 of the present Code. Today, 
the Commissioner's power to effect a re-allocation is said to exist 
whether or not the two trades or businesses are separately incor-
porated and whether they are organized in the United States or 
abroad. The power extends to gross income, deductions, credits, 
and other allowances, provided such re-allocation is necessary "in 
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income 
of any of such organizations, trades or businesses." 122 
Complementing the foregoing wholesale type of provision are 
""'H. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., xst Sess. 14 ( 1921 ). 
'
21 Rev. Act of 1921, § 24o(d). 
122 I.R.C., § 482. 
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three sections of the code, §§ 861, 862, and 863, which-absent 
a superseding treaty-fix the source of income, identifying whether 
an item will be treated as domestic or foreign. On the income side, 
two of those sections deal with items which are allocated exclusively 
to one country or the other.123 Both then go on to provide that ex-
penses and other deductions shall be attributed to the income items 
on the same basis; in addition, however, there must be a proper 
apportionment of a "ratable part of any expenses, losses, or other 
deductions which cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class 
of gross income." 124 The third provision, § 863, deals with income 
derived partly from within and partly from without the United 
States, including, e.g., sales abroad of personal property produced 
in the United States. In circumstances where this principle is applied, 
apportionment of expenses and deductions is also required. How-
ever, in the case of simple export arrangements, earlier discussion 
in PART II indicated that this third statutory provision (§ 863) 
was less important with respect to sales in foreign countries with 
which the United States has a tax treaty. By such treaties, the for-
eign countries have abandoned the right to tax an American enter-
prise's export profits except where it maintains a permanent estab-
lishment in the treaty country. Where such an establishment is 
maintained, those treaties would apply an allocation philosophy 
similar to that reflected in the sweeping provision now found in the 
previously mentioned § 482 of the Code. 
Illustrative is the treaty with Belgium, which provides that "there 
shall be attributed to such permanent establishment the net indus-
trial and commercial profit which it might be expected to derive if 
it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar 
activities under the same or similar conditions." 125 Unlike the other 
treaties, that provision-like certain rulings of the Service-goes 
on expressly to require such net profit to "be determined on the 
basis of separate accounts pertaining to such establishment." The 
Belgian and French treaties, though not those with other member 
nations, also add what would otherwise seem to be the case in any 
event, namely, that the competent authority of a particular taxing 
state may rectify such accounts, if need be, in order to reflect the 
apportionment principle described above.126 This recognition, that 
each state may make its own interpretation of the way the appor-
123 I.R.C., §§ 861 and 862. 
l.lUoJ.R.C., §§861(b) and 862(b), interpreted in G.C.M. 7592, C.B. IX-1, 213. 
lll5 Art. IV ( 1). Accord, Art. III ( 3) of the German and Italian treaties, and Art. 
III (z) of the Netherlands treaty. Cf. Art. 4 of the French treaty. 
108 Belgian treaty, Art. IV(2); French treaty, Art. 4-
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tionment principle applies to a given case, is theoretically cushioned 
by four of the treaties which expressly recognize the right of com-
petent authorities in both countries to "lay down rules by agreement 
for the apportionment of industrial or commercial profits." 127 
While the basic allocation provision in the treaties generally deals 
with net profits, three of the treaties add an express comment witli 
regard to deductions. For example, the Belgian treaty authorizes a 
permanent establishment to avail itself of deductions "wherever 
incurred, insofar as they are reasonably allocable to the permanent 
establishment, including executive and general administrative ex-
penses so allocable." 128 
(c) A !location between an American corporation and its 
foreign subsidiary.-ln the case of a foreign subsidiary which con-
ducts all of its activity in one member nation, an allocation problem 
generally arises only in connection with inter-company transactions 
and dividends. A 1959 case, decided by the Tax Court, is illustrative 
of the former. There an American enterprise sought to deflect the 
great bulk of its profit on foreign sales to its foreign sales subsidiary. 
The latter was billed at a price which enabled it to enjoy 90% of the 
total profit whereas sales through independent commission agents 
were handled on a 20% commission basis. The Commissioner's 
power to re-allocate under the previously discussed § 482 of the 
Code was sustained.129 
Now, in the case of related corporations, tax treaties with five of 
the six member nations include language very much like that found 
in the earliest counterpart to § 482. For example, the Belgian 
treaty provides that if the parent company, "by reason of its par-
ticipation in the management or financial structure" of a Belgian 
corporation "makes with or imposes on the latter enterprise, in 
their financial or commercial relations, conditions different from 
those which would be made with an independent enterprise, any 
profits which, but for those conditions, would have accrued to one 
of the enterprises may be included in the taxable profits of that 
enterprise subject to applicable measures of appeal." 130 The Amer-
'
27 The quotation is from the German treaty, Art. III ( 5). Only the French treaty 
lacks a provision to this effect. Italics added. 
128 Art. IV(4). Also, German treaty, Art. III(4), and Italian treaty, Art. III(s). 
Italics added. 
""Jesse E. Hall, Sr., 32 T.C. 390(1959). For a different kind of example, see Asiatic 
Petroleum Corporation, Ltd. v. Comm'r, (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. {2d), 234, cert. denied, 
296 U.S. 645, 56 S. Ct. 248 (1935). 
,.. Art. V. Cf. the allocation language in Revenue Act of 1921, § 1331 (b); French 
treaty, Art. s; and Art. IV of the German, Italian, and Netherlands treaties. 
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ican regulation construing that provision notes that its obvious pur-
pose is to achieve "tax parity with uncontrolled" enterprises, and 
adds that the previously described § 482 of the Code will be fol-
lowed in effecting the implementation.131 
A slightly different kind of allocation problem arises in connection 
with dividends received by the parent. As noted elsewhere, by refer-
ence solely to American law, a proper portion of the parent's 
general administrative or overhead expenses must be allocated to 
the dividend in determining the amount of "taxable income" derived 
by the parent from the subsidiary.132 
SUBSECTION 4· SPECIAL PROBLEMS RE CREDIT FOR FOREIGN 
TAXES OF A FACILITY SERVING ONE MEMBER 
NATION 
(a) Introductory note.-The more frequently recurring 
mathematical aspects of the American credit for those foreign taxes 
suffered by a facility serving only one Common Market country were 
dealt with in Subsection I, supra. Within this same limited setting, 
the discussion below focuses attention on certain special substantive 
and procedural problems which may be encountered in connection 
with the credit. Following a description of the treatment accorded 
"delayed" distributions received by a parent from a foreign sub-
sidiary, the discussion shifts to the fact that the deemed-paid credit 
will generally be available only where the payment received is in the 
nature of a "dividend." Thereafter, a quite different overall restric-
tion, generally limiting both direct and deemed-paid credits to for-
eign "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes," is considered. 
This Subsection then concludes with a description of the require-
ments relating to the procedure to be followed in claiming a credit. 
(b) ((Delayed" distributions from accumulated earnings 
and profits.-Directors who declare a dividend just before the close 
of a taxable year normally contemplate that they are distributing 
profits of that year. But such a declaration might also be made in 
a loss year; the directors of a foreign subsidiary may have been un-
willing to "pass" a regular dividend date because of the expectations 
of certain foreigners who held some shares in the American enter-
prise's foreign subsidiary. Dividends are also frequently declared 
131 T.D. 616o, § 504.106. 
132 International Standard Electric Corporation, I T.C. II53 (1943), aff'd., (2d Cir. 
1944) 144 F. (2d) 4&7, cert. denied, 323 U.S. &o3, 65 S. Ct. 560 (1945); South Porto 
Rico Sugar Co., 2 T.C. 738 ( 1943 ). 
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in the early part of one year, it being contemplated that the distribu-
tion was of the preceding year's profits. 
In circumstances such as these, for purposes of the deemed-paid 
credit it is necessary to determine which year's profit will be deemed 
to have been distributed. Only then is it possible to identify which 
year's foreign taxes are to be credited against the American tax 
liability on the dividend. 
The enactment of the deemed-paid credit in 1918 was followed 
shortly thereafter by delegation of power to the Treasury to resolve 
this question of timing in each case, subject to two important limita-
tions.133 This same arrangement prevails today.134 
The first limitation is to the effect that dividends paid within the 
first 6o days of any taxable year are to be treated by the Secretary 
of the Treasury as having been paid from the accumulated profits 
of the preceding year or years "unless to his satisfaction shown 
otherwise. . . . " 135 In all other respects, according to the second 
limitation, dividends are to be treated as having been paid from the 
"most recently" accumulated profits. This latter rule means that 
dividends declared in December 1960 in an amount exceeding the 
profits of I 960 will normally be deemed, to the extent of the excess, 
to have been paid first from profits of I 9 59, if any, and to the extent 
not absorbed by the accumulated profits of that year, then from 
those of 1958, etc. And to the extent the declaration was deemed 
to be from I 9 58 profits, the deemed-paid credit allowed at the time 
of the dividend in I96o will normally relate to foreign taxes paid by 
the subsidiary on the 1958 profits. As a consequence, the deemed-
paid credit attributable to the 1960 dividend could require separate 
computations with respect to the subsidiary's foreign taxes for I960, 
1959, 1958, etc., in order to determine for each of those years, 
pursuant to § 90I, what portion of each particular year's tax was 
paid on the profit actually distributed.136 In other words, to each of 
those years one first must separately apply the formula previously 
discussed in Subsection I, supra, reading as follows: 
Share of I96o Dividend 
. . Attributable to Profits of 
Foreign. ~ax Paid a Particular year 
by Subsidiary for X =--.-----~--
a Particular Year Entire Accumulated . 
133 Rev. Act of 1921, §238(e). 
'"'I.R.C., §902(c). 
Profits of That Particu-
lar Year 
135 The problem of proof is illustrated by P. H. Peavey & Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1932) 
73 Ct. Cl. 6oo, 55 F. (2d) 516. 
136 General Foods Corporation, 4 T.C. 209 (1944). 
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The results from those separate determinations are then aggregated 
for the purpose of determining the deemed-paid credit attributable 
to the I 960 dividend. 137 
It will be recalled also from the earlier discussion in Subsection I, 
supra, that the per-country limitation will require a further compu-
tation. But this will be less complex. Its limited purpose, to prevent 
the credit for a particular foreign country's tax on the distributed 
profit from offsetting American taxes on income derived from 
sources other than that foreign country, does not require the type 
of unscrambling essential to the original computation of the credit. 
The per-country ceiling on the total direct and deemed-paid credit 138 
otherwise ascertained is determined by the same formula used 
where the subsidiary distributes dividends only from current 
profits, 139 namely: 
Total Dividends 
Parent's U.~. From Country Y 
Tax on Entire X P t' E t' T bl I aren s n 1re 
axa e ncome Taxable income 
(c) Extent to which the deemed-paid credit is limited to 
"dividend" situations.-From I 9 I 8 to I 9 54, a deemed-paid credit 
could only be taken upon the receipt of a "dividend." 140 The signif-
icance of this limitation is illustrated by a decision of the Court of 
Claims to the effect that a parent corporation could not take such 
a credit in connection with liquidation distributions received from a 
subsidiary even though the distribution included previously accumu-
lated profits on which the subsidiary had paid substantial foreign 
income taxes. 141 The Code treats such payments as proceeds from 
an "exchange," rather than a dividend.142 And because this is so, the 
parent corporation will usually enjoy the preferential treatment 
accorded capital gains, i.e., a 25% rate on the realized gain/43 
rather than suffer the ordinary tax rate-assumed in this study to 
be 52 %-on the entire proceeds. The Court of Claims, in restricting 
the deemed-paid credit in accordance with the literal language of the 
statute, was comforted by the supposition that Congress could not 
137 Ibid.; Coca-Cola Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1944) 101 Ct. Cl. 729, 55 F. Supp. 616. 
""United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. White, (1st Cir. 1937) 89 F. (zd) 363. 
139 Note 136, supra, acq., C.B. 1946-1, 2; G.C.M. 24823, C.B. 1946-1, 246 revoking 
G.C.M. 20286, C.B. 1938-2, 223. 
""Rev. Act of 1918, § 24o(c), now reflected in I.R.C., § 902(a) through (c). The 
term "dividend" is controlled by the definition in I.R.C., § 316 
,.,Freeport Sulphur Co. v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1958) 163 F. Supp. 648, addendum, (Ct. 
Ct. 1959) 172 F. Supp. 462. 
, •• l.R.C., § 33 I. 
148 This assumes that the corporation is not collapsible. See I.R.C., § 341. 
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have intended to allow both this preferential treatment and a credit 
for foreign taxes.144 
Presumably the deemed-paid credit was not originally extended 
to cover interest payments because of the absence of a double tax 
problem with reference to such payments. Most foreign countries, 
including all Common Market nations, allow a subsidiary to deduct 
interest paid its parent, up to a reasonable amount, in arriving at 
the subsidiary's foreign tax base.145 This is not to say, of course, that 
all member nations also immunize the parent with respect to the 
interest payment it receives. Indeed, in the typical situation, four of 
the six member nations will apply a withholding tax against the 
parent.146 But in this circumstance, the direct credit is allowed,147 
dollar for dollar, subject only to the per-country limitation upon 
total credits attributable to income from the source country. 
In I 9 54, for the first time, Congress did link the deemed-paid 
credit to a type of payment which a foreign subsidiary might be 
able to deduct in computing its own foreign tax base, specifically to 
"property" paid "in the form of royalty or compensation" for 
"property or services . . . furnished" by the parent to the sub-
sidiary.148 
In this instance, however, three conditions, otherwise not appli-
cable to the deemed-paid credit, must be satisfied: 
(I) In contrast to dividend situations where the deemed-paid 
credit is allowed if the domestic corporation owns at least "ro% 
of the voting stock" 149 of the foreign corporation from which it 
received the dividend, here the former must own, directly or in-
directly, "roo% of all outstanding stock" of the subsidiary; 150 
( 2) In contrast to the dividend situation where the deemed-
paid credit is available without regard to the nature of a sub-
'"In any instance where the deemed-paid credit would be more valuable than the 
preferential treatment accorded capital gains, the subsidiary might stagger the dis-
tribution, declaring a large regular dividend before proceeding with liquidation. But 
in such case, care must be taken or the Service may claim that all of the payments fall 
on the liquidation side of the line. 
140 See Section B, supra, and the country-by-country survey in PART I, supra, with 
reference to the French and German limitations. 
146 Ibid. Belgium and France are limited by treaty to 15% (Arts. VIII (A} and 6A, 
respectively}; Germany must exempt such payments (Art. VII); Italy and Luxembourg 
are free to apply their respective national laws (26.32% and so/o, respectively); and 
the Netherlands own law does not normally provide for a tax except where the loan 
is secured by a mortgage on real property. Cf. its treaty provision, Art. VIII. 
147 Unlike the deemed-paid credit, the direct credit is available with respect to any 
income item, so long as the foreign country also exacted a qualifying tax. 
148 l.R.C., §9o2(d). The congressional committee reports say nothing about the 
motive which led to this enactment. 
149 I.R.C., § 902 (a). 
'"'I.R.C., §9oz(d}(1). 
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sidiary's foreign business activity, covering even sales subsidiaries, 
this credit is extended here to the different type of payment only 
if the subsidiary is engaged in "manufacturing, production, or 
mining" ; 151 
(3) Here the property received as royalty or compensation 
must be pursuant to a contractual arrangement which must also 
provide that the payment "shall be accepted in lieu of dividends 
and that such foreign corporation shall neither declare nor pay 
any dividends . . . in any calendar year in which such property 
is paid to" the parent.152 
If these conditions are satisfied, then the property received by 
the parent shall be deemed a "distribution" 153 and ultimately a 
dividend-assuming the foreign subsidiary has adequate earnings 
and profits to pay such 154-to the extent of the difference between 
the value of that distributed and the cost to the parent of the "prop-
erty or services so furnished" to the subsidiary. 
By subsequently agreeing that the expression, "property" re-
ceived, included money, the Internal Revenue Service has made this 
provision much more meaningful.155 The Service has also properly 
called for a slight modification in the formula which is normally 
otherwise used in calculating the amount of the deemed-paid credit. 
The formula typically used, 
. Dividend Foreign Taxes X ..,.......,--,,..,-,---,-~--~--=­
Subsidiary's Accumulated 
Profits Before Foreign Income Taxes, 
contemplates that the denominator of the fraction will include the 
subsidiary's profits for the year before deducting its income, war 
profits, and excess profits taxes. In the case of this new special ar-
rangement, the Service has ruled that the "dividend" portion of the 
royalty or other compensation must be restored to the denominator 
even though, pursuant to foreign tax law, it had been deducted by 
the subsidiary.156 Illustratively, assume that a domestic parent re-
ceived $50 in service fees from a wholly owned foreign subsidiary, 
the full amount having been deducted by the latter for foreign in-
151 Ibid. 
'""I.R.C., § 902 (d) (2) and (3). 
153 Controlled by I.R.C., § 301 except with respect to the amount and basis. 
1
"' See I.R.C., § 316. 
"'"Rev. Rul. 55-312, C.B. 1955-1, 8o. This interpretation rested on the fact that 
§ 902 (d) is expressly made dependent upon I.R.C., § 301 which uses the term "property" 
as defined in I.R.C., § 317· The latter includes "money" in the definition. 
"'"Rev. Rul. 59-71, C.B. 1959-1, 194, relying on the underlying philosophy of Biddle 
v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938), and the fact that, for purposes 
of the new § 902 (d), a portion of the distribution is a "dividend" under American 
law, however it mav be treated by foreign law. 
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come tax purposes, leaving it with $ soo in foreign income on which 
it paid foreign income taxes of $200. The cost to the parent of the 
service extended to the subsidiary amounted to $2. The deemed-paid 
credit would be computed as follows: 
. $48 Dividend 





As indicated in PART II, Section C, supra, subsidiaries in all 
Common Market countries may treat royalties paid a U.S. parent 
-for use of a patent, copyright, etc.-as a deductible business ex-
pense, but only to the extent the royalties are fair in amount and do 
not represent a hidden distribution of profits. One would certainly 
expect this limitation to be policed most carefully in those cases 
where the parent contractually commits itself, as it must under the 
new § 902 (d), to accept the royalty "in lieu of dividends." More-
over, in the unlikely event a subsidiary did succeed in deflecting all 
of its profit to the parent via deductible royalty payments, there 
would be no foreign income tax against which the new § 902 (d) 
deemed-paid credit could be applied. This suggests that the new 
provision will be most useful over the long run in circumstances 
similar to the illustration above, where the subsidiary retained its 
own taxable profits for expansion, only a reasonable royalty having 
been paid to the parent during the taxable year. And in this case, 
again by reference to PART II, Section C, five of the Common Mar-
ket countries are also precluded by treaty from withholding an in-
come tax against the parent for the royalty it receives so long as 
( r) the royalty related to "the right to use copyrights, patents, 
secret processes and formulae, trade marks, and other analagous 
rights," 158 and ( 2) the parent did not maintain a "permanent 
establishment" in the country in question.159 
(d) Required characteristics of a foreign tax if it is to 
qualify for the credit.-The credit for foreign taxes was originally 
confined to foreign "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes." 160 
157 While a part of the parent's overhead entered into the calculation of the $z in 
cost, it may also be necessary, for purposes of the credit, to attribute another part of 
the parent's overhead to the collection of the dividend, in which case the latter would 
be less than $48. Cf. International Standard Electric Corporation v. Comm'r., (zd Cir. 
1944) 144 F. (zd) 487, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 803, 65 S. Ct. 560 ( 1945). 
158 PART II, Section C indicates those instances where coverage differs from this. 
""'PART II, Section C outlines the dispute which exists with reference to this ques-
tion. 
""Rev. Act of 1918, § 238(a)[1], now J.R.C., § 901. 
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In the middle of World War II, at a time when the United States 
had tacked an excess profits tax on to increased regular corporate 
rates, the Senate Finance Committee's attention was called to new 
tax patterns which had been developed in Latin America, this being 
the area to which American foreign trade had then become re-
stricted because of war-time condi tions.161 Several countries in that 
area had encountered difficulty in determining the portion of an 
American enterprise's profit which should be deemed to have its 
source there. In some cases, tax administrators there found it im-
practical to attempt to unravel deductions covering expenses alleged 
to have been incurred in the United States with reference to items 
exported into Latin America. In other instances, the difficulty re-
lated to the proper allocation of profit derived from items exported 
from Latin America to the States. International shipping operations 
also presented difficult allocation problems. Because of these diffi-
culties, some of the Latin American countries substituted more 
simply designed special taxes for the income tax which the enterprise 
would have otherwise borne. While at least some of these levies 
were intended to produce an amount approximately equal to that 
which the Latin American country believed should have been pro-
duced by their income tax in a normal year, the formal character of 
the tax itself departed rather markedly from the typical net income 
tax which had evolved in the States. That formal difference led the 
Internal Revenue Service to deny that the taxpayer was entitled to 
a credit, arguing that American tax concepts controlled the meaning 
of the eligible categories, "income, war profits, and excess profits 
taxes." 162 
The Senate Finance Committee/63 and ultimately the Congress, 
responded to this problem by providing that the eligible category 
would also include "a tax paid in lieu of a tax upon income, war 
profits or excess profits otherwise generally imposed" by any foreign 
country.164 
This latter provision has been said to extend the credit to an 
otherwise ineligible foreign tax only if the foreign country has in 
force a general income tax to which the taxpayer would have been 
subject in the absence of a special immunizing provision.165 More-
'"1 Statement of Mitchell B. Carroll, Hearings, Committee on Finance, nth Cong., 
2d Sess. ( 1942) Vol. r, 206. 
102 E.g., note the government's position in Seatrain Lines, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942), 
and its subsequent nonacquiescence to the decision reached there. C.B. 1942-2, 31. 
163 s. Rep. No. 1631, nth Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48, 131-132 ( 1942). 
'"'Rev. Act of 1942, § 158 (f), now I.R.C., § 903. 
166 l.T. Regs., §1.903-I(a). 
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over, the government insists that the statutory phrase, "a tax paid 
in lieu of" an otherwise eligible tax, means that adoption of the 
former tax must have been the quid pro quo for that freedom which 
the taxpayer received from the otherwise generally applied income 
tax.166 In other words, there must be a link between the two; if the 
taxpayer's freedom from the general income tax was not attributable 
to its payment of a special foreign tax, the in-lieu-of provision will 
not apply. For example, the government denies that the provision 
covers German turnover taxes on royalties received from Germany 
even though such royalties were not subjected to the latter's income 
tax. The denial was grounded on the fact that freedom from the 
foreign income tax grew out of bilateral tax treaties designed to 
prevent double income taxation rather than out of any arrangement 
calling for substitution of a turnover tax.167 
Of more general interest than the in-lieu-of provision with respect 
to the Common Market is the problem of identifying those taxes 
which will be deemed "income taxes" under the original basic provi-
SIOn. 
The courts have not fully agreed on the underlying standard or 
yardstick to be used in determining whether or not a given tax will 
be deemed an income tax. As previously noted, it is, on the one hand, 
definitively settled that American, rather than foreign, income con-
cepts control,168 and as a consequence the typical gross receipts tax 
will usually fall short of the mark.169 For example, as was true of 
the German turnover tax,170 the Service has indicated that the 
French registry tax imposed on the transfer of real estate by refer-
ence to the total purchase price is not eligible for the credit. 171 
At the other extreme, it is also generally recognized that the for-
eign tax need not coincide at all points with our statutory concept. 
For example, there may be some difference with respect to inclu-
sions and deductions.172 Indeed if this were not so, the congressional 
aim in enacting the original credit provision would have been com-
pletely frustrated; all foreign income taxes differ in one degree or 
166 Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, sox. Cf. Campania Embotelladora Coca-Cola, S.A. 
v. U.S., (Ct. Cl. 1956) 139 F. Supp. 953 with Comm'r. v. American Metal Co., (2d Cir. 
1955) 221 F.(2d) 134, cert. den., 350 U.S. 829, 76 S. Ct. 61 (1955). 
181 Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, sox. 
168 Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938). 
169 Guantanamo & Western Railroad Co., 31 T.C. 842 (1959). 
170 See note 167, supra. 
171 Rev. Rul. 56-so7, C.B. 1956-2, 120. However, the tax may be deducted from gross 
income by the person against whom it is imposed. Also, see G.C.M. 8478, C.B. IX-2, 
224 ( 1930) re a special French turnover tax. 
172 Helvering v. Campbell, (4th Cir. x944) 139 F. (zd) 865; LT. 4074, C.B. 1952-1, 87. 
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another from the American statutory version. Uncertainty neces-
sarily increases, however, as the differences become more marked; 
for example, what result should be reached if the foreign tax reaches 
gross income as distinguished from gross receipts, provision not 
having been made for any of the more important deductions? One 
court, pointing to the fact that the Sixteenth Amendment had been 
held to embrace gross income, indicated that it was perhaps enough 
that this constitutional norm be satisfied.173 To this decision, how-
ever, the government filed a non-acquiescence. 174 On a later occasion, 
the same court talked as though the American statutory concept 
really constituted the basic point of reference, 175 only thereafter to 
see the Service exclude a Mexican tax because "liability for the tax 
arises at the time the operation to the tax takes place, whether or 
not income in the [American J constitutional sense results." 176 In-
terestingly enough, these twists and turns came after the Supreme 
Court, while deciding a related but admittedly different question 
arising out of the credit provision, had stated in Biddle v. Commis-
sioner: 
The phrase "income taxes paid," as used in our revenue 
laws, has for most practical purposes a well understood 
meaning to be derived from an explanation of the statutes 
which provide for the laying and collection of income 
taxes. It is that meaning which must be attributed to it as 
used in § 131 [now I.R.C., § 901 et seq. governing for-
eign tax credits ].177 
That Court actually had before it a question which will be com-
mon, though quite probably less prejudicial, to all of the Common 
Market withholding taxes on dividends. The issue was whether an 
individual stockholder, at the point of receiving a dividend, was 
entitled to a direct credit for his equitable share of the regular cor-
porate tax suffered by the distributing company at the time its profits 
were earned. While the stockholder, pursuant to British surtax pro-
visions, "grossed up" the dividend by also including in his gross 
income an allocate share of the corporate tax and then credited the 
latter against his British surtax, the Court denied him an American 
tax credit for his portion of the British corporate tax. That Amer-
ican tax laws-the basic yardstick-did not attribute taxes assessed 
173 Seatrain Lines, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1076 ( 1942 ). 
""C.B. 1942-2, 31. 
175 See Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia, 26 T.C. 582 ( 1956) ; L. Helena 
Wilson, 7 T.C. 1469 ( 1946). 
178 Rev. Rul. 58-3, C.B. 1958-1, 263 at 264-
177 302 U.S. 573 at 579, 58 S. Ct. 379 (1938). 
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against the corporation to stockholders as such was said to be de-
CISIVe. 
While the principle of the Biddle case, as applied to the United 
Kingdom, was subsequently modified by treaty,178 the point decided 
there is still relevant to Common Market withholding taxes on 
dividends paid by subsidiaries or by their sub-subsidiaries. Unless 
foreign law treats those taxes as assessments against the distributee, 
withholding serving as a collection device, so-called dividend taxes 
paid by a foreign subsidiary on dividends distributed to the Amer-
ican parent will come under the deemed-paid credit provision, if any, 
rather than under the direct credit provision.179 And in like fashion, 
the dividend tax withheld by a sub-subsidiary would come under the 
special deemed-paid credit arrangement applicable to a sub-subsidi-
ary's own tax, and would not be treated as a part of the distributee-
subsidiary's own direct tax liability.180 
The same type of problem arises, of course, in connection with 
the deduction allowed for other foreign taxes. For example, a for-
eign stamp tax is deductible only by the person against whom the 
tax is imposed, even though another may actually suffer its economic 
burden.181 
Unfortunately for those engaged in tax planning, the Internal 
Revenue Service has not published many rulings directly responsive 
to the foregoing questions in the setting of Common Market taxes. 
This may be due to its realization that, at least theoretically, such 
rulings would have a relatively short effective life in that each 
amendment of a given foreign tax law would require reconsideration 
of the government's position even though, in the end, it might not be 
changed.182 In any event, the paucity of published rulings plus the 
possibility that amendments to a foreign law might lead the govern-
ment to reconsider its position suggest that one engaged in planning 
should, after making preliminary comparisons, seek advance rulings 
before tentative plans are finalized. 
In this connection, a final common problem involves the multiple 
178 Article XIII; Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B. 1956-1, 321. 
179 Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-289, C.B. 1956-1, 321. 
180 The credit arrangement, as it bears on a sub-subsidiary, is discussed in Section 
E, Subsection 2, infra. 
181 Rev. Rul. 56-507, C.B. 1956-2, 120. In holding that the French registry tax fell into 
the deductible category, the Service avoided deciding on which person the tax was 
imposed, saying only that it was deductible by the person who properly paid it 
=E.g., since the last published ruling on the Netherlands income tax as applied to 
dividends (I.T. 3371, C.B. 1940-1, 102), the tax pattern of that country has been 
changed. 
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base Common Market enterprise or trade taxes. On the one hand, 
as previously noted, full credit-subject only to the per-country 
limitation-may be enjoyed though the foreign tax includes within 
its base some items which the United States does not in fact tax as 
income. 183 For example, the Cuban income tax was not disqualified 
even though it reached stock dividends/84 an item not in fact taxed 
by the Internal Revenue Code 185 and perhaps even constitutionally 
beyond its reach.186 In explaining its favorable position in such cases, 
the Internal Revenue Service has said: 
When such a unified tax is imposed by a foreign country, 
its predominant character will determine whether the tax 
is an income tax and credit will be denied for the entire 
amount or allowed for the entire tax subject to the limita-
tions of section 904 of the Code [the per-country limita-
tion] .187 
This "ali-or-nothing" notion, geared to a balancing of the com-
peting characteristics, will not be applied, however, if the foreign 
assessment does not actually rest on a unified interdependent tax 
base. Both the Tax Court and the Service have unraveled a multiple 
base foreign assessment, qualifying the income tax component while 
rendering ineligible the non-income tax factors. 188 One such instance 
involved the German three factor enterprise tax, credit being al-
lowed for the profit factor but not for that portion of the assessment 
representing taxes on capital employed in the business and on wages 
paid.ls9 
1&'! Helvering v. Campbell, (4th Cir. 1944) 139 F.(2d) 865. 
'"'LT. 4074, C.B. 1952·1, 87. 
186 I.R.C., § 305. 
186 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 ( 1920). But see discussion to 
the contrary in Wright, The Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme 
Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 STAN. L. REv. 164 ( 1956). 
Contrary to the rationale of the stock dividend ruling was the decision denying a 
credit to that part of a British income tax assessment based on the "annual value" of 
real property. Woolworth Co. v. U.S., (2d Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 973, cert. den., 302 
U.S. 768, 58 S. Ct. 481 ( 1938). An earlier decision had allowed a credit for a some-
what similar tax imposed in France. Herbert Ide Keen, 15 B.T.A. 1243 (1929), ap-
proved in I.T. 2485, C.B. VIII-2, 252. Cf. denial of the credit for a so-called income 
tax imposed by Canada on a legacy, L. Helena Wilson, 7 T.C. 1469 ( 1946). 
187 Rev. Rul. 56-51, C.B. 1956-1, 320. Italics added. 
188 Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co. of Columbia, 26 T.C. 582 (1956) re a multiple 
base income and property tax; Rev. Rul. s6-sx, C.B. 1956-1, 320. 
186 Rev. Rul. 59-208, C.B. 1959-1, 192. The regular German corporate income tax 
was viewed favorably credit-wise in I.T. 4026, C.B. 1950-2, 51; in Rev. Rul. 59-56, 
C.B. 1959-1, 737 as applied to income derived from cutting and selling timber. 
While the general income tax in Italy, known as "RM," was approved for credit 
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(e) Procedure in initially claiming the credit.-The Treas-
ury designed Form I I 18 as the device by which to secure from cor-
porations that information deemed essential to allowance and com-
putation of the credit. 190 In claiming a credit for foreign taxes al-
ready paid, the receipt or sworn copy, 191 together with an accurate 
translation, must accompany the form. In the absence of a receipt, 
secondary evidence-such as a photostatic copy of the check or draft 
-will suffice.192 In the case of foreign taxes withheld from divi-
dends, etc., secondary evidence-including submission of evidence 
relating to the foreign country's rates and withholding procedures-
may be submitted absent direct evidence of the withholding.193 
Normally an appropriate copy of the foreign return must accom-
pany Form I I I 8 if claim is made for accrued but unpaid foreign 
taxes.194 Excerpts from the taxpayer's accounts may serve, however, 
as a substitute if need be. 
The immediate future is likely to see some change in the amount 
and type of information which must be furnished. In late 1960, 
Congress adopted an additional policing measure, clearly establish-
ing the right of the government to obtain from domestic parents 
certain types of information relative to their foreign subsidiaries 
and sub-subsidiaries, which information the Treasury had always 
had the clear right to obtain with reference to foreign branches.194a 
Included among the types of information which the Treasury may 
require are explanations regarding inter-company transactions, 
balance sheets, and analyses of accumulated earnings and profits 
covering even inclusions, deductions, etc. At this writing, regulations 
implementing the new provision have not been issued. 
Finally, with reference to accrued foreign taxes, the District Di-
rector may also condition allowance of the credit upon the submis-
sion of a proper bond. 
Conversion problems as they affect the credit, and questions re-
lating to the use of the cash and accrual methods, are dealt with 
in Section E of PART IV. 
purposes in S.M. I6I4A, C.B. IV-2, 203 (I925), certain other Italian taxes were denied 
the benefit of a credit in S.M. 3982, C.B. IV-2, 204 (I925). 
11
'
0 LT. Regs., § I.905-2 also prescribes that Form I II6 will be used by individuals. 
191 Or a certified or authenticated copy. I.T. Regs., § 1.905-2(a) (2). 
190 I.T. Regs.,§ I.905-2(a) (2) and (b) (I). 
""LT. Regs., § I.905-2 (b) (3). 
1
"' A duplicate original or a certified, authenticated or sworn copy. I.T. Regs., 
§ 1.905-2(a) (2). 
1948 Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), § 6, adding a new § 6038 to the 
Code, the old § 6038 being renumbered as § 6039. 
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SECTION D. FURTHER FOREIGN AND AMERICAN TAX 
EFFECTS WHERE FOREIGN PERMANENT 
EsTABLISHMENT OR SuBsiDIARY IN ONE 
MEMBER NATION EXPORTS DIRECTLY To 
CusTOMERS IN ANOTHER 
(a) Introductory note.-In developing plans for marketing 
a product in more than one member nation, an American enterprise 
may well consider, inter alia, creation of a foreign permanent estab-
lishment or subsidiary in one country with the expectation that it 
will also export directly to customers in one or more other affiliates 
of the Common Market. Potential tax implications of such an ar-
rangement depend on: ( 1) whether the export profits will be taxed 
by more than one member nation; ( 2) whether multiple turnover 
taxes will be encountered; ( 3) whether one country, as dis-
tinguished from another, offers a more favorable direct tax climate; 
and ( 4) the extent to which the increase in foreign taxes, if any, 
will serve further to reduce American tax liability. These questions 
are considered separately under the sub-topics which follow. 
(b) Extent to which export profits will be taxed by the im-
porting as well as the exporting member nation.-Under the respec-
tive national laws of member nations, the exporting country in which 
the permanent establishment or subsidiary is located will, of course, 
reach the entire profit made from direct export operations. For a 
comparison of the direct tax load which each member nation would 
impose if it were the exporting country, see the discussion and charts 
in sub-topics (b) and (c) of Section B, supra. 
With regard to the importing country, it should be noted at the 
outset that the Common Market arrangement does not include a 
multilateral tax treaty dealing with double taxation. Only bilateral 
arrangements exist. The status of treaties of this sort is reflected in 
Table III M. 
Under the treaties in force or concluded but not yet ratified, the 
importing countries will respond in a manner similar to that pro-
vided for in other bilateral tax treaties to which the United States 
is a party. This means, according to the more detailed discussion in 
PART II supra, that the importing country will not attempt to 
reach any part of such profits unless a permanent establishment or 
subsidiary has been established in the importing country. 
The chart on the next page indicates that a treaty between 
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TABLE III M 
TREATY STATUS CHART 
Meaning of Symbols 
F-In force 





Germany N OFC 
Italy F OFC 
Luxembourg F, F 
Netherlands F F 
OFC-Old treaty in force, but to 
be replaced by new treaty 
which is concluded but not 
yet in force 
N-Under negotiation 
NONE-Treaty not even under ne-
gotiation 
Lux em- Nether-
Germany Italy bourg lands 
N F F F 
OFC OFC F F 
F F F 
F NONE c 
F NONE NONE 
F c NONE 
Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Italy and the Netherlands, on 
the other, is not even under negotiation. Accordingly, where the 
former or the latter receives imports from the other, direct taxes 
imposed by the two countries would depend entirely upon the char-
acter of their respective national laws. However, in the case of ex-
ports between Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the tax effect is 
quite similar to that which would follow under a typical treaty. 
While the exporting country will reach the entire profit, the im-
porting country will not assess direct taxes if a permanent estab-
lishment has not been created there. A different consequence follows 
in the case of exports from Luxembourg to Italy. The latter, as the 
import country, will impose its income tax whether or not a perma-
nent establishment exists there, provided the exporter is active in 
Italy in a regular and habitual manner. While Luxembourg, as the 
exporting country, will also tax the entire export profit, it will allow 
a deduction against income for the amount of Italian taxes paid, if 
any. 
(c) Extent to which exports from one member nation to 
customers in another will encounter multiple turnover taxes.-Gen-
erally speaking, as distinguished from customs duties, the turnover 
tax imposed by a member nation at the point of import will not vary 
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by reference to the different countries from which the goods could 
have originated. Illustratively, the turnover tax imposed by Italy at 
the point of import will be the same whether the goods originated in 
the United States or in France. The one exception grew out of a 
special formal economic relationship which includes Belgium and 
Luxembourg. Pursuant to that arrangement, Belgium has agreed to 
forego the increased turnover tax which it would otherwise assess at 
the point products are imported from Luxembourg. 
Earlier discussion in Section B of PART II indicated in some 
circumstances that certain import countries (Nether lands, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, and France) may assess one turnover tax at 
the point of import and another at the point of delivery. In the 
Netherlands, for example, reservation of title up to the point of 
actual delivery will lead to a second taxable event (normal rate 
. 7 5% at the point of delivery). The same result will follow in 
Luxembourg and Germany if the goods are transported by the ex-
porter's own vehicles ( 2% and 4% applied, respectively, if exporter 
was the manufacturer or if he delivers the goods directly to private 
consumers). The earlier mentioned discussion in Section B of 
PART II, supra, also explores various means by which the second 
taxable event might be avoided. While arrangements relating to de-
livery in France can also theoretically complicate the turnover tax 
problem, the end result is less serious there because France's tax is 
essentially one on added value with the consequence that the tax 
paid on a second taxable event will be offset by a credit for the tax 
paid on the first taxable event. 
In all member nations, the exporting country will allow the export 
transaction itself to be exempt from its turnover tax. But only four 
of them (Netherlands, Germany, France, and Italy) quite generally 
provide some kind of refund for turnover taxes paid in connection 
with earlier transfers in the course of which the product was created. 
While the German formula for computing the refund is less exact 
than that of the Netherlands, in general both refund the turnover 
taxes previously paid when the exporter bought the goods or the 
raw materials out of which he manufactured the goods or, if im-
ported by him, they refund the tax paid on that occasion. Under the 
French system, on the other hand, the entire turnover tax burden 
previously suffered by the product will be refunded, as well as that 
portion of turnover taxes borne in connection with the acquisition of 
capital goods which were used in manufacturing the exported item. 
Administratively, it is easier for the French to calculate and refund 
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the exact amount of turnover taxes previously borne by a product. 
Under its turnover tax system, records of taxes previously borne 
must be kept quite generally, for these serve as a credit against the 
gross tax due at later stages, the aim being to reach only the value 
added at any given stage. Finally, in Italy, factors reflecting a rough 
approximation of turnover taxes previously paid are used in deter-
mining refunds allowed on special lists of various types of goods. 
Belgium does not attempt at the point of export to make restitu-
tion of any turnover taxes previously paid. However, it is possible 
to import goods or raw materials into Belgium tax free if they are 
ultimately destined for export. 
Luxembourg provides a modest restitution (. 5%) at the point 
of export only in the case of certain metallic products. 
(d) Conclusion: Foreign tax factors to consider if a foreign 
permanent establishment or subsidiary is to engage in direct export 
to customers in. other member nations.-All other things being 
equal, differences in the direct tax structure of member nations may 
well affect the location of a foreign permanent establishment or 
subsidiary if it is also expected to export directly to customers in 
other member nations. But in assessing the significance of direct 
tax differences, the American enterprise may not be going far 
enough, at least theoretically, if it compares just those burdens 
which each member nation would impose if it were the exporting 
country. Consideration should also be given to differences which 
may appear if each were placed in the position of being an importing 
country, instead of being the home of the permanent establishment 
or subsidiary. The possible importance of this last feature is illus-
trated by a case where Italy is to be a significant market. In that 
event, Luxembourg would suffer one disadvantage, at least in prin-
ciple, if it were considered as the potential site for the permanent 
establishment or subsidiary. It does not have an income tax treaty 
with Italy. And as noted in sub-topic (b) supra, in some circum-
stances Italy, as an import country, would apply its income tax to 
the trade profit. And Luxembourg would take account of the Italian 
direct tax only by allowing a deduction from gross income, as dis-
tinguished from a credit against the Luxembourg tax itself. 
In choosing the site for the permanent establishment or subsidi-
ary, it is also necessary to compare turnover taxes of each member 
nation, not just in terms of its possible role as an export nation, but 
also by reference to its practices if cast in the role of an import na-
tion. For example, from an export standpoint, France offers the 
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most attractive turnover tax arrangement, because in principle all 
turnover taxes paid prior to export are refunded. Thus on the ex-
port side, a permanent establishment or subsidiary located there 
would encounter only the turnover taxes of those member nations 
into which goods are imported. While on this same count, the 
Netherlands and Germany constitute a close second and third to 
France, Luxembourg would again, at least in principle, provide the 
least attractive site. Turnover taxes paid there prior to the export 
transaction itself are not refunded except in a limited amount in the 
case of certain metallic products. 
The foregoing discussion of direct as well as turnover taxes in-
dicated that, in principle, Luxembourg suffered certain tax disad-
vantages as an export nation. In making comparisons, however, care 
must be taken to distinguish disadvantages in principle from those 
in fact. The two previously mentioned circumstances regarding 
Luxembourg are in point. While it does not have an income tax 
treaty with Italy, and though profits on exports to Italy might be 
taxed twice in some circumstances, the prejudicial circumstances are 
not in fact very great. Again, while Luxembourg does not refund 
turnover taxes paid prior to the export transaction, it will be remem-
bered from the discussion in Section B of this PART that, compara-
tively speaking, turnover taxes in Luxembourg are not very high. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned in this Section, exports from 
Luxembourg to Belgium enjoy particularly favorable turnover tax 
treatment in the latter nation. 
The difference between a disadvantage in principle and one in fact 
can also be illustrated by the problem of resolving ambiguities in 
the bilateral income tax treaties. In principle, the interpretative 
process in France is less attractive than that of certain other coun-
tries from a taxpayer's viewpoint. There, more or less final inter-
pretations are made by an administrative department, rather than 
by the courts. In the general run of cases, however, it is not believed 
that the effect has in fact been unfavorable. 
(e) Extent to which the importing member nation's ta:'Ces 
will serve to reduce American tax liability.-According to the previ-
ous discussion, the importing member nation will not normally im-
pose an income tax on any portion of the profits derived in the ex-
porting member nation from simple export arrangements. There-
fore, the export arrangement will not normally further complicate 
the computation of either the deemed-paid or direct credit for for-
eign income taxes in determining American tax liability, if any. The 
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credit for income taxes paid the exporting member nation will be 
available and determined, of course, in accordance with the prin-
ciples described in Section C, supra. Subsection 2 of Section E, infra, 
will indicate the complication which will arise should the importing 
nation assess an income tax because it determines that a permanent 
establishment was in fact created therein or if, as in Italy-with 
respect to imports from Luxembourg, it is determined that the ex-
porter was locally active in a regular and habitual manner. 
To the limited extent the export arrangement may give rise to 
multiple turnover tax liability, prices will be increased or profits 
reduced. If a subsidiary corporation handled the export from the 
first member nation, that part of its gross profit devoted to the in-
creased turnover tax liability, if any, will never be declared as a 
dividend and as a consequence will never be brought into the Amer-
ican parent's gross income. 
If, on the other hand, the exports were from an American cor-
poration's branch or permanent establishment in the first member 
nation, the increased turnover tax liability would be deducted in 
computing American "taxable income," provided the liability was 
actually asserted by the foreign nation against the exporter and not 
against the importing vendee.195 
SEcTION E. FuRTHER TAx IMPLICATIONS IF A FoREIGN 
OPERATING SUBSIDIARY IN ONE MEMBER 
NATION CREATES ITs OwN PERMANENT 
EsTABLISHMENT OR SuBsiDIARY IN ANOTHER 
MEMBER NATION 
SUBSECTION I. FURTHER FOREIGN TAX IMPLICATIONS 
(a} A foreign subsidiary creates a permanent establishment 
in another member nation: The direct tax problem.-The discus-
sion in Section D, supra, indicated that export profits realized by a 
subsidiary domiciled in one member nation would not normally be 
taxed by other member nations to which the products were exported. 
However, if the exporting subsidiary goes on to create its own 
permanent establishment in the importing member nation, the lat-
ter's income tax will quite generally be applied to that part of the 
total profit which is properly attributable to the permanent estab-
lishment. While there are minor variations in bilateral tax treaties 
1
"' The problem associated with the "liability" question is illustrated in Rev. Rul. 
s6-5o7, c.B. 1956-z, uo. 
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and relevant national laws with regard to the standards which will 
be applied in determining whether a permanent establishment has 
been created, reference to the general discussion of definitions in 
Section A of PART II and Section B of this PART must suffice for 
purposes of this study. Reference is also made to Section B of this 
PART for a comparison of the direct tax loads which each Com-
mon Market country would impose on such an establishment if sub-
ject to its jurisdiction. 
The more important question is whether the profit of that perma-
nent establishment will also be taxed by the quite separate domicile 
of the foreign subsidiary which created it. Such a second tax is one 
of the targets of bilateral tax treaties which are in force, or have 
been executed but not ratified, between various European countries. 
The status of those treaties is indicated in Section D, supra. Under 
such treaties, where the domicile of the subsidiary has a progressive 
rate structure (see PART I), the usual scheme is for that country 
to take account of the foreign permanent establishment's profit only 
for the purpose of determining the rate bracket on the subsidiary's 
other income. In short, the applicable percentage figure is deter-
mined by reference to the total income, but is actually applied only 
with reference to income other than that earned by and attributable 
to the foreign permanent establishment. 
In the absence of a treaty precluding double taxation, one must 
look to unilateral provisions, if any, to mitigate the double tax pos-
sibility. Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands have incorporated 
such in their national laws. Belgium reduces by %ths the normal 
rate which it would otherwise apply under its professional tax to the 
income of the foreign permanent establishment. Germany responds 
to the problem by allowing a tax credit. The same could be said with 
respect to the Netherlands, though relief there will normally be 
more favorable, leading in most instances to an exemption of for-
eign profits. Theoretically, the Netherlands would compute the 
amount of the credit without regard to the actual tax burden as-
sessed on the foreign income by the other member nation. The 
credit would be determined by reference to the amount of the Dutch 
tax rate on the foreign income. As a practical matter, this generally 
relieves the foreign profit from the Dutch tax, for the Dutch rate 
schedule has little progression. 
Although France does not have any specific unilateral relief pro-
visions, the result there (and to some extent in Italy) will corre-
spond for all practical purposes to the situation in the Nether lands, 
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for in principle only profits from domestic sources are taxed by 
France. 
As previously indicated, any member nation in which the perma-
nent establishment is located would apply its regular tax load to the 
income attributable to the establishment. Table III N indicates the 
instances where the domicile of the subsidiary which created the 
establishment would free that same income from double taxation, 
either through operation of a bilateral treaty or unilateral provi-
sion. The expression, "tax free," is used in Table III N in a more 
or less loose sense. In the instance where the domicile of the sub-
sidiary has a progressive tax, that expression ("tax free") is used 
even though the domicile of the subsidiary would take the foreign 
profit into account in determining the rate which would be applied 
to the subsidiary's Dther income. 
Immunity which might otherwise exist from a double tax will be 
prejudiced, of course, if the two countries do not allocate the overall 
profit in the same fashion. When this problem is encountered, the 
matter must be thrashed out with the proper tax authorities, for 
determination of a proper allocation is largely a question of fact. 
(b) A foreign subsidiary creates its own subsidiary in an-
other member nation: The direct tax problem.-If the first oper-
ating subsidiary which the American enterprise created in one of the 
Common Market countries (assume country A) establishes its own 
second tier subllidiary in yet another member nation (assume coun-
try B), the profits earned by the second tier subsidiary (No. 2) 
will be taxed to it only by country B, its domicile. Direct taxes which 
each member nation would impose on that second subsidiary if 
domiciled therein are compared in Section B, supra. Account is also 
taken there of differences which may arise in subsidiary No. z's own 
tax load depending on whether its profits are retained in whole or 
in part. 
At that point when the second subsidiary distributes profits in the 
form of dividends, there is the further question of whether both 
countries will assess a tax against the recipient, subsidiary No. 1. 
Any tax imposed on the latter by the distributing subsidiary's domi-
cile would, of course, be handled on a withholding basis, as in the 
case of other non-residents. Table III 0 indicates whether and to 
what degree the two countries would seek to tax the recipient by 
reference to the dividend. 
In determining the total direct tax costs, the tax exacted from the 
recipient of the dividend must be combined with the tax load orig-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inally imposed on the distributing subsidiary by its own domicile. 
Appraisal of the practical significance of the figures in the above 
chart would require, illustratively, that account be taken of the fact 
that Belgium and Germany would have assessed relatively low di-
rect taxes against the distributing subsidiary itself, if domiciled 
there. And in all circumstances, it must be remembered that the re-
cipient's tax base-the dividend-will be in an amount less than the 
distributing subsidiary's original taxable income even if the latter 
company distributed all of its available profit. That portion of its 
taxable income used to discharge its own tax liability to its domicile 
would not, of course, be available for distribution. 
(c) Further foreign turnover tax implications.-In keeping 
with the principles discussed in Section D, supra, an export transac-
tion from subsidiary No. I in country A to its own subsidiary in 
country B will be free of the export country's turnover tax. Also as 
indicated in that Section, the export subsidiary can obtain restitution 
of turnover taxes previously paid the export country at earlier 
stages of the product's development, this restitution being more or 
less complete except in Belgium and Luxembourg. While only the 
* According to a new treaty. 
Symbols: **According to an old treaty. 
***According to a new treaty, otherwise rs%. 
198 As is indicated in the next paragraph, the regular corporate income tax imposed 
by France will have little impact when a French parent company receives a dividend. 
However, it is true that the French withholding tax of 24% must be paid when the 
dividend is received, though at a reduced rate of 12% when received from Belgium 
and, when received from Luxembourg, less a credit for the Luxembourg withholding 
tax. But upon immediate distribution by the French parent company to its own stock-
holders, the withholding tax will not again be assessed. The stockholders are even 
granted a credit of the full 24% against the general income tax on their total incomes 
(including the dividend in question). Since other countries, in the absence of a tax 
treaty, would impose a withholding tax on this second event (see Section B, supra), 
i.e., when the parent distributes the dividend, an overall comparison would lead to 
the conclusion that the French withholding tax should be disregarded or treated, at 
least, as a prepayment of the kind of tax due elsewhere when the parent distributes a 
dividend. 
As stated above, the regular French corporate income tax will have little effect 
when the parent company first received the dividend. It will be levied on only 25% 
of the dividends received by the parent. This tax is designed to take into account the 
fact that a certain amount of the parent's overhead costs, though deducted by it from 
its profits, actually related to a dividend which was not, in principle, otherwise taxable. 
109 The 36% will apply if the parent company does not immediately distribute the 
amount as a dividend to its own shareholder~. 
-Treaty provisions between the two countries limit Luxembourg as follows: For 
purposes of the Luxembourg corporate income tax, only the net amount received by the 
Luxembourg corporation from the German subsidiary may be taken into account, i.e., 
the 75% which remains after the German withholding tax is applied. Only so% of 
that net is then subject to the Luxembourg corporate income tax. However, the futl 
net is subject to the Luxembourg business or enterprise tax. 
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importing country's turnover tax is generally encountered under the 
foregoing arrangement, the chance of multiplying that tax is greater 
in this circumstance than when shipments are made from country A 
direct to independent customers in country B. The import or first 
taxable transaction will be followed by a second event, i.e., delivery 
by the receiving permanent establishment or subsidiary to its cus-
tomers; in principle, that inland delivery will usually be treated as a 
second taxable event. 
One might suppose that the rate applied to that second transac-
tion would quite generally vary depending, inter alia, on whether 
the operation in country B was handled by a permanent establish-
ment or a subsidiary. Assume, e.g., that the first subsidiary in coun-
try A had manufactured the product, shipping it to its sales office, a 
permanent establishment in country B. Since a permanent establish-
ment is an extension of the manufacturing company in country A, 
delivery by the sales office to its own customers would be subjected 
in some countries to the rate applicable to manufacturers. A sales 
subsidiary in country B would usually be treated, however, as an in-
dependent entity for turnover tax purposes as well as other legal 
purposes. In other words, the rate applicable to wholesalers would 
usually be applied to its delivery, assuming this was not to the ulti-
mate consumer. The two patterns just outlined have not always 
been adhered to, however, by Common Market countries. 
Germany has frequently denied independent status to sales sub-
sidiaries for the purpose of determining turnover tax rates, and in 
this circumstance has frequently applied the normal 4% manufac-
turer's rate, rather than the I% wholesaler's rate, to the sales sub-
sidiary's deliveries. 
The Netherlands has followed the opposite tack; delivery by a 
sales office, whether a permanent establishment or a subsidiary, is 
deemed to have been made by a "dealer" subject to the %% rate, 
assuming the sale is not to the ultimate consumer in which case de-
livery is free of tax. This result stems from the fact that the first 
import transaction was deemed equal to a manufacturer's sale 
within the Netherlands. 
Italy and Belgium do not normally impose different rates on 
manufacturers and wholesalers. Accordingly, the problem noted 
above is not significant in that locale. 
(d) Conclusion: Choosing locale of foreign parent subsidi-
ary, as affected by foreign tax considerations.-Comparison of the 
tax costs associated with the selection of a locale for a foreign sub-
sidiary which is to create its own permanent establishment or sub-
TAXATION 52 I 
sidiary in another member nation will be much less complex if the 
two will not be engaging in business transactions, such as exports, 
with each other. If in that circumstance, a permanent establishment 
is to he created in the second member nation, one need only integrate 
the effect of that nation's direr! taxes with the direct taxes, if any, 
of the foreign subsidiary's domicile. If the latter of these two tax 
problems could be viewed in isolation, the ideal solution would he 
found in a fiscally neutral country, i.e., one which \vould not impose 
any direct tax on profits earned by a permanent establishment main-
tained elsewhere. From the chart in subtopic (a), supra) it appears, 
because of bilateral treaties or unilateral provisions, that France, 
Italy, and the Netherlands could provide such a neutral forum, 
with Belgium and Germany providing somewhat less attractive 
settings. It would be a mistake, however, to view the tax position of 
the controlling subsidiary's domicile in isolation. Indeed, when the 
tax costs of the two countries are integrated, a non-neutral country 
may actually furnish a more attractive domicile for the controlling 
subsidiary. Illustrative is the case where the controlling subsidiary's 
own earned income makes up the great preponderence of the total 
income earned by the two. In that circumstance, the fact that a coun-
try's tax on income earned domestically is lower than elsewhere may 
be more important in choosing the domicile for the controlling sub-
sidiary than the fact that the country does impose some tax on 
income earned by a permanent establishment maintained elsewhere. 
This principle is illustrated in Table III P by comparing the total 
direct tax costs if non-neutral Belgium, rather than neutral Nether-
lands, were chosen as the site for a subsidiary which will earn 
$500,000 from its own activities, its permanent establishment in 
country X earning only $50,000. 
The charted comparison indicates in the foregoing circumstance 
that, if all other things were equal, Belgium would provide a much 
more advantageous site for the controlling subsidiary. Table III Q 
illustrates that a different result can be reached, however, if one 
assumes the opposite facts, i.e., that the income earned by country 
X's permanent establishment (say, $45o,ooo) will far exceed that 
earned by the controlling subsidiary (assume $ roo,ooo) from its 
own activities. 
The two tables indicate that while Belgium was preferred as the 
site for the controlling subsidiary in the first assumed situation, the 
Netherlands would be preferred in the second, if all other things 
were equal. The fact that there are varying degrees in between the 
two situations suggests that absolute comparisons cannot actually 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































524 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
be made; results will differ depending on the precise circumstances. 
The same is true if the controlling subsidiary creates a subsidiary 
in country X instead of a permanent establishment. Effective com-
parisons can only be made on the basis of certain assumptions, like 
those noted above. Here, however, it may also be necessary to take 
account of an additional tax on dividends. With reference to this cir-
cumstance, the Netherlands is the only neutral country, as is indi-
cated in the charted comparison in subtopic (b), supra. 
It was assumed throughout the foregoing discussion that the two 
affiliates would not indulge in business transactions with each other, 
such as exports from the parent subsidiary to the organization which 
it created in country X. While the direct tax loads will remain the 
same if such exports are contemplated, bilateral tax treaties, or-
in their absence-unilateral provisions, require that the prices 
charged for products or services coincide for tax purposes with 
those which would be associated with transactions entered into at 
arm's length by independent companies. Turnover taxes would also 
complicate the comparisons in this setting, in the manner described 
in sub-topic (c), supra. 
SUBSECTION 2. INTEGRATING FOREIGN AND AMERICAN 
INCOME TAX IMPLICATIONS 
(a) Introductory note.-The method of determining an 
American company's gross income will not be further affected by the 
question of whether its own operating subsidiary in one Common 
Market country creates a permanent establishment or a sub-
subsidiary in a second member nation. The parent's gross will still 
be dependent upon dividend payments from its own subsidiary. 
And everything said in Section C, supra, and in PART IV, infra, 
with reference to this question would be applicable here. In terms 
of principles, the prime previously undiscussed complication created 
by the subsidiary's extension of facilities into a second member 
nation relates to the credit for foreign income taxes. Since this will 
be affected in different ways, depending on whether a branch or 
sub-subsidiary is created in the second Common Market country, 
the two arrangements will be discussed under separate sub-topics 
below. 
While the succeeding Section F will then go on to compare the 
principles governing these two-tier foreign arrangements with 
those applicable to the American parent's own establishment of 
"sister" foreign facilities, it should be noted here that the former's 
TAXATION 
practical advantages are actually similar, though not identical on 
all counts, to those associated with the use of a pure foreign hold-
ing (or "base") company created to own operating facilities. 
Reference is made, therefore, to Section G, infra, for an analysis 
of those practical advantages, though in the setting of a foreign 
base company arrangement. 
(b) Credit for foreign taxes where foreign subsidiary 
crt:ates own permanent establishment in a second member nation. 
-\Vhere a foreign operating subsidiary creates its own permanent 
establishment (branch) in a yet different member nation, the 
initial computation of the credit for foreign income taxes is not 
affected. The provisions authorizing both direct and deemed-paid 
credits are addressed to the income, war profits, and excess profits 
taxes of "any" 201 foreign country, not, in our illustration, just to 
those taxes of the first member nation in which the American 
parent's own subsidiary was incorporated. Illustratively, when the 
parent receives a dividend from the subsidiary, the deemed-paid 
credit allowed by § 902 would be computed in the first instance 
by multiplying the aggregate foreign income taxes of the subsidiary 
by the traditional fraction, the dividend being the numerator, and 
the pre-tax 202 accumulated profits being the denominator. 
The literal language of the per-country limitation in § 904203 
is not so easily applied. That provision expressly limits the total 
credit for taxes paid "any country" by a fraction, the numerator 
generally being the "taxpayer's taxable income from sources within 
such country," with the denominator being the taxpayer's entire 
taxable income.204 Of what significance is it that the subsidiary 
in our illustration would pay income taxes to more than one for-
eign country, while the American parent would actually derive 
foreign "taxable income" (a dividend) from only one such country? 
Admittedly, it was originally contemplated that the per-country 
limitation would generally be applied on a country-by-country basis. 
But it is equally true that the deemed-paid credit provision itself 
generally contemplated that an American parent would enjoy some 
credit with respect to the foreign income taxes paid by a foreign 
subsidiary to u any foreign country." 205 In resolving the interpre-
tative difficulty posed by the statutory language used in connection 
201 I.R.C., §§ 901 (b) (x) and 902(a). 
"""The term "pre-tax accumulated profits" is used here to mean accumulated profits 
after deducting all direct taxes except those types which qualify for the credit. 
""'Discussed generally in Subsection 1 (f) of Section C, supra. 
'""The numerator cannot exceed the taxpayer's "entire taxable income." 
""'I.R.C., § 902(a). 
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with the per-country limitation, the Treasury has neutralized any 
prejudice which the parent otherwise might have suffered as a 
result of the fact that the dividend had its source in but one country, 
that in which the subsidiary was incorporated. To that same country, 
the Treasury has attributed all of the income, war profits, and excess 
profits taxes paid or deemed to have been paid by that subsidiary 
even though such taxes may have been imposed by and paid to 
two or more different foreign countries. 206 In effect, this permits 
an averaging of the foreign tax loads imposed by two or more for-
eign countries, thus permitting some escape from the per-country 
limitation in that instance where one of the foreign countries had 
a higher, and the other had a lower, effective rate than the United 
States. The result is similar to that which would follow if an 
overall limitation, rather than per-country limitation, were applied 
to the credit.206a 
(c) Foreign operating subsidiary creates own subsidiary 
in a second member nation.-Until World War II, the deemed-paid 
credit allowed an American corporation was confined to the for-
eign income taxes of its own foreign subsidiary; neither were 
"deemed," for purposes of the American credit, to have paid the 
foreign income taxes of a second tier foreign subsidiary, the stock 
of which was held by the first subsidiary. At that time, at least for 
deemed-paid credit purposes, it made greater sense if the parent's 
own foreign subsidiary created a permanent establishment instead 
of a subsidiary in the second European country. Or the latter's 
income taxes could also have been brought within the sweep of 
the deemed-paid credit provision if the parent itself created a 
second "sister" subsidiary there. 
For a variety of reasons, a parent organization often preferred 
to handle its affairs in the second country through an entity incor-
porated there. But only if the latter was an unincorporated branch 
of the parent's first subsidiary was it easy to satisfy both of two 
succeeding tax aims: ( 1) to use the first facility's profits to develop 
and expand the second facility without having to route those profits 
through the American parent's gross income; and ( 2) in a later 
distribution stage, to enjoy a deemed-paid credit for the income 
208 I.T. Regs., § 1.902-1 (c). 
""'• By virtue of legislation enacted in late 1960, the American parent could reach 
the same result by electing to submit its foreign tax credit to the newly revived "over-
all" limitation. Its ramifications, and the differences which may arise between it and 
the per-country limitation in a multiple-tier setting, are discussed in Sections F and G 
infra. 
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taxes of the second European country. Only the second of these 
could be achieved if the parent itself formed the second subsidiary, 
absent some sort of loan arrangement between the two subsidiaries. 
In the middle of World War II, Congress resolved an American 
corporation's planning problem by extending the "deemed-paid" 
concept. It provided that a foreign subsidiary, upon receipt of 
a dividend from its own foreign incorporated subsidiary, "shall 
be deemed to have paid" a portion of the latter's income tax, the 
fraction to be of the same type as that previously used in connection 
with the parent's previously existing deemed-paid credit for the 
first subsidiary's tax. 207 
When initially enacted, the first subsidiary was deemed to have 
paid a fractional part of the second subsidiary's tax only if the 
former owned u all the voting stock (except qualifying shares)" 
in the second subsidiary.208 However, in 195o-in connection with 
the tax hearings designed to give further impetus to the Point 4 
Program, Congress was urged by business to relax this require-
ment.209 The consequent reduction coincided with a downgrading 
in the proportion of ownership which the parent had to hold in 
the first subsidiary in order to be deemed to have paid a fractional 
part of its income taxes. A reduction to 10% in the latter situa-
tion 210 was complemented by changing the word "all" to "so%" 
with reference to the voting stock which one foreign corporation 
had to hold in the sub-subsidiary.211 Indeed, these limitations were 
assertedly retained only because of certain "administrative" prob-
lems.212 
Under the two deemed-paid arrangements, if the profits of both 
subsidiaries suffered the same amount of foreign tax, and if both 
distributed all of their after-tax profits, American gross income 
and the parent's deemed-paid credit would be equal to what they 
would have been if the first subsidiary had earned the entire foreign 
profit. Assume for example that each earned $Ioo,ooo on which 
""'Rev. Act of 1942, § 131(£) (2), now as revised, I.R.C., § 902(b). 
'"'"Rev. Act of 1942, § 131 (f) (2). 
909 For example, see statement of Mitche.ll B. Carroll, Hearings, Committee on Ways 
and Means, Sxst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) Vol. 3, 623 at 6z6. 
""'Rev. Act of 1951, § 332(a), now I.R.C., § 902(a). 
211 Rev. Act of 1951, § 332(b), now I.R.C., § 902(b). 
212 S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., xst Sess. 55 ( 1951). These administrative difficulties 
did not appear quite so formidable to a later inquiring House committee. In 1960 the 
Committee on Ways and Means proposed, and the House agreed, to reduce the so% 
requirement as it related to a sub-subsidiary to 2oo/o, the sponsoring Committee stating 
that this would "provide fully for any administrative problems." H. Rep. No. 2100, 
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960) re H.R. n,68r. When the session closed, the Senate had 
not reached consideration of this bill. 
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a foreign tax of 26% ($26,ooo by each) was suffered. The first 
subsidiary would be "deemed to have paid" $19,240 of its own 
subsidiary's foreign tax, computed as follows: 
$2G,ooo X $74,000 (Dividend) $ 
$1oo,ooo (Pre-tax Profit) = 19' 240 
The first subsidiary's total foreign tax would now be $4 5,240 
(own tax of $26,ooo plus deemed-paid tax of $19,240) for which 
the American parent would get a deemed-paid credit of $38,480, 
computed as follows: 
$148,ooo (Dividend 
$ X To Parent) _ $ 8 8 2 13 45'240 $174,000 (First Subsidiary's- 3 '4 0 
Own Pre-tax Profit) 
If the first subsidiary had earned the entire profit of $2oo,ooo, 
suffering a 26% tax ( $52,000), the parent's deemed-paid credit 





The one-tier and two-tier deemed-paid arrangements will not 
give rise to like results, however, if there is a variation in the 
amount of tax suffered by the two facilities. In such case, the Ameri-
can parent could actually enjoy a slightly greater ultimate tax ad-
vantage from the sub-subsidiary or two-tier deemed-paid arrange-
ment than from the older single subsidiary or one-tier deemed-paid 
arrangement. The reason is the same as that which was responsible 
for the ultimate tax advantage which a subsidiary arrangement 
enjoyed over a branch operation even in that case where all after-
tax profits are remitted.214 In a period when the subsidiary and 
sub-subsidiary distribute all of their respective after-tax profits, 
that portion of the sub-subsidiary's profits devoted to its own in-
come tax never becomes gross income to the first subsidiary. Though 
this exclusion is economically equivalent to a deduction for that 
tax, the first subsidiary will still be deemed to have paid a part 
of that tax for credit purposes. 
Even if an American enterprise intended only to have one sub-
sidiary which in turn would have but one subsidiary of its own, 
"'"A somewhat ~imilar example is contained in H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., zd 
Sess. 101 (1942). 
m• See discussion in Section C, supra. 
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the range of possible tax patterns and rate relationships in the 
Common Market is so varied as to preclude, at least in this type 
of study, any really meaningful comparison of the integrated 
American and foreign direct tax costs with respect to all of the lo-
cation possibilities. With only the simple two-tier organizational 
structure described above, there would be 36 location possibilities 
within the Common Market. Comparisons, to be meaningful in 
the sense of being generally applicable, would have to go on to ac-
commodate the infinite variety in relative sizes of the two facilities. 
And to the variety of rate structures which could be applied directly 
on operating profits, one would have to add the variation in rate 
patterns which might be applied to the inter-corporate dividends-
in terms of the withholding taxes imposed by the sub-subsidiary's 
domicile as well as any tax which might be imposed by the dis-
tributee's own domicile at the time it received the dividend and 
again when the net was re-distributed to the American parent. On 
this one count, for example, only if the sub-subsidiary is incorpo-
rated in Italy, and the parent's own subsidiary is in the Nether-
lands, will there be no tax on dividends as such, except that imposed 
by the United States when the parent ultimately receives a distribu-
tion. But even in this setting, as in certain others, the fact that 
some Italian direct taxes would not seem to qualify for the credit 
further complicates the matter. 
With reference to this general arrangement, however, it should 
be noted that-as in the case where the first subsidiary created a 
permanent establishment in the second member nation-those quali-
fying taxes of the sub-subsidiary deemed paid by the parent's own 
subsidiary will be treated, for purposes of the per-country limita-
tion, as though imposed on the latter by its own country of incor-
poration.215 Here too, then, an averaging of the foreign tax loads 
is in effect substituted for the per-country approach in determining 
the limitation on the credit for foreign taxes. 
SECTION F. TAX IMPLICATIONS IF AN AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE CREATES "SISTER" FOREIGN PERMANENT 
EsTABLISHMENTS OR FoREIGN SuBSIDIARIES 
(a) Introductory note.-The discussion in Section D, supra, 
indicated that double taxation within the Common Market itself 
would almost never arise in that instance where an American 
enterprise's Common Market subsidiary exported directly to cus-
tomers in other member nations. Business reasons, however, 
"'" I.T. Regs., § 1.902-1 (c). 
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might make it desirable to have some sort of facility in the second 
member nation. Accordingly, the immediately preceding Section 
E considered the tax implications where the first operating sub-
sidiary created its own permanent establishments (branches) or 
subsidiaries in one or more of the other member nations. That same 
Section indicated, however, that double taxation within the Com-
mon Market itself would be one cost associated with a few choices 
of locale in that instance where the Common Market subsidiary 
created its own permanent establishment in another member nation. 
That same result would follow in a few more instances if the 
first Common Market subsidiary created a subsidiary in the second 
member nation instead of creating a permanent establishment. Be-
cause certain choices of locale in these last two instances would 
involve double taxation within the Common Market itself, the 
total European direct tax load might exceed the American rate on 
dividends eventually received by the American parent. In that 
event, the unilateral relief provisions (a credit) in the Internal 
Revenue Code would be inadequate to avoid further double taxa-
tion. 
Other difficulties may also be associated with the tier or chain 
arrangement. As is more fully explained in the discussion of base 
company operations in Section G, infra, the American parent might 
encounter some difficulty in availing itself of the special credit 
provision with respect to any royalties received from sub-sub-
sidiaries. Also, as is more fully explained there, if the first operat-
ing subsidiary created permanent establishments in the other mem-
ber nations, losses, if any, incurred by the latter would prejudice 
the opportunity to take a full credit for income taxes paid in those 
countries where the operations were profitable. 
For the foregoing reasons, consideration might be given to a 
different type of organization, as follows: 
Common Market Permanent 
Establishments or Subsidiaries 
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(b) Foreign direct ta:us re a sister" facilities created by 
an American parent.-The charted arrangement above, involving 
creation by the American enterprise itself of "sister" foreign 
permanent establishments or subsidiaries, would completely avoid 
double taxation within the Common Market itself. The foreign 
direct tax implications would be identical to those discussed supra, in 
Section B. 
If the American enterprise also contemplates direct exports to 
customers in those same member nations, an appropriate part of 
the export profit will generally be attributed to the permanent es-
tablishment located in the importing country. Sub-topic (b) of the 
preceding Section B compares the differences in tax loads which 
would be imposed by the various member nations in this circum-
stance. This same problem will arise if Common Market subsidiaries 
are used to represent the American enterprise in member nations, 
for in fact such a representative will usually constitute a permanent 
establishment. In this connection, see the discussions in PART II 
and in Section B of this PART III. 
(c) American tax implications: In general.-Subject to one 
basic exception which arises only if a domestic parent so elects, 
the American tax implications associated with creation by a domes-
tic parent of "sister" permanent establishments or subsidiaries in 
different Common Market countries would be governed by the 
principles described in the preceding Section C where discussion 
actually centered on creation of but one foreign facility designed 
only to serve one member nation. Illustratively, as distinguished 
from the chain arrangement discussed in the immediately preceding 
Section F, the profits of sister facilities in different countries would 
be isolated, one from the other, in applying the per-country limita-
tion on the credit.216 Losses incurred by a branch in one country 
would not prejudice allowance of a full credit for foreign income 
taxes paid by a profitable branch in another country.217 
Another advantage, where sister subsidiaries are established, 
involves the American parent's opportunity, without difficulty, to 
avail itself of the special credit allowed under certain circumstances 
for royalties received in lieu of dividends.217a 
Tax-wise, the two most general shortcomings of this arrangement 
involve, first, the fact that, absent some inter-subsidiary loan ar-
216 I.R.C., § 904, discussed more fully in Section C, Subsection r, supra. 
217 Discussed more fully in the succeeding Section G. 
:l17a/d. 
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rangement, profits of one subsidiary could not be used to expand 
another without routing that profit through the American parent's 
income ledger. If branches are used, this would not be an additional 
difficulty, however; their respective incomes would be includible by 
the American parent whether or not remitted. The second disad-
vantage grows out of the application of the per-country limitation 
on the credit; that limitation would prevent averaging for the pur-
pose of leveling out the different high- and low-tax countries, such 
as Germany and Belgium. However, by virtue of new legislation 
enacted in late I 960, this result can be avoided if the taxpayer 
chooses, by election, to substitute an "overall" limitation for the 
per-country limitation, as is more fully discussed in the immediately 
succeeding sub-topic. 
(d) American tax implications: The alternative "overall" 
limitation.-Congress has not "hewn a straight path" with refer-
ence to the kind of limitation which should be applied to the credit 
for foreign taxes. The story 217b goes back to I 9 I 8 when, for a 
period of three years, a corporation's affairs were viewed on a 
world-wide basis, the credit then being so designed that foreign 
taxes imposed at rates exceeding those prevailing in the United 
States could reduce American tax liability on domestic income. In 
terms of net effect, a world-wide average rate was actually applied. 
Then for eleven years, from I92I to I932, corporate affairs were 
divided into two parts, domestic and foreign, with an "overall" 
limitation on the credit serving to prevent total foreign taxes, 
wherever paid, from reducing the American tax on domestic in-
come.217c The net effect, with respect to the limitation, was to permit 
a taxpayer to average out the high and low foreign income taxes, 
a disadvantage, generally speaking, only where losses were encoun-
tered in one of the foreign countries. Then for the succeeding 
twenty-two years, I932 to I954, two different sets of divisions were 
applied to a corporation's affairs; its activities were first divided 
into two parts, domestic and foreign, to the same end as that noted 
above. Then they were re-divided on a per-country basis, the aim 
being to prevent the taxes of one country which might have a higher 
effective rate than the United States from being averaged with the 
rates of a low-tax country in determining the limit on the credit for 
foreign taxes paid the high-tax country.217d Only this latter per-
217
" Discussed more fully in Section C, Subsection 1 (f), supra. 
217
• Rev. Act of I9ZI, § 238 (a). 
2174 Rev. Act of 1932, ~ 131(b). 
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country limitation survived the comprehensive revision of the Code 
in 1954, the overall limitation being eliminated.217e The asserted 
reason related to the disadvantage which some taxpayers suffered 
as a result of the overall limitation, i.e., to the previously mentioned 
fact that losses incurred in one foreign country were averaged with 
profits in another country, thus increasing the chance of a reduction 
in the American credit for taxes actually paid the foreign country 
where profits had been reaped. Congress concluded that this tended 
to discourage companies from using their foreign profits to open 
new businesses in countries in which they had not previously carried 
on business. 217f 
During the period when only the per-country limitation was in 
vogue (I 9 54 to I 960), it was still possible, as noted in Subsection z 
of the preceding Section E, for an enterprise to organize its affairs 
so as to avoid the strict impact of the country-by-country approach. 
As noted there, where the American parent had its first foreign 
operating subsidiary create its own permanent establishments or 
sub-subsidiaries in other countries, for purposes of the per-country 
limitation, the American parent's entire income from the multi-
country foreign operation (dividends) was deemed to have been 
derived from the country in which the first tier foreign subsidiary 
was incorporated, thus permitting what was in effect an averaging 
of high- and low-tax countries. The immediately succeeding Section G 
indicates that a like result was reached where ownership of the 
foreign permanent establishments or subsidiaries was consolidated 
under one foreign holding company. 
In 1960, Congress re-examined the "limitations" question. Em-
barrassing any mutually exclusive congressional choice between the 
two methods ("per-country" and "overall") was the fact, as noted 
above, that for years taxpayers had enjoyed what was tantamount 
to an election between the two limitations; organizational form, not 
substance, made the difference. 
In late 1960, the appropriate House and Senate committees 
agreed to resolve the problem by writing an election into the law 
itself, giving corporations a choice to conform either to the per-
country or to an overall limitation. Those which had already been 
subject to the per-country limitation were given the unrestricted 
right to shift, at their own election.217g While the Treasury Depart-
217• I.R.C., § 904. 
2171 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1954). 
"'
7gPub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ~ 1, amending I.R.C., § 90f. 
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ment had objected earlier to a somewhat similar proposal-pri-
marily because of the revenue loss involved,217h it indicated a will-
ingness to accept the Senate's variation on the House committee's 
proposal.2171 Whereas the House would have permitted a corpora-
tion to shift from one limitation to the other every five years, the 
Senate would permit a company which invoked the overall limitation 
to shift to the per-country limitation, or later again shift back to the 
overall limitation, only with the consent of the Treasury.217J While 
the Senate's restrictions were written into the law as enacted,217k 
the damaging thrust-from a taxpayer's viewpoint-will probably 
be cushioned because of the Senate committee's expressed view that 
such consent should be granted by the Treasury whenever there are 
basic changes in the taxpayer's business, such as where taxpayers 
are "about to enter substantial operations in a new foreign country 
and anticipate that the operations in that country will prove risky 
with the possibility of their resulting in a loss for a number of 
years," 2171 in which case the taxpayer who previously had invoked 
the overall limitation might now want to shift to the per-country 
limitation. It was also contemplated that the shift back to the per-
country limitation would be permitted where "substantial losses are 
realized with respect to existing investments because of nationaliza-
tion, expropriation, or war." 217m 
Assuming administrative compliance with the Senate committee's 
views as to when a further shift will be permitted after the taxpayer 
has once elected to come under the overall limitation, such shifts, 
assuming satisfaction of those standards, can presumably be ac-
complished on the basis of "hindsight." More specifically, assuming 
Treasury consent can be obtained because there has been the type 
of operational change contemplated by the Senate committee, the 
shift from or back to the overall limitation may be made with 
respect to any taxable year for which the statute of limitations has 
not yet run on refund rights.217n 
This possibility of resorting to hindsight, i.e., making an election 
retroactive where the standard requisite to further change was 
actually met in an earlier year, may cushion in at least one circum-
217
h Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, May 6, 1959, in '59 Vol. 6 CCH para. 6469. 
mTt S. Rep. No. 1393, 86th Cong., 2d SeRs. 3 (1960). 
217l I d., at 2. 
217
k Note 217g, supra, subsection 1 (b). 
2171 Note 217i, supra, 5· 
217m Jd. 
2178 Note 217g, supra, subsection I (b). 
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stance another generally applicable and quite significant restriction. 
While the House committee would have permitted excess unused 
credits of a per-country-limitation year to be carried forward or 
back into an overall-limitation year as well as into a per-country 
year, though not vice versa/170 the Senate 217P and ultimately the 
Congress decided not to permit any such commingling between the 
two different types of years.217q Where, at the time a basic change 
in operations occurs, it is not clear that a further shift to a different 
limitation should be invoked, it will be at least theoretically possible 
to change later, on a retroactive basis but within the refund period, 
if as events turn out the taxpayer's old limitation resulted in unused 
excess credits which could have been accommodated had the other 
limitation been in force. 
Finally, the new bill would deny averaging under the overall 
limitation to the extent foreign taxes are above those of the United 
States because of the fourteen-percentage-point tax differential al-
lowed Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations.217r In short, it 
was not thought that the excess foreign tax on the latter type of 
corporation should be allowed to wipe out U.S. taxes imposed at 
the regular corporate rate on income earned in countries where the 
foreign taxes involved are less than those imposed by the United 
States. 217" 
It was previously noted that even before enactment of the new 
statutory election, taxpayers had enjoyed what was tantamount to 
an election between the two types of limitation because of their 
right to choose the organizational form in which foreign operations 
would be housed. Whereas averaging, of the type associated with 
the overall limitation, resulted if one foreign subsidiary created 
its own diverse branches (permanent establishments), the strict 
country-by-country approach applied if the American parent itself 
created sister foreign branches or subsidiaries. There are certain 
significant practical differences, as well as similarities, between what 
was formerly, and remains today, only tantamount to an election, 
and the new specific statutory election. 
First, where business reasm~s forced a choice of organizational 
form which itself led to averaging, as in the first of the two types 
2170 H. Rep. No. 1358, 86th Cong., :zd Sess. 5 ( 1960). 
2170 S. Rep. No. 1393, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ( 1960). 
217
• Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., :zd Sess. (1960), § 1(d), adding subsections 904(e) 
and (f) to the Code. 
217
' I d.,§ 2, amending I.R.C., § 1503. 
217
' S. Rep. No. 1393, 86th Con g., 2d Sess. 6 ( 1960). 
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of cases mentioned supra, that organizational form did not and 
will not have the opportunity to invoke a strict country-by-country 
approach to the limitation. The reason: averaging or an overall 
approach results from the way the per-country limitation itself is 
interpreted in that setting. On the other hand, under the new legis-
lation, foreign operations involving sister subsidiaries created by 
the American parent itself enjoy a real option between a strict 
country-by-country approach and an overall approach. 
Second, if it be assumed in the two foregoing situations that both 
domestic parents had computed the limitation by reference to an 
averaging technique, one because of organizational form, the other 
having previously invoked the overall limitation by an election, both 
could still isolate a new substantial operation to be initiated in a yet 
different foreign country if there is concern over the prospect that 
losses there incurred would reduce the credit for foreign taxes paid 
other countries in which profitable businesses had been carried on. 
The American parent which had established sister foreign facilities 
would simply establish another sister facility, simultaneously revok-
ing its election to conform to the overall limitation.217t The other 
American parent would have to deviate from its own organizational 
practice in isolating the new facility; the parent itself, rather than 
its top tier foreign subsidiary, would have to create the new facility. 
The per-country limitation, having previously applied to the parent's 
older chain arrangement though there having an averaging effect, 
would now serve to isolate the losses of the new facility. 
Third, implicit in the solution of the immediately preceding prob-
lem is a yet more sweeping difference between that averaging which 
is accomplished by organizational form under the per-country limi-
tation and that which would be accomplished through invocation of 
the new statutory election. The statutory election to invoke the 
overall limitation affects a company's total or world-wide foreign 
operations, subject only to the previously noted restriction regarding 
Western Hemisphere Corporations. Averaging accomplished, on 
the other hand, solely by reference to the impact of organizational 
form on the per-country limitation can be applied on a selective 
basis, in two different respects. The first is illustrated by a previously 
mentioned example, i.e., by a case where a chain organization is 
used in covering certain foreign countries, averaging being the goal, 
""'It is assumed here that the standard requisite to securing the Treasury's consent 
can be met by reference to the Senate committee's expressed views regarding the con-
templated shape of those standards. 
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with the American parent itself creating sister facilities in all other 
countries where a strict country-by-country approach is desired. The 
second type of selectivity is illustrated by the case where two or 
more top tier subsidiaries, each with its own satellites, are created by 
the parent on the same foreign continent but in different countries, 
or on different continents. While the per-country limitation would 
require averaging of foreign taxes within each chain, the two chains 
would be dealt with separately under that limitation. 
A final major difference between that averaging which is accom-
plished under the per-country limitation by reference to organiza-
tional form and that which could be accomplished through the 
statutory election involves the opportunity, though only in the 
latter case, to resort to the type of hindsight described earlier. 
SEcTION G. TAx IMPLICATIONS RE UsE OF FoREIGN 
HoLDING CoMPANY HoLDING STocK IN ONE 
OR MoRE FoREIGN SuBsiDIARIES 
(a) Introduction.-Various business reasons may make it 
desirable to control several foreign operating subsidiaries through 
a foreign holding company. Control may be more effectively ex-
ercised in this manner than through a domestic department of the 
American enterprise. Financial and commercial policies may be more 
easily integrated into those of the Common Market. Use of Euro-
pean banking facilities, including credit arrangements, may be 
facilitated. Such a holding company could also be used as a buffer 
to shield European profits from American taxation; profits made 
by a subsidiary in one member nation could be deflected to an ex-
panding subsidiary in another, without routing dividends through 
the American parent. The advantage of this practice can be meas-
ured by the degree to which the American tax rate exceeds the 
European tax load imposed on the operating facilities, provided 
the foreign holding company enjoys a favorable tax regime. 
The tax laws of five Common Market countries do not dis-
tinguish between a "pure" holding company and an operating 
company which also holds shares in other operating companies. 
Luxembourg, however, has established a most favorable tax climate 
for pure holding companies. Of the others, the Netherlands pro-
vides the most attractive setting for a holding company arrange-
ment. The tax position of other member nations and of so-called 
tax havens outside the Common Market will be discussed after 
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consideration of the tax implications associated with use of Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands as sites for the holding company. 
(b) Luxembourg as a domicile for the holding company. 
-For all practical purposes, a pure Luxembourg holding company, 
having a paid-in capital of less than $2o,ooo,ooo (L. Fr. r,ooo,-
ooo,ooo), is exempt from income as well as property taxes. More-
over, dividends and interest which it pays out are also exempt 
from the tax on movable capital even where payment is made to 
a nonresident. 
The one significant exception to the foregoing involves the sit-
uation where the Luxembourg holding company holds shares in a 
local Luxembourg operating subsidiary. Dividends paid by the 
latter will be subjected to the normal withholding tax on movable 
capital. 
In the end, Luxembourg holding companies of the type first 
described will pay only three taxes, all of which are related to the 
capital structure: 
(I) Droit d'apport is imposed on the payment of capital 
into the corporation, the rate being ·3 2 o/o. This tax is also levied 
at the time the company is liquidated; 
( 2) Droit de timbre is imposed at the rate of . r% on the 
issuance of shares and debentures, measured by their values; and 
(3) Droit d'abonnement is an annual tax on the capital of the 
holding company, the rate being .r6%. 
Another class of Luxembourg holding companies are those to 
which a foreign corporation has paid in capital of $2o,ooo,ooo 
( L. Fr. I ,ooo,ooo,ooo) or more. These, known as Societe holding 
Milliardaire, are free of the above described Droit d' abonnement 
as well as normal income and property taxes. They are subject, 
however, to the Droit d' apport at the time capital is paid in, and 
to the Droit de timbre on the issuance of shares and debentures, 
both being geared m this instance to a regressive rate schedule, 
as in Table III R. 
TABLE III R 
Droit Droit 
Droit de fl alue de 
Paid-in Capital d'apport I' alue of Shares timbre of Debentures timbre 
First $2o,ooo,ooo ·32% First $zo,ooo,ooo .Io/o First $6o,ooo,ooo .Io/o 
Next $zo,ooo,ooo .24% Next $zo,ooo,ooo .os% Next $zo,ooo,ooo .os% 
Next $zo,ooo,ooo .rz% Next $zo,ooo,ooo .04% Next $zo,ooo,ooo .025% 
Next $zo,ooo,ooo .o6% Next $zo,ooo,ooo .oz% Balance .oz% 
Next $zo,ooo,ooo .or% Balance .005% 
Balance .015% 
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From Table III R, it appears that the total tax at the time 
capital is paid in, and shares or debentures are issued, will run at 
least to $S4,ooo, assuming a minimum $2o,ooo,ooo is paid in. 
Apart from the Droit de timbre, a special annual tax is levied on 
this second class of larger holding companies, covering interest 
paid on debentures issued by the holding company, dividends 
paid out on its stock, and salaries or other remuneration paid 
directors and managers who do not stay in Luxembourg at least 
6 months out of the year. Interest paid out on debentures is taxed 
at a uniform rate of 3%· The rate on dividends and the type of 
remuneration described above falls, however, into two classes, 
each class being determined by reference to the amount of interest 
paid out, as in Table III S. 
TABLE III s 
Amount of Rate on 
Amount of Interest Dividends and Special Dividends and 
Paid on Debentures Class of Remuneration R emuner atio n 
Class I 
$2,ooo,ooo or less a. First $I ,ooo,ooo or less .IS% 
b. Excess over $I ,ooo,ooo .I % 
Class II 
Over $2,ooo,ooo a. To the extent the 
amount is less than the 
amount by which inter-
est payments exceed 
$2,000,000 J.O% 
b. Next $I ,ooo,ooo .IS% 
c. Balance . I % 
The minimum amount assessed under this special tax is $J2,ooo 
(L. Fr. I,6oo,ooo) per year. 
In analyzing the amount which could be subjected to the fore-
going taxes, it must be remembered that the holding company will 
not always receive the gross amount of dividends declared by the 
operating facilities, for certain Common Market countries will 
have imposed a withholding tax on dividends declared by operating 
facilities domiciled there, as follows: 
Country Tax 
Belgium Taxe Mobiliere, 30% 
France Withholding tax, 24% 
Germany Tax on income from movable capital, 25% 
Italy No dividend tax 
Netherlands Dividend tax, 15% 
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(c) Netherlands as a domicile for the holding company.-
The Netherlands does not confine its favorable tax climate to 
"pure" holding companies. Equally attractive benefits are available 
if an American enterprise chooses to have its operating subsidiary 
in the Netherlands hold the shares in other European operating 
companies. 
Dividends received by a Netherlands corporation from foreign 
companies are exempt from the regular taxes which the Netherlands 
would otherwise impose if ( 1) the Netherlands corporation holds 
at least 25% of the foreign corporation's shares and (2) the 
foreign corporation itself was liable for a domiciliary income tax 
on its profits. 
By treaty, the Netherlands has also abandoned the right to 
tax dividends which the Netherlands corporation would in turn 
pay the American parent corporation. Thus, apart from the regis-
tration fees and stamp duties which would be imposed on the for-
mation of the Netherlands corporation (see PART I) dividends 
received by the Netherlands holding company and distributed to 
the American parent would have been subjected only to the with-
holding taxes imposed by certain Common Market countries at the 
time the operating subsidiaries distributed their profits, as follows: 
Country Tax 
Belgium Taxe Mobiliere, 30% 
France No withholding tax (Treaty) 
Italy No dividend tax 
Germany Tax on income from movable capital, 25% 
Luxembourg Tax on income from movable capital, 15% 
Netherlands No dividend tax 
(d) Other Common Market countries as domiciles for 
the holding company.-Common Market countries other than Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands do not offer special benefits for 
holding company arrangements. For example, dividends received 
by a German corporation are tax exempt only if received from a 
German subsidiary, and even then the receiving company will 
suffer a 36% tax if the amount received is not immediately dis-
tributed by it. Nor do France 218 and Belgium provide exemptions 
=The French 24 o/o withholding tax will apply upon receipt of the dividend, though 
upon re-distribution of that dividend by the holding company another withholding tax 
will not be applied. Upon the receipt of the dividend, the holding company is also 
allowed a 75% dividends-received deduction for purposes of the regular French cor-
porate income tax. The 25o/o not neutralized is taxed as a means of compensating for 
that portion of overhead expenses which, though deducted by the parent, were prop-
erly attributable to the dividend. 
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for dividends received. However, when the holding company it-
self distributes profits derived from dividends, those two countries 
do not again exact their respective withholding tax, and Taxe 
Mobiliere, in the instance where a subsidiary had been the source 
of the holding company's earnings. 
Finally, on formation of a holding company, all Common Market 
countries except Luxembourg exact the regular registration fees 
and stamp duties imposed, as discussed in PART I, on formation 
of corporations generally. Luxembourg's special arrangements were 
considered in sub-topic (b), supra. 
(e) Incorporation of the holding company in a so-called 
"tax haven."-The term, "tax haven," is usually applied to a 
country which does not exact any tax, or at most only a nominal 
amount, from holding companies. As previously indicated, Lux-
embourg is the only Common Market country which fits that 
classification, though the Netherlands also may be considered as 
such. Among non-member European nations, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein are the most frequently mentioned tax havens. 
Holding companies in Switzerland do not pay an income tax on 
dividends received. Since cantonal (state) tax laws are generally 
more burdensome than the Swiss federal income tax, it is also im-
portant to note that some cantonal laws also provide an exemption 
for interest and royalties received, as well as dividends received. 
On the other hand, federal, cantonal, and sometimes even local 
property taxes are imposed on a holding company's net wealth 
or paid-in capital. While the rates of these taxes rarely run as high 
as I%, dividends paid out by the holding company to the American 
parent company will suffer a withholding tax of s% provided the 
American parent owns at least 95% of the holding company's stock. 
Otherwise, the rate would be rs%. 
Liechtenstein also frees dividends received from its income tax. 
While the holding company will suffer a . I% tax on its property, 
an agreement as to this can be made with the tax department 
covering a 30-year period. Finally, dividends paid by the holding 
company to the American parent will be subjected to a 3% coupon 
tax. 
When account is taken of the 5% and 3% taxes which Switzer-
land and Liechtenstein would impose, respectively, on dividends 
paid by the holding company to the American parent, and of the 
property taxes which would be assessed in each of those countries, 
it should be apparent that they do not offer holding companies any 
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significant tax advantage superior to those available in certain 
Common Market countries. While the tax which those two coun-
tries would normally impose on dividends to the American parent 
would not be incurred if the holding company retained its profits 
for expansion purposes, such accumulation would serve to increase 
the company's property taxes. It should also be noted that the two 
countries in question do not have as many tax treaties with Common 
Market countries as the latter have among themselves. In some 
instances, this may further prejudice their selection, particularly 
a choice of Liechtenstein, as the domicile for the holding company. 
Common Market countries will assess the following withholding 
taxes on dividends paid by operating subsidiaries domiciled there 
to a holding company domiciled in one of those two countries as 
appears in Table III T. 









TABLE III T 
Tax Assessed by Domicile of 
Operating Subsidiary on Dividends 





Comparison of these figures with those set forth in sub-topics (b) 
and (c) as applied to Luxembourg and the Nether lands indicates 
that in some instances the latter two countries enjoy an advantage 
in this respect. 
SUBSECTION 2. AMERICAN TAX IMPLICATIONS RE USE OF 
A FOREIGN BASE COMPANY 
(a) Introductory note.-Following consideration of the 
American tax implications associated with a base company ar-
rangement during the operational phase, certain problems pecul-
iarly incident to the creation of such companies will be analyzed. 
(b) General tax implications.-With respect to the normal 
operational stage, it is from two principles that the practical 
American tax advantages of the base company arrangement arise. 
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The first such principle is common to all foreign corporations, 
namely, that the income which the foreign base company derives 
from Common Market sources will not be included in American 
gross income 219 unless distributed as a dividend to the American 
parent. Thus, as indicated in the Introduction to this Section, where 
the effective American tax rate is higher than the total effective 
income tax rate imposed by the country which houses an operating 
facility, the latter facility's profit could be deflected through the 
base company to other expanding foreign facilities without suffering 
what may be an expensive tax detour through the American 
parent. 
Fear that exchange controls will emerge in the operational coun-
try may actually be the only immediate reason for a current or 
timely extraction of profits made by the operating facility located 
there; these profits could be stored in a base company situated 
elsewhere until such time as they are needed for expansion of 
foreign facilities in yet other countries. Storing them in such a 
company in this circumstance, instead of remitting them to the 
United States, may also be motivated by a desire to avoid the 
risks associated with the American tax on unreasonable accumula-
tions.220 As noted in PART I, generally speaking the Common 
Market countries have not resorted to this type of penalty tax. 
The first principle, that a base company's income is not reachable 
by American authorities until distributed as a dividend to the 
American parent, also enables this type of organizational structure 
to accommodate, without American tax cost, dividend requirements 
of European interests which may own shares in the operational 
subsidiaries. The amount which otherwise would have been dis-
tributed as the American parent's share would be deflected to the 
foreign base company. Where outside interests are involved in 
this way, the base company type of organizational structure would 
not be so acceptable, however, if the outsiders owned more than 
so% of the voting stock of one or more of the operating companies. 
As is explained more fully in Subsection 2 (c) of Section E, supra, 
the American parent's eventual deemed-paid credit for foreign 
income taxes of an operating company will be lost unless the foreign 
base company, in which the American parent must hold at least 
219 I.R.C., § 882 (b). This principle is discussed more fully in Section C, supra. 
""'Since the foreign profit will not have become a part of American gross income, 
it would not be a part of the base to which the penalty tax attaches, i.e., "accumulated 
taxable income." I.R.C., § 531. 
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w% of the voting stock, in turn owns at least so% of the voting 
stock of the sub-subsidiary.220a 
The second basic tax principle to which a base company arrange-
ment's tax advantage is attributable involves another provision 
bearing on the credit. As was also explained more fully in Sub-
section 2 of Section E, supra, when profits derived by a holding 
company from two or more Common Market countries are ulti-
mately remitted to the States, an averaging arrangement 221 is 
read into the per-country limitation 222 on the credit for foreign 
income taxes. Normally, this will be advantageous in the instance 
where one operating facility is situated in a low income tax country 
like Italy, another being in a country having a higher effective rate 
than the United States. By treating the foreign income as though 
derived from the one country in which the base company is in-
corporated, and by attributing to that single country the total for-
eign tax paid to the operational countries, there is less likelihood 
of prejudice from the per-country limitation. 
In at least one circumstance, however, the averaging arrangement 
could have an unfavorable effect. This may be so where the base 
company owns branch operations, as distinguished from subsid-
iaries, in two or more countries and one of the branches suffers 
a loss, say of$ so,ooo, while the other makes a profit, say of $ IOO,-
ooo on which it paid $5o,ooo in foreign income taxes. In that event, 
averaging will serve to make the numerator (foreign source net 
or "taxable income"-$ so,ooo) of the per-country limitation less 
than the profits of the one profitable branch ($roo,ooo) which 
did pay a foreign tax ( $ so,ooo). The effect is to create a greater 
possibility, in our illustration-a certainty, that the average effec-
tive rate of foreign taxes on foreign source income, here roo%, 
will exceed the effective American rate. The consequent loss of a 
current credit for part of the foreign tax, assuming a distribution 
by the base company of the profitable branch's gain, would not have 
been suffered currently if the operating facilities had been housed 
in sub-subsidiaries, rather than branches. With a sub-subsidiary 
organizational structure, averaging on a current basis could have 
been avoided; foreign source income of the base company and of 
""'"This difficulty will be less serious if Congress ultimately passes a bill which was 
approved by the House in the 1960 session but which the Senate did not have time to 
consider. That bill would reduce the required degree of ownership from 50% to zoo/o. 
H.R. n,681, 86th Cong., zd Sess. (1960). 
2:l
1 I.T. Regs.,§ 1.902·1(c). 
022 I.R.C., § 904, discussed generally in Section C, supra. 
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the American parent would have been based solely on the dividend 
declared by the profitable operating subsidiary, with the effective 
foreign tax rate in our illustration being 50%, not IOO%. 
Because of legislation enacted in late 1960 and discussed more 
fully in Section F, supra, averaging can now also be accomplished 
without regard to the form of organization, i.e., can even be ap-
plied where the American parent itself creates sister facilities in 
two or more countries. As noted in Section F, an election by such a 
taxpayer to conform to an "overall" limitation, rather than the per-
country limitation, serves as the new statutory device by which that 
domestic parent would shift to an averaging technique. But if 
averaging in the setting of that sister-type organizational structure 
is really important in order to level out high- and low-tax countries, 
the parent may be confronted with a hard choice at a later point 
when it contemplates opening a new facility in a yet different foreign 
country from which, for a few years, it anticipates losses. As noted 
in the preceding paragraph, averaging these losses in with the older 
profitable foreign operations may reduce the credit allowed for 
taxes actually paid those countries in which profitable operations 
are conducted. Of course, this could be avoided by obtaining the 
Treasury's consent to revocation of the election to conform to the 
overall limitation. But the price would be a forfeiture of the right 
to average the profits from those high- and low-tax countries which 
house the profitable operations, for revocation would mean that a 
strict country-by-country approach would be applied as a limitation 
on all foreign operations. This world-wide statutory choice between 
one or the other type of limitation is not required, however, where 
averaging of high- and low-tax countries is accomplished solely by 
reference to organizational structure because of the way the per-
country limitation itself is interpreted. A parent which had enjoyed 
averaging only because it had operated through a base company 
could isolate what will initially be a new loss operation in a yet 
different country by creating its own facility there, the per-country 
limitation serving to prevent the loss there from affecting the aver-
aging which is applied to the operations conducted through the base 
company. Theoretically, and perhaps even from a practical stand-
point, this too is not without a price tag. One advantage normally 
associated with base company operations will be lost. Absent some 
inter-company loan arrangements, if profits of the base company 
operations are to be used in creating the new facility, they must first 
be routed through the parent and become a part of American gross 
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income, for as previously noted, isolation will be accomplished only 
if the parent itself creates the new facility. The practical disadvan-
tage of this is not likely to be very great, however, if averaging was 
really important to the base company operation. That fact alone 
probably means that the average foreign rate suffered by the base 
company operations comes fairly close to the American rate, in 
which event, because of the credit, the additional American tax is 
not likely to be of overriding significance. 
The final operational problem in base company settings involves 
the policing problem. 
Absent distributions to the American parent, transactions be-
tween the base company and the operating subsidiaries would not 
be policed by the Internal Revenue Service under § 482 of the 
Code. But at the point of distribution to the American parent, it 
is entirely possible that the Service is free to invoke § 48 2 in 
applying the American concept of "accumulated profits" to the 
various organizational tiers; only in this way could it effectively 
preserve the integrity of and difference between, the one-tier and 
two-tier deemed-paid credit arrangements. In this connection, the 
congressional adoption of an additional policing measure in late 
1960 is not without meaning. A new bill clearly establishes the right 
of the Treasury to obtain from domestic parents various types of 
information relative to their foreign subsidiaries and sub-subsidi-
aries, including not only balance sheets, but also data pertaining to 
inter-company transactions and the make-up of the accumulated 
earnings and profits of such foreign corporations.222a Moreover, 
prior to distribution by the base company, inter-company arrange-
ments between it and operating companies would fall within the 
policing jurisdiction of the foreign countries. Also in this connection, 
it should not be forgotten that most bilateral tax treaties provide 
that transactions will be unscrambled for tax purposes if they are 
not entered into in accordance with standards comparable to those 
which would be applied by strangers. 
(c) American tax problems peculiarly incident to the crea-
tion of a base company.-The first of the three prime American 
tax problems immediately incident to the creation of a foreign hold-
ing company involves the sweeping response made by Congress to 
a fairly limited and obviously unwarranted type of avoidance device 
practiced in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Some taxpayers who 
owned securities which had increased substantially in value sought 
.... Note 194a, supra. 
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to reduce these to cash without suffering any tax whatever. Their 
first step involved a tax-free transfer of the securities in exchange 
for the entire stock of a foreign corporation created in a country 
which did not tax capital gains. In seeking immunity from American 
tax with respect to this first step, reliance was placed upon a non-
recognition provision similar to § 35 r of the Code. The foreign 
holding company would then make a tax-free sale of the portfolio 
for cash which it then transferred to a newly created American 
corporation in exchange for all of its stock, the latter being dis-
tributed to the original American taxpayer in reliance on the re-
organization provisions. Through the new wholly owned American 
corporation, the taxpayer would now control cash which had been 
realized without tax cost, provided the judiciary approved the 
application of the two nonrecognition provisions. In 1932, a con-
gressional committee expressed some doubt as to what the judiciary 
might do with the latter question; 223 accordingly, it proposed 224 
and the Congress adopted two complementary remedies which 
literally go far beyond the dimensions of the original problem. 
The first such remedy,225 as currently designed,226 neutralized 
the right under § 3 5 r to make a tax-free transfer of appreciated 
property to a controlled foreign corporation unless, before the 
exchange, it is established to the satisfaction of the Treasury that 
the exchange is not "in pursuance of a plan having as one of its 
principal purposes the avoidance of federal income taxes." A like 
limitation is placed upon the reorganization and tax-free inter-
corporate liquidation provisions.227 
Though the practice which gave rise to this grant of adminis-
trative discretion involved attempts by taxpayers to avoid the 
American capital gain tax while realizing effective control over 
cash, the statutory language itself-in identifying the type of 
transfers covered-is sufficiently broad to encompass any transfer 
of appreciated stock in foreign operating subsidiaries to a foreign 
base or holding company. Moreover, the delegation of administra-
tive discretion would also seem to be sufficiently broad to permit 
the Commissioner to deny nonrecognition if he determines that one 
of the principal purposes is to avoid the American tax on future 
ordinary income through use of the base company as a storehouse 
223 H. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., rst Sess. 20 (1932). 
""'Ibid. 
205 Rev. Act of 1932, § II2 (k) . 
... I.R.C., § 367. 
""
1 Ibid. 
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or deflection instrumentality for the profits of operating facilities. 
In any event, where creation of a base company is postponed until 
after one or more operating companies have expanded out of re-
tained profits, thus increasing the value of the stock, the Commis-
sioner's determination must first be secured if the American parent 
is to have any hope for nonrecognition of what would be realized 
gain on transferring the appreciated stock to the base company. 
Presumably because the issue in each case is largely one of fact, the 
Service has refrained from publishing any rulings which otherwise 
might have served as guideposts. 
The second or complementary remedy enacted by Congress in 
1932 is similar to the first, 228 except as now written ( 1) it relates 
only to a transfer of "stock or securities," (2) it imposes a 27%% 
excise tax on any appreciation in value, and (3) it does not have 
a supplementary provision which, following application of the tax, 
steps up the basis of the stock received in the base company.229 Thus 
while transfer of a foreign branch operation which had appreciated 
in value could be prejudiced by the Treasury only under the first 
provision,230 a transfer of stock in operating companies could be 
affected by either provision. 
Creation of the base company before stock of the operating 
facilities has appreciated in value through retained earnings will, 
of course, avoid the immediate costs described above. It should also 
be clear that the above provisions will constitute less of a problem 
where the operating subsidiaries are really sales organizations which 
do not own substantial assets. Their future profits could be deflected 
to the base company which might in turn invest them in manufac-
turing facilities located in the most appropriate country or coun-
tries. 
But even in the two recited circumstances where nonrecognition 
of immediate gain will not be a serious problem, it would be wise 
to see that the holding company actually performs a meaningful 
control function; otherwise, there is some risk that it may be caught 
up in any drive which the Service may some day launch in an effort 
to neutralize-as a recognizable tax entity-any foreign corpora-
tion which serves only as a passive receptacle of, and shield for, 
profits earned by operating sub-subsidiaries.231 While there is noth-
ing to indicate that such a drive is about to be launched, or-assum-
... Rev. Act of 1932, § 1250, now I.R.C., § 1491. 
"""I.R.C., § 358 complements §§ 367 and 351, but not § 1491. 
330 I.R.C., § 351, on which § 367 rides "piggy-back," relates to transfers of "property." 
""'Cf. Aldon Homes, Inc. 33 T.C. 582 (1959). 
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ing a "tidy" arrangement-that it would be successful, the same 
could have been said of Clifford trusts before the Treasury launched 
what turned out to be a successful attack against them.232 
By legislation enacted in late 1960, Congress also increased the 
likelihood that the Treasury would learn of the creation or reor-
ganization of foreign corporations in which American individuals 
or corporations hold a 5% interest, direct or indirect, or with respect 
to which Americans will serve as officers or directors. The Treasury 
is now empowered by regulation to prescribe the contents of an in-
formation return which such officers, directors, or stockholders 
must submit upon the creation or reorganization of a foreign cor-
poration with which they are associated.232a At this writing, the 
Treasury had not yet had a chance to promulgate such regulations. 
The second major American tax problem immediately incident to 
the creation of a foreign holding company involves licensing ar-
rangements. Assume that the American parent had previously 
licensed its patents to one or more of the foreign operating sub-
sidiaries. While the deemed-paid credit for foreign income taxes is 
normally allowed only in connection with the receipt of dividends, 
the discussion in Subsection 4 of Section C, supra, indicated, in the 
absence of dividends, that a credit would be allowed under certain 
circumstances upon the receipt of royalties.233 The advantages of 
that arrangement, as outlined in the previously mentioned Section, 
will probably be lost if stock of the licensee-subsidiary is transferred 
to the holding company. According to the Code, this unique credit 
arrangement is authorized only where an American corporation 
owns "directly or indirectly, 100% of all classes of stock" of the 
foreign licensee-corporation. Transfer of the latter's stock to the 
holding company would vest direct ownership in a foreign entity. 
While the statutory provision also literally encompasses situations 
where the American enterprise ((indirectly" owns all shares in the 
licensee-corporation, it does not literally incorporate the precise 
rules of constructive ownership reflected in other parts of the Code. 
Indeed, certain conditions set forth in the provision seem to suggest 
that ownership through an intermediate corporation is not con-
232 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 6o S. Ct. 554 (1940). 
232
" Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), § 7, amending l.R.C., § 6046. Also 
enacted was a provision preserving the opportunity to obtain the 85% dividends re-
ceived deduction with respect to dividends paid out of earnings and profits which were 
accumulated at a time when a corporation was domestic to the United States, but where 
the dividend was actually paid after the corporation had taken on a foreign com-
plexion through the tax-free reorganization provisions. Pub. Law 86-779, 86th Cong., 
zd Sess. (196o), § 3, amending I.R.C., § 243. 
"''' l.R.C., § 902(d). 
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templated. And if not, nothing would be gained by entering into a 
substitute licensing arrangement with the holding company, the 
stock of which would be ((directly" owned by an American corpora-
tion. The statute specifically prescribes that the roo% ownership 
must relate to a foreign corporation engaged in ((manufacturing, 
production, or mining," 234 a standard to which a pure holding 
company would not conform. The difficulties just described would be 
avoided, of course, if the operations were conducted through perma-
nent establishments (branches) of the base company, rather than 
through sub-subsidiaries. 
The third major American tax problem incident to the creation 
of a foreign holding company involves the case where stock in the 
American parent is centralized in a very few persons. Viewing this 
circumstance solely in practical terms, the parent's foreign holding 
company would be closely akin to a personal holding company. At 
least, since 1937, Congress has thought the similarity to be sufficient 
in some cases to justify such an equation. The prejudicial quality of 
that equation stems from the treatment accorded true foreign "per-
sonal" holding companies. 
Such a company is said to exist whenever ( r) more than so% 
in value of its outstanding stock is owned, "directly or indirectly," by 
or for not more than five American residents or citizens, and ( 2) at 
least 6o% (in some cases, so%) of its gross income is so-called 
"foreign personal holding company income," i.e., is derived in the 
form of dividends, interest, royalties, etc.235 Generally speaking, 
when these two standards are met, the foreign personal holding com-
pany income is taxable to the holding company's stockholders 
whether or not distributed.236 This means, when coupled with the 
complementary doctrine of constructive ownership,237 that an Amer-
ican parent which owns all of the stock of a pure foreign holding 
company will be taxable on its undistributed earnings if over half 
the stock of the parent is divided among no more than five stock-
holders. 
This neutralization of the tax advantages otherwise associated 
with foreign base companies could be avoided if the base company 
itself also has an active operational function from which it derives 
sufficient "gross income" to enable it to fall short of the second of 
""'Ibid. Italics added. 
230 l.R.C., § 552. 
238 l.R.C., § 551. 
231 l.R.C., §§ 554 and 544· 
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the two previously enumerated definitional standards. But that the 
active operational function must be truly significant is at once recog-
nizable when account is taken of the fact that the standard is geared 
to "gross income," not gross receipts. For example, if it engaged 
only in a selling activity, only that part of its gross receipts in excess 
of the cost of goods sold would be deemed "gross income" for this 
purpose. 
SECTION H. FuRTHER TAX IMPLICATIONS IF A COMMON 
MARKET FACILITY ExPORTs OuTsiDE THE 
CoMMON MARKET 
An American enterprise may contemplate that any Common 
Market facility which it creates will also export to countries outside 
the Community. While sub-topic (c) of Section D, supra, indicated 
that any Common Market nation in which the facility might be 
located would free the export transaction itself from turnover tax, 
it also noted some variation among member nations in the degree 
to which any turnover tax previously paid at earlier stages in the 
production process would be refunded. Comparison of the rates 
which each might have applied in those earlier stages appears, supra, 
in Section B. 
While all Common Market countries in which the facility might 
be located would more or less free the exported item from the im-
pact of its turnover tax, all would impose an income tax on any 
profit derived by the facility from the export. According to the dis-
cussion in Section D, supra, a double income tax would not normally 
be suffered, however, if the goods were sold by the facility directly to 
customers in another member nation. Normally, the latter's income 
tax would only be applied if a permanent establishment had also 
been created there. There may be cases, however, where importing 
nations outside the Common Market will seek to reach the ex-
porter's profit whether or not a permanent establishment of the type 
heretofore described is maintained therein. To avoid this possibility, 
Common Market nations have entered into or are negotiating bi-
lateral treaties with a number of non-member nations. The status 
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PART IV. THE PROBLEM OF CONVERTING FOREIGN. 
PROFITS AND TAXES INTO AMERICAN DOLLARS, 
AS IT AFFECTS AMERICAN TAXES ON THOSE 
ENGAGED IN FOREIGN TRADE OR BUSINESS 
SECTION A. INTRODUCTION 
Even those American businesses which engage only in domestic 
activity are affected by constant changes which take place in the value 
of the dollar. Cost of living adjustments in wages scales, pursuant 
to labor contracts, may be matched on the tax side by realization of, 
and a tax on, illusory capital gains. Again, predictions regarding 
future monetary changes may well affect a choice of inventory 
methods for tax as well as other purposes, leading, illustratively, to 
the adoption of L.I.F.O. While choices such as this may affect the 
amount of ultimate tax on a business which confines its endeavors 
to the United States, from the beginning of American tax history 
each stage of the computation has always been reflected in terms of 
American dollars assumed to be stable. 
When businesses, accustomed only to domestic activity, first began 
to conduct foreign trade in countries with gold-backed, fully con-
vertible currencies enjoying a stable rate of exchange, their account-
ing problems did become more involved, but in that earlier day 
such complications had little American tax significance. Those busi-
nesses which paid or accrued their foreign income taxes in a stable, 
easily converted foreign currency and went through the year without 
having converted their foreign profits into American dollars did 
have to resolve such questions as, ( 1) the choice of a date on which 
conversion into American dollars would be effected, and ( 2) in the 
case of a branch operation, whether the conversion would relate 
only to foreign profits computed in the manner of domestic profits 
or would penetrate into the net worth position of the foreign opera-
tion, reflecting a profit or loss based on a comparison-in dollar 
values-of net worth at the beginning and end of the year. But tax-
wise these questions were of little practical significance when the 
British pound was equal to $4.86 in American money, with a maxi-
mum variation of about 2¢ in each direction, and when every reason-
able man had the right to believe this state of affairs would continue 
as an undisputed fact of economic life. 
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Foreign exchange questions became highly relevant for tax pur-
poses, however, when the devaluation process of foreign currencies 
set in. 
An additional complication developed when blocked or re-
stricted currencies became commonplace. We are familiar with a 
few American tax concepts which permit deferment of taxes even 
on certain domestic earnings which have been locked up and thus 
rendered completely unavailable for current use. Employer contri-
butions to pension trusts in which an employee-taxpayer has a vested 
right furnish the best illustration. Foreign profits reflected in blocked 
foreign currency added this question of possible deferment to those 
previously enumerated. Ancillary to it was the further question of 
whether a deduction for expenses associated with blocked income 
should also be deferred. Finally, blocked or restricted foreign cur-
rency set the stage for three rates of exchange-the official, the 
black market, and the commercial rate in the United States. The 
problem of choosing from among these was added to the previous 
list. 
The four sections which follow deal with the more typical tax 
accounting complications associated with the conversion and defer-
ment problems. The first relates to the method by which foreign 
profits will be reflected as well as to the timing question, absent 
blockage or other restriction. The discussion here assumes an under-
standing, however, of the general tax differences noted in PARTS 
II and III with respect to direct exports and other foreign opera-
tions conducted through a permanent establishment or foreign 
subsidiary. 
The second section concerns the possibility of deferring blocked 
or restricted foreign profits, while the third focuses on the choice of 
the market place which will be resorted to for the purpose of fixing 
the conversion rate. 
The last section explores the conversion problem as it affects the 
credit for foreign income taxes which have been paid or accrued in 
a foreign currency. 
SEcTION B. METHOD AND TIME FoR CoNVERTING 
FOREIGN PROFITS INTO DOLLARS, ABSENT 
BLOCKAGE OR RESTRICTION 
(a) Introductory note.-For tax purposes, the time and 
method for converting into dollar values foreign profits tied up in 
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foreign currency will differ, depending on whether the American 
business is engaged only in direct exports to foreign customers or 
instead operates a foreign facility through a permanent establish-
ment or foreign subsidiary. Accordingly, the problem must be dis-
cussed separately in these three settings. 
(b) Conversion problem re profits from direct exports to 
foreign customers.-There is nothing to indicate that American 
manufactures engaged in direct exports to foreign customers are 
freed from the usual rule requiring sales to be reflected on an ac-
crual basis for federal tax purposes.1 Not all such vendors, how-
ever, will encounter exchange problems and possible attendant tax 
complications. Such problems will be avoided, for example, if the 
American enterprise sells its product to, say, a Netherlands importer 
who agrees to make payment in American dollars. The need to ex-
change Dutch guilders for American dollars and the attendant prob-
lems associated with rates of exchange rest wholly upon the Dutch 
firm. Even if the American exporter sells goods under an agreement 
to accept payment in guilders, it does not necessarily follow that the 
exchange problem will complicate its tax affairs. The taxpayer may 
design the transaction so that accrual, payment, and conversion take 
place on the same date, the overall effect being akin to payment in 
dollars. In this connection, even accrual basis taxpayers engaged only 
in domestic business have some control over the time when a sale 
must be brought into gross receipts. According to the regulations, 
"a taxpayer engaged in a manufacturing business may account for 
sales of his product when the goods are shipped, when the product 
is delivered or accepted, or when title to the goods passes to the 
customer, whether or not billed, depending upon the method regu-
larly employed in keeping his books." 2 If payment in a foreign cur-
rency and conversion into American dollars are normally expected 
to coincide with delivery, the regulation would permit the latter to 
be chosen as the occasion for accrual, but presumably only if the 
taxpayer's books were regularly kept in that manner also with re-
spect to domestic sales. Even where domestic sales have regularly 
been reflected in gross receipts as of the date of sale, it still might 
'The regulations do not distinguish between foreign and domestic sales. I.T. Regs., 
§ 1.446-1(c) (i) (iv) (b). The Tax Court has said that a taxpayer who accrued such 
profits properly reflected the item. Foundation Co., 14 T.C. 1333 (1950), Acq., C.B. 
1950-2, 2. While certain general rulings of the Service pick the time of receipt as the 
pivotal dateline, it is believed that the facts to which those rulings were addressed 
involved other types of income in the setting of a cash basis taxpayer. E.g., see O.D. 
419, C.B. 2, 6o (1920). This was certainly the case in Rev. Rul. 291, C.B. 1953-2, 42, 48. 
"I.T. Regs., § 1.446-r(c) (i) (ii). (Italics added.) 
55 6 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
be possible to design sales to foreign customers so that the benefits 
and burdens of ownership passed only upon delivery.3 
In the absence of some such arrangements, it is possible, though 
not probable, that in the course of the total transaction, three dif-
ferent rates of exchange may be in effect; at the time of accrual, 
later at the time of payment in the foreign currency, and still later 
on the date of conversion into American dollars. A change in the 
conversion rate, occurring between any two of these events, will com-
picate the tax problem. 
In one sense, the sale transaction itself is closed on the date of 
accrual; the then conversion rate must be applied to the amount 
thereafter receivable in foreign currency in order to determine the 
amount includible in gross receipts. That same rate fixes the basis 
for the foreign currency when later received.4 The fact that the dol-
lar value_ of the foreign account receivable may have declined as of 
the end of the taxable year because of a change in exchange rates 
apparently does not serve, in the eyes of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice, to justify a loss deduction for the exporter,5 though a contrary 
rule is now recognized in the case of foreign branch operations. 6 
A second transaction has not yet been closed. Assuming, however, 
that the American exporter does not thereafter hold the foreign 
currency, when received, as an investment, subsequent conversion 
of it into dollars at a different rate of exchange than prevailed at the 
time of accrual will give rise to further ordinary income or to an 
ordinary loss, depending on whether intervening changes, if any, 
in the exchange rate were favorable or unfavorable.7 
(c) Conversion problem re profits derived through a for-
eign permanent establishment.-Theoretically, and certainly for 
jurisdictional purposes, § 6 I of the Code has always included in the 
gross income of an American corporation the gross from all sources, 
foreign as well as domestic. As early as 1920, however, the In-
3 While treaties with 5 of the Common Market countries would guarantee immunity 
of the profit from foreign income taxes, such an arrangement might lead to multiple 
turnover taxes. See discussion in PART II, supra. 
'Foundation Co., 14 T.C. 1333 ( 1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2. Cf. Maurice P. O'Meara, 
8 T.C. 622 (1947). 
6 G.C.M. 4954, C.B. VII-2, 293 (1928). Cf. O.D. 590, C.B. 3, 75 (r92o) and Joyce-
Koeble Co., 6 B.T.A. 403 (1927), Acq., C.B. VI-2, 4· Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. 
United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) r68 F. Supp. 542, indicates, however, that the government 
has on occasion entered into an agreement with taxpayers permitting accounts to be 
discounted at the end of the year by reference to shifts in exchange rates. 
• See discussion in sub-topic (c), infra. 
7 Foundation Co., If T.C. 1333 ( 1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2. 
TAXATION 557 
ternal Revenue Service ruled in O.D. 5 so that only the net result 
of a foreign branch's operations need be consolidated with that of 
the American enterprise in the instance where the branch kept a 
separate set of records.8 This accommodation of the jurisdictional 
rule to an accounting principle was complemented in the same rul-
ing by a more detailed outline of the accounting technique approved 
by the Service in determining the net result of the foreign branch's 
operation. In essence, it established what has been described as the 
"profit-and-loss" method. The branch's profits were to be deter-
mined first in terms of the foreign currency, though in accordance, 
of course, with American law with respect to inclusions, deductions, 
capitalizable items, etc. 9 From this figure, remittances during the 
year-expressed in the foreign currency-were to be subtracted, 
though these were then to be picked up by the American enterprise 
at the rate of conversion which applied as of the date of remittance. 
The balance of the branch's net profits, expressed initially in the 
foreign currency, were to be accounted for by the American enter-
prise as of the end of the year, the rate of exchange on that date 
to be applied in converting the unremitted foreign profits into Ameri-
can dollars. 
Under the foregoing method, a branch might show a taxable 
profit though unfavorable mid-year shifts in the rate of exchange 
would show that the dollar value of its current assets had declined 
from the beginning to the end of the year. In just such a situation, 
an American enterprise sought to reflect a foreign branch's opera-
tions in accordance with what has become known as the net worth 
or balance sheet method. In short, from the branch's tentative profit 
-computed first according to a profit-and-loss method, it deducted 
the dollar amount which its current assets had declined in value, 
from the beginning to the end of the year, solely because of un-
favorable changes in exchange rates. 
The government argued that this improperly permitted the tax-
payer to take advantage of what was essentially an unrealized loss. 
However, a court sided with the taxpayer; it rejected the notion 
that foreign currency and other current assets required incident to 
the operation of a branch engaged, illustratively, in a manufactur-
ing operation should be treated like fixed assets with reference to 
which an unrealized decline between the two points of time in 
•c.B. 2, 61 (192o). 
• That American law controls inclusions, etc., see PART III, supra. 
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American-dollar value was admittedly not recognizable for tax pur-
poses.10 In calling for a comparative translation of the current assets 
into dollar values at the two points of time, the court agreed that 
the net worth adjustment was proper with respect to inventories, 
accounts receivable and payable, cash, and bank deposits, but not, 
of course, with respect to fixed assets such as land, buildings, and 
machinery. The latter were to be carried on a dollar value balance 
sheet at the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of acquisition, 
and to that same figure the depreciation reserve would also be re-
sponsive. 
More recently the Tax Court has indicated that the taxpayer 
really has a choice of methods, the profit-and-loss and the net-worth 
methods being characterized as the "main approaches." 11 Since, 
within limits, "the question is one of accounting and not of sub-
stantive law," 12 the overriding requirement was said to be consist-
ency in practice. Only in this way will the various methods reflect 
like amounts over the long haul.13 
(d) Conversion problem re dividends derived from a for-
eign subsidiary.-A dividend is not the only type of profit which an 
American enterprise may derive from operations conducted through 
a foreign subsidiary. Illustratively, the American parent may also 
sell its own exported· products to the foreign subsidiary or treat the 
latter, at least in part, as a permanent establishment in the nature of 
a sales agent for those American products not manufactured by the 
subsidiary. The problem of converting the latter types of profit into 
American dollars has been considered, however, in the preceding 
subtopics; attention here is limited to the matter of dividends. 
For tax purposes, the date on which an American parent should 
convert dividends declared in foreign currency is clear enough in 
the limited instance where the parent otherwise keeps its books on a 
cash basis. Conversion takes place on the date the dividend is actu-
ally or constructively received.H Contrary to what others have ap-
10 Vietor and Ache lis v. Salt's Textile Mfg. Co., (D.C. Conn. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 249• 
11 American Pad & Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304, 1310 (1951). 
12 Ibid. 
13 It would appear that long term liabilities should also generally be reflected at 
the rate prevailing on the date the liability was incurred. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants reflects its recommendations 
with respect to the net-worth method in Bulletin No. 43, Ch. 12, p. 113. A method 
typically in use in also described in Munsche, Exchange and Other Problems in Taxa-
tion of Foreign Income, 17 N.Y. INST. 425, 433 (1959). In general, see HEPWORTH, 
REPORTING FOREIGN OPERATIONS ( 1956). 
"Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-1, 84; Frank W. Ross, 44 B.T.A. r ( 1941) ; O.D. 419, C.B. 
2, 6o ( 1920). Because of the constructive receipt doctrine, the date of payment will be the 
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parently assumed/5 the matter is not so clear, however, in the more 
frequently recurring circumstance where the parent keeps its books 
on an accrual basis. The difficulty here is not attributable to the for-
eign character of the dividend; it stems from uncertainty regarding 
the more basic question of when a dividend derived from an Ameri-
can source is properly accruable. 
In this latter connection, at one time the Board of Tax Appeals 
looked to the declaration date.16 And in that era, the government 
failed to raise this particular question in at least one contested case 
where a taxpayer had used that date in translating foreign dividends 
into American incomeY Throughout that period, however, those 
regulations which dealt specifically with dividends, as distinguished 
from the more general provisions bearing on accounting methods, 
failed to distinguish between shareholders whose books were kept 
on the accrual basis rather than on the cash basis.18 Dividends were 
said to be "included in the gross income of the distributees when the 
cash or other property is unqualifiedly made subject to their de-
mands." 19 This meant the date on which the dividend was payable 
except in the instance where the item could not be said to have been 
constructively received on that date,20 in which case the actual date 
of receipt governed. This shotgun type of regulation led the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit to reverse in 1942 the historical 
position of the Board.21 By the previously quoted regulation, divi-
dends were said to have been carved out for treatment which differed 
from that associated with other income items, reflection of which was 
generally determined by reference to the taxpayer's regular method 
of accounting. The appellate court ignored the declaration and 
record dates, choosing instead the date of payment and receipt 
which, in this case, happened to coincide. 
The Tax Court (known before 1942 as the Board of Tax Ap-
peals) thereafter noted that "certainty of the answer" was most 
critical point if the payment is then unqualifiedly subject to the parent's demand. 
I.T. Regs.,§ I.f5I-2(b). 
16 See Johnson, Foreign Tax Credit, INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD: 
SoUTHWESTERN LEGAL FouNDATION 45, 79 ( 1959) ; Munsche, Exchange and Other Frob-
Inns in the Taxation of Foreign Income, 17 N.Y. lNsT. 425, 427 (1959). 
16 Archer M. Campbell, 6 B.T.A. 6o ( 1927), Non-acq., C. B. VI-z, 8; Tar Products 
Co., 45 B.T.A. 1033 ( 1941), rev'd. (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F. (2d) 866. 
'"Bon Ami Co., 39 B.T.A. 825 (1939). But cf. Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-x, 84 at 86. 
18 E.g., see I.T. Regs. n8, §§ 39.42-3 and 39·II5(a)-I(d). 
19 I.T. Regs. n8, §39-IIS(a)-•(d). 
"'The regulation included an illustration in which the constructive receipt doc-
trine would not be applied. 
01 Tar Products Corporation v. Comm'r., (3d Cir. 1942) 130 F.(2d) 866, rev'g. 45 
B.T.A. 1033 (1941). 
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important; for this reason, it chose not to reconsider "the relative 
merits of the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals and our own." 
It adopted the view of the former. 22 Its new position was affirmed 
on appeal by a quite different court of appeals, that of the seventh 
circuit.23 While the Supreme Court during the period of the 1940's 
did not go beyond saying that dividends do not in any event accrue 
prior to the record date,24 it is of some significance that the previ-
ously mentioned decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, postponing inclusion to the date of payment, was selected 
for publication by the Internal Revenue Service in its own Cumula-
tive Bulletin, a fact which usually meant that the government in-
tended to follow the result.25 
On the basis of the foregoing, one might conclude with some as-
surance that an accrual basis taxpayer resolves the timing question, 
as it relates to inclusion of dividends, in the same manner as cash 
basis distributees. The one note of caution relates to a slight change 
made in the new regulations issued under the 1954 Code. While the 
statute itself was not changed in any respect relevant here, and while 
the new regulations do incorporate the statement previously 
quoted,26 they go on now at another point to say that the constructive 
receipt doctrine is not generally applicable if, e.g., an item would be 
accruable at a different date under the taxpayer's regular method 
of accounting.27 At least one writer has suggested that by this device 
the government may attempt to re-open the accrual question as it 
relates specifically to dividends.28 
In any event, apart from the matter of dividends and contrary to 
the case where operations are conducted through a foreign branch, 
the American parent will not be permitted to take advantage of any 
shift, resulting from movement of exchange rates, in the dollar value 
of the foreign subsidiary's current assets.29 The two are separate en-
tities for American tax purposes. Nor may the American corpora-
tion revalue at year's end its own accounts receivable running against 
""American Light & Traction Company, 3 T.C. 1048, 1050 (1944). 
23 (7th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 398. 
"'Putnam Estate v. Comm'r., 324 U.S. 393, 65 S. Ct. 811 ( 1945 ). 
""Ct. D. 1678, C.B. 1946-2, 135. The government also withdrew the non-acquiescence 
previously published in 1944 C.B. 32 with reference to the Tax Court's decision. See 
C.B. 1946-2, I. 
26 l.T. Regs., § 1.451-2(b). 
"'I.T. Regs.,§ 1.451-1(a). 
""RABKIN AND }OHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFr AND ESTATE TAXATION § 21.04(7), 
(1954) . 
.. G.C.M. 4954, C.B. VII-2, 293 ( 1928), cited with approval in American Pad & 
Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304, 1310, Note 2 (1951). 
TAXATION s6r 
the subsidiary in order to reflect changes, since the date of sale, in 
exchange rates.30 
SECTION c. TIMING THE REFLECTION OF BLOCKED OR 
RESTRICTED FOREIGN PROFITS 
(a) Introductory note.-Fiscal manipulations by foreign 
countries have usually coincided with wars and depressions-local 
or world-wide. Restrictions have run the gamut, ranging, inter alia, 
from a series of varying limitations on extraction of profits by 
foreigners-including American enterprises-to complete blockage 
of those profits. Not until the world-wide economic crisis of the 
193o's were the American tax implications of these restraints con-
sidered, however, by the judiciary. And even the cases decided in 
that era were few in number; the only important conclusion was to 
the effect that a total lock-up justified deferral of income which 
otherwise would have been deemed realized. Later decisions during 
World War II indica ted, on the other hand, that certain less severe 
restrictions would not justify a deferral. That period, characterized 
by restraints of all sorts, did not, however, bring forth meaningful 
administrative rulings to reduce the sizeable no-man's land in be-
tween the two results; the regulations were amended only for the 
purpose of assuring that deductions and credits would be linked to 
income properly deferred. But post-war restrictions did bring forth 
administrative guidelines as precise as could be expected. 
As indicated elsewhere in this volume, currency restrictions im-
posed in Common Market countries today are not nearly so serious 
as those of an earlier time; comparatively speaking, profits from 
licensed investments enjoy unusual freedom. Nevertheless, the dis-
cussion below of the way American tax law has evolved in response 
to various types of restrictions is not wholly academic, for times can 
change. Moreover, there are other kinds of profits with reference 
to which restrictions are more significant. 
(b) Circumstances calling for deferral of income.-ln 
1937, the Supreme Court concluded in one case, contrary to the usual 
rule, that a domestic exchange out of which the taxpayer received 
30 Ibid. Cf. Appeal of Louis Roessel & Co., Ltd., 2 B.T.A. 1141 (1925); Appeal of 
Theodore Tiedmann & Sons, Inc., I B.T.A. 1077 (1925). But Anderson, Clayton & Co. 
v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) 168 F. Supp. 542, does indicate that on occasion the 
government has entered into an agreement permitting accounts between a parent and 
subsidiary to be revalued at year's end by reference to the then prevailing rate of 
exchange. 
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certain peculiarly circumstanced stock did not furnish an appropriate 
occasion for tax reckoning. 31 The decision rested on a finding that 
these particular shares did not have a "fair market value, capable 
of being ascertained with reasonable certainty," and "in the absence 
of such value, the ownership of the shares did not lay the basis for 
the computation of gain .... " 32 The difficulty was attributable 
"to their highly speculative quality and to the terms of a restrictive 
agreement making a sale thereof impossible .... " 33 
Within 3 months, the theory embodied in that decision was ap-
plied by the Board of Tax Appeals to the first case which had come 
before it involving restricted foreign profits, International Mart-
gage and Investment Corporation.34 
A bank crisis in the early 1930's had led the German government 
to prohibit the transfer of marks out of Germany. While on the next 
to the last day of the taxable year, that government did establish a 
procedure whereby, upon permission, blocked marks could be rein-
vested on a long-term basis in Germany, repayment on any such 
reinvestment was also blocked. The Board of Tax Appeals also 
found as a fact that no market existed within the taxable year for 
such marks and "no one could form an opinion as to their value at 
that time." 35 
In this setting, the Board determined that an American enterprise 
was not presently taxable even though it had realized a profit in Ger-
man marks upon disposition of a German investment. The result 
was bottomed on the fact that "income for our Federal income tax 
purposes is measured only in terms of dollars," 36 and here the tax-
payer's profit was simply "not measurable in terms of dollars." 37 
Foreign profit realized by the same taxpayer from other disposi-
tions which took place during the same taxable year, but prior to 
the blockage, were, however, included in its gross income though, 
through failure to effect a timely conversion into dollars, those 
profits were also entrapped by the subsequently adopted monetary 
restrictions. It was enough that the taxpayer had unrestricted power 
31 Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Company, 300 U.S. 481, 57 S. Ct. 569 ( 1937). 
"'Id. at 499· 
33 Ibid . 
... 36 B.T.A. 187 (1937). 
35 !d. at 189. 
80 !d. at 190. 
37 Ibid. Accord, Stuart, James & Cooke, Inc., P-H B.T.A. Memo. Dec., para. 38-095 
(1938}. A like result was later reached in United Artists Corporation of Japan, 3 
T.C.M. 574 ( 1944) though the blocked item was actually on deposit in a San Francisco 
branch of a Japanese bank. See note 47, infra. 
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to convert at the moment the profit was realized in the foreign cur-
rency. 
While the Internal Revenue Service did file an acquiescence to 
that part of the Board's decision which allowed the taxpayer to 
defer income realized in blocked German marks,38 it took a different 
view of the problem in later taxable years as the German govern-
ment began to relax its currency restrictions. 
In Credit and Investment Corporation/9 the taxpayer failed to 
show that it could not have obtained permission to take out of Ger-
many certain marks which it had realized on disposing of an asset, 
which marks-because of the various uses to which they could be 
put-did have some market value on the New York exchange though 
in an amount less than the official blocked rate. Indeed, in that same 
taxable year it had used that market place to convert certain other 
restricted German marks. In deciding against the taxpayer, the 
Board drew a distinction between this situation and that presented 
earlier in the International Mortgage and Investment Corporation 
case. In the latter case, contrary to the situation here, it had been 
shown that the taxpayer could not obtain permission to transfer any 
of its marks out of Germany and, because of the nature of the re-
strictions on their use, no outside market place catered to such 
marks.40 
That the government accepted the distinction between the two 
cases, and recognized that the earlier decision which was adverse to 
it still retained its vitality, was demonstrated by its promulgation, 
at approximately this same time, of a ruling wherein it acknowledged 
that certain types of profit tied up in blocked British pounds were not 
presently includible for federal income tax purposes.41 And this 
was so though the blocked profits could have been reinvested in 
British securities, interest on which could have been converted. 
Otherwise, however, the government did not attempt at this stage in 
history to chart a more exacting line between deferable and non-
deferable income insofar as the matter turned on foreign monetary 
restrictions. Its more or less concurrent amendment of the regula-
tions was confined to the other side of the ledger and was predicated 
38 Acq., C.B. 1937-2, 15. 
89 47 B.T.A. 673 (1942). 
40 The importance of the burden of proof was the center of the court's focus in Corn 
Products Refining Co. v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1954) 215 F.(2d) 513 where the taxpayer 
sought to include a dividend which the government claimed was blocked. The gov-
ernment prevailed. 
01 Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-1, 84. 
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on the conclusion that, in a given case, foreign income had been 
properly excluded because of "monetary exchange, or other restric-
tions imposed by a foreign country." In such event, the deductions 
and credits attributable to such excluded items were also to be post-
poned, account being taken of them proportionately as and if the de-
ferred income items properly became includible in gross incomeY 
Before the government again spoke administratively, separate 
arms of the judiciary evolved in one case two other reasons for 
denying deferment to foreign income which suffered from some 
restriction. In Phanor f. Eder/3 the Service assessed a deficiency 
against a lawyer-stockholder by reference to the undistributed in-
come of a foreign personal holding company domiciled in Colombia. 
In connection with his practice, the lawyer-stockholder had spent 
two months of the year in that Latin American country. 
While the exchange laws and regulations of Colombia prohibited 
the company from transferring its profits or pesos outside that 
country, the "spending or investment of pesos within" the country 
were not restricted. But if articles bought with pesos were sold out-
side the country, the vendor was obligated to return the sales pro-
ceeds to Colombia. 
None of these latter circumstances, involving the exact nature of 
the exchange restrictions, seemed important to the Board of Tax 
Appeals. It was enough that Congress-in attempting to thwart 
avoidance-had specifically called for a tax on stockholders with 
reference to any undistributed income of a foreign personal hold-
ing company.44 The fact that such income would have been blocked, 
had it been distributed as a dividend, was thought to be beside the 
point. The immunizing philosophy of the earlier International 
Mortgage and Investment Co. case had to give way in the face of 
such specific legislation. 
An appellate court was not satisfied to rest only on this theory. 
It denied that "inability to expend income in the United States, or 
to use any portion of it in payment of income taxes, necessarily 
precludes taxability." 45 Of importance was the fact that the tax-
payers "could have invested, or spent, the 'blocked' pesos in Co-
lumbia and, as a result, could there have received economic satis-
faction." The fact that the taxpayer himself spent a part of the year 
.. T.D. 5281, July 12, 1943, C.B. 1943, 213 amending I.T. Regs. 103, §§ 19-43-1 and 
19.131-6, reflected now in I.T. Regs.,§§ 1.461-1(a) (4) and 1.905-I(h). 
•• 47 B.T.A. 235 (1942). 
"Revenue Act of 1938, § 337, now I.R.C., § 551 et seq. 
'"Eder v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 27. 
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in Colombia suggested that it was actually necessary for him to ex-
pend "some" pesos in Colombia. 
This theory, geared to a power to obtain economic satisfaction 
through foreign reinvestment or other expenditure, necessarily 
called for an appraisal of the value of that potential satisfaction-
but in terms of American dollars. The court suggested that this 
might be accomplished through a comparison of various price indices 
prevailing in the United States and Colombia. To this end, the 
case was remanded to what had now been renamed the Tax Court, 
and it proceeded to make the comparison in question, though account 
was also taken of expert testimony the basis for which was not dis-
closed.46 
The loosely worded suggestion by the court of appeals, to the 
effect that deferment was not available if the blocked income could 
be ''reinvested or spent" in the foreign country, may have con-
tributed to the government's effort thereafter to sustain a 1938 de-
ficiency against a corporate taxpayer the foreign profits of which 
were tied up in Japanese yen. For at least part of the taxable year, 
that corporation could have reinvested the yen in Japanese securities 
-a practice then frowned upon by the State Department, or in 
items deemed essential to Japan-such as scrap iron, provided a 
permit authorizing the purchase could be obtained from that gov-
ernment. These circumstances did not, however, impress the Tax 
Court. It distinguished the Eder case on its own original theory, to 
the effect that the question of blockage was irrelevant there because 
of specific legislation which called for a tax on stockholders of a 
foreign personal holding company without regard to the question 
of distribution. Deferment of the blocked yen here was deemed justi-
fied because the taxpayer did not have " 'unrestricted use and enjoy-
ment' " of his gain. 47 
It was after this decision, in the setting of post-war foreign mone-
tary restrictions, that the government made it possible for taxpayers 
to obtain assurance that it would not attempt to deny deferment be-
cause of a power to reinvest blocked foreign profits. The device, 
established in Mimeograph 6475,48 involved what was described 
•• 3 T.C.M. 460 (1944). 
47 United Artists Corporation of Japan, 3 T.C.M. 574 ( 1944). Later on in the same 
taxable year, an agreement was reached with the Japanese government pursuant to 
which the blocked yen could be converted into dollars, but these had to be placed in a 
non-negotiable deposit for 3 years, without interest, with a San Francisco branch of a 
Japanese bank. The Tax Court thought that deferment was still justified. 
•• C.B. 1950-1, so. Subsequent amendments appear in Mim. 6494, C.B. 1950-1, 54, 
and in Mim. 6584, C.B. 1951-1, 19. 
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as a method of accounting which, under prescribed conditions, tax-
payers might elect with respect to "deferable income." This classi-
fication included that income which, "owing to monetary exchange 
or other restrictions imposed by a foreign country, is not readily 
convertible into United States dollars or into other money or prop-
erty which is readily convertible into United States dollars." 49 
Such income could be deferred until the earlier to occur of any 
one of three events, i.e., (I) until that point when the item no longer 
satisfied the definition of deferable income, or ( 2) until the item 
was in fact converted into dollars or into property readily converti-
ble into such, or ( 3) until it was used for nondeductible personal 
expenses, was disposed of by way of gift, bequest, device, or in-
heritance, or by dividend or other distribution, or, in the case of a 
resident alien, a taxpayer terminated his residence in the United 
States. 
On the one hand, the first of the three possibilities demonstrated 
that actual conversion into dollars of previously blocked income 
was not a sine qua non to taxability. It was enough that the item 
became "readily convertible." On the other hand, it was equally 
clear from this mimeograph, as well as from a complementary ruling 
of the same year, 5° that actual reinvestment, as well as the power to 
reinvest, in foreign investment or business property did not, stand-
ing alone, serve to take blocked profits of an electing taxpayer out 
of the deferable class. Nor would the mere existence of a power to 
use the foreign currency for foreign personal expenses prohibit de-
ferment, provided the amounts were not in fact so used. While no 
mention is made of the circumstance where deferable income is used 
to pay off foreign loans repayable in foreign currency, it could be 
argued that deferment should still be allowed if the loan was ob-
tained after blockage set in and was invested in investment or busi-
ness property. In such circumstance, deferment would have been 
allowed if the blocked foreign currency had been used to make the 
investment in the first instance. In other circumstances, such as where 
the loan was obtained prior to restrictions on foreign currency, the 
government could argue that the loan transaction was a separate and 
closed matter when repaid, justifying inclusion of the funds pre-
viously deferred because of blockage. 
(c) Circumstances requiring deferral of deductions and 
credits.-As noted supra, the regulations were amended in 1943 so 
•• Ibid . 
.., I.T. 4037, C.B. 1950-2, 31. 
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as to require deferment of deductions and credits attributable to any 
income properly deferred because of exchange controls.51 
The later promulgated Mimeograph 64 7 5 elaborated on this 
principle as applied to taxpayers invoking the benefits of the method 
of accounting there prescribed. 
Depreciation, obsolescence, and depletion, when measured in 
terms of foreign currency, were to be taken into account, like other 
expenses incurred in foreign currency, in subsequent taxable years in 
the same proportion as the deferable income, to which they were 
linked, was includible in taxable income. Where blocked foreign 
profits were reinvested abroad in investment or business property, a 
complementary ruling indicated that such property originally took 
on a deferred income basis measured by its cost in terms of the fore-
going currency.52 It was contemplated that an annual information 
return covering blocked income would reflect that basis as well as 
adjustments thereto, such as depreciation, allowed by the Code. 
When the foreign currency originally used to acquire the assets took 
on a non-blocked status, two steps were to be taken. First, the origi-
nal amount so devoted was to be translated into American dollars at 
the exchange rate prevailing when the funds became unblocked, that 
amount then being includible in gross income. Second, the adjust-
ments made in the property acquired, as well as the funds originally 
used to make the acquisition, would be converted at the same rate as 
that applied in fixing the amount of income; the resulting figure es-
tablished the basis for the property. 
The deferment principle also included costs and direct expenses 
incurred in American dollars, to the extent attributable to deferable 
income. As the proceeds became unblocked, the entire cost of goods 
sold in a given transaction was to be recovered first, before any 
amount was includible in gross income. Only after those costs were 
recovered was account to be taken of other direct dollar expenses 
attributable to the sale. Even then, absent permission to do other-
wise, these expenses, unlike the cost of goods sold in the transaction, 
were to be taken into account proportionately by reference to the 
relationship which the amount included in gross income during that 
taxable year bore to the transaction's total proceeds in excess of the 
cost of goods sold. 53 
51 See note 40, supra. 
•• LT. 4037, C.B. 1950-2, 31. 
63 The mimeograph provided for a special arrangement as to these costs if more 
than one foreign country was involved in the transaction. See para. 7 {b) of the 
mimeograph as amended by Mim. 6494, C.B. 1950-1, 54· 
S68 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Deferment of the foregoing costs and expenses incurred in dollars 
will also cease, of course, if the items reflecting the deferable income 
become worthless. 
The mimeograph does not call for deferment of indirect expenses 
incurred in dollars. Absence of any mention of them presumably 
means that the taxpayer will not be required to undertake the com-
plicated task of unscrambling these for purposes of affecting alloca-
tion to particular transactions only some of which may involve the 
problem of blockage. 
(d) Mechanics and effect of election under Mimeograph 
647 5.-The mimeograph, as amended, calls for the election to be 
made "no later than the time prescribed by law (including any ex-
tension thereof) for filing the income tax return for the first taxable 
year for which the election is to be applicable." 54 
Along with his regular return, the taxpayer is required to file 
separate information returns, on the same type of form, with respect 
to each country in which a deferable account exists. On these re-
turns, which must be labelled "Report Of Deferable Foreign In-
come, pursuant to Mimeograph No. 6475," the taxpayer must enter 
into two agreements: (I) that the deferable income will be included 
in taxable income in that taxable year in which it ceases to be defer-
able under the provisions of the mimeograph, and ( 2) that no 
claim will be made that such deferable income was includible in 
gross income for any earlier year. While like agreement need not be 
expressly entered on the return with reference to losses, the mimeo-
graph itself does provide that taxpayers electing this method of 
accounting must also treat losses in a consistent manner.55 Finally, 
once the election is made, it may not be changed without securing the 
consent of the Commissioner. 
By way of general summary, the taxpayer's gross receipts in 
blocked foreign currency is reported, though only for information 
purposes, and the cost of goods sold-in terms of such currency-
are subtracted. From the resulting figure-foreign currency gross 
income-expenses incurred in terms of the foreign currency are de-
ducted in arriving at foreign currency net income. 
When some part of the foreign currency net income ceases to be 
deferable by reference to the standards previously indicated, that 
amount is reduced by the dollar costs attributable to that transac-
.. Mim. 6584, C.B. 1951-1, 19, amending para. 9 of Mim. 6475. 
55 That the election is binding with regard to losses even in the instance where books 
regarding foreign profits are otherwise kept in accordance with the net worth method, 
see Anderson, Clayton & Co v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) 168 F. Supp. 542. 
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tion, the remainder being included in the taxpayer's gross income 
from which dollar direct expenses, as previously explained, are 
deducted in turn on a proportionate basis. The Service has also taken 
the position that a partial remittance of unblocked income covering 
several years is to be reported, as it becomes unblocked, on a first-in-
first-out basis. 56 
(e) Conclusion.-The foregoing discussion suggests that 
Mimeograph 64 7 5 permits restricted foreign income to be deferred 
in some instances where deferment might not have been permitted 
under case law. Certainly the right to reinvest in foreign investment 
or business property without loss of the deferment privilege would 
not have been permitted by the court of appeals which decided the 
previously discussed Eder case. It was, perhaps, because of this vari-
ation that the government characterized the mimeograph as de-
scriptive only of a "method of accounting." While prior cases in this 
precise area had approached the problem as though it involved a 
question of law, other cases in related areas have stated that re-
flection of profits in foreign currency poses an accounting question 
for which there may be more than one answer-provided the tax-
payer follows a sensible practice consistently.57 In any event, there 
is also authority to the effect that taxpayers who elect to be treated 
under the mimeograph must also be consistent in abiding by its 
various provisions though one or more may operate to his preju-
dice.58 
It is also true that the mimeograph provides a more compre-
hensive set of answers with reference to the overall method it pre-
scribes than is available under case law. This is so even though the 
Service could not be perfectly precise in resolving the most basic 
of all questions. The range of conceivable variations in factual pat-
terns quite rightly restrained it from saying anything more precise 
than that deferable income consisted of that which was not "readily 
convertible" into dollars. 
Taxpayers remain free, of course, to ignore the mimeograph, 
falling back on the less precise case law pattern. And particularly in 
these cases, the question will arise: What market place is to be 
chosen for valuation of foreign currency in the event deferment is 
not to be allowed in a given case? This is the subject matter of the 
next section. 
68 Rev. Rul. 57-379, C.B. 1957-2, 299. 
57 E.g., see American Pad & Textile Co., 16 T.C. 1304 (1951). 
08 Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1958) x68 F. Supp. 542· 
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SECTION D. CHOICE OF MARKET PLACE IN DETERMINING 
THE CoNVERSION RATE 
(a) Introductory note.-At some point, foreign profits and 
the amount of foreign income taxes paid must be reflected in dollars 
for American tax purposes. Particularly where a foreign country's 
currency is blocked or restricted, differences may well exist between 
that country's official rate of exchange, its black market rate, and the 
commercial rate at which such foreign money is transferable in 
the United States. Thus, if the income cannot be deferred for Ameri-
can tax purposes under the principles set forth in Section C, supra, 
it may be necessary to determine which of these several market places 
will be resorted to in fixing the conversion rate. 
As indicated below, the government has not always maintained a 
consistent position, though in all but two significant cases it has 
fostered the official rate, a view for which the courts have generally 
substituted the American commercial rate. The fact that the govern-
ment has acquiesced in all of the Tax Court cases which were ad-
verse to its position and that the matter has not been further liti-
gated within the past five years may be some indication that it is 
prepared to accept what may seem to be inevitable. On the other 
hand, its most recent published ruling, as described below, is so 
equivocal that it might feel free to argue, without embarrassment, 
that those acquiescences rested on the peculiar facts of the litigated 
items. 
About half of the litigated items have concerned the estate or 
gift tax, rather than the income tax, but the Tax Court has insisted 
that common principles apply to all three and has indiscriminately 
commingled citations. 
(b) Evolution of relevant developments.-In 1920, the 
Service's then Committee on Appeals and Review found the ab-
normal conditions associated with foreign exchange during the 
World War I sufficient cause to justify authorizing a taxpayer to 
"convert current assets less current liabilities payable in the foreign 
currency at the current rate of exchange or at any rate less favorable 
to him." 59 But it then went on to drain most of the vitality from this 
notion by adding an equivocal caveat, "The Commissioner should 
consider in any case applications to adopt a rate more favorable to 
.. A.R.R. 15, 2 C.B. 6o (1920). 
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the taxpayer or may on his own motion apply such a rate where the 
facts in the particular case warrant such departure." 60 
The government did not again speak for publication until I94I; 
in the interval, the elasticity of its earlier position was seemingly 
unchanged in such private rulings as were reported by recipients. 
In one, the government is said to have called for the selection of that 
market place which would most clearly reflect the income,61 and in 
another it was said that there could be no general rule, for each case 
turned on its own peculiar facts. 62 
The peculiar facts deemed important by it in connection with the 
British government's restrictions on exchange during World War 
II turned out to be the effectiveness of the British restraining orders. 
Required compliance reached the point where there was said to be 
"little 'free sterling exchange' " and "little difference between the 
controlled 'official' exchange rate and the 'free exchange' rate on 
sterling still available on open market." 63 In that circumstance, with 
respect to those unblocked accounts for which the British govern-
ment would permit an exchange, but only at the official rate, the 
Service insisted that "the rates of exchange, both for conversion of 
British current assets at the beginning and end of the taxable year 
and for conversion of British taxes paid with respect to the income 
involved, either for foreign tax credit purposes or deduction from · 
gross income in the taxpayer's United States return, "Should be taken 
at the 'official' rate" except where actual realization had taken place 
at some other rate.64 
A year later, however, the government-in LT. 3568-was still 
insisting that the overall problem could not be reduced to a general 
rule. In rejecting the notion that exchange rates certified by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York for customs purposes could be 
used in all cases, it stated: 
Notwithstanding present conditions of disturbances and 
the control of trading and exchange by foreign countries, 
free or open market rates lower than either official or 
controlled rates were in certain cases realizable on Decem-
ber 3 I, I 94 I, dependent upon regulations of the particu-
lar foreign country and the degree of control which was 
00 Ibid. (Italics added.) 
61 Cohen, Tax Accounting Problems in International Operations, 18 N.Y. INST. 293, 
300 (1960). 
02 Roberts, Effect of Blocking of Currency on Gain or Loss, 7 N.Y. INST. 1224 (1949). 
""Mim. 5297, C.B. 1942-1, 84 at 86. 
"'Ibid. 
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exercised. In any case in which conversion rates as of that 
date are to be used, such rates shall be those giving a re-
sult most clearly reflecting the proper amounts of the 
items to which they relate as affected by the conditions and 
available means and rates of conversion as of that date. 
The rates of exchange used will be subject to verification 
and check upon the examination of the taxpayer's books 
and records by internal revenue agents. 65 
More or less simultaneous with the publication of that ruling, 
the government litigated a case involving blocked German marks. 
And there it sought to reduce the taxpayer's claimed loss on a sale by 
arguing that his basis for the property-purchased by the taxpayer 
with blocked German marks acquired from an earlier sale-should 
be determined by reference to the commercial rate of exchange pre-
vailing in New York at the time of his purchase, rather than by ref-
erence to the official rate. The Board of Tax Appeals agreed, noting 
that while the marks were blocked at the time the taxpayer origi-
nally purchased the property, he would not have been prevented 
from disposing of those marks on the available New York market.66 
At approximately the same time, in an effort to increase the 
amount of a different taxpayer's profit, the government shifted its 
support to the official rate by applying to blocked income that rate 
which the foreign government itself allowed on unblocked or un-
restricted income. Before the Tax Court, the taxpayer had conceded 
this issue,67 arguing only that he should not be subject to any tax. On 
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
manded the case on the valuation issue, concluding that the value 
of blocked foreign currency was not on a par with unblocked income 
in the same currency.68 In the absence of a regular New York 
market, the Tax Court then accepted the testimony of a New York 
banker to the effect that income so restricted was worth half of the 
rate which was available for unblocked income originating in that 
same country. 69 
65 C.B. 1942-2, 112 . 
.. Credit and Investment Corporation, 47 B.T.A. 673 ( 1942). Also, Foundation Co., 
14 T.C. 1333 (1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2. 
07 Phanor J. Eder, 47 B.T.A. 235, 238 (1942). 
""Eder v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1943) 138 F.(2d) 27. 
•• Phanor J. Erler, 3 T.C.M. 460 ( 1944). The same approach was made in Estate 
of Anthony H. G. Fokker, 10 T.C. 1225 (1948), Acq., C.B. 1948-2, 2 and Estate of Oei 
Tjong Swan, 24 T.C. 829 ( 1955), Acq., C.B. 1956-2, 8. In the latter case, the court 
stated (at 88o): "In other words, if an amount had actually been realizable in United 
States dollars, our holding would have been based thereon; but since there could have 
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In a similar case decided by the Tax Court four months later, 
the government had again espoused the cause of the official rate, 
opposing application of the less attractive established New York 
commercial rate. While a Brazilian administrative agency appar-
ently had authority to redeem the taxpayer's milreis at the official 
rate, the evidence indicated that this authority was seldom if ever 
granted in the type of case at bar and that in fact the taxpayer had 
resorted to the New York exchange in earlier dealings. The Tax 
Court was now content with the statement that "Taxation is a 
practical matter. We apply the commercial rate." 70 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.71 
This principle was then extended by the Tax Court to gift 72 
and estate tax 73 situations. In the former, for example, a California 
banker appeared as an expert witness, testifying that his bank had 
bought and sold such blocked currency for an amount approximating 
so% of the official rate for unblocked currency of that country. 
This ratio was then adopted by the court. Those decisions were 
thereafter cited as authority for the resolution of income tax cases, 
the Tax Court stating that the change in setting "makes no dif-
ference in the fundamental question involved." 74 
Only where the taxpayer did not raise the issue,75 or where the 
higher official rate was actually available,76 has the Tax Court ac-
cepted the government's recurring efforts to apply the official rate. 
As previously suggested, the government's acquiescences to other 
adverse holdings and its failure to litigate a case since 1955 may 
indicate that the question is now considered settled. 
been no realization of dollars in respect to the blocked assets under consideration, it 
is necessary to translate foreign value into dollars for estate tax purposes by con-
version at an appropriate rate of exchange which will reflect the various restrictions 
and other factors impinging on value." 
70 Edmond Weil, Inc., 3 T.C.M. 844, 849 (1944). 
71 (2d Cir. 1945) 150 F.(2d) 950. 
72 Morris Marks Landau, 7 T.C. 12 ( 1946), Acq., C.B. 1946-2, 3· 
78 Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 ( 1947), Acq., C.B. 1948-2, 2. Also, Estate of 
Jan Willem Nienhuys, 17 T.C. 1149 (1952), Acq., C.B. 1952-1, 3· 
7
' Ceska Cooper, 15 T.C. 757 at 765 (1950), Acq., C.B. 1951-1, 2; Foundation Co., 
14 T.C. 1333 (1950), Acq., C.B. 1950-2, 2. 
75 Waterman's Estate, 16 T.C. 467 (1951), rev'd. on another issue, (2d Cir. 1952) 
195 F.(2d) 244; Max Freudmann, 10 T.C. 775 (1948). 
76 Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 ( 1947) re account in Barclays Bank. The 
official rate was also applied to an army officer stationed in England and France be-
cause the blocked foreign currencies which he received there at the official rate could 
be converted into dollars at the higher official rate upon his departure from those 
countries. S. E. Boyer, 9 T.C. u68 (1947). Cf. Ceska Cooper, 15 T.C. 757 (1950), 
Acq., C.B. 1951-1, 2, 
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SEcTION E. CoNVERSION PROBLEM As IT AFFECTs THE 
CREDIT FoR FoREIGN INcOME TAXES 
(a) Introductory note.-As explained in PART III, supra, 
an American taxpayer is allowed a credit for any foreign income 
taxes actually borne by him (so-called direct tax credit) 77 as well 
as, in the case of an American corporation, a portion of those paid 
or deemed paid by a foreign corporation at least ro% of the voting 
stock of which is held by the domestic corporation (so-called 
"deemed paid" tax credit) .78 In both instances, the foreign tax will 
normally be payable in a foreign currency. But because the time when 
the amount so paid must be converted into American dollars differs 
by reference to the two types of credit, the conversion problem is 
discussed separately as to each. 
(b) Conversion for purposes of the direct tax credit.-
Shortly after the credit for foreign income taxes was established, 
the Commissioner ruled that cq,sh basis taxpayers who paid such in 
a foreign currency should compute the credit by converting the 
amount paid into American dollars by reference to exchange rates 
prevailing on the date of payment.79 
In that same period, as to a deductible domestic tax, the govern-
ment was contending that accrual basis taxpayers should reflect the 
item in the year in which the events occurred "which fix the amount 
of the tax and the liability of the taxpayer to pay it" 80 even though 
the tax might not yet be due and payable. Only then was it thought 
that such a taxpayer would be reflecting his true income for the 
period. This concept, as applied to accrual basis taxpayers, was 
carried over by the government to the direct credit for foreign in-
come taxes. Since the governing provision authorized an accrual of 
the credit,81 where such foreign tax had not been paid during the 
year the rate of exchange in effect on the last day of the year was 
said by the government to be the basis by which the foreign liability 
was to be converted into American dollars. 82 
77 I.R.C., § 901. As explained in PART III, this credit also includes war profits and 
excess profits taxes as well as any tax paid in lieu of the~e and income taxes otherwise 
generally imposed. I.R.C., § 903. 
78 I.R. c., § 902. 
70 I.T. 1645, C.B. Il-1, 141 ( 1923). 
""United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441, 46 S. Ct. 131 (1926). 
81 Revenue Act of 1921, § 238 (b), now I.R.C., § 905 (c) . 
.. I.T. r645, C.B. U-1, 141 (1923), 
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The earliest statutory provision,83 like that on the books today,84 
also provided that the domestic tax for the "year or years affected" 
would later be redetermined in the event the amount of foreign tax 
subsequently paid by the accrual basis taxpayer differed from that 
previously estimated and accrued as of the end of the original taxa-
ble year. The government concluded that this statutory arrangement 
had the effect of establishing a superseding conversion rate in such 
cases, the effect being to convert the earlier accrual into a "provi-
sional or interim credit." 85 It reasoned as follows: 
... the law having directed the adjustment of the 
amount accrued to the amount actually paid, the necessary 
inference is that the amount of the payment if made in 
. . . [foreign] money shall be converted into American 
money at the rate of exchange as of the date of payment, 
since this is the only way of arriving at the amount actually 
paid. To convert a payment made in ... [a subsequent 
year] into American dollars at the rate of exchange pre-
vailing . . . [in the earlier year of accrual J would be to 
allow the taxpayer a greater or less amount than he has 
actually paid, depending upon whether the rate of ex-
change . . . [in the earlier year J is higher or lower than 
that in . . . [the later year J .86 
The foregoing principles, initially established by rulings, were 
approved shortly thereafter by the Board of Tax Appeals.87 
In I 924, a congressional committee called attention to the fact 
that many foreign countries, like our own, provided for the payment 
of income taxes during the year following the year for which the tax 
was imposed.88 This meant that cash basis taxpayers were taking a 
credit against the domestic tax in the year following the year in 
which their foreign income was earned. To avoid any prejudice 
which might result as a consequence of variation in the yearly 
amount of foreign income, the· statutory provision regarding the 
credit was amended at the committee's request so as to permit cash 
basis taxpayers to elect to reflect the credit in the same manner as 
accrual taxpayers. 89 
"'Revenue Act of 1918, § 238 (a) . 
.. I.R.C., §9os (c). 
85 Texas Company (Caribbean) Ltd., 12 T.C. 925, 929 (1949), Acq., C.B. 1949-2, 3· 
811 S.M. 4081, C.B. IV-2, 201 at 202 (1925). (Italics added.) 
"'D. E. Brown, 1 B.T.A. 446 (1925); Mead Cycle Co., 10 B.T.A. 887 (1928), Acq., 
C.B. VII-2, 26. Also, Texas Company (Caribbean) Ltd., 12 T.C. 925 (1949), Acq., 
C.B. 1949-2, 3· 
88 H. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., rst Sess. 22 (1924). 
89 Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 238(c) and 222(c), now I.R.C., § 905(a). 
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The special character of the provisions relating to accrual of 
foreign taxes for purposes of the credit has led to modification of 
one other doctrine which applies to accrual of domestic taxes. 
In the latter circumstance, an accrual basis taxpayer must post-
pone accrual of any tax, liability for which he is contesting. The 
accrual takes place in and for the year the contest is settled.90 
While the accrual of that part of any foreign tax being contested 
must also be postponed until the matter is resolved, it has been held, 
and the Service agrees, that the congressional aims permitting ac-
crual in a foreign tax setting justify relating the accrual back to the 
year for which credit would have been taken in the absence of the 
contest.91 
Accrual basis taxpayers, as well as cash basis taxpayers who elect 
the accrual method, may be required to post a bond on accruing the 
credit prior to payment of the foreign tax.92 In both settings, a ten-
year statutory period of limitations has also been imposed on 
recognition of overpayments of American tax resulting from sub-
sequent redeterminations reflecting differences between the amount 
of foreign taxes accrued and that actually paid.93 
(c) Conversion for purposes of the "deemed-paid" tax 
credit.-As previously noted, an American corporation may enjoy a 
credit for a proper part of any foreign income taxes paid or deemed 
paid by a foreign corporation at least 10% of the voting stock of 
which is held by the domestic enterprise.94 This credit may be taken, 
however, only as dividends are drawn from the foreign corporation. 
Thus the question may arise as to whether, for credit purposes, the 
amount of foreign taxes paid by the foreign corporation should be 
converted into American dollars according to the rate of exchange 
prevailing when the foreign corporation paid the foreign tax or 
according to a rate later prevailing when a dividend is included in 
the American corporation's gross income. 
The first contested situation involved a dividend received from 
a foreign corporation's earnings and profits of an earlier year the 
foreign tax on which had been paid in the earlier year. The foreign 
00 Dixie Pine Products v. Comm'r., 320 U.S. 516, 64 S. Ct. 364 ( 1944). 
91 Cuba Railroad Co. v. U.S., (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 182; Rev. Rul. 
58-55, C.B. 1958-1, 266. 
""I.R.C., § 905 (c). 
98 l.R.C., § 65II (d) (3). If the foreign tax is refunded and the American credit is 
thereby reduced, interest will not be assessed by the American government with re-
spect to the redetermination except to the extent interest was paid by the foteign coun-
try on the refund. I.R.C., § 905 (c). 
"'I.R.C., § 902. 
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corporation had always kept its accounts in terms of the foreign 
currency with which it had also paid the foreign tax. The Board of 
Tax Appeals noted that prior to the declaration of the dividend, 
"neither the earnings nor the taxes of that foreign subsidiary had in 
any way affected the income tax liability of the domestic corpora-
tion." 95 Since, prior to the dividend, there had never been any 
occasion to reduce the payment of foreign taxes into American dol-
lars, the Board, like the government, thought that it was "reason-
able and logical" to effect the conversion according to exchange 
rates prevailing at the time of the dividend, rather than at the time 
the foreign tax was actually paid by the foreign corporation.96 
The government thought the same principle should apply even 
though the foreign corporation always kept its accounts in American 
dollars, using the latter to pay dividends and to purchase foreign 
currency with which to pay its foreign tax. But the Tax Court 
(formerly Board of Tax Appeals) 97 and the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit 98 thought otherwise. In this circumstance, 
the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the dividend was thought 
to have no relation whatever to the amount of accumulated earnings 
and profits, to the dividend, or to the foreign taxes actually paid. 
The foreign corporation itself had invoked an exchange rate at 
the time it used its own American dollars to buy the foreign cur-
rency with which to pay the foreign tax. Accordingly, in this cir-
cumstance it was thought that no exchange problem arose at the 
time of the dividend. Subsequently, the government acquiesced in 
the distinction between the two cases.99 
"'Bon Ami Co., 39 B.T.A. 825, 827 (1939). 
06 ld. at 828. 
"'American Metal Co., 19 T.C. 879 (1953). 
08 (2d Cir. 1955) 221 F.(2d) 134, cert. den., 350 U.S. 829, 76 S. Ct. 61 (1955). 
99 Non-acq. to the Tax Court's opinion, in C.B. 1953-1, 7, was withdrawn in C.B. 
1955-2, 3· 
PART V. FOREIGN AND AMERICAN TAXES ON 
INDIVIDUALS AS THEY AFFECT MOVEMENT 
OF EMPLOYEES TO FOREIGN LANDS 
SECTION A. INTRODUCTION 
American enterprises which create foreign subsidiaries or open 
permanent establishments in Common Market countries are likely 
to transfer certain of their American employees to the foreign sta-
tions. The country-by-country survey in PART I, supra, furnishes 
the background for the comparison in Section B, below, of the ways 
and extent to which income taxes of member nations will affect 
American citizens so assigned. Generally speaking, until such time 
as the American becomes a resident of a particular Common Market 
country as defined under its law, each nation will assert jurisdiction 
only over that income for which it is the source. When residence in 
a particular country is established pursuant to its law, that Com-
mon Market nation will generally increase its jurisdictional sweep 
to include the resident's income from all sources. But even in this 
circumstance, unilaterally and by treaty, most of those countries 
have provided some form of relief to mitigate double taxation with 
respect, at least, to certain types of income which the displaced 
American continues to derive from sources in the United States. 
In other words, to that extent, most of them acknowledge the pri-
ority of the United States over its own citizens. Moreover, uni-
laterally or under bilateral tax treaties between member nations, 
the foreign country of residence may also grant some relief with 
reference to any income which the American may derive from other 
member nations. 
While the notion of gross income which prevails in the United 
States generally requires a citizen to include income "from all 
sources" though the item may also be subject to a foreign tax, 
there are circumstances in which Congress has permitted Americans 
stationed abroad to immunize foreign service income from the 
American tax. This concession is geared generally to establishment 
of bona fide residence in a particular foreign country but pursuant 
to standards fixed by American law. Alternatively, extended physi-
cal presence abroad, i.e., presence in one or more countries, for a 
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period approximating 1 ~ years will warrant an exclusion, though 
here there is a limitation on the amount. To the extent of the im-
munity thus granted, the United States in effect acknowledges the 
sole right of the foreign country or countries to tax any "earned" 
income which has its source there. The discussion of this matter in 
Section C, below, is coupled with an analysis of the way in which the 
foreign tax would be integrated with the American tax in the in-
stance where the immunizing criteria specified by Congress are not 
satisfied. 
Other employees who are permanently stationed at the home of-
fice in the States may be called upon to make more or less brief busi-
ness trips to the scene of the foreign operation. Alternatively, Amer-
icans who have been stationed abroad might be called back to the 
States for a short time. Nonresident alien employees, i.e., citizens 
of Common Market countries, might also be brought from their 
overseas stations to the home office for consultation, etc. Within 
the same taxable year, any one of these three classes might perform 
services at home as well as in a foreign land. This could complicate 
their tax problems, for the Code as well as bilateral treaties gen-
erally look to the place where service is performed, rather than to 
the place of payment, in fixing the source of compensation for tax 
purposes. And source itself is generally considered the prime basis 
for asserting jurisdiction over compensation. However, Section D, 
below, calls attention to a standard which has been added to the In-
ternal Revenue Code, and to others incorporated in treaties, for the 
purpose of freeing certain international business visits from such 
tax complications. The device involves a modification in the rules 
which generally designate the place of service as the source of 
earned income. Subject to certain conditions, each country in effect 
foregoes treating itself as the source of compensation even though 
the business visitor actually performed services there. But this vari-
ation is only applied by each country to those business visitors who 
are nonresident aliens, and then only if such persons are physically 
present for a period usually not exceeding 6 months. In other words, 
the United States would not forego taxability of income attributable 
to services performed in the States by a business visitor who is an 
American citizen, and this is so though he might then actually be a 
resident of a foreign country. 
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SECTION B. CoMPARING CoMMON MARKET TAXES ON 
AMERICANs AssiGNED To WoRK IN A 
MEMBER NATION 
(a) Foreign tax effect when an American establishes resi-
dence abroad: In general.-Aside from special exclusions designed 
to accommodate international business visits, the income tax of al-
most all countries reaches earnings derived by anyone from personal 
services performed locally. Common Market countries, like the 
United States, go on generally, however, to consider residence there 
a proper basis for asserting jurisdiction over a person's total in-
come, from wherever derived. Absent special provision, this would 
mean that at least two countries would be asserting worldwide juris-
diction over the total income of an American citizen who has taken 
up residence in a Common Market country. Section C, infra, de-
scribes the two prime types of relief which have been incorporated 
into the Internal Revenue Code to accommodate the plight of such 
a person. The first, in the form of an inclusion, is limited to the 
American citizen's foreign service income. The second, in the form 
of a credit for any foreign income tax which may have been paid, 
would, inter alia, accommodate that citizen's other income but only 
to the extent it is derived from sources outside the United States. 
In other words, America insists upon full payment of tax attribut-
able to that part of a nonresident citizen's income which may have 
been derived from sources within the United States. Many foreign 
countries have unilateral statutory provisions which are designed, 
in one degree or another, to protect any resident who is an American 
citizen from double taxation with respect to this latter type of in-
come. Luxembourg has one of the least attractive arrangements 
of this type in that it only allows the American tax attributable to 
such benefits to be deducted from gross income in computing the net 
base. The other five Common Market countries are now hemmed 
in by provisions in the bilateral tax treaties. As is indicated more 
fully in the notes/ these fall into three general categories. The Bel-
1 By Article XII of the Belgian treaty, Belgium agreed (I) to reduce to ¥.;th the 
Professionelle and Nationale Crisis taxes which would otherwise be levied on income 
sourced in and taxed by the United States, (2) to tax income from personal and real 
property having a source in the United States at a maximum rate of xzo/o, and (3) to 
reduce to * the personal complementary tax on the American citizen with reference 
to income sourced in and taxed by the United States. 
Unilaterally, Italy does not apply its complementary progressive income tax on a 
resident alien's income from other sources until it is remitted. But by Article XV(x) (b) 
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gian provision calls for a substantial reduction in the rate on that 
income which such a person continues to derive from American 
sources. Italy responds by crediting the American tax against their 
own assessments. Germany, France, and the Nether lands, on the 
other hand, generally provide exemptions for such income though 
the latter country does not grant such in the case of dividends, in-
terest, and royalties received by individuals. 
The Common Market countries also take different approaches 
in resolving the question of whether an American has become a 
resident in one of the former countries for tax purposes. A person 
who has resided in Germany or in Luxembourg for a period in ex-
cess of 6 months is deemed a resident and will be taxed accordingly, 
beginning with the first day of his stay. While the basic period in 
France is five years, a person in the service of an enterprise situated 
there is likely to be considered a resident after one year and be 
taxed accordingly from that moment on. At a minumum, he will be 
taxed the first year on income having its source in France or on a 
sum equal to five times the rental value of his house or apartment, 
whichever is greater. 
Theoretically, the other three member nations do not gear the 
question of residence for tax purposes to any particular period of 
stay. Under the taxing statutes of Belgium and the Netherlands, the 
question turns on the total facts. In Italy the matter is tied to the 
civil law interpretation of domicile. But as a practical matter, all 
three countries will normally assert residence at least at the point 
when a stay has extended beyond one year. 
of the treaty, Italy agreed to reduce its tax by the amount of United States tax on in-
come from sources in the United States where such income was not exempt from United 
States tax. The formula includes an arrangement to prevent the credit from immunizing 
Italian taxes on income derived from non-United States sources. Dividends sourced 
within the United States are treated separately; Italy allows a credit against tax in an 
amount equal to 8 o/o of the dividend itself. 
By Article XIX(3) of the Netherlands treaty, the Netherlands agreed to grant a 
credit, insofar as allowed by Netherlands law, for income taxes paid to the United 
States. But see also the reference in Section D, infra, to an exclusion permitted by the 
national law of the Netherlands. 
By Article XV(I) (b) of the German treaty, Germany agreed to immunize from tax 
income of an American citizen derived from the United States and not exempt from 
United States tax. However, Germany reserved the right to include excluded items 
for the purpose of determining the rate applicable to other income. 
Article 14(B) of the French treaty governs its response. A credit is allowed against 
the proportional tax on interest, dividends, and trust income, derived from the United 
States. Any other income derived from the United States is exempt from that tax. 
Also, Article 164 of the French General Tax Code has been frozen into the treaty, and 
generally exempts U.S. income from the French general income tax when derived by 
an American residing in France, providing such income was taxable in the United 
States. 
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(b) Comparative progressive impact of Common Market 
income taxes on employment income.-The country-by-country sur-
vey in PART I contained separate descriptions of the income taxes 
which each member nation would impose on individuals. Three coun-
tries-Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands-follow a 
basic pattern much like that used in the United States in that only 
one income tax is imposed on individuals. France's reform in late 
1959 also moved it toward that same type of structure. While at 
least temporarily it did retain a complementary tax in addition to 
its general income tax, only the latter applies to wages and salaries. 
In lieu of the former, employers pay a substitute tax which the em-
ployees may credit against their general income tax. 
The two other countries-Belgium and Italy-superimpose a 
progressive surtax Oli other separately scheduled income taxes which 
are divided by reference to various classes of income. 
Considerable variation also exists with reference to the way in 
which allowances for a spouse and other dependents are handled. 
The Italian approach to this problem most closely resembles that of 
the United States; the matter is accommodated by deductions from 
gross income in arriving at the tax base. The personal allowance for 
the taxpayer amounts to $387; each dependent, including a spouse, 
gives rise to an additional $81 deduction. 
Belgium solves the dependency problem through credits against 
tax on the first $5 ,ooo of income, as follows: 
(a) 5% each for the first and second dependents; 
(b) 10% each for the third and fourth dependents; and 
(c) 20% for each additional dependent. 
Belgium also exempts from tax a modest amount ($500 to $8oo 
depending on the size of municipality in which the taxpayer resides) 
but only if the total income does not exceed the exemption. 
The French response involves a split-income arrangement for 
computation purposes, the taxpayer and his spouse counting as one 
each, other dependents being counted as 12 each. 
Germany also mitigates progression by allowing the taxpayer to 
split his income with his spouse for computation purposes. Allow-
ances for children, however, are handled in a fashion similar to 
that in the United States and Italy, the deductions from gross in-
come being $214 for the first child, $400 for the second, with $428 
being allowed for each additional child. 
Finally, Luxembourg and the Netherlands approach the prob-
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lem through multiple rate tables, the choice of a particular table 
being dependent upon the taxpayer's family situation. 
As indicated in PART I, other deductions from an individual's 
gross income will also vary from country to country. However, 
practically all have established some kind· of minimum standard 
deduction to accommodate an employee's business expenses; 
amounts in excess of that must be itemized en toto. Also interesting 
because of its departure from American practice is the allowance 
frequently allowed for life insurance premiums, up to a certain 
amount. Germany and Luxembourg add on old age, health, and ac-
cident insurance. While Belgium also allows a deduction for social 
security contributions, the Netherlands even permit a deduction up 
to a certain amount for premiums paid on a life annuity contract. 
Life insurance, however, is not accommodated there. Germany and 
Luxembourg also permit a taxpayer to take a standard personal de-
duction in lieu of itemizing most other personal deductions. This is 
separate and apart from the standard business deduction previously 
mentioned. 
A final significant departure from American practice involves a 
deduction of all or a part of the income tax itself. While France and 
Italy permit their complementary tax and separately scheduled in-
come taxes, respectively, to be deducted from the amount subject 
to their respective progressive taxes, Belgium goes on to allow the 
progressive tax of one year to be deducted from that income subject 
to progressive tax in the next year. 
Comparison of the relative impact of each member nation's in-
come tax on individuals is only possible on the basis of assumed facts. 
Table V A assumes that all income (salaries of $6,ooo, $I 2,ooo, and 
$48,ooo) was derived from employment, a:nd reflects the effective 
percentage which would be absorbed by taxes against single tax-
payers and married taxpayers with two children, standard minimum 
deductions also having been taken into account. It will be noted that 
Italy is quite generally on the low side, with the Netherlands being 
consistently on the high side. Also to be noted is the fact that the 
United States would generally fall into the less demanding group, 
for real progression in Europe generally starts at a lower figure 
than in the United States. 
Many Americans will draw an added bonus from their employers 
for foreign service even though the dollar has a comparatively high 
purchasing power in most Common Market countries. Foreign tax 
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TABLE v A 
EFFECTIVE RATES ON SALARY INCOME 
I Salary. $6,ooo ~ Salary, $r2,000 Salary, $48,000 
M""''" 'I 
llrfarried Married 
I Single and T'IJ.•a : Single and Twa Single and Twa 
COUNTRY I Taxpayer Children / Taxpayer Children Taxpayer Children 
' " I' Belgium II 22.37% 16.77% II 36.61% 34·23% II s6.7o% 56.10% 







Germany** 25.2% 16.-% 33·5 % 24·3 % 47·2% 4o.8o% 
Italy I 12.36% 12.05% 14·98% 14.84% i 21.74% 21.6o% 





49·07% 40·36% II 64·30% 61.n% 
United States 17·40% 10.-% 24.20% 15·40% I so. so% 35.6o% I 
*In comparing the French effective rate, account must be taken of the fact that 
salaries are free from the 8% complementary tax, employers paying in lieu thereof a 
slightly progressive tax by reference to wages paid each employee. Though paid by 
the employer, this latter tax is credited by the employee against his general income tax. 
The above figures take into account a 5% credit, this being the normal percentage paid 
by employers. 
**A church tax, usually amounting to 8% of the tax on wages, must be added. 
***Figures are those applicable to taxpayers under age so. 
authorities generally treat this as part of their taxable incomes. 
Americans do, however, frequently receive quite favorable treat-
ment on other scores; this varies from special allowances for ex-
penses up to a certain percentage, to acceptance of currency exchange 
rates which are lower than those officially posted. Illustratively, 
where American controlled enterprises have sent employees from 
the head office to establish Belgian factories or offices, those em-
ployees who are deemed to retain their tax residence in the United 
States have received the benefit of a special ruling from the Belgian 
authorities. If the employee's European activities are conducted 
almost exclusively in Belgium, he is permitted a standard deduction 
equal to so% of the salary received in Belgium. 
Generalizations with respect to the circumstances in which Ameri-
cans may enjoy special tax benefits are not really meaningful, how-
ever, for such matters usually depend upon negotiation in each case. 
And as more and more Americans take up residence in the Com-
mon Market, it is likely to become more difficult to obtain such 
privileges. 
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SECTION c. IMPACT OF u.s. INCOME TAX ON AMERICAN 
EMPLOYEEs AssiGNED To FoREIGN STATIONS 
(a) Introductory note.-In the first income tax act passed 
pursuant to the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress asserted a power 
to tax an American citizen on his income "from all sources," with-
out regard to whether he worked or resided "at home or abroad." 2 
This sweeping view of jurisdictional power was sustained-as a 
constitutional matter-on the theory that "government, by its very 
nature benefits the citizen and his property wherever found .... " 3 
It was equally true, however, that a citizen who derived his income 
by performing services in a foreign country also benefitted from the 
activities of that government and, at least to the extent of the in-
come earned there, was usually taxed by it.4 Congress began to re-
spond to this double tax threat in I 9 I 6; within IO years, it had in-
stituted three relief measures. These served as mutually exclusive 
alternatives in some situations; in certain others they were com-
plementary. 
The first congressionally inspired relief against double taxation 
has survived in slightly altered form to this day. It involves a deduc-
tion from gross income of most of the different types of taxes im-
posed by a foreign country.5 But this deduction fell far short of 
relieving the citizen of the entire burden of his foreign tax. For ex-
ample, if his effective domestic rate was 33%, the American tax 
was in effect reduced only by an amount equal to one-third of the 
foreign tax. The taxpayer himself continued to shoulder the eco-
nomic burden of the remaining two-thirds. 
The consequence of this limited form of relief was re-examined 
during World War I when both domestic and foreign income tax 
rates were being increased. Fear was expressed that citizens were 
still discouraged "from going out after commerce and business in 
different countries or residing for such purposes in different coun-
tries." It was asserted that some would even "become a citizen of 
another country ... in order to escape the large and double taxa-
2 Rev. Act of 1913, Section II, §A, Subdiv. x. 
3 Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56, 44 S. Ct. 444 ( 1924). 
4 The prime exception to this rule of taxability today relates to immunity accorded 
nonresident alien business visitors whose performance of services and stay do not 
exceed a limited period, usually 6 months. See discussion in Section D, infra. 
"Rev. Act of 1916, § s(a) Third, now reflected in I.R.C., § 164. The deduction does 
not embrace estate, inheritance, legacy, succession, or gift taxes, nor taxes assessed 
against local benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of the property assessed. 
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tion imposed." 6 As an alternative to the deduction, it was provided 
that foreign income taxes, as well as war profits and excess profits 
taxes, could be taken as a credit against the American tax itself.i 
The previously existing deduction arrangement now assumed a com-
plementary as well as an alternative status. It complemented the 
credit in that it was the only form of relief with regard to foreign 
taxes other than income taxes, though later the credit itself was 
extended to cover any foreign tax paid "in lieu of a tax on income, 
war profits, or excess profits otherwise generally imposed" by a 
foreign country. 8 
From the earlier discussion in Section B, supra, it will be recalled 
that the effective income tax rates in several Common Market coun-
tries exceed those assessed in the United States. If a taxpayer's 
entire income is attributable to his foreign employment, the effect 
in this circumstance would be to wipe out his American tax liability. 
The taxpayer may not avail himself, however, of any excess foreign 
tax as an offset against any American tax liability attributable to 
income which he derived in that year from United States sources. 
More accurately speaking, one's credit for income taxes paid a 
foreign country may not exceed that proportion of the American 
tax which his "taxable income" from the foreign country bears to 
his total "taxable income." 9 
The comparisons made in Section B, supra, also revealed in some 
circumstances that the effective American rates were higher than 
those of some Common Market countries, Italy being the most 
striking example. American emphasis on the income tax was even 
more noticeable when compared to many non-European countries. 
In the mid-1920's, this meant that any differential in tax was always 
paid over to the federal government. In that era, however, an as-
serted desire to help increase our exports led the House Committee 
on Ways and Means to propose that under certain conditions 
0 Statement of Representative Kitchen, 56 Cong. Rec. 677-678 ( 1918). 
7 Rev. Act of 1918, § zzz(a) (r), now, as modified, I.R.C., § 901 et seq. 
8 Rev. Act of 1942, § 158(f), amending I.R.C. (1939), § 131, now I.R.C. (195+), 
§ 903. (Italics added.) 
'I.R.C., § 904. For the purpose of computing this limitation, an individual's "taxable 
income" must be computed without any deduction for personal exemptions. Provision 
is made in § 904 for a carry-over of excess foreign taxes, but this will usually be 
advantageous only if the foreign rate is reduced in future years to a point below the 
American rate. For other details relating to the credit, see PART III, supra. Section F 
of that Part calls attention to the new statutory election which permits the taxpayer to 
substitute an "overall" limitation for the per-country limitation discussed in the text. 
In effect this would permit the taxpayer to average foreign taxes paid to high- and 
low-tax countries. 
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Americans working abroad in connection with export sales be freed 
of any such differential with regard to their salaries or commissions. 
An exclusion of such benefits from their domestic gross income was 
to serve as the device by which to accomplish this end. 10 While the 
Senate agreed that certain conditions should be imposed, it insisted 
that this third more favorable and controversial arrangement be 
extended to all types of foreign earned income. 
This latter exclusion was to be the repeated focus of congressional 
concern for many years. Only where its constantly changing require-
ments could not be satisfied would a citizen assigned to a foreign 
station normally fall back on the credit for foreign income taxes and 
the deduction for other foreign taxes. 
While the exclusionary device would obviously be most advan-
tageous where the service was performed in a low income tax country 
like Italy, it must be remembered that the advantage would be di-
luted in some part by the prejudice which such a citizen would other-
wise suffer because of the substantial reliance by low income tax 
countries on turnover taxes. The latter, normally not considered 
income taxes nor imposed in lieu of such, would not usually qualify 
for the credit.U Nor would they qualify for the alternative deduc-
tion to the extent such taxes were imposed on persons other than 
the ultimate consumer, and this was so though in the end the eco-
nomic, as distinguished from the legal, incidence of such taxes fell 
on the consumer.12 
A discussion of the shifting statutory standards applicable to the 
exclusion for foreign service income follows. 
(b) Evolution of the present alternative standards appli-
cable to the exclusion.-The House first proposed that the exclusion 
for foreign service income be allowed if the citizen was abroad for 
more than 6 months of the taxable yearY This dividing line was 
seized upon because certain countries subjected an American to their 
income tax if he lived there in excess of 6 monthsY 
While the Senate Finance Committee thought it was enough in 
such cases to grant the previously allowed credit for foreign income 
taxes, 15 in the end the exclusionary principle prevailed, but only if 
10 H.R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st. Sess. 7 (1926), § 213 (b) (14) of Committee Print No. 1. 
11 See e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-635, C.B. 1956-2, sor. 
12 The provision in I.R.C., § 164, which authorizes consumers to deduct retail sales 
taxes which are actually imposed on retail vendors, does not even apply in a foreign 
setting. 
18 See note 10, supra. 
14 Statement of Senator Reed, 75 Cong. Rec. 10410-11 (1932). 
15 S. Rep. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 ( 1926). 
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the citizen was a "bona fide nonresident of the United States for 
more than six months during the taxable year.'' 16 
The latter condition, interpreted to require nothing more than 
physical absence from the United States for over half of the taxable 
year/7 was later thought in practice to be entirely too lax. Within 
4 years, the Senate Committee discovered "to our surprise, that 
. . . American ambassadors and ministers and officers of the for-
eign service were getting clear out of the payment of any income 
tax . . . , which nobody in the world ever intended. . . . These 
people do not deserve the exemption, because they are not subject 
to the income taxation of the foreign countries in which they are 
stationed .... " 18 Of course, this could be, and was, remedied by 
neutralizing the exclusion in the case of amounts paid by the United 
States or any agency thereofY But in 1942, the same Committee 
noted that the provision had also "suffered considerable abuse in 
the case of [other] persons absenting themselves from the United 
States for more than 6 months simply for tax-evasion purposes." 20 
There was no guarantee, of course, that such a person would stay in 
one foreign country long enough to suffer its tax. This, plus the 
asserted belief that the whole idea of an exclusion involved "unjust 
discrimination" in favor of those earning income abroad, led the 
House Committee on Ways and Means-the original sponsors of 
the exclusionary principle-to call for its complete elimination.21 
But the Senate Committee thought such an elimination would "work 
a hardship in the case of citizens ... who are bona fide residents 
of foreign countries," noting, for example, that "many employees 
of American business in South America do not return to the United 
States for periods of years. Such persons are fully subject to the 
income tax of the foreign country of their residence." 22 In the end, 
the Senate prevailed; the exclusion was still to be allowed, but only 
if the person was a ( 1) ((bona fide resident of a foreign country or 
1"Rev. Act of 1926, § 213(b) (14). See also H. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., rst Sess. 367 
( 1926} for conference amendments. 
11 G.C.M. 9848, C.B. X-2, 178. This view was also adopted in Commissioner v. Fiske, 
(7th Cir. 1942) 128 Fed.(2d) 487, cert. den., 317 U.S. 635, 63 S. Ct. 63 (1942). 
18 Statement of Senator Reed, 75 Cong. Rec. I04IO-II (1932). 
19 Rev. Act of 1932, § u6(a}, now reflected in I.R.C., § 91I. However, certain im-
munities are provided in the case of cost of living allowances drawn by certain gov-
ernment employees. I.R.C., § 912. Post World War II treaties with Common Market 
countries provide immunity from foreign tax in the case of amounts paid by the 
United States or its agencies. 
""S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1942). 
21 H. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. so ( 1942). 
"'S. Rep. No. 163 r, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 ( 1942). 
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countries" and ( 2) was such "during the entire taxable year." 23 
The intended effect of this shift, according to the Chairman of the 
Senate committee, was to reach those "American citizens who are 
merely temporarily away from home," while preserving the ex-
clusion "in the case of the bona fide, nonresident American citizen 
who established a home and maintains his establishment and is 
taking on the corresponding obligations of the home in any foreign 
country .... " 24 
To accommodate the problem which would arise under the "en-
tire-taxable-year" rule in the case of mid-year changes of residence 
back to the United States, it was further provided that if the person 
had been a bona fide resident of a foreign country for at least a two-
year period before he again took up residence in the United States, 
earned income attributable to the final partial year was excludable.25 
Almost a decade passed without further change. Then, in 1951, 
the Senate Finance Committee moved to liberalize the exclusion on 
two fronts. 
To alleviate the first-year plight of one who became a bona fide 
resident of a foreign country in mid-year, the ''entire-taxable-year" 
rule was modified so as to allow the exclusion where such residence 
was "for an uninterrupted period which includes an entire taxable 
year." 26 Even more important was the establishment over the 
House Committee's objections of a general standard which con-
tinues to serve today as an alternative to the bona-fide-residence rule. 
This separate test involved a revival in modified form of the earlier 
discarded and less demanding physical absence test. 
In developing this alternative, the Senate Committee noted that 
the United States was then trying to aid foreign countries under the 
Point 4 foreign aid program, and that in keeping with this program 
it was desirable "to encourage men with technical knowledge to go 
abroad." 27 It was further asserted that because "the term 'bona 
fide' residence abroad ... [had] been construed quite strictly," 
many persons who had gone abroad to work "even for a relatively 
25 Rev. Act of 1942, § 148(a), amending I.R.C. (1939), § uQ.(a). 
""Hearings, Senate Finance Committee, H.R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. I, 743 
( 1942). (Italics supplied.) 
25 Rev. Act of 1942, § 148, amending I.R.C. ( 1939), § u6 (a). While the language of 
the provision might not seem to limit the exclusion to income for the last partial year, 
the committee's report and the catchline in the statute indicated this was the limited 
purpose. S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 ( 1942 ). 
26 Rev. Act of 1951, § 321(a), amending I.R.C. (1939), § 116(a), now reflected in 
I.R.C., § 911 (a) ( 1 ). 
27 S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1951). 
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long period of time" had been unable to obtain an exclusion of their 
foreign earned income.28 They had failed to measure up on either 
of two counts. 
One difficulty was that the "nature of the individual's work ... 
[was] such as to make it difficult to establish a 'residence' in the 
more widely accepted use of the term." 29 Others had fallen short 
because they had "gone abroad only for a stated period of time. 
Examples of this . . . [were] managers, technicians, and skilled 
workmen who are induced to go abroad for periods of I 8 to 36 
months to complete specific projects." 30 
The enacted solution granted an exclusion of foreign earned in-
come where the person was physically present in a foreign country 
or countries 5 I o days (approximately 17 months) out of any con-
secutive I 8 month's period, though for reasons previously stated in 
connection with the bona-fide-residence test, this immunity was not 
to be available with regard to amounts received from the United 
States government or an agency thereof.31 
Within two years, widely publicized abuses of the new alternative 
standard which had been added to what is now § 9 I I of the Code 
led the House Committee, in 1953, to respond to the Secretary of 
the Treasury's demand for "corrective legislation" 32 by calling for 
complete elimination of the new alternative. Both noted that while 
the provision "was designed to encourage men with technical knowl-
edge to go abroad in order to complete specific projects, . . . in-
dividuals with large earnings [such as movie stars] have seized 
upon the provision as an inducement to go abroad to perform serv-
ices, which were customarily performed at home, for the primary 
purpose of avoiding the Federal income tax." 33 Equally disturbing 
was the fact that in many such cases, the persons did "not pay in-
come tax even to the foreign country or countries in which the income 
is earned. This is because they are not in any particular foreign 
country long enough to establish a residence or because the foreign 




31 Rev. Act of 1951, § 32I(a), amending l.R.C. (1939), § 116(a) (2), now found in 
altered form in I.R.C., §9u(a)(2) . 
.. Ltr. to Chairman of the House Committee, dated April 13, 1953, 99 Cong. Rec. 
3079 (1953). 
33 H. Rep. No. 894, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1953) . 
.. Ibid. 
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In the end, a less drastic change proposed by the Senate prevailed; 
it was content to limit the exclusion under this alternative standard 
to $zo,ooo per taxable year, or to a pro tanto part thereof for any 
period less than a taxable year.35 This limitation, did not, however, 
carry over to those persons who could satisfy the older and quite 
separate bona-fide-residence test. 
(c) Differences in the character of foreign status required 
by the exclusionary principle's two alternative standards.-More 
handsomely paid Americans who are assigned to work in a Common 
Market country, particularly in one which has a low income tax 
such as Italy, will derive greater advantage if they satisfy § 91 1's 
foreign-bona-fide-residence test rather than its alternative 510-day 
rule. Satisfaction of the former would permit avoidance of the 
latter's $zo,ooo per year limitation. As we shall later see, even in 
the case of those less well paid, the bona-fide-residence test will also 
more effectively preserve the integrity of the exclusion with refer-
ence to certain deferred compensation plans, and will facilitate 
more flexible planning with respect to vacations and business trips 
back to the States. Except in the most clear cut cases, however, it 
has not been easy to predict in advance whether the more liberal 
bona-fide-residence test will be satisfied. 
Little interpretative difficulty will be encountered, of course, in 
connection with the one mathematically fixed objective criterion to 
the effect that a qualified status must exist "for an uninterrupted 
period which includes an entire taxable year." But in addition to 
this independent requirement relating to time, a qualified status, 
i.e., something more than mere physical presence in a foreign coun-
try, must also exist. Difficulty in predicting whether one has become 
a bona fide resident of a foreign country under American standards 
stems from the fact that it turns on "his intention with regard to the 
length and nature of his stay." 36 And here one starts with two handi-
caps. As one court put the first, "Exemptions as well as deductions 
are matters of legislative grace, and a taxpayer seeking either must 
show that he comes squarely within the term of the law conferring 
the benefit sought." 37 Even if the facts are stipulated, there will be 
difficulty in showing that they "squarely" satisfy a rule so ill-defined. 
35 8. Rep. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953). Technical Changes Act of 1953, 
§ 204(a), amending I.R.C. (1939), § u6{a), now I.R.C., § 9u{a) (2). 
•• I.T. Regs., § 1.9II-1 (a) (2) refers back to § 1.871-2{b) for this definition. {Italics 
added.) 
37 Donald H. Nelson, 30 T.C. II 51 (1958). 
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Second, frequently the question is said ultimately to be one of fact 
with regard to which the taxpayer bears the burden of proof.38 
And because it is a question of fact, Tax Court decisions, to which 
one might otherwise look for authority, generally include a state-
ment in the "Findings of Fact" to the effect that the particular tax-
payers involved there were or were not bona fide residents of a 
foreign country.39 In most cases, however, those persons intended 
to do just what they did do, and the standard to which the intention 
must relate was at least closely akin to a question of law. Courts 
implicitly recognized this when they made an effort in their opinions 
to distinguish the cases at bar from other decisions.40 But even when 
doing this, they frequently added, because all surrounding circum-
stances were important in deciding such cases, that it was not possi-
ble or worthwhile to attempt to harmonize the many decisions.41 
Certainly there is general agreement that cases involving ques-
tions of residence in non-tax statutory settings are of no value; 42 
"bona fide residence" for this purpose is to be determined in the 
light of the congressional purpose in enacting this particular pro-
VISIOn. 
In seeking out the congressional purpose, the report of the spon-
soring Committee furnished two helpful guides, one of which had 
only a narrow thrust. It was to the effect that "Vacation or business 
trips to the United States during the taxable year will not necessarily 
deprive a taxpayer, otherwise qualified, of the exemption provided 
by this section." 43 The other was to the effect that American tests 
used in determining whether an alien was a resident of the States 
were to be employed in deciding whether an American was a bona 
fide resident of a foreign country.44 This led courts to place great 
reliance on the previously existing regulations relating to aliens, 
and these administrative provisions turned the question on the tax-
payer's intention "with regard to the length and nature of his 
stay." 45 
In general, those regulations sought to distinguish transients from 
those who truly made their "home" abroad. With reference to 
38 Ibid.; Leonard Larsen, 23 T.C. 599 (1955). 
39 Burlin B. Hamer, 22 T.C. 343 ( 1954) ; Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 ( 1947). 
••Fred H. Pierce, 22 T.C. 493 (1954); Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 (1947). 
""Leonard Larsen, 23 T.C. 599 (1955) . 
.,. Arthur J. H. Johnson, 7 T.C. 1040 (1946) . 
.. S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1942); Seeley v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 
1951) 186 F. (zd) 541; I.T. Regs., § 1.911-1 (a) (2). 
"Ibid. 
"'Now in I.T. Regs., § 1.871-2(b). Henningsen v. Comm'r., (4th Cir. 1957) 243 
F.(zd) 954; David E. Rose, 16 T.C. 232 (1951); Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 (1947). 
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the projected length of stay, the taxpayer would not fall short 
merely because he had a "floating intention, indefinite as to time, 
to return" to the States. But he could not attain the necessary status 
if, on going abroad, the purpose was one "which in its nature may 
be promptly accomplished." In other words, his purpose had to be 
of such a nature that "an extended stay may be necessary for its ac-
complishment, and to that end the ... [person] makes his home . 
. . . " abroad. This was sufficient even though the person also in-
tended "at all times to return to his domicile [here] ... when the 
purpose" had been consummated or abandoned.46 
Obviously the difference between a purpose which may be 
"promptly accomplished" and one which requires an "extended 
stay" is not easily drawn. But in interpreting the further require-
ment that the person make his "home" in the foreign country, 
though he may ultimately intend to return, some courts have been 
assisted by the statement which the Chairman of the sponsoring 
Committee made during the course of congressional hearings. He 
said, it will be recalled, that the provision was intended to accommo-
date "nonresident American citizens who established a home and 
maintains his establishment and is taking on corresponding obliga-
tions of the home in any foreign country .... " 47 
It seems fairly clear from the foregoing that one might be able 
to predict that there would be a meaningful difference between the 
employee who lives abroad in company barracks, eats in a mess 
hall provided by the employer-mingling only with other em-
ployees,48 and another who resigns from all of his American clubs, 
gives up his house in the States-moving his family and furniture 
abroad where he takes a long-term lease on a house, opens charge 
accounts, and joins in some community activities of the foreign 
country and pays income tax to it.49 The fact is, however, that there 
are no reliable rules of thumb. For example, the first man might 
have been a resident from the beginning if he had intended, for • 
'"LT. Regs., § 1.871-2(b), (Italics added.) The cases agree that the person may be 
a foreign resident though the United States remains his domicile. Comm'r. v. Swent, 
(4th Cir. 1946) 155 F.(2d) 513; Fred H. Pierce, 22 T.C. 493 (1954). In Leigh White, 
22 T.C. 585 (1954), the Court stated (at 590): "It is made clear by many decisions 
that the term is not to be confused with· 'domicile,' and that it includes a temporary 
residence, where an extended stay is contemplated although there is at all times an 
intention thereafter to return to a former residence or to establish a new residence 
elsewhere." 
41 Hearings, Senate Finance Committee, H. Res. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. I, 
743 (1942). 
'"Cf. Ernest R. Hertig, 19 T.C. 109 (1952). 
•• Cf. David E. Rose, 16 T.C. 232 ( 1951) ; Herman F. Baehre, 15 T.C. 236 ( 1950). 
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example, to bring his family over when housing became available.50 
And he may not have paid a foreign income tax only because he sup-
posed, in his ignorance, that none was due because of something he 
had heard about tax treaties.51 
To assure somewhat greater certainty of result, the taxpayer may 
also seek to qualify under the 5 IO-days-out-of-IS-months-foreign-
physical-presence test, even though it is limited by the apportionable 
$2o,ooo per year limitation. 
The 5 10-day requirement relates to full days (midnight to mid-
night) 52 actually spent in a foreign country.53 It also includes the 
time spent in going between foreign countries so long as travel over 
international waters does not exceed 24 hours nor involve a detour 
to the United States, its possessions, or territories. 54 While the 5 IO 
days need not be consecutive, being broken by a vacation or business 
trips back to the States, the foreign earned income attributable to a 
particular day is immune only if that full day is one of 5 IO which do 
fall in a consecutive IS-month's period. Because of the peculiar way 
in which a taxpayer's interim return trips are scattered, in immuniz-
ing the income of a particular day, he may find it necessary to over-
lap different I 8-month's periods, treating one as beginning before 
another ends. 55 
(d) Types of benefits excluded under § 91 I's alternative 
standards, and allocable deductions.-A taxpayer who is entitled to 
a § 9I I exclusion with respect to foreign service income may also 
avail himself of other exclusions applicable to taxpayers generally. 
For example, suppose that an American employer either pays or 
reimburses an old employee for expenses incurred by him in moving 
60 Cf. Seeley v. Comm'r., (2d Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 541; Fred H. Pierce, 22 T.C. 
493 (1954). 
61 Cf. Charles F. Bouldin, 8 T.C. 959 ( 1947). Also, David E. Rose, 16 T.C. 232 (I95I); 
White v. Hofferbert, (D.C. Md. I950) 88 F. Supp. 457· See Ernest R. Hertig, 19 T.C. 
109 (1952). 
62 I.T. Regs., § 1.911-I (b) (Io). 
62 Defined to include only territory under the sovereignty of a foreign government 
and the air space above. I.T. Regs.,§ 1.911-1(b) (7). 
"LT. Regs., § 1.911-I (b) (Io). If he does detour to the United States, its possessions, 
or territories, the period of the detour, including the day he left the foreign country 
through the day on which he returned to a foreign country, would not be counted 
in the 510 days. 
66 For example, assume that the taxpayer first arrived in France, from the United 
States, at noon, December 31, 1956. He left France for the United States at noon, 
December I, 1957, arriving back in France on December 31, 1957. He again left France 
on August I, I958, returning there on August gr, 1958. He left France permanently 
for reassignment to the United States on July 1, 1959. Income attributable to March 
I5, I957 would qualify by reference to the 18-month period, January 1, 1957 through 
June 30, I958. Income earned on September 1, I958 could qualify by reference to the 
overlapping period January I, 1958 through June 30, 1959· 
I 
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himself, his family, and furniture to an overseas station. This ma-
terial benefit would not be covered by the § 9 I I exclusion. Practi-
cally all, if not all, of this benefit is attributable to a period prior to 
the establishment of foreign residence. Nor would the 5 IO-day rule 
cover this arrangement, for its springs into operation only with the 
first full day in which the taxpayer is present in a foreign country. 
Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service agrees that this benefit 
would be excludable if the transfer was actually made for the con-
venience of the employer. In that circumstance, the payment is not 
deemed compensatory in character and is, therefore, beyond the 
reach of § 6 I which defines gross income.56 
The § 9 I I exclusion itself constitutes a sanctuary from domestic 
tax only with reference to foreign "earned income"; other types of 
foreign income, such as interest or dividends, will enjoy only the 
advantage of the previously described credit or deduction allowed 
by American law for foreign taxes. None of these cushions will be 
available, however, with reference to any kind of income which has 
its source in the United States. This is so even with respect to in-
come attributable to services performed during a temporary busi-
ness visit to the United States by an American citizen who has be-
come a bona fide resident of a Common Market country.57 
""Rev. Rul. 54-429, C.B. 1954-2, 53· The same ruling calls for a different result in cer-
tain situations involving new employees. Where an employee moves from one locality 
in the United States to another to accept employment with a new employer, reimburse-
ment by the latter for those moving expenses would be includible in the employee's 
gross income and could not be deducted in arriving at taxable income. Also U.S. v. 
Woodall, (10th Cir. 1958) 255 F.(2d) 370, cert. den., 358 U.S. 824, 79 S. Ct. 39 (1958); 
Rev. Rul. 59-236, I.R.B. 1959-28, 14. Americans hired within the United States for 
re-assignment to foreign branches would normally spend a period at the home office, 
being oriented. Reimbursement for their subsequent oceanic travel would probably be 
excludable. But the result is less clear if a wholly owned foreign subsidiary paid 
oceanic moving expenses incurred by an old employee of the American parent on the 
occasion of his transfer from the parent's offices in the United States to the subsidiary's 
offices in the Common Market. Technically at least, the employee is changing em-
ployers . 
• , Looking only at the Code, it is clear that income from services has its source where 
the services are performed. I.R.C., § 861 (a) (3). Moreover, the Code itself immunizes 
income from services performed in the States only in the case of certain nonresident 
aliens who are here for 90 days or less. Ibid; 
The tax treaties which the United States has with 5 Common Market countries do 
not immunize the American earned income of a nonresident American. The treaty 
with Belgium is typical. On the one hand, it does provide that a "rrsident of Belgium 
shall be exempt from United States tax upon compensation for labor or personal serv-
ices performed within the United States .... " if he fits certain classifications. Article 
XI. But in that treaty, as in the others, the United States reserved the right in the case 
of its own "citizens or residents or corporations ... " to impose its regular income tax 
law as though the "convention had not come into effect." Article XII. Provisions 
similar to this have been interpreted to mean that the regular Code provisions apply 
to nonresident Americans. Marie G. Crerar, 26 T.C. 702 (1956). 
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The Code section which establishes an exclusion for foreign 
"earned income" goes on to relate it to "wages, salaries, or pro-
fessional fees, and other amounts received as compensation for per-
sonal services actually rendered .... " 58 In some settings, difficult 
questions of fact will arise in determining whether a given payment 
is truly for services or for something else. Illustrative are those 
situations where the taxpayer occupies a dual relationship to an 
enterprise, such as where he is an employee as well as a stockholder 
of a corporation or where he owns as well as manages a proprietor-
ship with reference to which both capital and services constitute 
material income-producing factors. In the former setting, a princi-
pal stockholder-knowing that dividends would be includable in 
domestic gross income-may attempt to characterize a payment 
as compensation for his foreign services though the amount actually 
exceeds a reasonable allowance for these services. The government 
has the authority, of course, to police the provision, apportioning 
the excess to the dividend category.59 And in the case of the proprie-
torship where capital was also a material income-producing factor, 
the Code expressly includes a ceiling on that portion of the net 
profits which can be considered compensation for the owner's serv-
ices, the limitation being 30%.60 A realistic apportionment may, of 
course, call for exclusion of less than 30%; that figure is only a 
ceiling.61 
Differences between the two forms of enterprise may also be 
important with reference to the loss of an exclusion in the case of 
"amounts paid by the United States or an agency thereof." For 
example, because of this statutory language, it has been held that 
an exclusion will not be enjoyed with reference to the distributive 
share of a professional partnership's profits which arose out of a 
government contract with the firm for its foreign services.62 On the 
other hand, where one is truly an officer or employee of a corpora-
tion, he will not lose the benefit of the exclusion merely because the 
employer is working on a government contract. 63 
While the Code excludes earned income attributable to a quali-
fied period only if it is "received from sources without the United 
States," the latter requirement is satisfied if the personal services 
68 I.R.C., §9u (b). 
•• Ibid. 
""Ibid. 
81 I.T. Regs., § 1.911·1 (a) (5). 
""Leif J. Sverdrup, 14 T.C. 859 (1950). But that case did approve the exclusion with 
respect to a so-called salary paid one partner. 
63 Rev. Rul. 54-483, C.B. 1954-2, 168. Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-4, C.B. 1958-z, 268. 
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are "performed" abroad.64 The "place of receipt" is immaterial.65 
But only under the bona-fide-residence test is the time of receipt 
immaterial. Under that test, deferred payments which are attribu-
table to earlier foreign service and are paid in the years following 
the employee's return to the States may be excluded if the other re-
quirements are satisfied. 66 In some instances, a contractually de-
ferred payment of this type may completely escape taxation because 
of the inability of a Common Market country to collect tax once the 
American has returned to his native land. However, if the amount 
in question is properly chargeable for tax purposes to a foreign 
permanent establishment or is paid by a foreign subsidiary, in all 
probability the withholding requirements of a particular Common 
Market country at least theoretically apply. 67 But in five of the 
Common Market countries this is probably not the case if the con-
tractually deferred compensation takes the form of a "pension." It 
is assumed in this connection that the American citizen abandoned 
his foreign residence immediately upon returning to the United 
States, concurrently re-establishing his residence in his native land, 
after which the contractual "pension" payments were to be received. 
Bilateral tax treaties with the five provide that private pensions paid 
to American citizens residing in the United States will not be taxed 
by the Common Market country even though the latter is the source 
from which the pension is derived. 68 And "pensions" are generally 
defined in those treaties, illustratively in the case of Belgium, to 
mean "periodic payments made in consideration of services rendered 
or by way of compensation for injuries received." 69 
In the case of qualified funded retirement plans having their situs 
in the United States, unless an American working and residing in a 
Common Market country is taxed by the latter at that point of time 
when contributions to the fund were made by the American em-
ployer, 70 a significant part of pension payments subsequently re-
.. I.R.C. §§ 9II and 862{a) (3), respectively. {Italics added.) 
65 1.T. Regs., §1.9II-I{a){6) and (b)(5); James D. Mooney, 9 T.C. 713 (1947); 
Herman A. Kollmar, 4 T.C. 727 ( 1945 ). 
66 Rev. Rul. 55-294, C.B. 1955-r, 368. 
67 The benefit in any event is believed to be taxable in Belgium and the Netherlands, 
though difficulty in realizing upon the claim is recognized. In Germany, while so-called 
"home salaries" are fully taxable, the tax authorities have held that bonuses paid an 
employee after he has finished his work in Germany are not taxable. 
'"'Article X of the Belgian treaty is illustrative. On the other hand, the treaty with 
South Africa provides an opposite rule. Art. VIII{2). Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-235, C.B. 
1956-2, 1125. 
69 Ibid. {Italics added.) 
wIt would be particularly surprising if a Common Market country would attempt 
currently to tax the employee on the employer's contribution if the employee's rights 
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ceived following the employee's return to the States will also be com-
pletely immune from tax. Such pension payments would be immune 
from American tax in the proportion the payment is directly at-
tributable to the contribution which the employer made with refer-
ence to that earlier foreign service which qualified under the foreign 
bona-fide-residence test.71 However, that portion of the pension 
which represents earnings on or accretion in the value of those em-
ployer contributions will not be excludable for American tax pur-
poses, for that part does not really constitute "earned" income 
entitled to the § 9 I I treatment. 72 If the American has re-established 
residence at home, the treaty provisions noted above would, of 
course, foreclose the Common Market country from asserting tax 
liability by reference to the pension payments themselves, even if 
collection of tax were otherwise possible. The same overall degree 
of tax freedom might even be enjoyed by returning American em-
ployees who are beneficiaries of certain types of funded plans which 
have their situs in a Common Market country. 73 
Returning employees whose foreign status qualified only under 
the 5 IO-day rule will not fare so well, with reference at least to 
certain deferred compensation arrangements. Their difficulty stems 
from the way the government interprets the $2o,ooo limitation. 
Until this limitation was added, amounts which qualified under the 
5 Io-day rule, like those associated with the bona-fide-residence test, 
were excludable from gross income "irrespective of when they. . . . 
[were] received." 74 But in fixing the $2o,ooo ceiling, the statute 
was amended to read as follows: 
the amount excluded under this paragraph for such tax-
able year shall not exceed $2o,ooo. If the I 8-month pe-
riod does not include the entire taxable year, the amount 
excluded under this paragraph for such taxable year shall 
not exceed an amount which bears the same ratio to 
were not vested. In the Netherlands, it is not believed that the benefit will be taxed in 
any event as long as the contribution is to a regular pension arrangement. Germany 
will immunize contributions at least if made to a company administered fund. 
71 Rev. Rul. 59-278, C.B. 1959-2, 174, indicates certain variations geared to date-
lines corresponding to various amendments made to § 9u's bona-fide-residence rule. 
See also Rev. Rul. 56-125, C.B. 1956-1, 627; Rev. Rul. 56-571, C.B. 1956-2, 982; and 
Goodman, The Unique Status Of Foreign Service Prnsions Offers Tax Advantages 
II }OURNAL OF TAXATION 30 (1959). 
72 Ibid. 
72 I.R.C., § 402(c) and note 71, supra. The statement assumes, with reference to an 
exclusion under foreign tax law for contributions made by the employer, that the 
foreign trust also meets requirements that might be imposed by foreign tax law. 
74 Rev. Rul. 54-72, C.B. 1954-1, II7 at n8 and I.T. Regs. (1939), § 39.II6-1(b) as 
amended by T.D. 6o39, C.B. 1953-2, 162. 
TAXATION 599 
$2o,ooo as the number of days in the part of the taxable 
year within the I 8-month period bears to the total number 
of days in such year. 75 
On the one hand, Congress clearly intended to restrict the 
$2o,ooo per year ceiling by a further pro-tanto type of limitation 
where the period of absence in a particular year was less than the 
whole year. 76 The Treasury, however, also interprets the statutory 
language to mean that no exclusion will be permitted if none of the 
actual payment was received in a taxable year which fell, at least in 
part, within the I 8-month period.77 According to its interpretation, 
where a calendar year taxpayer qualified under the 5 10-day rule 
and left Europe on July 1, 1960 for reassignment to the States, a 
maximum compensation of approximately $ w,ooo would be ex-
cludable provided it was attributable to the foreign service and was 
received within the taxable year 1960, a part of which did fall 
within the I 8-month period. No part of any payment received in 
1961 would qualify, however, even if it were the only compensation 
the taxpayer received for that six months of foreign service which 
fell in 1960.78 It is quite possible that these limitations, developed 
in the setting of deferred contractual payments, will also serve to 
restrict immunity with regard to pension payments under funded 
plans if the returning taxpayer's foreign status qualified only under 
the 5 I o-da y rule. 
Taxpayers who enjoy the benefit of a § 911 exclusion will not be 
permitted to offset other U.S. income by deducting expenses al-
locable to the excluded amounts. But while the Code denies a deduc-
tion for any expense which is "properly allocable to or chargeable 
against" excluded amounts, 79 so-called personal deductions, such 
as personal exemptions, charitable contributions, real estate taxes 
on a home, interest paid on a mortgage against the home, and medi-
cal expense are not adversely affected; these are not deemed allo-
cable to any particular income item.80 
(e) Conclusion re Americans working abroad: Filing re-
quirements, etc.-Traditionally, Americans have been required to 
75 Technical Changes Act of 1953, § 204(a), now reflected in I.R.C., § 9II (a) (2). 
(Italics added.) 
"' S. Rep. No. 685, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1953); C.B. 1953-2, 526, 528-529. 
"LT. Regs., § I.9II-I; Rev. Rul. 54-72, C.B. 1954-1, u;o. 
'"I bid. 
'" I.R.C., § 911. Where the $2o,ooo limitation precludes a complete exclusion of 
foreign earned income, deductions chargeable to such income are lost on the same 
proportionate basis. I.T. Regs., § I.9II-I (b) ( 6 ). 
soi.T. Regs., §1.9II(a)(3) and (b)(6). 
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file an income tax return when their gross income exceeded $6oo, or 
in the case of those over 6 5 years of age-$ I 200.81 Even before a 
recent statutory amendment, this meant that many who had gone 
abroad to work would still have to file a domestic return. Americans 
working abroad frequently realized more than $6oo (or $I 200 as 
the case may be) in other than foreign "earned income" to which 
the special exclusion was confined. In fact, even with this exclusion 
and a full allowance for so-called personal deductions including full 
exemptions, returns of many of them could easily show that some 
tax was actually owing to the United States. Tnis was so even if 
the non-excluded income was also derived from a foreign source, for 
the cumulative effect of the credit and deduction for foreign taxes 
will not necessarily wipe out the American tax liability. The In-
ternal Revenue Service reported to Congress, however, that many 
such Americans were not even filing a domestic return, in part be-
cause they apparently supposed that their entire income was ex-
cludable.82 Certainly it is more difficult for an American working 
abroad to obtain information concerning his domestic tax liability, 
if any, than it is for those working in the States. In any event, ab-
sence of the information which would have been disclosed by such 
returns made it difficult for the Service to pick out those taxpayers 
whose affairs should be audited. Congress responded to this prob-
lem in I 9 58 by providing that even the foreign income which quali-
fies for an exclusion in determining tax liability will be included in 
gross income but only for the purpose of determining whether the 
taxpayer had an amount of gross income ( $6oo, or $I 200 if over 
6 5 years of age) sufficient to require the filing of a return. 83 The 
obvious effect is that practically all Americans working abroad must 
now file a domestic return, though in the end many of them will not 
actually owe an American tax. 
Because of the difficulty in filing a return if one is abroad on the 
regular filing date, the Treasury has granted an automatic extension 
of 3 months to calendar year taxpayers and 2 months to taxpayers 
on a fiscal year. 84 A delay of 3 months is also allowed in the case of 
declarations of estimated tax, and while this extension is granted 
without any charge for interest, it is otherwise in the case of the 
final return. 
Where a citizen, on departure from the United States, contem-
81 I.R.C., § 6012. 
•• S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1958). 
83 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 72, amending I.R.C., § 6012 . 
.. Rev. Rul. 55-171, C.B. 1955-1, 8o. 
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plates compliance with the 5 IO-day requirement, the final return 
for the taxable year during which he left will normally be due be-
fore that exclusionary standard has been satisfied. The Congress 
and the Service have accommodated themselves to this problem. 
The former has provided that the government's authority to grant 
extensions only up to 6 months shall not be so limited in the case 
of those who are abroad.85 In turn the Treasury has issued a ruling 
whereby one who desires to postpone determination of his tax lia-
bility until the exclusionary standard is met may, upon request, ob-
tain a special extension regarding the regular filing date. 86 Otherwise 
the matter will be handled on a refund basis. 
SEcTioN D. TAx IMPLICATIONs OF BusiNEss VIsiTs BY 
EMPLOYEES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND CoMMON MARKET NATIONS 
(a) Introductory note.-The preceding discussion in Sec-
tion C outlined the requirements which an American citizen working 
in a Common Market country must meet if he hopes to obtain an 
exclusion of his foreign service income under § 9 I I of the Code. 
But even if such an exclusion is obtained, that individual may com-
plicate his tax problem by making short intermittent visits back 
to the States. Double taxation will normally be avoided, however, 
for as noted in Section B, supra, most Common Market countries 
will defer in one degree or another to the American tax on com-
pensation attributable to his work in the States, with Luxembourg 
having the least attractive arrangement-a deduction of the Ameri-
can tax from gross income. 
Less tax complication will normally be encountered on similar 
trips made by a Common Market country citizen who has been work-
ing in his native land for an American owned facility. The same is 
true of trips made abroad by Americans who normally work at the 
enterprise's head office in the United States. In these two cases, 
as distinguished from the situation first mentioned, the country be-
ing visited normally forgoes its right to tax any compensation at-
tributable to services performed there. 
The aims and period of time covered by such trips may run the 
gamut, from very short stays designed to enable the individual to 
purchase merchandise and equipment, to longer excursions devoted 
80 I.R.C., § 6o81 (a). 
""Rev. Proc. 57-33, C.B. 1957-2, uo6 and Rev. Rul. 55-171, C.B. 1955-1, So. 
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to an analysis of sales promotion and production techniques of the 
head office, of the foreign facility, or of a foreign licensee to whom 
"know-how" must be communicated. A vacation may also be thrown 
in for good measure. 
The extent to which arrangements have been made to simplify 
the tax problems associated with trips made by the three classes 
of individuals described above is indicated in the discussion which 
follows. 
(b) Intermittent trips to the States during the period an 
American is otherwise qualified for the § 91 I exclusion.-Satisfac-
tion of the foreign-bona-fide-residence test or the alternative 5 ro-
day rule of § 91 I of the Code serves only to exclude an American 
citizen's foreign earned income.87 Compensation attributable to his 
business trips back to the States are not affected by those statutory 
tests. 88 The Code itself expressly designates the foreign country as 
the "source" of compensation only with respect to services "per-
formed" there. 89 Thus the place or origin of payment with respect 
to work done on a business trip back to the States is irrelevant; 90 
the amount so attributable must be included in American gross in-
come under § 6 r. 
The statutory requirement that such compensation be included is 
not neutralized by the bilateral tax treaties which the United States 
has entered into with five of the Common Market countries. From 
a casual reading of those treaties, one might at first think otherwise 
if the American has become a resident of a Common Market coun-
try for tax purposes; those treaties do open by extending to Com-
mon Market "residents" an exemption from United States tax in 
the case of income earned from services performed in the States 
during the course of brief business trips.91 But those treaties close 
with a reservation which accomplishes the same result which the 
American treaty with the United Kingdom more directly accom-
plished by definition. Whereas the latter expressly defines English 
"residents" for this purpose so as to exclude "a citizen of the United 
States," 92 the treaties with the Common Market countries achieve 
a like result through a provision which expressly reserves to the 
87 See discussion in Section C, supra. 
88 I.R.C., § 861 (a) (3) provides the only exclusion for circumstances of this type, and 
it is limited to nonresident aliens. See subtopics (c) and (d), infra. 
89 I.R.C., § 86z(a) (3). 
"'I.T. Regs., § 1.861-4{a). 
111 Articles XI, 9, XI, XI, and XVI, respectively, of the treaties with Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands . 
.. Article II (i) (g). 
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United States the right to tax its own citizens under the regular 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.93 
The fact that the compensation attributable to the United States 
trip is includible in his American gross income does not necessarily 
mean that the citizen will actually suffer an American tax. In most 
cases, of course, he would have had to file a United States return-
though perhaps showing no actual tax liability-even in the absence 
of the trips in question.94 If that compensation which is attributable 
to business trips to the States is the only income he realizes other 
than that excluded under § 91 1, the fact that he will be allowed full 
exemptions for himself and his dependents, as well as all other 
purely personal deductions,95 may leave him with little or no Ameri-
can net or "taxable income." However, where the compensation is 
completely neutralized for American tax purposes by offsetting per-
sonal deductions, in only one instance is it probable that such com-
pensation will completely escape taxation. Assuming in this con-
nection that the American citizen has become a resident of the Com-
mon Market country in which he is stationed, he will usually find 
that the income attributable to his trip back to the States is also 
includible in the return which he files with that member nation. 
This would be so if the country were Luxembourg; and there only 
a deduction in computing the tax base would be allowed for any 
American tax-here assumed to be none because of exemptions, etc. 
-which he might have paid. However, some of the other Com~ 
mon Market countries are more liberal with reference to earned 
income which a resident American derived from his native land. 
According to the discussion in PART I, the Netherlands would 
completely exempt the compensation in question even though an 
American tax is not actually suffered because of the offsetting per~ 
sonal exemptions, etc.96 That income will be taken into account, 
however, for the purpose of determining the Dutch rate on the tax-
payer's other income. 
While the bilateral tax treaties with five member nations include 
a provision aimed at compensation derived by a nonresident citizen 
93 Articles XII, 14, XV, XV, and XIX; respectively, of the treaties with Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands . 
.. Every American citizen, as well as certain others, must file a U.S. return if he has 
a gross income over $6oo, or if over age 65, of $1,200. And for this purpose, but only 
this purpose, foreign service income otherwise excludable must be included. I.R.C., 
§ 6o12(c). 
05 I.R.C., § 9II deprives him only of those deductions properly chargeable to the 
excluded income. See discussion in Section C, supra. 
'"PART I, Section F(i) (h). 
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from his native land, they are not usually so liberal as is the uni-
lateral treatment accorded by the Netherlands.97 For example, the 
rate reduction formula of the Belgian treaty which was more fully 
discussed in Section B, supra, applies only where the compensation 
derived from American sources was "taxed by the United States." 98 
The treaty with Germany, also more fully described in Section B, 
calls for an exemption, but only if the item was "not exempt from 
United States tax." 99 And, of course, the credit which Italy would 
allow springs into operation only if the compensation did, in fact, 
suffer an American tax.100 
A vacation, rather than business, may motivate a return trip to 
the States by an American who qualifies for a § 9 I 1 exclusion under 
the foreign-bona-fide-residence rule. The absence of labor or serv-
ices in the United States should mean that any compensation at-
tributable to the vacation period will not have its source within the 
United States, but will instead be attributable to work previously 
done abroad and should then also come within § 9 I I if otherwise 
qualified.101 
After a certain period of foreign service, some employers pay the 
transportation expenses associated with a vacation back to the 
States, covering the employee's family as well as the employee. Even 
if such a benefit is deemed additional income under American tax 
concepts, it would appear to be attributable to the foreign service 
and, therefore, also excludable by one who is qualified under the 
foreign-bona-fide-residence test.102 The same should be true of one 
97 Indeed, the treaty with Netherlands requires only a credit to the extent permitted 
by its law. 
98 Article XII(3). 
99 Article XV. The leading commentary on Germany's tax treaties, that by Korn-
Dietz, confirms the effective taxability requirement at p. USA-35. 
100 Article XV. 
101 Cf. Chidester v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 322; Rev. Rul. 57-316, 
C.B. 1957-2, 626. An apportionment problem may arise where a part of the vacation 
is attributable to the period in which work was done in the United States. 
100 It is entirely possible that one or more Common Market countries would treat 
this as a taxable benefit attributable to work done there. This is believed to be the 
rule in the Netherlands and in Germany. In the latter country, however, some immunity 
might be obtained under § 31 Abs. I EStG (Income Tax Act) pursuant to which 
those immigrating to Germany may petition the highest tax authorities of the Lander 
for the purpose of obtaining by negotiation a lump sum settlement of their income tax 
during each of the first xo years. While no reduction is ordinarily granted under this 
provision with respect to income arising in Germany, it is entirely possible that special 
treatment might be obtained for matters such as the vacation trip in question. Indeed, 
in order to obtain the limited deduction allowed for life insurance premiums, a tax-
payer who makes such payments to an American company must invoke the above 
procedure if he is to have any chance to enjoy the deduction; the statute itself limits 
such deductions to premiums paid German companies. 
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qualified under the 5 I o-day rule, but in that circumstance the addi-
tional amount may run the employee over the $zo,ooo per year 
limitation. In such event, as well as in the case where the employee 
falls completely short of§ 9I I, it would be necessary to determine 
whether such benefit is actually embraced by the American concept 
of income. On the one hand, it is clear that vacation expenses paid 
by an employer for a domestic employee's trip within the United 
States constitutes additional income to him.103 However, to extend 
this principle to those transportation expenses which are designed 
to allow the employee and his family to return for a vacation in his 
native land would embarrass even the United States government it-
self. For, as an employer, it too pays transportation expenses as-
sociated with vacation trips to the States by foreign service officials 
of the State Department.104 The Internal Revenue Service has not 
yet, however, published the position it will ultimately take in such 
cases. 
It is not unusual for a visiting American citizen employed abroad 
to dovetail a vacation with his business trip to the States. And in 
trying to keep compensation attributable to United States sources 
within an amount which can be offset by his personal exemptions 
and deductions, it may be important to such persons that the time 
spent vacationing be isolated. To provide adequate safeguards in 
the event his return is audited, it may be desirable for the employee 
to have a realistic written understanding with the employer regard-
ing the respective amounts of time to be devoted to the two different 
purposes. 
(c) American statutory exclusion designed to accommodate 
intermittent trips to the States by Common Market citizens.-The 
American tax problems which will be encountered by the typical 
nonresident alien who is temporarily brought to the United States 
for business purposes will usually be much less complex than are 
those associated with like trips by American citizens residing 
abroad. Congress has always drawn a sharp distinction between citi-
It is doubtful that Belgium would tax the benefits associated with the vacation trip. 
At least it recently immunized such payments with respect to employees returning on 
vacations from what until recently had been the Belgian Congo. While such benefits 
are probably theoretically taxable in France, in practice it is believed that the tax 
authorities will ignore the matter unless the expense is charged to the branch or sub-
sidiary doing business there. 
"
08 Any other result could hardly be justified in the face of sweeping language like 
that found in Comm'r. v. LoBue, 351 U.-S. 243, 76 S. Ct. 8oo (1956}; Rutkin v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 130, 72 S. Ct. 571 (1952). See Rev. Rul. 57-130, C.B. 1957-1, 108. 
"
04 22 U,S.C. §§ II36 and n48. 
606 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
zens and residents, on the one hand, and nonresident aliens on the 
other, being content in the latter case to reach nothing more than 
gross income which was derived from sources within the United 
States.105 Until 1936, this was enough, however, to call for inclusion 
of all compensation attributable to any labor or service performed 
by the nonresident alien in the States.106 In that year, however, Con-
gress did add a specific statutory exclusion designed to accommo-
date, within limits, compensation attributable to short business trips. 
Later, the Senate ratified tax treaties with five of the Common 
Market countries, and in some circumstances these included even 
more generous exclusionary standards with respect to such income. 
But alien employees from the sixth country (Luxembourg), and in 
some situations those from the other five can look only to the 
statutory exclusion for protection, if any. And sometimes the em-
ployee will fall short of the exclusionary corridors marked out by 
both, coming face to face then with the overall statutory tax treat-
ment of nonresident aliens. The latter pattern may also be important 
for other reasons. For example, some of the treaties do not immu-
nize a nonresident alien's capital gains which have their source in 
the States. Since employees of the type in question may well own 
American securities, particularly in the American enterprise with 
which they are directly or indirectly associated, the statutory treat-
ment of such may be important. Indeed the existence of such a gain 
can even affect the American tax on that part of a visitor's earned 
income attributable to services performed during his business trips 
to the States. However, this study is confined to the exclusionary ar-
rangements designed to accommodate international business trips. 
Because the American statutory exclusion still has practical signifi-
cance, it will be discussed first; an analysis of the related provisions 
in the tax treaties will then follow. 
Since compensation for labor or personal services performed in 
the States was deemed to have its source there, without regard to 
the origin or place of payment, Congress early found it necessary 
to add a collection procedure requiring the nonresident alien, upon 
his departure from the States, to file what was tantamount to an in· 
formation return and pay a tentative tax or provide security there-
for/07 notions which survive to this day.108 This demand for pay-
106 Rev. Act of 1913, Section II, §A, Subdiv. x, now I.R.C., § 872. 
108 Rev. Act of 1921, § 217(a) (3), now I.R.C., § 861(a) (3). If the trip is solely a 
business trip, the service attributed to the States will presumably begin when the per· 
son comes within the territorial limits. Cf. I.T. Regs., § 1.861-4(c). 
107 Rev. Act of 1921, § 25o(g). 
"
18 l.R.C., §6851(d). See also T.I.R. No. 225, April 21, 1960, '6o Vol, 6 CCH para. 
6442. 
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ment before an alien business visitor could leave the country was 
later found by a congressional committee to have "created irrita-
tion and ill will quite disproportionate to the slight revenue in-
volved." 109 It was that committee which then pushed through a 
statutory exclusion which was expressly confined to those cases 
where labor or services were performed as an employee or under 
contract with truly foreign entities not engaged in a trade or business 
in the United States. In other words, the employee could not qualify 
for the exclusion if the employer, not otherwise engaged in a trade 
or business in the States, was other than a "nonresident alien, for-
eign partnership, or foreign corporation." 110 This had the effect, 
inter alia, of rendering ineligible for the exclusion nonresident alien 
employees of the foreign branch of an American corporation.m 
Later, as is more fully discussed below, a like limitation was incor-
porated in some of the tax treaties. But still later, after those 
treaties were signed, Congress extended the statutory exclusion, 
qualifying also local services performed by a nonresident alien for 
an office or place of business maintained in a foreign country by an 
American corporation. 112 
Before that amendment, as well as now, the exclusion was other-
wise available only where the nonresident alien ( 1) was tempor-
arily present in the States for periods not exceeding a total of 90 
days during the taxable year, and ( 2) then only if the compensation 
for the services rendered here did not exceed $J,OOO in the aggre-
gate.113 Failure on either count results in a loss of the entire ex-
clusionary privilege. 
As is true of Americans who are employed by a foreign facility 
to work abroad, it is not unusual for nonresident aliens to dovetail 
vacations with business trips to the States. And in trying to stay 
within the aggregate $J,OOO statutory limitation, it may also be 
important to such persons that the time spent vacationing be iso-
lated. Even though they are entitled to a so-called "paid vacation," 
compensation attributable to the period devoted to sightseeing, etc., 
is free of American tax without regard to the specific statutory ex-
clusion. The absence of labor or services in that part of the period 
devoted to vacationing means that the applicable compensation is 
not from sources within the States, 114 and is, therefore, beyond the 
100 8. Rep. No. 2156, 74th Cong., zd Sess. 22 (1936}. 
110 Rev. Act of 1936, § 119(a) (3). 
m I.T. 3943, C.B. 1949-1, 83. 
112 I.R.C., § 861(a) (3). 
113 Ibid. 
"'Cf. the philosophy of Chidester v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 322. 
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reach of the American tax gatherer under the general rule which 
confines the gross income of nonresident aliens to that which has 
its source within the Sta tes. 115 
To facilitate a proper apportionment, for tax audit purposes, 
of that compensation attributable to the vacation portion of the 
trip, it may also be desirable for these employees to have realistic 
written understandings with employers regarding the respective 
amounts of time to be devoted to the two different purposes. It must 
be remembered, however, that the quite separate 90-day limitation 
relates to the aggregate physical presence in the United States with-
out regard to purpose. But where this period is too short to accom-
modate all of the visitor's purposes, it may be possible to salvage 
tax immunity either by resorting to what may be a more generous 
provision in the governing treaty or by spreading his presence in 
the States across two taxable years. The fact that the statutory 90-
day limitation is geared to aggregate presence "during the taxable 
year" 116 means that a visitor who comes to the States in the last 
quarter of a taxable year, and otherwise qualifies, can safely spread 
his visit over into the first quarter of the succeeding taxable year. 
Similar planning may be useful to an alien visitor who would 
otherwise be entrapped by the separate statutory $3,000 limitation. 
For example, one who earns $3,000 for each 30-day period and 
plans to stay 45 days may qualify by starting his visit in December, 
thus taking advantage of two qualifying amounts instead of one. 
But it seems worthwhile to repeat that failure to satisfy either one 
of the two different limitations means loss of the entire statutory 
exclusionary privilege. 
Many persons will not be able to take advantage of the spread-
ing devices related above. In certain circumstances they may still 
obtain refuge from the American tax by relying on more generous 
standards which appear in certain of the tax treaties discussed im-
mediately below, provided they can also meet the other treaty 
specifications. 
(d) Reciprocal treaty exclusions to accommodate a Com-
mon Market citizen's trips to the United States and an American 
citizen's trips abroad.-Each of the American treaties with five of 
the member states provides for a specific exclusion of compensation 
attributable to "labor or personal services" performed within the 
United States by "residents," whether or not citizens, of the specific 
115 I.R.C., § 872 (a). 
116 I.R.C., § 86r(a) (3). 
TAXATION 
Member State.117 The same treaty articles include a reciprocal pro-
vision, designed to accord like treatment in the case of business trips 
to Europe by Americans whose normal employment stations them 
in the United States. 
Table V B, which appears at the conclusion of this sub-topic, 
indicates the varying requirements expressly reflected in the relevant 
provisions. From it, laying aside refinements, two different basic 
patterns emerge. 
First, all of the treaties establish a wider tax free corridor than 
that made available to visiting nonresident aliens by the American 
statute, provided the employer is a resident or other entity of the 
traveler's own residence. Where that important condition is met, 
an exclusion is allowed by the country being visited regardless of 
the amount of compensation involved so long as the aggregate 
periods of physical presence there do not exceed what generally ap-
proximates twice the aggregate time permitted by the Code in the 
case of nonresident aliens. Under all treaties, except that with Italy, 
the aggregate periods of physical presence in the country being vis-
ited may extend through 183 days during any one taxable year. The 
Italian treaty is identical with the Code in restricting the periods to 
a total of go days in any one year. 
The second basic grouping relates to the question of whether any 
exclusion at all is provided for in the instance where the employer 
is other than a resident or entity of the visitor's own place of resi-
dence. One of the treaties-that with the Netherlands-like the 
earlier American Code provision which existed when that treaty was 
signed, does not permit an exclusion in such casesY8 But where resi-
dents of that member nation are employed by branches of an Ameri-
can corporation, on visiting the States they may now look to the 
amended statutory provision which does authorize an exclusion in 
such cases, but then the other statutory specifications must also be 
satisfied. In other words, the absence of a treaty authorization does 
not prohibit reliance on statutory privileges accorded by the Ameri-
can Code. 
Treaties with the other four countries do authorize an exclusion 
in such cases, though three of the four impose an amount limitation 
similar to that imposed by the American Code. The treaties with 
117 Articles XI, 9, X, IX, and XVI, respectively, of the treaties with Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. American citizens, resident in such countries, 
would not be eligible, however, for this exclusion. See discussion, sub-topic (b) supra. 
118 The French treaty was originally so limited, but it was later amended to ac-
commodate employees of a corporation's foreign branch. 
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Belgium and Germany require that the aggregate amount of com-
pensation in any one year must not exceed $3,000; the Italian treaty 
restricts the amount to a total of $2,000. Only the French treaty 
allows an exclusion in this circumstance without regard to the 
amount. Moreover, in this circumstance, i.e., where the employer is 
other than a resident or entity of the traveler's place of residence, 
only in the French and German treaties may the aggregate period of 
the visits during any one year exceed that authorized by the Code to 
nonresident aliens. Those two treaties conform in this circumstance 
to the time limitation applicable in the opposite situation, i.e., to 
183 days in any one taxable year. The conventions with Italy and 
Belgium, like the Code, contain a more confining 90-day restriction. 
Finally it should be noted that certain kinds of personal activity 
are ineligible for exclusions otherwise made available by treaty. 
Illustratively, the treaty with Belgium specifically denies the exclu-
sion to an otherwise qualified American who visits Belgium in order 
to perform his function as a director of a Belgian corporation. 
While the German treaty provides otherwise in the case of the 
nonresident visiting director, it should be noted that under German 
law the remuneration of nonresident directors of German corpora-
tions are taxed even if they neve·r set foot in Germany. 
The prime standards set forth in the various treaties, as well as 
those prescribed by the American statute to deal with the case of 
nonresident aliens visiting the United States, are consolidated in 
the chart which follows, insofar as they affect four situations: 
( 1) The exclusion allowed by Common Market countries, pur-
suant to treaty, in the case of visiting American citizens who 
regularly work in the States for the home office; and 
( 2) The exclusion allowed by the United States where a Com-
mon Market country citizen who is regularly employed in his 
native land visits the American company's home office in the 
States. In this situation, the chart reflects those differences, if 
any, which are dependent upon whether the visitor was regu-
larly employed by the American company's (a) foreign sub-
sidiary or a foreign incorporated licensee, (b) foreign per-
manent establishment, or (c) home office, the employee serving 
regularly as a Common Market promotional representative. 
INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE 
§ 861(a) (3) BELGIAN TREATY -ARTICLE XI FRENCH TREATY-ARTICLE 9(1) 
TABLE v B 
REQUIREMENTS 
Maximum Total Period Of Physical Presence 
In Country Being Visited By Nonresident 
-Not exceeding 90 days ............... . 
-Not exceeding 183 days .............. . 
Maximum Amount Of Compensation If Ex-
clusion Is To Apply 
-$2,000 .............................. . 
-$3,000 .............................. . 
-Unlimited ........................... . 
Specifically Required Business Relationship 
-Service must be performed for or on be-
half of a resident, entity, or permane:lt 
establishment of the visitor's place of 
residence .......................... . 
-Service must be performed as "an em-
ployee of, or under contract with" a 
resident or entity of the visitor's place 
of residence ....................... . 
-Service must be performed as "an em-
ployee of or under a contract with" a 
resident or entity of a foreign country 
not engaged in trade or business within 
the United States or for a domestic cor-
poration "if such labor or services are 
performed for an office or place of busi-
ness maintained in a foreign country or 
in a possession of the United States by 
such corporation" .................. . 
Required Locus Of Compensation Burden 
-Employer located in visitor's place of res-
idence must bear actual burden of com-
pensation .......................... . 
Belgian Exemption: 
Statutory Exemption 11 merican Citizen 
from U.S. Tax Re Resident, Employed 
Nonresident 11liens by U.S. Corp., Jlisit-
Fisiting U.S. ing Belgium(2e) 
........ X ....... . 
........ x ....... . 
. ....... x ....... . 
. ....... x ....... . 
. ....... x ....... . 
........ X ....... . I ................. . 
r 
I ....... x ....... . 




.... x ..... 
.... X ..... 
.... X ..... 
. ... x ..... 
(2) Specifically Enumerated Activities In The Country Being Visited In Addition To "labor or 
personal services" Performed There. 
(a) Specifically also including services as a director. 
(b) Specifically also including exercise of a liberal profession. 
(c) Specifically excluded from the general rule under the French treaty is the exercise of a 
liberal profession. While Article X of that treaty goes on to provide that income from 
such exercise is taxable only by the country in which the professional activity is exer-
cised, this notion is limited by another provision to the effect that a liberal profession 
will be deemed to be exercised in a country only where the professional activity bas a 
French Exemption: 
Employee American Citizen 
of Permanent Employed Resident, Employed 
Establishment Directly by by U.S. Corp., Fisit-
in Belgium U.S. Corp. ing France(2c) 
..... x ..... .... x .... 
. ....... x ...... . 
..... X ..... .... x .... 
........ X ...... . 
........ x ...... . 
U.S. Exemption: A liens 
(French Residents) Visiting U.S. (zc) 
Employee 
Employee of Permanent Employed 
of French Establishment Directly by 
Corporation in France U.S. Corp. 
.... X ..... ...... X ..... 
.... x ..... ...... X ..... 
. ... X ..... . ..... x ..... 
"fixed center" in that country. T.D. 5499, § 7.412 (f) of the United States regulations in-
terprets this latter limitation to mean that a visiting French doctor, lawyer, engineer, or 
other member of a liberal profession will enjoy an exclusion from U.S. tax provided he 
"does not maintain within the United States an office, installation, or other fixed center 
relating to the practice of his profession." 
(d) Specifically excluding remuneration of officer or director of U.S. corporation. 
(e) Specifically excluding remuneration of "'administrateurs,' 'commissaires,' or 'liqui-
dateurs' of, or of other individuals, exercising similar functions in corporations created 
or organized in Belgium." 
GERMAN TREATY-ARTICLE X 
German ExemPtion: 
11 merican Citizen 
Resident, 
Employed by 
U.S. Corp., Visiting 
Germany(2a), (2b) 
. ....... x ....... . 
. ....... x ....... . 
........ x ....... . 
........ X ....... . 
U.S. Exemption: Aliens 
(German Residents) 




.... X ..... 
.... X ..... 
. ... X ..... 





...... X ..... 




. ... X ..... 
. ... X ..... 




by u.s. corp., 
Pisiting ltalJ(2b) 
. ....... x.: ... .. 
I ····· .... ········ 
. ....... X ...... . 
. ....... X.' ..... . 
·····--··--1······ 
U.S. Exemption: Aliens 




.... X ..... 
. ... X ..... 





. ..... x ..... 




.. •. X ..... 
. ... X ..... 
NETHERLANDS TREATY-ARTICLE XVI 
Netherlands Exemfrlion: 
11 merican Citizen 
Resident, Employed 
by U.S. Corp.,, 
Jlisiting Netherlands 
.......... x ..... i .... 
•• ••••• ••••••••• •!o•••• 
. .......•. X ......... . 
. ......... X ......... . 
U.S. Exemption: Aliens 




. ... X ..... 
. .•. X ..... 









. ......... x .... i····· 1 •••• x .... . .. ............ I . . . . . . . J 
! 
PART VI. THE FUTURE TAX SITUATION AS IT 
~/MAY AFFECT DOING BUSINESS IN THE 
COMMON MARKET 
Introductory note.-Foreign political relations aside, many busi-
nessmen are convinced there are few norms as unstable as those 
embodied in tax laws. Despite the existence of an almost day-to-
day amending process, too great attention to these amendments can 
be misleading, for more often than not, it is tantamount to a "clean-
ing up" operation. 
Revision of internal basic principles, affecting as they do the 
whole economic paraphernalia of a nation, is not easily achieved. 
Newly founded external relationships, such as those formed through 
the establishment of the European Common Market, do, however, 
tend to force each affected member nation to undertake a more 
penetrating examination into the basic structure of its tax laws. 
Other countries, such as the United States, who would do business 
with such newly founded communities may be likewise affected. 
The likelihood of basic changes in the Common Market tax pic-
ture is the subject matter of the abbreviated discussion below in 
Section A. Subsequent Section B identifies the relevant major changes 
which are being given thoughtful consideration in the United States. 
SECTION A. FuTURE TAX SITUATION IN THE 
COMMON MARKET 
(a) Tax premises of the Common Market treaty.-Those 
who framed the Common Market treaty apparently concluded that 
tax aspects relevant to greater economic cooperation were too com-
plicated to solve in the treaty itself. The latter has only a few pro-
visions bearing on the subject (Articles 9 5-99), and these deal 
only with indirect taxes (turnover taxes and excise duties). Direct 
taxes (income, property, and enterprise taxes) are not specifically 
mentioned; Article 220 does, however, refer to the necessity of 
avoiding double taxation. 
With respect to indirect taxes, all of the relevant provisions but 
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one assume the existing tax pattern and provide only for certain 
limitations. The one exception, Article 99, charges the Commission 
(the Community's principal administrative body) with the respon-
sibility of conducting a study in order to determine how these taxes 
might be harmonized. The preceding Articles of the treaty assume 
continuation of the existing practices with reference to exports and 
imports, as more fully described in PART II, supra. In the case of 
exports, refund of turnover taxes previously paid is limited to those 
actually suffered by the product. In short, a refund system may not 
be used as a device by which to subsidize export trade. The aim on 
the import side, on the other hand, was to preclude the possibility of 
disguised tariffs; thus turnover taxes imposed on imports may not 
exceed the burden assessed with respect to similar products manu-
factured in the importing country itself. 
(b) The likelihood and adequacy of harmonized indirect 
tax systems.-Appraisal of the logic behind the treaty provisions 
should turn on the extent to which the incidence of taxation is 
actually a factor in fixing competitive conditions. 
The treaty assumes that indirect taxes are in the nature of costs 
which directly influence competition in that they are passed on to 
the consumer. In other words, if the same article is subject to a 
different tax burden, and if all other costs are equal, that which 
suffers the least tax burden will be more easily sold. From this 
premise, many tax specialists are led to the conclusion that in a 
community like the Common Market all merchandise must bear the 
same indirect taxes, without regard to the country of origin. From 
this, it would follow that the exporting country must refund all 
previously paid turnover taxes, and the importing country should 
levy a tax identical to that imposed on locally manufactured mer-
chandise. 
Apart from the merits, an almost insurmountable practical diffi-
culty will be encountered in effectuating this scheme unless the mem-
ber nations revise the basic structure or theory of their respective 
turnover taxes. As indicated in PARTS I and II, supra, five of the 
six members levy a multiple stage tax, i.e., one on each succeeding 
stage in the production and distribution process. This fact alone 
would make it difficult to develop a refund formula which would 
be accurate in each case. Each product bears different cost factors, 
starting with raw materials and spreading across plant, machinery, 
and overhead costs, each of which comprise a different tax element. 
Theoretically, the French added-value tax ( T at-ce sur la J7 aleur 
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Ajoutee) is the only one which can compensate for these difficulties. 
And in Germany, where reformation of the turnover tax system is 
under advisement, there are those who favor the adoption of the 
French system, though experience has exposed deficiencies in the 
latter system also. As indicated in Sections A and D of PART I, 
supra, with reference to some products, Italy and Belgium have sub-
stituted a single transfer tax for the otherwise applicable multiple-
stage arrangement, but the substitution was not effected with refer-
ence to a host of products, such as raw materials, machinery, etc. 
In any event, adoption of one turnover tax system by all member 
nations is not to be expected in the near future. Nor would such a 
move serve actually to equalize tax burdens. Three reasons, each 
shading into the other, contribute to the difficulty. 
First, because economic and social circumstances in the six coun-
tries differ, different systems of e.r:emptions and internal variations 
in applicable rates will have to be maintained by most member na-
tions. This, of course, makes calculation of the exact burden borne 
by a given product more difficult. 
Second, the Introduction to PART III, supra, indicated the dif-
ferences in the degree to which each member nation relies upon 
indirect taxes, as distinguished from direct taxes. The variation is 
considerable and attributable to differences to be found in the tax 
psychology of the member nations. Illustratively, France and Italy 
would now find it almost impossible to impose higher taxes on in-
come. On the other hand, it would be equally difficult to raise in-
direct taxes in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and to a lesser 
extent in Germany. Admittedly, this problem would be of less sig-
nificance to international trade if the amount of indirect taxes could 
be accurately determined and refunded at export, while being levied 
on imports in an amount exactly equal to that borne by local prod-
ucts. Enthusiasm for this, as a solution, has been dampened, how-
ever, by the third and final major consideration. 
In this latter connection, there is growing awareness that direct 
taxes-matters not really dealt with by the Common Market treaty 
-also influence competition. Laying aside direct taxes on the in-
come of individuals such as wage earners (though such might also 
be shifted), greater numbers have come to the realization that en-
terprise taxes, such as the corporate income tax, will influence the 
price of manufactured products. A common illustration in the in-
ternational setting should suffice. Assume that two companies from 
different countries (A and B) bid on the right to build a hydro-
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electric plant in a third country, C. Assume further that both will 
pay an income tax to C, but that their respective countries of resi-
dence differ in that A provides a credit for foreign taxes while B 
does not. As a consequence, the firm from the latter country must 
either offer a higher bid than the other firm, thereby affecting the 
former's competitive position, or take a lower profit-a prospect 
which may lead it not to bid at all. 
The foregoing is another way of saying that harmonization of 
indirect taxes will not actually equalize tax burdens suffered by in-
ternational traffic. Equality of tax burdens will be achieved only if 
all taxes are harmonized, but even this would lead to ultimate equal-
ity of the burden borne by international trade participants only if 
all other factors are equalized, including national incomes (in gen-
eral and per capita), the percentage of national income absorbed by 
tax revenues, and services rendered by the member nations to resi-
dents and business interests. Comparison and harmonization of 
total tax burdens is less significant as long as differences exist in 
services provided by the member nations, wherein residents of one 
pay for services of a type which residents of another enjoy at the 
expense of the nation. 
The difficulty of establishing one economic community out of 
member nations which have diverse interests is obvious enough. And 
this is also true in the tax area, since, as before stated, the internal 
tax philosophy of each member nation depends largely on its own 
economic and social circumstances. Because the totality of its en-
suing tax structure affects competitive conditions, it seems illogical 
to distinguish between taxes. Yet such a distinction is the underlying 
premise indulged in by those who argue in support of a system 
which relies upon a refund of indirect taxes at the point of export, 
with a compensatory tax being imposed at the point of import. Inter 
alia, this fails to accommodate differences in the direct tax burden 
borne by products. 
One solution-highly theoretical-would be to refund direct as 
well as indirect taxes at the point of export, compensatory taxes 
being levied at the point of import. The practical difficulty of im-
plementation is obvious and almost insurmountable. 
A more practical and logical solution would call for abolition of 
the refund system in recognition of the fact that all taxes of a given 
member nation are inter-locked and determine together the tax bur-
den borne by a product. This proposed solution is gaining increasing 
support. 
TAXATION 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that there will be, or 
need be, great diversity in all tax rules. Many tax problems lend 
themselves to a common solution, such as the matter of stock valua-
tion, depreciation methods, loss carry-forwards, and, in the field of 
turnover taxes, the question of whether a multiple stage system is 
to be preferred over a single tax. These differences are largly re-
sponsible for the difficulty one encounters in trying to compare tax 
burdens. It is also more feasible to obtain uniformity in these re-
spects than with reference to total tax rates. 
While changes of the type noted are feasible, the likelihood that 
uniformity of this type will be achieved in the near future is quite 
another question. Each country would be forced to complicate its 
amending process by consulting with five other countries before 
effecting changes. All too often, this is not done for internally 
valid reasons. On the other hand, there is in fact some tendency to-
ward greater uniformity. For example, France's adoption in 1948 
of the lmpot sur les Socihes (corporation income tax) was a step 
in the direction of those income taxes imposed by Germany, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands.1 Again, the French tax reform in late 
1 Tax Reform Bill No. 6,000, dated July 27, I96o and now pending in the Dutch 
Parliament, would make a few rather substantial changes in the tax pattern of that 
country, as it affects corporations. 
The most important change involves a proposal to discriminate in favor of dis-
tributed profits. While the present temporarily increased rate of 47% (regular rate, 
43%) would continue to apply to undistributed profits, a reduced rate of 32% (or 
28% if the Netherlands returns to its regular rate schedule) would be applied to 
distributed profits. Subsidiaries which distribute profits to a parent would also enjoy 
the lower rate, though the parent, if Dutch, would suffer an additional IS% levy if it 
did not immediately re-distribute the profit. This IS% surcharge would not apply, 
however, to a foreign parent, for example, one domiciled in the United States. This 
means, if the pending legislation is adopted, that there could be a substantial difference 
between Dutch taxation of American branches (permanent establishments), on the 
one hand, and subsidiaries, on the other. The former would suffer the rate on undis-
tributed profits (now 47%) whether or not its profits were remitted, while the sub-
sidiary could enjoy the 32% reduced rate insofar as its profits are distributed. A quite 
separate factor may at some point compensate, at least in part, for this differential. 
The same legislation proposes to increase the Dutch 'U:ithholding tax on dividends from 
the present Is% to zs%. At the moment, because of a treaty provision, even the IS% 
does not apply to dividends paid by an American controlled subsidiary to its U.S. 
parent. However, it is said that the Dutch government intends to start negotiations 
leading to a revision of this immunity, substituting instead, perhaps, a 10% or IS% 
rate, with the possibility of a distinction of some type being drawn if the subsidiary is 
wholly owned. 
The pending legislation would also enlarge the chance that a corporate distributee 
would itself be immune from the regular corporate tax on dividends received from 
another corporation. The proposal is to allow the immunity if the distributee owns 
s% or more of the distributing corporation's capital, as distinguished from the pres-
ently required 2so/o. 
Another proposal would involve abandonment of the special tax on remuneration 
of corporate directors. Instead, limitations would be placed on the deduction allowed 
6 I 6 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
1959, the ultimate aim being to substitute a single income tax on 
individuals for the previously existing multiple system (propor-
tional tax and progressive tax), also brought the French tax struc-
ture into closer alignment with the income taxes imposed on individ-
uals by the three previously mentioned countries. A year earlier, in 
1958, the Belgian Minister of Finance announced that his country 
would also re-study its tax structure and that it would be desirable 
to adopt a system similar to that of the countries noted above. 
In spite of this progress, it must be recognized that, for the rea-
sons previously given, harmonization, which-to the foreigners who 
wish to trade in the Common Market-also carries with it a wel-
come overtone of simplification, will not take place overnight. 
(c) Harmonization through modernization of the bilateral 
tax treaties among Common Market countries.-A chart in Section 
D of PART III, supra, shows the present status of the bilateral 
tax treaties which exist among Common Market countries. Some 
of these pre-date World War II and came into being before the 
dramatic increase, following that war, in international business 
activity. In certain respects, some treaties are, therefore, obsolete, 
as in the case of those between Germany and Italy, Belgium and 
France, and Belgium and the Netherlands. Others, such as those 
between France and Germany, and France and Italy, have been re-
placed by more modern versions. Belgium and Luxembourg chose, 
on the other hand, to supplement their earlier agreement. 
This tendency toward modernization will be facilitated by two 
circumstances, apart from the fact that increasing business activity 
necessarily makes the matter one of urgent necessity. 
The first such circumstance relates to the new tax systems which 
have been recently adopted, as explained in the preceding subtopic. 
It is obviously easier to enter into bilateral tax treaties where the 
two national tax systems coincide in terms of basic structure. 
The second contributing circumstance goes beyond the Common 
Market itself. It relates to the work of the Fiscal Committee set 
up by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, cov-
to the corporation, as follows: (1) remuneration of $526 (Fl. z,ooo) would be fully 
deductible; (2) the excess would be deductible only up to soo/o; and (3) no deduction 
would be permitted for amounts in excess of $2,630 (Fl. 10,000) per year. 
In the case of individuals, instead of a variable rate, from 2oo/o to 4oo/o, on capital 
gains realized from the sale of shares of stock in corporations in which the taxpayer 
held a substantial interest, a flat rate of 2oo/o would be imposed. 
Finally, the withholding tax on an individual's compensation from employment 
will be a final levy, provided the compensation did not exceed $1,934 (instead of the 
present $x,815) and other income was not in excess of $79 (instead of the present $53). 
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ering all free European countries and with which the United States 
cooperates to a substantial extent. The Committee is charged with 
the responsibility of developing provisions which could be adopted 
by all member countries, thus giving rise to the first real prospect 
for a multilateral tax treaty. 
Model tax treaties have been designed before; illustrative was 
one drafted by the League of Nations. While some of its provisions 
were incorporated in many bilateral tax treaties, a multilateral 
treaty did not result. There is greater hope, however, for the prod-
uct of the Fiscal Committee of the O.E.E.C. The national delega-
tions to it are composed of those senior officials in each country who 
normally have much to do with the preparation of their own na-
tional tax laws and with bilateral tax treaties. Each group of prob-
lems has been assigned to a working sub-committee composed of 
two or three delegations. The proposed texts are brought into 
plenary session for discussion and, if need be, amended in order to 
obtain unanimity at the point of adoption. Two reports, consisting 
of I 4 provisions to which rather extended official commentaries 
were added, were published in 1958 and 1959. These reports recom-
mended that each member country incorporate the articles either 
in their own tax laws or in bilateral tax treaties to which they were 
parties. The character of the competent membership of the com-
mittee, and the fact that the ultimate product resulted from nego-
tiation, will contribute markedly to the acceptance of their work. In 
fact, some of the proposed articles have already been included in 
the newest treaties concluded by France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands. One can even expect that all treaties drafted in the future will 
be based on the Fiscal Committee's recommendations. Because of 
the extensive official commentaries appended to each article, inter-
pretations are certain to be more uniform than are those associated 
with older bilateral arrangements. Nor is it too optimistic to believe 
that these recommendations will also have a harmonizing effect on 
the shape of national tax laws. 
(d) Illustrative effect of harmonization on American enter-
prises.-Harmonization will, of course, tend to simplify the prob-
lems of those foreigners, such as American enterprises, who wish 
to do business in the Common Market. It will also reduce the sig-
nificance of tax factors in making a choice of locale. But it may also 
have an adverse effect in some instances. Illustrative is the problem 
associated with taxes on inter-corporate dividends. 
As indicated in the country-by-country survey in PART I, most 
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countries exempt intercorporate dividends from tax if both parent 
and subsidiary are residents. Even the withholding tax, if any, has 
been neutralized in that circumstance. Except in France and the 
Netherlands, however, such exemptions are not granted if the sub-
sidiary is a nonresident corporation. Harmonization of the tax laws 
will certainly lead to the adoption of general exemptions in this 
circumstance. But the result may directly affect only the member 
nations; in effect, outside countries, such as the United States, may 
be prejudiced. This may make it desirable for an American company 
to have "sister" subsidiaries in the member nations. While the 
deemed-paid credit provisions in the American Internal Revenue 
Code may give adequate relief from double taxation, it may still be 
useful to transfer the shares of the "sister" subsidiaries to a Euro-
pean holding company situated within the Common Market, i.e., in 
a country which will not impose an income tax on incoming divi-
dends nor, in compliance with a bilateral tax treaty with the United 
States, withhold tax when these are ultimately remitted to the 
American parent. And if this organizational structure is ultimately 
to be established, it may be desirable to make the necessary transfers 
before one encounters the knotty capital gains problem which would 
arise on transferring the shares to the holding company, as ex-
plained more fully in Section G of PART III. 
SECTION B. FUTURE AMERICAN TAXATION OF 
FOREIGN INCOME 
(a) Chronology of the past: A guide to the future.-An 
abbreviated chronology of the past will contribute markedly to the 
identification of possible statutory changes which are most likely 
to receive serious consideration by those responsible for fixing the 
American tax reaction to foreign income. Indeed, that so much of 
the present tax pattern reaches so far back into the past during which 
heavy foreign investments have been made-thus giving rise to a 
"vested right" type of psychology, is the most serious, and perhaps 
meritorious, obstacle confronting any major attempt at overall re-
VISIOn. 
For 47 years, American industry has acted on the assumption 
that, through use of a foreign subsidiary, American taxation of for-
eign income could be deferred until such income was remitted as a 
dividend to the States.2 For that same period of time, form has 
• The United States has never tried to reach more than is now reached by I.R.C., 
§ 882(b), except in the case of foreign personal holding companies. See I.R.C., § 551. 
TAXATION 
counted for much; timing-wise, American tax incidence on the for-
eign income of branches could not be so deferred.3 The effect, solely 
by reference to this differential, has been that one arrangement en-
joyed an interest free loan of taxes denied to the other. 
For a slightly shorter, but, nevertheless, a very long period-42 
years, the total ultimate two-country tax on foreign income of Amer-
ican owned or controlled enterprises has been less in one frequently 
recurring circumstance than the tax borne by domestically earned in-
come. This has been so whenever (a) foreign operations were con-
ducted through a foreign subsidiary, (b) the foreign country im-
posed an income tax, but (c) at a lower effective rate than that of 
the United States. American concepts, relating to gross income and 
the deemed-paid credit, combined to make it possible for foreign 
income in that circumstance to enjoy both a deduction and a sub-
stantial credit for foreign income taxes; 4 as a result, the ultimate 
total two-country effective rate on foreign income earned by an 
American parent's subsidiary could be as low as 45.24%, compared 
with 52% on domestically earned income. And because of the pecu-
liar workings of the two concepts, American companies with sub-
sidiaries in nations which imposed a 26% tax on the operating unit 
fared better, tax-wise, than those companies which situated the unit 
in countries which imposed 39% or 13% effective rates, or for that 
matter o or 52% rates. 5 
For I 8 years, another possible difference in ultimate total tax 
costs has turned on whether foreign operations were conducted by 
the parent's own subsidiary, or through sub-subsidiaries, the differ-
ence here being attributable to the peculiar way in which the deemed-
paid credit works at the two-tier foreign level as distinguished from 
the one-tier level. 6 Under the best of circumstances, the total effec-
tive rate under the two-tier or sub-subsidiary foreign arrangement 
could drop as low as 40.18%/ contrasted with 45.24% in the best 
possible circumstance under the one-tier foreign arrangement. 
Again for that same period, the amount of American tax, stand-
ing alone, has differed by reference to the place where foreign in-
come was earned. During World War II, when American trade was 
necessarily confined in major proportions to its own hemisphere, en-
3 I.R.C., § 61. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 38 S. Ct. 432 (1918). 
• Discussed more fully in PART III, Section C, Subsection r, supra. 
• Statement of Jay W. Glasman, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings 
on H.R. 10859 and 10860, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1960) p. 3· 
• Originated by Rev. Act of 1942, § 131 (f) (z), now as revised, I.R.C., § 902 (b). 
7 See note 5, supra, at 4- Discussed more fully in PART III, section E, Subsection 2, 
wpra. 
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actment of what is now a special deduction with respect to foreign 
income earned by a domestic corporation in that hemisphere-the 
aim being to make American companies more competitive with inter-
national businesses which are based in Europe,8 has meant that the 
business activity of American companies in, say, South America 
could enjoy more favorable tax treatment than American activity 
carried on in Europe. Assuming branch operations in both cases, the 
differential in American tax amounts to 14 percentage points, i.e., 
38% as against 52%.9 
For 34 years, the concept underlying the difference in American 
taxes on that kind of domestic and foreign income most frequently 
associated with individuals (earned income) has been out of har-
mony with one of the most significant concepts underlying the Amer-
ican tax differential on corporate domestic and foreign income. An 
American citizen who works abroad while a resident there for 
American tax purposes will never pay U.S. taxes on his foreign 
earned income even though the applicable foreign tax is substan-
tially lower than would be the American tax, and this immunity may 
be enjoyed though the nonresident citizen ultimately remits a sub-
stantial part of his earnings to the States.10 By way of contrast, an 
American corporation's foreign income, even when earned by a for-
eign (i.e., nonresident) subsidiary, will always be taxed upon re-
mission to the States as a dividend, assuming, of course, that the 
foreign income tax was not so high as to wipe out American tax 
liability through operation of the credit provision. 
From the above, as well as from the focus of recent congres-
sional inquiries, it appears that two different two-part problems 
are most likely to attract the attention of future sessions of Con-
gress. The first involves the question of whether foreign income 
should enjoy a lower total effective tax rate than domestically 
earned income, and if there is to be such a differential, to what ex-
tent should it turn on the matter of form. The second concerns the 
extent to which the American tax should be deferred until foreign 
income is remitted to the United States, as well as the complemen-
tary question of whether form should also make a difference here. 
While the degree and direction of congressional concern with re-
spect to these two basic problems will be considered under separate 
sub-topics below, other questions which only recently have been 
resolved by Congress should be noted here. 
8 S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, III (1942). 
• l.R.C., §§ 921 and 922. 
10 I.R.C., §911(a), discussed more fully in PART V, Section C, supra, originated 
with Rev. Act of 1926, § 213 (b) ( '4). 
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In late 1960, Congress sought in three different respects to mini-
mize the significance of differences which had previously turned on 
the form of organization. First, it authorized even those American 
corporations which operated abroad through "sister" facilities to 
elect to submit their foreign tax credit to an "overall" limitation,11 
rather than to the previously applicable "per-country" limitation.12 
Because of the way the per-country limitation itself had been con-
strued, other forms of organization-such as foreign holding com-
pany arrangements-had always enjoyed the averaging effect 
associated with the overall limitation.13 While this new legislation 
did whittle down the effect of a difference which previously had 
turned solely on form, certain practical differences, as noted else-
where, do remain.H Second, Congress also adopted legislation which 
clearly established the right of the government to obtain from do-
mestic parents certain types of information relative to their for-
eign subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, which information the Treas-
ury had always had the clear right to obtain with reference to 
foreign branchesY In this same connection, it also extended to 
stockholders, officers, and directors a responsibility to file informa-
tion returns with reference to the creation or reorganization of 
foreign corporations with which they were associated.16 Third and 
finally, it also extended the 8 5% dividends received deduction to 
American parent corporations with respect to dividends paid by a 
foreign corporation out of earnings and profits accumulated by the 
foreign facility at an earlier time when it was actually incorporated 
in the United States, i.e., before the enterprise was converted into 
a foreign corporation through a tax-free reorganizationY 
(b) Prospect for reduction in American taxes re income 
earned in the Common M arket.-As a practical matter, it seems 
unlikely, in the forseeable future, that the present ultimate American 
11 Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The ramifications pertaining to the 
election are discussed more fully in Section F, PART III, supra. 
'"A detailed discussion of the per-country limitation appears in Subsection 1 of 
Section C, PART III, supra. 
'"Discussed more fully in Sections F and G, PART III, supra. 
14 I d. 
15 Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Con g., 2d Sess. ( 1960), adding a new § 6038 to the Code, 
the old § 6038 being renumbered § 6039. Included in that which must be submitted is 
information regarding accumulated profits, balance sheets, and certain inter-company 
transactions. 
16 Pub. Law 86-780, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960), amending I.R.C., § 6046. Formerly, 
only those who advised with reference to the creation or reorganization of foreign 
corporations had to furnish such information. This proved to be relatively ineffective, 
because attorneys apparently felt their advice was protected by the attorney-client 
relationship. 
11 Pub. Law 86-779, 86th Cong., 2d Ses~. ( 1960), amending I.R.C., ~ 243. 
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tax load borne by income derived from the Common Market will be 
changed. 
In the past, the United States has tried three of the four ways 
by which the ultimate American tax on foreign income could be re-
duced to a point below that borne by domestic income. The first, a 
reduction in rates for domestic Western Hemisphere Trade Corpo-
rations,18 gave way to the second, a deduction of equivalent propor-
tions for the same beneficiary.19 Policy makers in the Treasury De-
partment have made it abundantly clear that they oppose extension 
of this type of benefit to investment operations even in under-
developed foreign countries, to say nothing of extending such to 
the more industrialized communi ties of Western Europe. 20 
Spokesmen for the Department start from the premise that rate 
discrimination between foreign and domestic income cannot be justi-
fied on grounds of tax policy; it must be justified, if at all, by refer-
ence to the requirements of foreign economic policy-a matter dic-
tated in the end by foreign political policy.21 And while clearly inter-
ested in an expansion of investments in the under-developed part of 
the world, they have expressed doubt as to whether rate reduction 
for income from those less fortunate areas would actually consti-
tute a significant incentive, facilitating expansion of American in-
vestments in those areas.22 As to the highly developed parts of the 
world, additional "special stimulus" of this type was not thought, in 
any event, to be a requisite of America's foreign economic policy.23 
Coupled with the foregoing philosophy was a banker's point of view, 
to the effect that the Treasury was not prepared to accept the annual 
revenue loss of $2oo,ooo,ooo which would follow extension of the 
Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation concept to the rest of 
the world.24 
Perhaps it was these same considerations, plus Treasury opposi-
tion, that led appropriate congressional committees to eliminate 
from bills pending in the I 960 session any extension of the West-
ern Hemisphere Corporation tax reduction formula.25 
18 The reduction involved an exemption from surtax. Rev. Act of 1942, § 15 (b). 
19 I.R.C., § 921. Indeed, for a short time a credit was also involved, Rev. Act of 
1950, § 121(c) amending I.R.C. (1939), § 15(a). 
00 Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Chairman of the House Com-




23 See Secretary Anderson's letter, note 20, supra. 
24 Note 20, supra. 
25 § 4 of the originally proposed Foreign Investment Incentive Tax Act of 1959 
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On the other hand, the President as well as the Treasury have 
indicated agreement in principle with a third method of reducing 
taxes on foreign income, i.e., the so-called {(tax-sparing" arrange-
ment.26 Under present American law, a reduction by a foreign coun-
try of its own tax rates is advantageous to an American company 
only as long as its profits are reinvested in that country, and this only 
if the business is conducted through a foreign subsidiary; otherwise, 
in terms of ultimate effect, it serves only to reduce the credit which 
the American company would otherwise apply against its American 
tax liability. The so-called tax-sparing principle would allow a credit 
for income taxes specifically waived by a foreign country as an in-
ducement to investment. While the Treasury agrees that the Amer-
ican tax pattern should not always have a negative effect on the 
desire of a foreign country to make special reductions in its own tax 
load as a means to attract American capital, the Treasury is not 
prepared to accept any such program on "an unlimited and unilateral 
basis." 27 In other words, it believes that tax-sparing "should be 
implemented on a selective basis either by treaties or by negotiated 
agreements authorized by statute." 28 This is probably another way 
of saying, inter alia, that the program should not be extended to 
the industrialized Common Market even in the unlikely event that 
area manifested an interest in the kind of tax sacrifice and local 
discrimination which such a program envisages; instead the focal 
point would be on the under-developed parts of the world, with the 
tax-sparing principle applied there only to the extent and in the 
manner deemed to be in accordance with the requirements of Amer-
ican economic policy. In the face of these considerations and Treas-
ury opposition, here too congressional committees eliminated from 
pending bills of the 1960 session any reference to the tax-sparing 
principle. 29 
As previously indicated, a fourth method by which foreign income 
will actually enjoy an effective rate advantage over domestic income 
relates to the combined effect of the gross income and deemed-paid 
credit concepts, wherein income earned through a foreign subsidiary 
(H.R. 5) does not now appear in the 1960 version approved by H. Rep. No. 1282, 86th 
Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960). 
26 The President's original proposal in his Budget message of 1954 is still supported 
in principle by the Secretary's letter, note 20, supra. 
fn See the Secretary's letter, note 20, supra. 
28 lbid . 
.. § 6 of the originally proposed Foreign Incentive Tax Act of 1959 (H.R. 5) does 
not now appear in the 1960 version approved by H. Rep. No. 1282, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1960). 
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arrangement in effect enjoys both a deduction and a substantial 
credit for foreign income taxes.30 The fact that a similar rate ad-
vantage is not available to branch operations obviously indicates 
considerable stress on fotm. Also, the fact that the ultimate prefer-
ence available to a foreign subsidiary's foreign income springs from 
the operation of the gross income and credit concepts, rather than 
via a uniform rate reduction, means that the degree of preference 
will in fact depend "upon and fluctuate with the level and changes 
in tax rates abroad on a country-by-country basis. . . . " 31 For these 
reasons, the Treasury has publicly recognized that if preference is 
to be given because-according to its underlying premise-of the 
requirements of America's foreign economic policy, "it would ap-
pear more sound and equitable that it be granted on a uniform and 
predictable basis." 32 Looking at the matter solely in terms of tax 
principles, the Treasury thought (I) that the combined deduction 
and credit which the subsidiary arrangement enjoyed with reference 
to foreign income could not be defended, and ( 2) that it would be 
more appropriate to "gross up" the parent's dividend by the amount 
of foreign income taxes, a full credit then being allowed for those 
same taxes, assuming a distribution of all of the foreign profit. In 
other words, laying aside the question of possible differences in 
timing, the foreign income of branch and subsidiary arrangements 
should be taxed alike in terms of ultimate effect. But at this point 
the Treasury found itself in a dilemma. 
On the one hand, the Treasury fully recognized that adoption of 
the "gross up" arrangement, without a compensating rate reduction 
for subsidiary operations, would result in a $46,ooo,ooo tax in-
crease 33 with respect to the latter through elimination of a prefer-
ence which such arrangements had enjoyed for 42 years. On the 
other hand, extension of any such wholesale rate reduction to 
branches would constitute an additional inroad (I) on its under-
lying philosophy, namely, that preference for foreign income, over 
domestic income, could be justified only by reference to the needs 
of foreign economic policy, ( 2) on its factual premise, namely, a 
doubt that rate reduction would really stimulate foreign investments 
in any significant sense, and ( 3) on its conclusion that, in any event, 
30 There are those who deny that this is a "fair" way of describing the effect. State-
ment of Clayton E. Turney, representing the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., 
Hearings on H.R. 10859 and xo86o, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 
zd Sess. (1960) p. 31 at 32. 
31 Note 5, supra, at 8. 
32 lbid. 
33 ld. at 7· 
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investments in industrialized foreign markets did not need a further 
special stimulus. Nor was the Treasury prepared to accept the 
revenue loss which extension of a rate reduction to branches would 
involve. In this connection, to be wholly fair to the "vested right" 
psychology of subsidiary arrangements in the sense of avoiding 
prejudice to any, it would have been necessary to effect a reduction 
equal to the maximum advantage presently enjoyed by any such 
arrangements, namely, by those in relatively low income tax coun-
tries. 
While the House Ways and Means Committee indicated at one 
point that it was prepared to adopt the "gross up" formula so as to 
put branches and subsidiaries on a par,34 reconsideration leading to 
additional hearings in April, 1960 has led the committee to with-
hold, to date, reporting out a bill which would have accomplished 
that end.35 Indeed, in at least one sense it has moved in the opposite 
direction in that it has reported out a bill 36 which is actually de-
signed to enhance the feasibility of resorting to the advantageous 
multiple tier sub-subsidiary arrangement, this being the setting in 
which the combined exclusion and credit have the most exaggerated 
effect. 
In this latter connection, the deemed-paid credit, when first ex-
tended twenty-eight years ago to embrace a sub-subsidiary's foreign 
taxes, was available only if the top tier foreign subsidiary owned 
"all the voting stock (except qualifying shares)" of the sub-
subsidiary.37 Eight years later, in 19so, business urged that the 
Point 4 Program would be furthered if Congress relaxed all of 
the ownership requirements associated with the deemed-paid credit.3s 
Reduction in the proportionate interest which the parent had to 
hold in the top tier foreign subsidiary, to 10%,39 was accompanied 
by reducing to so% the interest which that subsidiary had to hold 
in a sub-subsidiary,40 the overall aim being to accommodate those 
cases where ownership of the subsidiary and sub-subsidiary was 
divided for any number of reasons, including requirements of for-
eign lawY Indeed, it was then asserted that the so% limitation at 
the second tier level was retained only for administrative rea-
'"For a statement regarding the sequence of events, see note 5, supra, at +· 
""H.R. 10859 and 1086o, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960). 
"" H.R. n,681, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 
'"Rev. Act of 1942, § 131(f) (z). 
""See statement of Mitchell B. Carroll, Hearings, Committee on Ways and Means. 
8rst Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) Vol. 3, 623 at 626. 
""Rev. Act of 1951, § 332(a), now I.R.C., § 902(a). 
40 Rev. Act of 1951, § 332 (b), now I.R.C., § 902 (b). 
41 S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., rst Sess. 55 (1951). 
626 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
sons, 42 the general belief being expressed that the amount of ulti-
mate dividends received by the parent would be affected by foreign 
ineome taxes irrespective of the proportion of ownership.43 In late 
I960, the House committee reported out a bill 44 which would 
downgrade the required ownership at the second tier level to zo%, 
arguing again that divided ownership .cases should be accommodated 
subject only to limitations geared to administrative feasibility which 
now, it believed, would be "fully" provided for by a zo% stand-
ard.45 While the House itself approved the proposal,46 the Senate 
did not have an opportunity to act on the matter in the I960 session. 
The support which the proposal enjoyed in the House suggests, 
however, that the matter is almost certain to be considered again 
in the I 96 I session. 
(c) Prospect for a consistent pattern re deferral of Amer-
ican tax on foreign income.-As also noted in sub-topic (a), supra, 
the most striking and practical difference between an operation con-
ducted through a foreign subsidiary and that handled by a branch 
involves the opportunity, in the case of the former only, to defer 
American taxes on foreign income until such income is remitted to 
the States. 
Support for deferral in the case of foreign subsidiaries rests essen-
tially on the notion that only in this way will American controlled 
foreign operations be placed on a competitive basis with foreign 
controlled enterprises with which they compete.47 It has also been 
said that the deferral should terminate when dividends are dis-
tributed to the parent at which ti~e the foreign profits enter the 
domestic market.48 
The same general theory is obviously just as applicable to a 
branch operation as to a foreign subsidiary. Even the Treasury has 
acknowledged that the stress placed on form by existing law is hard 
to justify on the merits 49 though, of course, the problem itself can-
not be dealt with separate and apart from such intimately related 
matters as the difference between the applicable direct and deemed-
paid credit provisions. Nevertheless, the Treasury has opposed 
42 The character of the administrative difficulties and the reasons why so% became 
the magic number were not discussed. 
43 Note 41, supra. 
44 H.R. n,681, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1960). 
""H. Rep. No. 2100, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 ( 1960). 
46 S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1951). 
47 H. Rep. No. 1282, 86th Con g., 2d Sess. 1 ( 1960). 
48 I d. at 2. 
49 See Secretary's letter, note 20, supra. 
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wholesale extension of the deferral privilege to branch operations in 
general, noting that the revenue loss would run between $Joo,ooo,-
ooo and $5oo,ooo,ooo, and would amount at least to $1oo,ooo,ooo 
even if export situations were denied the privilege.50 On the other 
hand, the Treasury has voiced approval of a more limited solution 
to the differential, namely, allowance of the deferral privilege to a 
new type of domestic tax entity, to be called a "foreign business 
corporation," the business activities of which would be centralized 
in the under-developed nations.51 
The House Committee on Ways and Means was not originally 
content, however, with so limited an approach. H.R. 5, as approved 
by that committee in the current session,52 would have extended the 
deferral privilege to an electing domestic corporation (then to be 
known as a "foreign business corporation" or FBC) without limi-
tation by reference to the place from which its foreign source income 
was derived. 
That committee apparently believed its more sweeping approach 
would in fact accomplish in large measure the Treasury's aim of ex-
panding investments in under-developed areas; for the most part, 
those were the areas, according to the committee, "where the tax 
rates are lower than those in the United States, and it is only to the 
extent that the taxes on the same income are lower in the foreign 
countries that deferral of U.S. tax results in any benefit." 53 Never-
theless, the bill encountered very rough sledding in the House itself. 
Concern was expressed, for example, that adoption of the bill would 
further stimulate American industry to produce in other countries 
products now produced by American labor in the United States, 
thus eliminating American jobs.54 In the end, the House committee 
was forced to make a substantial concession; from the floor of the 
House, it proposed an amendment limiting the application of the 
new concept to FBC's doing business in uless developed roun-
tries," 55 a concept defined specifically, inter alia, to exclude most 
of Western Europe, -including all Common Market nations, and 
such other developed countries as Canada and Japan. 56 The House 
then passed the amended bill by a scant three vote margin. In view . 
'"'Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
52 Note 47, supra. 
63 /d. at 2 • 
.. See debate in the House, 106 Cong. Rec. 9823 (1960). 
56 106 Cong. Rec. 9821 (1960). 
50 /bid. See also proposed §951(e)(2) of H.R. 5, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) as 
transmitted to the Senate. 
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of that narrow margin and of the fact that the Senate Finance Com-
mittee has not yet indicated its own views with reference to the 
total problem, it is not worthwhile here to do more than indicate the 
main highlights of the House approved bill. 
The House committee itself originally contemplated applying 
five limitations as conditions for qu~lification as an FBC. Some of 
these, as well as other restrictions bearing only on the amount which 
could be deferred-as distinguished from the question of qualifica-
tion itself, were originally intended by the committee to be limita-
tions on either indirect or direct American activity of such a corpora-
tion. When the committee capitulated to the demand that the bill 
be limited to less developed countries, the previously mentioned 
limitations were re-designed as restrictions on indirect or direct 
activity outside of the less developed countries, as distinguished 
from activity solely within the United States. 
The five limitations, as re-designed, follow. 
(I) Certain types of corporations which already enjoy some 
significant type of special tax benefit or treatment would be ren-
dered ineligible, including tax-exempt organizations, China Trade 
Act corporations, regulated investment companies, personal hold-
ing companies, life insurance companies,57 unincorporated busi-
ness enterprises taxed as corporations under § I 3 6 I, and corpora-
tions electing to have their income taxed to shareholders under 
Subchapter S.58 
( 2) In order to facilitate the Treasury's determination of 
whether a corporation qualifies as an FBC and has complied with 
the requirements of other tax laws, the corporation, as a condi-
tion to qualification, would have to furnish the Treasury such in-
formation as may be necessary with reference to any year which 
is affected by, or affects, the election. 59 
( 3) While an otherwise qualified domestic corporation would 
not in any event enjoy deferral with respect to income "from 
sources without less developed countries," 60 qualification of the 
corporation as an FBC would also carry with it a requirement 
that its income be almost exclusively from foreign operations, i.e., 
90% or more of its gross income must be from sources within less 
developed countries.61 By way of contrast, deferral of the Amer-
57 Life insurance companies were excluded until the matter could be given further 
study. Note 47, supra, at 4· 
58 Proposed § 95I (a) (4). 
59 Proposed § 95I (a) (5). 
""Proposed § 952(a) (I) (A). 
61 Proposed § 95I(a) (I). 
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ican tax on a foreign subsidiary's foreign profit is not lost even if 
it derives substantial income from American sources. 
( 4) Qualification would also be denied if the corporation de-
rived more than w% of its gross income from the sale of any 
articles for ultimate use, consumption, or disposition in the United 
States.62 This limitation rests on a notion which is not applied to 
foreign subsidiaries, namely, that deferral even with respect to a 
company's foreign source profit is unwarranted if a significant 
part of its products are "in competition with domestically pro-
duced or extracted products where this tax deferral is not avail-
able." 63 
( 5) In order to "restrict the benefits of tax deferral largely 
to an active business enterprise or to a corporation receiving in-
come from such a corporation," 64 qualification was also made de-
pendent upon a requirement that 90% or more of the corpora-
tion's gross income be from some combination of three specified 
classes of income: 65 (a) income from the active conduct of a 
trade or business; (b) dividends or other income from a qualified 
payor corporation, i.e., from a corporation in which the FBC 
itself held a w% stock ownership and which met substantially the 
same qualifications as the FBC itself; 66 and (c) compensation 
for technical, managerial, engineering, construction, scientific, or 
like services performed in less developed countries and for the 
right to use, in less developed countries, patents, copyrights, secret 
processes and formulas, goodwill, trademarks, trade brands, 
franchises, and other like properties. A royalty from patents, etc., 
but not income from services rendered abroad, is closely akin in 
many circumstances to passive income as distinguished from that 
derived from the active conduct of a trade or business. Accord-
ingly, except where it does involve such active conduct or is income 
other than dividends from a qualified payor corporation, the 
royalty income could not be taken into account in meeting the 90% 
test to the extent it exceeds 25% of the corporation's gross in-
come.67 Illustratively, if all of the corporation's income would 
have qualified under the 90% test except for the fact that 45% 
was derived from royalties, the corporation would not qualify, 
62 Proposed § 951(a) (3). 
63 Note 47, supra, at 4· 
"'ld. at 3· Italics added. 
05 Proposed § 951 (a) (2). 
00 The dividend must be out of earnings and profits of such a corporation when it 
wa~ a qualified payor corporation or would have been except for the xo% stock owner-
ship requirement. 
"'Proposed ~951(a)(z)(D)(ii). See also note ~7 • .wpra, at+ 
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for only So% of its gross would be deemed to satisfy the 90% 
requirement. 
Other limitations, while not conditions to qualification, would 
also be imposed as a means of denying deferral to the extent foreign 
income was actually attributable to business activity in other than 
less developed countries. To appreciate the significance of the device 
which would be utilized to this end, one must understand the differ-
ence between the ultimate tax treatment of a domestic FBC and 
that currently associated with foreign profits earned by a foreign 
subsidiary. 
Whereas the United States taxes the latter's profit only to the 
domestic parent, and then only to the extent of dividends received-
with an appropriate credit for foreign income taxes, the proposal 
regarding an FBC contemplates that it will be the taxable entity,6s 
the timing to coincide with any actual or constructive distribution,69 
and if to a parent, the latter would normally enjoy what is equivalent 
to a roo% dividends received deduction. 70 Loans from an FBC to a 
parent holding ro% or more stock ownership would be deemed, 
illustratively, a constructive distribution,71 the theory being that the 
parent "has effectively achieved the withdrawal of the funds from 
the foreign operation and made them available for its own opera-
tions." 72 
Moreover, in keeping with the previously stated purpose of deny-
ing deferral to the extent foreign income was actually attributable 
to business activity in other than the less developed countries, a 
formula, involving the ratio of investments and payroll in the less 
developed countries to total investments and payroll wherever lo-
cated, is to be applied to the active trade or business income from 
less developed countries for the purpose of denying deferral to that 
portion actually attributable to activity based elsewhere.73 In deter-
mining the ratio, the significance of inventory would be neutralized; 
the investment factor would include only real property and tangible 
personal property (other than inventory) of a type ordinary and 
necessary to the operation of the business, all such property being 
68 Proposed § 952. 
68 Proposed §§ 953 and 9 54· "Distribution" would include redemptions and liquida-
tions. 
70 § 2 {b) of H.R. 5 would amend I.R.C., § 243 to this effect. 
71 Proposed § 954( d). 
""Note 47, supra, at 12. However, loans from a subsidiary to an FBC will not result 
immediately in a U.S. tax though it will increase the FBC's reinvested foreign income. 
Proposed § 954{d). 
73 Proposed § 9 54 (b). 
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valued for this purpose by reference to the adjusted basis. The pay-
roll factor, geared also to ordinary and necessary items, would be 
given double weight. But only one-half of the product resulting from 
multiplication of the ratio by active business income from less de-
"·eloped countries would be deemed constructively distributed, but 
not-according to a de minimus rule-if the factors outside the less 
developed countries are less than 10%. 
When the taxpayer is engaged in two or more separate trades or 
businesses, the ratio would be applied separately, provided the 
trades or businesses are "clearly and distinctly separate." 74 
Also deemed constructively distributed from foreign income 
otherwise previously or currently deferred ("reinvested foreign in-
come account") are those amounts invested in so-called "prohibited 
property," 75 another notion which is inapplicable to the more free-
wheeling ordinary foreign subsidiary type of arrangement. The aim 
of this restriction is to limit deferral to those cases where the funds 
are being used in active foreign operations, i.e., to deny deferral to 
the extent the funds (I) have been diverted, directly or indirectly, 
to operations outside of less well developed countries, or ( 2) with 
certain exceptions, have been converted into mere investments, 
whether foreign or American. The description of the prohibited 
class is accomplished by identifying nonprohibited properties, which 
would include the following: (I) tangible or intangible property 
which is ordinary and necessary for carrying on a trade or business, 
but only where 90% of the total income for the current or preceding 
year is derived from less developed countries; ( 2) securities of a 
"qualified payor corporation" or of another 10% owned FBC (in-
cluding one not qualifying for the current year, provided it has 
elected FBC treatment); (3) bonds, etc., of foreign governments 
not in excess of I 5% of the corporation's earnings and profits accu-
mulated since I96o; (4) bonds, etc., of the United States; (5) 
money; ( 6) bank deposits; and ( 7) loans to a parent holding 10% 
stock ownership. Loans were excluded from the prohibited class 
because of the previously described separate treatment applicable 
to them. 76 
Wholly apart from the action of the House in restricting the 
benefits of this bill to those enterprises doing business in the "less 
developed countries," it appears from the foregoing that the oppor-
74 Note 47, supra, at I 1. 
75 Proposed § 954(c). 
"'Note 47, supra, at I 1. 
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tunity to defer American tax through an FBC would suffer from re-
strictions not applicable to an ordinary foreign subsidiary arrange-
ment. There will also be a difference between the two arrangements 
in the ultimate amount of American tax if the FBC must "gross up" 
the amount includible by adding the applicable amount of foreign 
taxes, a full credit then being allowed for the latter, while a foreign 
subsidiary arrangement remains free of the "gross up" requirement, 
thus enjoying what is tantamount to a deduction and a substantial 
credit for the foreign tax. 
While H.R. 5 (the proposed FBC legislation), as originally 
approved by the House committee, called for the application of a 
"gross up" requirement in both cases, that notion, as applied to 
ordinary foreign subsidiary arrangements, was carved out for 
special consideration in the separate legislation mentioned in sub-
topic (b) above. An ultimate difference between the two would 
survive if, on the one hand, that special bill should fail of adoption 
and, on the other, the House committee continued to insist, as it 
did in the original version of H.R. 5, that deferral for an FBC 
should not "decrease the ultimate level of combined foreign and 
U.S. tax on ... foreign income of these domestic corporations 
below the level of taxation generally applicable to other domestic 
corporations operating abroad through branches." 77 However, in 
the final House debate regarding H.R. 5 (FBC legislation), its 
sponsor noted that the House committee had not yet resolved the 
separate "gross up" question as it related to foreign subsidiaries 
and proceeded to suggest that the committee felt that "whatever is 
done should apply across the board .... " 
Laying aside the ultimate result with reference to that question, 
there may be some companies which would prefer an FBC arrange-
ment, using either branches abroad or using the FBC as a holding 
company to own stock in qualified foreign subsidiaries. In the ab-
sence of special mitigation, those with foreign interests otherwise 
presently organized might have encountered a tax at the point when 
interests are reshuffled so as to make use of an FBC. With reference 
to companies interested in converting foreign subsidiary operations 
into branches of an FBC, H.R. 5 takes account of the prospect that 
the Treasury, by reliance on § 367, might have called for recogni-
tion of gain when business property of the foreign subsidiary is 
transferred to an FBC. The bill specifically neutralizes § 367 in this 
case, provided substantially all of the property of the foreign sub-
71 ld. at 2. 
TAXATION 633 
sidiary is so transferred. But in such case, the accumulated earnings 
and profits of the foreign subsidiary pass into the reinvested foreign 
income account (deferred income account) of the FBC and would, 
upon distribution, be taxed to it.78 It was not thought that nonrecog-
nition should be enjoyed and deferral obtained with reference to 
increments which took place in the value of inventory while held 
in the United States prior to the transfer. Accordingly, H.R. 5 
would add a new section to the Code calling for inclusion in gross 
income of any gain realized when such property is transferred to an 
FBC or to a foreign subsidiary.79 
Under certain conditions, H.R. 5 also neutralizes § 367 in that 
instance where an FBC is converted into a holding company through 
transfer of "foreign business property" to a foreign subsidiary.80 
But this will be so only if the FBC (holding company) owns So% 
of the voting stock as well as So% of all other classes of stock in 
the subsidiary. Moreover, the foreign subsidiary must be a "quali-
fied payor corporation," i.e., it must in general meet the standards 
otherwise applicable to the FBC itself. Illustratively, its income 
must be derived, to the extent of 90%, from less developed coun-
tries. Again, 90% or more of its income must be derived from ar-
ticles which are not imported into the United States. 
Finally, but only in a fairly limited type of case, H.R. 5 would 
also neutralize the possibility, under § I 49 I, that the Treasury 
might apply an excise tax in that instance where an FBC transfers 
stock in one foreign subsidiary to another, thereby creating a three 
tier chain.81 The tax will not be applied if (I) the transferor satisfies 
the previously described control test, ( 2) the subsidiary, the stock 
of which is transferred, measures up to the previously described 
"qualified payor corporation" as to the transferor for the 3 pre-
ceding taxable years, and for the first subsequent taxable year, (a) 
will be such as to the transferee, and (b) will derive so% or more 
of its gross income from less developed countries and from the ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business. 
7'§3(a). 
79 § 3 (c) proposes addition of a new § 78 to the Code. 
80 Proposed § 367 (c). Under certain conditions, § 2 (d) of H.R. 5 would also immunize 
an F.B.C. from the personal holding company provisions by amending I.R.C., § 543· 
81 § 3 (b). 
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Chapter XII 
The Association of the Overseas 
Countries and Territories 
Peter Hay 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Four of the E.E.C. Member States have administered overseas 
dependencies which exceed their mother countries in area. The size 
and potential of the territories which have been associated with 
France are, in particular, often vastly underestimated. Former 
French West Africa alone is, for example, four times larger than 
the Europe of the Six; if its map were superimposed on that of 
Europe, its boundaries would run through Brest, Liverpool, Oslo, 
Warsaw, Moscow, Bucharest, Athens, Rome, and Barcelona. The 
examples could be multiplied: for instance, the former Belgian 
Congo is So times larger than Belgium and Dutch New Guinea 13 
times larger than the Netherlands. These present and former over-
seas dependencies are together almost I o times larger than the 
Europe of the Six and exceed the size of the United States by more 
than one-third, although their aggregate population of 55 million 
amounts (roughly) to only one-third that of the Six. Indeed, the 
vastness, the difficulty of access, and the climate of the African ter-
ritories justifies the epithet of the Roman geographer, "Africa 
protentosa." 1 
The idea of European cooperation with the African territories 
received its first formal impetus in a Recommendation adopted by 
the Council of Europe on September 25, 1952, the "Strasbourg-
Plan." 2 The Recommendation was designed to promote trade re-
lations and to assist the territories in their efforts to develop. Yet 
the Messina Declaration of 195 5, charging the intergovernmental 
1 Beaulieu, Les Investissements dans les Pays et Territoires d'Outre-M er As sociis a 
Ia .c.E.E., Politique Generate et Methodes, 1958 REVUE ou MARCHE CoMMUN 391, 392• 
Cf. O,E,E.C., COMMENTS ON THE STRASBOURG PLAN ( 1954). 
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committee under the chairmanship of M. Spaak with the task of 
drawing up a report on a European community, omitted any refer-
ence to the overseas territories. The question was not raised until 
November 1956 and was solved barely a month before the Treaty 
was signed in March 1957 by a special meeting of the heads of 
government.3 
The need for some sort of arrangement concerning the overseas 
territories arose mainly because of the special position of France. 
France felt that she could not grant economic concessions to her 
European partners and, at the same time, maintain a costly develop-
ment program for her overseas territories. She therefore felt Com-
munity assistance was needed. 
On the other hand, France found herself in a position akin to that 
of the United Kingdom in the negotiations for a Free Trade Area. 
She had existing economic commitments to her overseas territories 
-for instance, a customs union with French West Africa-to which 
was now to be added a customs union with her European partners. 
As a result France felt that she was being forced to choose between 
"divorce" and "bigamy" with regard to her overseas relations.4 A 
third choice, automatic extension of the E.E.C. Treaty to the over-
seas territories, met with opposition, particularly that of Germany, 
which hesitated to undertake new overseas commitments having 
long been free of them.5 A compromise solution was therefore 
reached whereby the territories were to be "associated" with the 
Community. 
The territories are, for purposes of association, divided into three 
groups: ( r) those which are constitutionally a part of their metro-
politan countries (for example, the overseas department of Re-
union) ; ( 2) those which are dependent overseas countries (for 
example, the Republic of Mauritania) ; and (3) independent coun-
tries which have special relations with France (Tunisia and Mo-
rocco) and Italy (Libya), as well as the autonomous parts of the 
Netherlands (Surinam and Antilles). Association is qualitatively 
different for each of the first two groups in regard to such matters 
as trade barriers, right of establishment, movement of workers, 
and availability of investment funds from the specially created over-
• Germany, Bundesrat, Niederschrift iiber die Sitzung des Sonderausschusses "Ge-
meinsamer M arkt und Euratom" vom 24. April I957, 4· 
• Leduc, L' Association des Pays d'Outre-M er, 1958 REVUE o'EcoNOMIE POLITIQUE 
198, 199, referring to MOUSSA, LES CHANCES ECONOMIQUES DE LA COMMUNAUTE FRANCO-
AFRICAINE, 193-195 (1957). 
6 Germany, Bundestag, Schriftlicher Bericht des J. Sondera!Uschusses-Gemeinsamer 
Markt/Euratom, Drucksache 366o, ;6 (1957). 
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seas Development Fund. The third group is invited to negotiate 
for association. 
Association is of obvious political importance in the struggle for 
the friendship of the uncommitted nations. 6 This and the economic 
significance of close ties between these producers of primary prod-
ucts and industrial Western Europe account for the lively discussion 
the association has already sparked both in the United Nations and 
in G.A.T.T. 
Association of the overseas territories with the E.E.C. is of im-
mediate relevance to only a limited group of American businesses 
-for example, to the extractive industries (such as mining and the 
oil industry) and to American agricultural (coffee and banana) 
interests in South America-which will be affected by African com-
petition in the European market. As association becomes a reality, 
however, business opportunities for a larger group of American 
enterprises may develop. The territories may eventually offer op-
portunities for the investment of development capital and for the 
establishment of companies using local raw materials and manu-
facturing for local consumption and export to European or other 
markets. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the legal status of the 
territories, the relevant provisions of the Treaty, and some of the 
legal and economic problems which association creates. The dis-
cussion will center mainly on the African territories since they make 
up the most important area covered by the association provisions, 
and it will give substantial attention to agricultural problems in 
contrast to other chapters in this book. The rapid changes taking 
place on the African Continent necessarily mean that parts of the 
discussion are tentative. 
II. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS 
OF THE TERRITORIES 
A careful distinction between the different uses of the word "ter-
ritories" must be made at the outset. \Vhen the reference is in a 
generic, collective sense, this chapter will refer to "territories." On 
the other hand, the term "Overseas Territories" will be used to 
denote those of the "territories" which are not, constitutionally, a 
• 
6 
Germany, Bundesrat, supra note 3 at 38 j also commentary by Fischer-Menshausen, 
m VON DER GROEBEN and VON BoECKH (editors), HANDBUCH FUR EUROPAISCHE WIRT-
SCHAFT (hereinafter cited as HANDBUCH) IA 59, 4· 
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part of their metropolitan countries (as are overseas departments 
of France, for example) and which are associated with the E. E. C. 
under the Implementing Convention of the Treaty. 
A. THE POLITICAL RELATION TO THE METROPOLITAN 
COUNTRIES 
I. THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES OF FRANCE 
Before the Constitution of 1958 went into effect, the French Re-
public consisted, in addition to metropolitan France including Al-
geria,7 of the overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Guiana, Mar-
tinique, and Reunion, of the Overseas Territories of French West 
Africa (Senegal, Mauritania, Sudan (not to be confused with the 
Sudan which lies south of Egypt), Guinea, Ivory Coast, Volta, Da-
homey, and Niger), French Equatorial Africa (Gabon, Congo, 
Ubangi-Shari and Chad), Madagascar, French Somaliland, St. 
Pierre, and Miquelon, the Cornaro Archipelago, as well as the Ter-
ritories in Oceania and the Antarctic. The Republic together with 
the trust-territories of Togo and Cameroon made up the French 
Union which, expanded by the friendly independent states of the 
franc area (Tunisia, Morocco) and the Condominium of the New 
Hebrides, made up the Ensemble Fran~aise. 8 
The new Constitution does not alter the relationship of France 
to its overseas departments, which were and are constitutionally 
a part of metropolitan France,9 to the trust territories, nor to the 
friendly associated states. It does, however, envision a change in 
France's relationship to the Overseas Territories. Even before the 
constitutional changes, the administration of the Overseas Terri-
tories had been liberalized. The basic law of 1956 (loi-cadre)/0 
had given them internal autonomy and to the territorial assemblies 
the right to elect responsible ministers to Government Councils. 
The Government Councils replaced the old "Great Councils" pre-
viously elected according to a class system. In July r 9 58 General 
de Gaulle transferred the chairmanship of the Government Councils 
from the Territorial Governors to the elected Prime Ministers. 
7 See the discussion of the "Statut de )'Algerie" of 1947 by Naegelen, L'Algerie, in 
BERNARD et al., LA FRANCE D'0UTRE·MER, SA SITUATION ACTUELLE, I at 8 (1953). 
8 DE LAITRE, LA MISE EN VALEUR DE L'ENSEMBLE EURAFRICAIN FRAN <;AIS ET LA P ARTICI· 
PATION DES CAPITAUX ETRANGERS 167 (1954). 
• Constitution of 1958 arts. 72-73. 
10 The loi-cadre of June 23, 1956 is discussed by Quermonne, 1957 RECUEIL DALLOZ 
Chronique 5; cf. also, Charpentier, Les Lois-Cadres et Ia Fonction Gouvernementale, 
1958 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE 220. 
REPUBLIC 01 
r---l FEDERATION OF MALl 
L_____jfDouofyecf Au11u•t 20, /P601 
k~ll .. COUNCIL Of THE ENUNTE UNION OF CENTliAL AFfiiCAN liPUILICS 
African Territories Associated under the E.E.C. Treaty 
,6 
liUNION 
Not shown: (a) The former trust-territory of Italian Somaliland, which, with former 
British Somaliland, now composes the Republic of Somalia, extending south from the 
easternmost tip of the continent, and (b) the former French trust-territory Cameroon, 
now independent and considered associated with the E.E.C., located due west of the 
Central African Republic. 
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The constitutional referendum of 1958 left the Overseas Ter-
ritories free to choose independence or membership in a "French 
Community." All, except Guinea, originally chose the latter. The new 
Constitution also leaves the Overseas Territories free to choose 
the form of membership in the new French Community, 11 and 
provides for a procedure by which they may gain independence at any 
timeP Their first alternative was to retain the status given them by 
the basic law of 1956, its implementing acts, and the Decree of 
1 9 58. In this case the Republic would continue to be responsible for 
external relations, defense, currency, and finances, the territorial 
assemblies would continue, and the governor appointed by the Re-
public would remain chef du territoire. French Somaliland, Oceania, 
the Comores, St. Pierre, Miquelon, and New Caledonia chose this 
statusY Secondly, the Overseas Territories could choose to become 
overseas departments. The governor would then be replaced by a 
prefect, and legislation and administration would become identical 
with that of metropolitan France, except for modifications neces-
sitated by the peculiar situation of the department.H Finally, the 
Overseas Territories could choose to become member states of the 
French Community. 
Seven Overseas Territories of French West Africa, the four 
Overseas Territories of French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar 
made this choice, and their territorial assemblies became "legisla-
tive assemblies." 15 The status of a member state in the French 
Community requires tran§fer of certain powers to the Community.16 
Under the Fourth Republic, these policy-making functions (in re-
gard to foreign affairs, defense, economic, and fiscal policy and 
policies concerning strategic raw materials) were attributes of the 
Republic. In the Fr_ench Community, however, France is only one 
of the partners, although she does enjoy some special privileges: 
she provides the president; she has a majority in the senate of the 
Community; she conducts affairs of common interest during an in-
terim period; and she plays a role in the modification of the status 
of any member state. 17 The organs of the Community are the 
u Constitution of 1958 art. 76. For the changes made by the new Constitution, see 
Massa, Die franzosische P erfassung vom 5· Oktober I958 und die iiberseeischen 
Gebiete, 14 EUROPA ARCHIV 109 ff. (1959), and Silvera, Passe de !'Union fran{aise et 
avenir de [a Communaute, 1958 REVUE }URID!QUE ET POLIT!QUE DE L'UNION FRAN<;:AISE, 
589 ff. 
12 Constitution of 1958 art. 86, para. 2. 
13 Massa, op. cit. supra note II, at 112; THE STATESMAN's YEAR BooK 1959, 997· 
"Constitution of 1958 art. 73· 
15 Constitution of 19 58 art. 8 3· 
1
" Constitution of 1958 art. 78. 
17 Cf. Constitution of 1958 arts. So, 83, 79, and 86. 
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Executive Council, presided over by the President of the Republic 
and attended by the heads of governments of the member states, 
the Senate of the Community (not to be confused with the Senate 
of the Republic), and the Court of Arbitration.18 
Apart from the changes in their relationship to metropolitan 
France, French West and Equatorial Africa also underwent internal 
changes. Four of the seven Overseas Territories of French West 
Africa established the Federation of Mali in January 1959; the 
Voltaic and Dahomey Republics later withdrew leaving only Sene-
gal and Sudan in the Federation.19 In August 1960 internal dif-
ferences developed, resulting in the dissolution of the Federation 
so that Senegal and Sudan now continue as separate republics. In 
September 1960, Sudan changed its name to Republic of Mali. While 
the Ivory Coast, Niger, and Mauritania declined to join the Federa-
tion, they agreed to join in a customs union with the states of the 
Federation on June 6, 1959.20 The Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey, 
and Voltaic Republics also entered into a loose association with each 
other-the Council of the Entente.21 The three republics of former 
French Equatorial Africa, the Congo-not to be confused with the 
Republic of the Congo on which it borders and which was formerly 
the Belgian Congo-, Central African (formerly Ubangi-Shari) 
and Chad Republics, are also grouped in the Union of Cen-
tral African Republics from which the Gabon Republic has re-
mained aloof, although she maintains close economic ties with the 
Union.22 
On May 1 I, 1960, an amendment to Articles 85 and 86 of the 
French Constitution took effect, which permits member states of 
the French Community to become independent without losing mem-
bership in the Community and independent states to become mem-
bers of the French Community. Accordingly the former Mali Fed-
eration became independent on June 20, 1960; the Malagasy Repub-
lic (formerly Madagascar) on June 25, 1960. Moreover, France 
signed accords on July II, 1960, pledging independence to the four 
republics of the Council of the Entente (the Ivory Coast, Niger, 
Dahomey, and Voltaic Republics) and on July r 2, 1960, to the 
Union of Central African Republics (the Congo, Central African, 
18 
Constitution of 1958 arts. So-84. For a discussion of these organs, see Massa, op. cit. 
supra note n, at II3-II4. Also see Krebs, Die Communauti Fran(aise im Jahre 196o 3 
EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT ISS (1960). ' 
19 
Massa, op: cit. supra note II at n8; N.Y. Times, March 2, 19S9, 2 :s; March 18, 
19s9, 2:s; Apnl 6, I9S9. w:4. 
2D New York Times, June 7, I9S9, IS :2. 
:U.S. Depart~ent of State, Press Release No. 602, Aug. zo, 19S9 at S· 
Massa, op. czt. supra note II, at II 8. 
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and Chad Republics). All should be independent by the time this 
book is published. 
The Gabon Republic was also negotiating with France for inde-
pendence in the summer of I96o and it was expected that the Re-
public of Mauritania would have received its independence by I961. 
2. THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, THE 
NETHERLANDS, AND ITALY 
The two Belgian Overseas Territories to which the Treaty origi-
nally applied were the Belgian Congo and the trust territory of 
Ruanda-Urundi. Since July 1, 1960, the Belgian Congo has been 
the independent Republic of the Congo, however, and in June 1960, 
Belgium informed the United Nations Trusteeship Council that 
she had agreed to hold elections in Ruanda-U rundi early in I 96 I 
as a prelude to discussions by the United Nations General Assembly 
of independence for this Overseas Territory. 
The Netherlands have three Overseas Territories, Surinam, 
Netherlands New Guinea, and Netherlands Antilles. Of these, the 
Nether lands could bind only New Guinea by signing the E. E. C. 
Treaty. The Statute of the Realm of I954 23 gives Surinam and 
the Antilles partnership status with the Netherlands as "members 
of the realm." Because of this substantial autonomy, the Nether-
lands could not bind them with regard to the E.E.C. Treaty. A 
separate agreement of association must therefore be negotiated, to 
be approved by the Netherlands as well as by the parliamentary 
bodies of Surinam and the Antilles.24 Italy, finally, administered the 
trust-territory of Italian Somaliland which became part of the in-
dependent Republic of Somalia on July I, 1960. A special problem 
shared by all of the formerly dependent or trust territories is that 
of continued association with the E.E.C. now that they are inde-
pendent.25 
B. EcoNoMIC CoNDITIONs IN THE OvERSEAS TERRITORIEs 
The territories in question, and most importantly those in Africa, 
are still in the early stages of economic development. Incomes per 
23 Cf. Van Panhuys, Das Statut des Kiinigreichs der Niederlande, in Kraft getreten 
am 29. Dezember I954, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FtiR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNo 
VtiLKERRECHT 304 (1955/56) . 
.. Belgium, Chambre des Representants, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission 
Speciale, 727 (1956-57), No.2, 68-69. 
05 Leduc, supra note 4, at 203. 
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capita are low and industry is lacking. The lack of industrial re-
sources results in a lack of investment capital and technical know-
how. Large development plans have been undertaken by the metro-
politan countries, although most such plans, because of the size of 
the task, can only be concerned with matters of "infrastructure," 
that is, roads, hospitals, schools, and the like. 
The Netherlands pursue a policy of non-discrimination with re-
gard to imports into New Guinea, and New Guinea exports are 
granted no preferential treatment in the Netherlands. On the other 
hand, the French Overseas Territories of the franc area together 
with France comprise a tightly-knit economic unit (with the ex-
ception of French Equatorial Africa which hitherto has accorded 
no preferences to France).26 The greatest part of the foreign trade 
of the French Overseas Territories takes place within the franc area 
and at prices above the world level. 
In 1956, the base year for the establishment of the E.E.C., the 
total value of the exports of the Overseas Territories amounted to 
roughly $1.06 billion, 27 of which 71 percent went to the E. E. C. 
countries. Of all export commodities, unroasted coffee is the most 
important. It amounted to 17.5 percent of the value of total exports 
in r956 and to 21.1 percent of total coffee imports by the E.E.C. 
countries. The next most important agricultural commodity is cocoa 
which in 1956 amounted to 4·9 percent of the value of exports. 
In order of importance, bananas and oil-bearing products represent 
the next largest percentages of agricultural exports. 
The metropolitan countries have established development pro-
grams for all the Overseas Territories to raise standards of living 
and promote some degree of industrialization. The Second Modern-
ization Plan for French Territories, for example, will result in con-
tributions of nearly $250 million annually.28 In the former Belgian 
"'Stohler, Afrika wird curopiiischer Wirtsc!zaftspartnrr, DIE ZEIT (Hamburg} May 
22, 1959, 13. 
21 See generally, U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT, Association 
of non-self-governing territories with the European Economic Community, Doc. 
A/3916jRev. I (1958), 5 If. 
""Ibid., 13-14. The annual average of "new investments" (i.e., excluding measures 
for the renewal of depreciated equipment and for the increase of supplies but including 
certain "expenses equivalent to an increase in capital"} in the French territories be-
tween 1951-1953 amounted to approximately $980 million. Doucy and Pouleur-Bouvier, 
Die Beziehungen zwischen einem integrierten Europa und den iiberseeischen Hoheits-
gebieten seiner Mitg/ieds/iinder, in RACINE (editor), EUROPAS WIRTSCHAFTSEINHEIT VON 
MoRGEN (Heft 15 der Schriftenreihe zum Handbuch f.iir Europaische Wirtschaft} 
r92 at 222 (1960). Referring to LA CROIX of April 3, 1957, Rubinsky points out that 20 
out of every 100 francs of tax money in France go to "Africa." Rubinsky, Imperialist 
Africa Projects, 1957 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 46 at 47 (No.7). (Published in U.S.S.R.) 
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Congo, a Io-year development plan, designed mainly to finance "in-
frastructure" projects during the years I 948-I 9 58 and totaling 
about $I billion went into effect.29 The grants of the Netherlands 
Government to New Guinea average $7.8 million yearly.30 Three-
quarters of the cost of the Somaliland Economic Development 
Plan, which envisaged a total investment of $I7.4 million between 
I954 and I96o, was borne by Italy.31 
Other resources for public development have been supplied by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Be-
tween I952 and I957 two loans of $40 million were given the Bel-
gian Congo, one of $4.8 million to Ruanda-Urundi, and one of $30 
million to Belgium to finance exports to the Congo. The second $40 
million loan to the Congo involved participation by I4, to a large ex-
tent American, investment institutions to the extent of some $6 mil-
lion. 
During the same period, Algeria benefited from a $Io million 
loan for the development of electrical facilities and French West 
Africa obtained $7.5 million for the modernization of railroads.32 
In I959, a $35 million loan was extended to Comilog, a company 
established in Gabon (French Equatorial Africa) for the develop-
ment of extensive high-grade manganese deposits.33 Finally, $5 mil-
lion were made available by the High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community to assist the Bureau Minier de la France 
d'Outre-Mer in its five-year program of prospection for iron and 
manganese ores in certain African territories.34 
The Republic of the Congo is inhabited by roughly I3 million 
people of which less than one percent were, prior to its independence, 
Europeans, giving it the low density of 5·5 persons per square kilo-
meter.35 The activities of Europeans centered mainly around mining 
and the raising of cash crops. The Congo has rich deposits of min-
29 Beaulieu, supra note r, at 394· 
•• U.N., supra note 27, at If. 
31 O.E.E.C., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF OVERSEAS CoUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES As-
SOCIATED WITH OEEC MEMBER COUNTRIES 139 (1958). 
82 See the 9th, rr-r3th Annual Reports of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Cf. also Krebs, Algerischer Entwicklungsplan oder "Plan von 
Constantine,'' 3 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 158 (r96o). Cf., Brady, All Algeria Won to 
Economic Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1960, Sec. r, r8 :r. 
82 International Monetary Fund, XII INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY 9 
(No. 2, July ro, 1959) . 
.. European Coal and Steel Community, HIGH AuTHORITY, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT 
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 209-210 ( 1959). 
85 Adjacent Ruanda-Urundi has a density of more than So persons per square kilo-
meter which is only paralleled in Nigeria in the agricultural areas. O.E.E.C., op. cit. 
supra note 3 r, at 13. 
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erals amounting to 6 5 percent of the export receipts with copper 
being the most important. A large part of the world's reserve of 
uranium is in the Congo, and it is the world's largest producer of 
industrial diamonds. However, the greater part of the African pop-
ulation still depends on subsistence agriculture for livelihood, and 
the development of the area remains uneven. In spite of technical 
assistance, much of African agricultural activity is still primitive.36 
The economies of the territories of France 37 are all essentially 
agricultural and progress in agricultural production is slow. In Al-
geria four-fifths of the population still depend entirely on agricul-
ture, with wine, cereals, and vegetables leading other commodities. 
More striking progress is being made in mining. Until recently 
Algeria's mineral reserves were considered small, but new drillings 
in the Sahara, particularly in the Hassi-Messaoud region, have un-
covered large crude oil reserves. Indeed, this fact has been reported 
to pose serious competitive problems for Venzuelan and Middle 
Eastern oil since Algerian oil may eventually permit France to be-
come self-sufficient and to supply some of her E.E.C. partners, 
notably Germany.38 Exploitation of Algerian oil is now in the hands 
of the French companies C.F.P.A. and REPAL.39 Algeria has a 
fairly substantial processing industry, recent advances having been 
made particularly in the foodstuffs, building materials, and chemi-
cal industries. 
French Africa south of the Sahara includes the most primitive 
and underdeveloped of the territories considered here. Agricultural 
produce amounted to over 90 percent of the total value of exports 
in I 9 55 whereas mining products represented less than 4 percent. 
Coffee, peanuts, and cocoa are the most important agricultural ex-
ports. Madagascar and the Cornaro Archipelago in addition prod-
uce and export vanilla, sugar, tobacco, and cloves. Significant de-
posits of bauxite are found in Guinea (formerly French West 
Africa) and of manganese ore in Franceville, which is reputed to 
consist of up to I 50 million tons of marketable ore with so percent 
manganese content. 
36 O.E.E.C., supra note 3I, Part I, I3 If. Doucy and Pouleur-Bouvier, supra note 28, 
at 200. 
"'Ibid., Part II, 49 If. Doucy and Pouleur-Bouvier, supra note 28, at 198. 
38 Carmical, Problems Posed by Algerian Oil, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, I959, Sec. 3, I :I, 
7:3. Cf. Rauchfuss, Erdol in den assoziierten Gebieten, 3 EuROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFI" 
406 ( I960). It was reported on October 9, I96o, that six million metric tons of Saharan 
petrol have been delivered to the Algerian port of Bougie by the new pipeline since 
pumping began in December of I959· Brady, supra note 32, at col. 5· 
89 I958 EUROPAISCilE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCilAFT 342. 
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As a result of the dependence on agricultural products these areas 
are often severely affected by oscillating world prices. To remedy 
this situation a number of price stabilization funds have been es-
tablished. The latest, the National Equalization Fund for Overseas 
Products established in 1955, alone received an initial allocation 
of approximately $13.7 million under the 1956 budget. 




A. IN GENERAL 
I. THE POLICY OF THE TREATY 
Integration of the Overseas Territories into the Community and 
the resultant application of all provisions of the Treaty would have 
been disastrous for the less developed economies of the Terri-
tories.40 Instead, the Treaty therefore extends to them most of the 
trade advantages of the Common Market and provides for public 
investment capital to further development, at the same time pro-
tecting them from the full brunt of European competition by per-
mitting the retention of certain trade barriers. In many areas other 
than trade the Treaty does not go beyond affirmation of a general 
policy of association, leaving details to further negotiation. This 
contrasts with other parts of the Treaty where the drafters took 
an intermediate step, creating a legal framework (a loi-cadre) to 
be filled in by the Community organs.41 The conservatism of the 
drafters in this regard is probably explained by the fear of some of 
the E.E.C. partners, notably Germany, that close association with 
the Overseas Territories would involve them in problems they did 
not wish to face. It was this fear which prompted inclusion of a ref-
erence 42 in the substantive provisions of the Treaty to the Pre-
amble, which in turn refers to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, the right to self-determination as a principle of the asso-
ciation being thereby incorporated by reference.43 This fear should 
now be alleviated by the provision in the new French Constitution 
39
" See generally, COUSTE, L'AssOCIATION DES PAYS o'OuTRE-MER A LA COMMUNAUTE 
ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE (1959). 
40 Bourcier de Carbon, L' Association des Pays et Territoires d'Outre-M er a la Com-
munauttf Economique, 9 REVUE ECONOMIQUE 278, at 282 (1958). 
41 Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communauti Economique Europienne, 1958 REVUE nu 
MARCHE COMMUN 161 at 164. Examples are arts. 135 and 136(2) of the Treaty . 
.. In art. 131(3). 
•• Art. 73, U.N. CHARTER. Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, Schri/tlicher Bericht des 
J. Sonderausschusses-Gemeinsamer Markt jEuratom-Drucksache 366o, 56 ( 1957). The 
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allowing the Overseas Territories to become independent, either 
leaving or remaining within the French Community.44 
The association of these areas which are producers of primary 
products with industrialized nations under a treaty establishing a 
system of trade preferences has been likened to the British Com-
monwealth 45 with its system of imperial preferences. To what ex-
tent such a system may bring about a contraction of world trade will 
be discussed after consideration of the association provisions of 
the Treaty. 
2. THE TREATY PROVISIONS IN DETAIL 
Because the legal status of the territories differs, the Treaty dif-
ferentiates among them. 
1) Article 227 describes the territorial scope of the Treaty and 
includes in it Algeria and the French overseas departments, since 
constitutionally they are part of metropolitan France. It lists the 
modifications which were thought necessary. 
2) A special, and separate, part of the Treaty (Articles 131-
136) deals with the association of the Overseas Territories and 
is supplemented by an Implementing Convention annexed to the 
Treaty. These provisions are then further modified by special proto-
cols. Annex IV of the Treaty lists the Overseas Territories con-
cerned. 
3) Finally, "Declarations of Intention" open the door to negotia-
tions for association with the autonomous parts of the Netherlands 
(Surinam and the Antilles), with the independent countries of the 
franc area (Morocco, Tunisia), and with Libya with which Italy 
has special relations. 
The association provisions will hereafter be considered without 
differentiating among the types of territories, except where differ-
ences exist in the treatment of the departments and the Overseas 
Territories. 
Socialist Representative Metzger thought, however, that the use of the word "entspre-
ehend" in art. 131 did not make this a self-evident incorporation by reference, but that 
it was a question of extensive versus restrictive treaty interpretation. Deutscher 
Bundestag, Sitzungsbericht 224. Sitzung, July 5, 1957, 13344. The extensive interpreta-
tion, however, was undoubtedly the intent of the parties. Cf. Erliiuterungen der Bundes· 
regierung in Bundestags-Drucksache 3440 (2. Legislaturperiode) in HANDBUCH IA 30, 
introductory comment to arts. 131-136. Cf. also Bundesrat, Niederschrift iiber die 
Sitzung des Sonderausschusses "Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom" vom 24. April 
I957, 41. 
44 Constitution of 1958 art. 86, para. 2. 
'"Germany, Deutscher Bundesrat, supra note 43, Anlage zu Punkt 5, Report by 
Senator Helmken 5· 
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B. THE SuBsTANCE OF THE AssociATION 
I. REMOVAL OF TRADE BARRIERS 
a. Tariffs 
One of the introductory Treaty articles states that the "ob-
jects" 46 of the association include extension to the Overseas Terri-
tories of the trade benefits which the Member States accord each 
other (gradual abolition of tariffs and quotas) and extension of 
most-favored-nation treatment by the Overseas Territories to the 
E.E.C. Member States. It will be noted that the "objects" of this 
Article concern only the Overseas Territories. Algeria and the over-
seas departments of France are governed by the same provisions re-
lating to the free movement of goods as are the E.E.C. Member 
StatesY The following Treaty provisions are designed to imple-
ment these "objects." 
The Overseas Territories benefit from the same reductions in 
tariffs as apply to trade among Member States.48 The Overseas 
Territories are also bound to abolish their customs duties with re-
gard to imports originating in Member States or other associated 
Overseas Territories in conformity with the Treaty provisions re-
lating to the free movement of goods. 49 This obligation is modified, 
however, insofar as the Overseas Territories may continue to im-
pose duties, if this is necessitated by their level of development or 
fiscal needs. This authorization extends both to protective and reve-
nue tariffs. 50 
These protectionist safeguards are limited, however. On the one 
hand, the tariffs which are maintained under this authorization 
must be progressively reduced to the level of duties levied on im-
ports originating in the Overseas Territory's mother country. 51 New 
preferences may not be granted the metropolitan country. The pace 
of these reductions is to be that of tariff reductions among the 
•• "Objects" is actually an incorrect heading for art. 132, since in reality it sets out 
the "contents" of the association. HANDBUCH IA 59, 1 J. 
47 Art. 227 (2 ). 
'"Art. 133 (r). 
49 Art. 133 (2). Express reference is made to the provisions of arts. 12, 13, 14, 15 
and 17. 
50 Because they are subject to the ordinary provisions relating to the free movement 
of goods, the overseas departments may not use these safeguard measures. They may 
only avail themselves of those safeguard measures which are also open to the Member 
States, particularly those of arts. ro8-109, 226. Cf. Leduc, supra note 4 at 209, n. 1. 
51 Art. 133 (3). 
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Member States. Consequently, if the stages of the transitional per-
iod applying to tariff reductions among the Member States are 
extended,52 the progression of reduction in the Overseas Territories 
will also be affected. The practical result of these provisions is, then, 
that imports originating in the Member States will be accorded 
what is essentially most-favored-nation treatment. On the other 
hand, the continued imposition of duties by the Overseas Territories 
is limited in time. They may only be imposed as long as they are 
economically necessary. Theoretically, therefore, the Treaty en-
visages total abolition of duties for trade in both directions at a 
time when the Overseas Territories are able to meet the increased 
competition. The compatibility of the association provisions with 
G.A.T.T. will primarily depend on whether the association is an 
arrangement designed to bring about a free-trade area "within 
a reasonable length of time" within the meaning of Article 
24(5) (c) of G.A.T.T.53 The creation of a free-trade area is theo-
retically possible, although the Overseas Territories will be able 
to impose safeguards during the foreseeable future. Despite this it 
is arguable that the test of "a reasonable length of time" should be 
interpreted more leniently in the case of presently underdeveloped 
countries than would be justifiable in the case of developed countries. 
In order that the principle of non-discrimination, which forms 
the basis of the tariff provisions, will not be illusory, a special para-
graph 54 prohibits all other discrimination whereby preferences 
could be granted a given metropolitan country by any Overseas Ter-
ritory. Included in this prohibition are measures whereby duties are 
established on the basis of artificial distinctions between products 
to the end that a preferential tariff is established for goods from the 
metropolitan country. 55 
Not affected by the obligation to extend at least most-favored-
nation treatment to E.E.C. countries were those Overseas Terri-
tories which already had internationally established customs re-
gimes requiring non-discriminatory treatment and which therefore 
could not extend preferences to the metropolitan country. This was 
•• Cf. arts. 8 and 13. HANDBUCH IA 59, 15. 
63 
HANDBUCH IA 59, 16. Brazil, Ceylon, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the United Kingdom however 
consider the association a new preferential area which is contrary to Art. I of G.A.T.T: 
See G.A.T.T., Report of the Working Party on the Association of the Overseas 
Territories with the European Economic Community, Doc. L/8os/Rev. 1, par. 12, 
5 (1958). 
"'Art. 133(5). 
65 HANDBUCH IA 59, 18. 
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true of the United Nations trust-territories of Togo, Cameroons, 
Ruanda-Urundi, and Italian Somaliland.56 It was also true of all 
Overseas Territories situated in the Congo basin (the Belgian 
Congo and parts of French Equatorial Africa) which were covered 
by the Act of Berlin and subsequent international agreements. 57 In 
accordance with their international obligations, these Overseas Ter-
ritories applied non-discriminatory duties; 58 they were therefore 
not bound to make reductions since no preferences were extended to 
metropolitan countries. Consequently, only those Overseas Terri-
tories which actually accorded preferences to their metropolitan 
countries lowered their tariffs on January I, I 9 59, with respect to 
other E.E.C. countries by IO percent of the difference between the 
existing tariff and the preferential tariff.59 
Provision is also made for the possibility that association of the 
Overseas Territories may cause trade diversions ("diversions of 
commercial traffic"). In this case, a Member State adversely af-
fected may request the Commission to propose appropriate meas-
ures to the other Member States. As one commentator pointed out, 
this procedure may prove inadequate and consideration should 
therefore be given to application by .analogy of the provisions re-
lating to similar situations in the E.E.C.60 Under those provisions 
the Commission could authorize the Member State affected to take 
protective measures. 
No mention is made of the external duties of the Overseas Terri-
tories, that is, those on goods from third countries. There is no 
problem if the Overseas Territory is a member of a customs union 
to which the metropolitan country belongs. In this case the E.E.C. 
external tariff will apply.61 Absent such a customs union, territories, 
56 Cf. art. 76(d), U.N. CHARTER. 
"'BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, Vol. 76, 4 (r884-1885), and Vol. 82, 55 
(r88<)-I89o), and LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES, Vol. 8-9, 27 (1922). See 
also, Belgique, Ganga et Marchi Commun, 1958 BELGIQUE CoLONIAL ET CoMMERCE 
INTERNATIONAL 13 at 25 ff. 
58 E.g., in Cameroon, duties on most imports were 12% ad valorem in 1957 
plus a small turnover tax. Some capital goods were admitted free of duty. Bureau of 
Foreign Commerce, WTIS, Part 1, No. 57-63, 15. In the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi 
duties were also levied on an ad valorem basis ranging from complete exemption to 
so%, the average rate being 22%. Special provisions, often exemptions, applied to food-
stuffs, farm machinery and equipment, and raw materials for local industry. No 
customs surtaxes were levied with the exception of a statistical tax of o.os% ad valorem 
which was imposed on all imports and exports. Ibid., Part 2, No. 57-89, r. 
59 See Stohler, op. cit. supra note 26. 
60 Those would be the provisions of art. us, paras. r and 3· HANDBUCH lA 59, 19. 
61 HANDBUCH IA 59, 15. This would fall under art. r8 ff. 
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other than the French departments,62 remain free with respect 
to their external tariffs. Insofar as measures adopted by them cause 
diversion of trade the provision discussed in the preceding para-
graph becomes applicable. 
b. Effect of the Tariff Provisions 
If these tari If provisions are viewed in context, it becomes ap-
parent that the Overseas Territories enjoy a twofold benefit. The 
participation in the intra-European tariff reductions and eventual 
abolition of tariffs will open a larger market for raw materials 
supplied by the territories. Secondly, this position is strengthened 
by the protection the territories will enjoy by virtue of the E.E.C. 
external tariff on goods from third countries, some of them also 
suppliers of primary products.63 This effect is quite important, 
as some examples will show. The Six imported 41.6 percent of 
their cocoa requirements in I 9 54 from the Overseas Territories. 
While the previous tariffs will be reduced and eventually abolished 
with regard to the Overseas Territories, List F of the Treaty 
envisages a tariff of 9 percent on cocoa imported from third 
countries. A more striking example, and one with more far-reaching 
effects, is that of coffee. The Six imported only 27 percent of their 
coffee needs in I956 from the Overseas Territories,64 but envisage 
an external tariff of I 6 percent on coffee. So far, the Six have mainly 
imported the arabica variety of coffee from Brazil and Columbia. 
Since arabica can be mixed with the robusta variety for the produc-
tion of instant coffee, imports of robusta from the Overseas Terri-
tories will undoubtedly increase, especially in view of the fact that 
robusta will enjoy tariff reductions in the Six (while arabica is 
faced with a duty of I 6 percent). Robusta will therefore not only be 
cheaper but, at the same time, protected. 
A similar trade-diverting effect may occur with respect to ba-
nanas; 65 in I956 the Six imported only 2I percent (approximately) 
62 Art. 227; cf. Carstens, Die Errichtung des gemeinsamen Marktes in der Euro-
piiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Atomgemeinschaft, und Gemeinschaft fur Kohle 
und Stahl, 18 ZEITSCHRIIT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNO VoLKERRECHT 
+59 at 464 and n. 15, 16 (1958) • 
.. , See Bourcier de Carbon, supra note 40 at 285. 
"'The import figures for both coffee and cocoa were taken from Bourcier de Carbon, 
id., 294, n. II. In 1956, the coffee imports from the Overseas Territories amounted only 
to 21.1% of total coffee imports. U.N., supra note 27 at 7· Cf. also G.A.T.T. supra 
note 53, Report on Coffee, Doc. L/8o5/Add. 2. 
65 With regard to the trade-diverting effect of the Treaty on coffee and bananas, 
see Report of the G.A.T.T. Working Party on Tropical Products, Press Bulletin 
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of their banana requirements from the Overseas Territories, but 
propose an external tariff of 20 percent on bananas from third 
countries. 
These potentially dislocating effects on world trade of certain 
tropical products must, however, be viewed in the light of special 
provisions contained in two Protocols annexed to the Treaty. These 
Protocols reduce somewhat the dislocating effect of the Treaty 
provisions concerning coffee and bananas, although their inclusion 
was not primarily due to a desire to shield third countries from 
the effect of the Treaty; it was necessitated by the economic posi-
tion of several of the E.E.C. Member States.66 Germany had been 
importing large quantities of bananas duty-free from Ecuador, 
Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras. The Protocol 67 therefore 
provides that Germany will be entitled to continue to import duty-
free, until the end of the second stage of the transitional period, an 
amount equal to 90 percent of its 1956 imports of bananas less the 
amount imported from the Overseas Territories. At the end of 
the third stage, the duty-free quota will be decreased to 8o percent, 
and at the end of the transitional period to 7 5 percent. It can be 
augmented by 50 percent of the difference between the 1956 im-
ports and the increase in successive years, but will be 8o or 90 per-
cent of the imports of the years after 1956, if the 1956 level of 
imports is not attained. Similar provisions apply to imports of un-
roasted coffee into Italy and the Benelux countries.68 The effect of 
protection by the external tariff is also lessened by the right of the 
Member States to substitute non-discriminatory internal fiscal taxes 
for the reduced tariffs; such action by Germany with respect to 
coffee has already caused some concern in the Overseas Terri-
tories.69 
One result of these provisions is that serious changes in the exist-
EUROPE, No. 357 item 1956 and No. 359 item 1983, March 9 and 11, 1959. G.A.T.T., 
supra note 64, and Report on Bananas, Doc. L/8os/ Add. 4· 
66 Cf. Rey, L'Association des Territoires d'Outre-Mer au Marchi Commun, 1958 
REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 50 at 51• 
67 Protocol Concerning the Tariff Quota for Imports of Bananas (Ex o8.o1 of the 
Brussels Nomenclature). 
68 Protocol Concerning the Tariff Quota for Imports of Unroasted Coffee (Ex 09.01 
of the Brussels Nomenclature). 
•• Arts. 17(3) and 95· Cf. Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 331, item 1743, Feb. 5, 1959. 
Cf. Resolution of the European Assembly of Nov. 27, 1959, [1959] Journal Officiel des 
Communautes Europeennes (hereinafter cited as J.O.) 1267/59 at para. 9 (b), p. 
1268/59, in which the Assembly urges Member Governments to execute the "spirit" of 
the Treaty and to refrain from substituting internal charges and "obstacles" for the 
tariff reductions. 
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ing patterns of supply of coffee and bananas may not occur in the 
near future during which the high quotas of the Protocols apply. 
However, as the larger European market raises the general stand-
ard of living and results in increased consumption, the special quotas 
under the Protocols will steadily decrease to fixed levels. To the ex-
tent that the high E.E.C. external tariff makes it unprofitable for 
third countries to export to the E.E.C., much of the increase in con-
sumption could be satisfied by the Overseas Territories. 
c. Quotas 
The Treaty provisions relating to import quotas of the territories 
and to quotas applicable to their goods resemble the tariff provi-
sions, although their effect is different because there is no quota 
equivalent of the common external tariff of the Six. The provisions 70 
require Member States to apply the same quota increases to imports 
coming from the Overseas Territories as they apply to imports from 
other Member States. To the extent that present quotas of the 
Member States encompass imports both from an Overseas Terri-
tory and its metropolitan country, the percentage of the imports 
from the Overseas Territory has to be determined on the basis of 
import statistics. This will determine the quota of the Overseas 
Territory which will then be converted into a global quota and will 
follow the Treaty provisions as to annual increases.71 The obliga-
tion imposed on the Member States, however, does not preclude 
them from imposing such restrictions as are warranted by public 
morals, order, security, and health, or by the protection of national 
treasures or of commercial and industrial property.72 
These provisions ensure participation by the Overseas Territories 
in all intra-Community trade liberalization. The Overseas Terri-
tories, on the other hand, must "globalize" the quotas open to Mem-
ber States other than the metropolitan country and extend them to all 
Member States. As a result, any preferences which the metropolitan 
country enjoys continue in existence; yet the "global quota" open 
to the other Member States will eventually reach the same degree 
of liberalization because the Overseas Territories must increase the 
global quotas annually by the same percentages which apply to the 
liberalization among the Six, that is, an annual increase by 20 per-
cent of total value of the quotas, but no less than 10 percent for 
70 The provisions are found in arts. 9-14 of the Implementing Convention, annexed 
to the Treaty. 
71 Art. 12, Implementing Convention. 
•• Art. 13, Implementing Convention. 
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each product.73 Where a global quota would represent less than 7 
percent of a Territory's total imports of the product, a 7 percent 
quota must be established and increased according to the same 
scheme.74 In the cases where the Overseas Territories had hereto-
fore offered no quota, the Commission is to determine the size of 
the quotas as well as the scale of increases. 
With respect to these quota measures several points must be 
noted. In the first place, the obligation of the Overseas Territories 
to extend globalized quotas to the Member States is, like their obli-
gation in the tariff field, a relatively small burden. Quotas, like 
tariffs, are covered by the open-door policy of the Act of Berlin 
and of the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter; 
the Overseas Territories of the Congo Basin and the trust terri-
tories were therefore already required to accord non-disciminatory 
treatment to the Six. Theoretically, the quota provisions go further 
than the tariff provisions in that they not only require reduction of 
discriminatory treatment to the level of the advantages accorded 
the metropolitan country but envisage total abolition eventually. 
However, considering that tariffs may only be maintained as long 
as economically necessary, the end effect supposedly will be total 
abolition of barriers in both cases. 
Secondly, just as the tariff provisions leave the Overseas Terri-
tories free to determine their own external tariffs, so the Overseas 
Territories are unaffected by the commercial policy of the E.E.C.75 ; 
they are free to determine their own quotas with regard to third 
countries subject to the above-mentioned international obligations. 
There is an interesting-and unexplainable-difference between the 
provisions applicable to the departments on the one hand, and to 
the Overseas Territories on the other. The Overseas Territories 
continue to be free, from the point of view of the E.E.C. Treaty, 
to set their own external quotas and tariffs. Yet, while external 
73 Art. II, Implementing Convention, which refers expressly to the percentages of 
art. 33· Reference is also made to art. 32; its provisions-that no new more restrictive 
quotas may be imposed and that the objective is the total abolition of quotas by the 
end of the transitional period-are therefore also applicable to the Overseas Terri-
tories. 
"'A difficult question of interpretation has arisen. Since art. 11 of the Implementing 
Convention refers to art. 33 of the Treaty, the question arises whether the 7% of 
"total imports" (art. II (2)) shall replace or be added to a quota of 3% of national 
output. The Commission has taken the position that it is in addition to the 3% because 
of the express reference in art. 11. If the Overseas Territories are prejudiced thereby, 
they can levy protective tariffs under art. 133 (3). Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 339, 
item x8xo, Feb. x6, 1959· 
75 Arts. no ff. 
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E.E.C. tariffs apply immediately to Algeria and the departments,76 
the provisions concerning the E.E.C. common commercial policy 
apply only after the Council renders a decision by unanimous vote 
within two years after the entry into force of the Treaty.77 A third 
problemxesults from the fact that the level of economic development 
of the French Overseas Territories necessitates stabilization and sub-
sidy measures by France. A special protocol 7 ~ therefore authorizes 
continued export subsidies and import charges up to the level existing 
on January I, I 9 57. The Council and Commission rna y examine 
these systems periodically, and, if their lack of uniformity prejudices 
industry, may request France to take appropriate measures in the 
areas of raw materials, semi-finished products, and finished prod-
ucts. Member States may take safeguard measures, if France does 
not comply. Since the purpose of this Protocol is the maintenance of 
an equilibrium in the balance-of-payments of the franc zone, the 
Council may decide by a qualified majority vote that the system must 
be discontinued, if equilibrium is reached and monetary reserves are 
satisfactory. If no agreement can be reached, the Protocol-de-
viating from the usual procedure of the Treaty 79-envisages arbi-
tration by a mutually appointed arbitrator, or, in case of disagree-
ment, by an arbitrator appointed by the President of the Court of 
Justice. 
d. Problems of Third Country Preferences and 
Origin of Goods 
Two further problems are closely connected with each other. They 
arise because some of the Member States have special relations with 
countries which are independent and therefore could not be af-
fected by the Treaty. Although the customs union between France 
and Tunisia has terminated, 8° France accords trade preferences to, 
and enjoys preferences of, Tunisia as well as Morocco, Cam-
bodia, Laos, and the Condominion of the New Hebrides. Similarly, 
7° Cf. Carstens, supra note 62. 
77 Art. 227 (2 ). 
7
" Part I, Protocol Relating to Certain Provisions of Concern to France. Cf. also 
HANDBUCH DER MONTANUNION, A 2012, 24-26. 
79 The only other use of arbitration is found in art. 8 (4) of the Treaty with respect 
to the extensions of the stages of the transitional period. Otherwise arbitration of dif-
ferences among Member States concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaty is expressly precluded by art. 219, and the procedures of arts. 169 or 170 be-
come applicable. 
80 N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1959, 1 :r. 
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Italy grants preferences to Libya, and the Netherlands to the au-
tonomous parts of its Kingdom, Surinam, and the Antilles. These 
countries could not be included in the association, but Declarations 
of Intention invite those countries to negotiate for association. 
Negotiations have already started with TunisiaY An interim solu-
tion was therefore necessary with respect to products entering the 
metropolitan countries on a preferential basis. A special protocol 82 
therefore expressly declares the provision concerning libre pratique 
inapplicable to these imports. That provision 83 accords duty-free 
entry into a Member State to goods which have entered another 
Member State and have been subject there to imposition of duty and 
have not enjoyed any drawbacks of such duties or charges on leav-
ing this second state. Thus, the effect of the Protocol is that, because 
of preferences enjoyed by these products upon entry into the metro-
politan country, they cannot benefit from the removal of intra-
Community duties. 
Closely connected with this is the general problem of how to de-
termine whether a particular shipment of goods benefits from the 
Treaty reductions. In the Community, including Algeria and the 
overseas departments, a Certificate of Commercial Traffic (Waren-
verkehrsbescheinigung) must accompany all shipments.84 For trade 
with the Overseas Territories, Certificates of Origin must also ac-
company shipments; these will serve to certify both the fact that the 
shipment is entitled to benefit from the percentage reduction cur-
rently in effect and that the goods originated in the Community or the 
Overseas Territories. Since all Overseas Territories benefit from the 
intra-Community reductions, this certificate must accompany all 
shipments to the Community. On the other hand, it need only ac-
company Community shipments to the Overseas Territories where 
the Member States will benefit from the preferences extended by an 
Overseas Territory to its metropolitan country. Such a certificate 
must therefore accompany products exported to French West 
Africa, New Caledonia, St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the French 
Settlements in Oceania. Since the other Overseas Territories do not 
extend preferences to their metropolitan countries, other Member 
81 Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 416 item 2460, 23 May 1959. Indications are that 
Tunisia is not seeking association on the basis of the Declaration of Intention but 
rather under art. 238 of the Treaty. 
82 Protocol Relating to Goods Originating in and Coming from Certain Countries 
and Enjoying Special Treatment on Importation into One of the Member States. 
83 Art. 10 of the Treaty. 
"'2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 48 (1959). 
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States will not benefit from reductions, 85 and no certificates need 
accompany shipments to those Territories. 
e. Special Problems: Duration of the Association; 
Relation to the Coal-Steel and Euratom Treaties 
Two problems remain. One concerns the duration of the associ-
ation, the other the relation of the E.E.C. Treaty to that of the 
Coal-Steel Community and to that of the European Atomic Energy 
Community. 
While Article 227 extends the application of the Treaty, with 
modifications, to Algeria and the overseas departments-and thus 
for an unlimited time 86-, the association of the Overseas Terri-
tories is accomplished partly by means of provisions in the body of 
the Treaty and partly by means of the Implementing Convention. 
The latter expires five years after the entry into force of the Treaty 
(December 31, 1962).87 At that time, the Council must determine 
by unanimous vote the form of continued association. The Council 
may pass only on the form of association, however, and not on 
whether to continue it.88 The result of the two separate Treaty 
sources for association is that the provisions for reduction, and 
eventual abolition, of tariffs continue to be in force after five years 
since they are contained in the main body of the Treaty, while the 
quota increases will freeze at the point of liberalization reached 
by the fifth year, pending extension by the Council.89 The reason 
for the difference in treatment was probably the desire to evaluate 
the political impact of the association before entering into a long-
range commitment. Nevertheless, it would seem that, except for 
slight or non-existent quotas whose liberalization starts at a low 
level, the annual liberalization of quotas according to the "zo per-
cent-of-total-imports-ro percent-minimum-per-product" scheme 
will have reached substantial enough proportions at the end of the 
fifth year to make continued liberalization of tariffs meaningful. 
The second problem concerns the effect of the association on coal 
and steel products and products covered by the Euratom Treaty. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Art. 240. 
87 Art. 17, Implementing Convention, art. 136 Treaty. 
88 
HANDBUCH lA 59, 22. The Council must take into account the principles of arts. 
131 and 132. 
'"Cf. art. 14, Implementing Convention; HANDBUCH IA 59, 21. 
670 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
Coal and steel products 90 are subject to the Coal-Steel Treaty 91 
which only applies to the European territories of the Member 
States.92 The E.E.C. Treaty, moreover, expressly provides that its 
provisions shall not "modify" those of the Coal-Steel Treaty.93 
A protocol promises future negotiation on the extension of the 
Coal-Steel Treaty to the overseas departments. 94 The problem 
therefore arises: to what extent do the movement-of-goods provi-
sions of the association also apply to coal and steel products? In 
the first place it is necessary to emphasize again that the problem 
exists only with respect to coal and steel products as defined by that 
Treaty; thus tin, of which the Belgian Congo supplied 9 percent 
of world exports at last report, is not covered by the Coal-Steel 
Treaty and can, therefore, be considered to be covered by the move-
ment-of-goods provisions of the E.E.C. Treaty. On the other hand, 
tin-plate is covered by the Coal-Steel Treaty. It is with respect to 
such products that the problem exists. 
The relation of the Coal-Steel Treaty to the E.E.C. Treaty is 
that of a special law to a generallaw.95 To the extent that the Mem-
ber States retained powers in regard to products covered by the 
Coal-Steel Treaty after the establishment of the Coal-Steel Com-
munity, they were free to delegate them in a new treaty. The gen-
eral assumption must be, then, that because of the comprehensive 
scope of the E.E.C. Treaty the residual powers remaining with the 
Member States under the Coal-Steel Treaty were delegated by them 
under the new treaty. A case-by-case analysis must determine 
whether: ( 1) such residual powers exist under the Coal-Steel 
Treaty, and ( 2) whether their coverage by the E.E.C. Treaty is 
precluded by an express reservation in that Treaty, or (3) whether 
their coverage by the E.E.C. Treaty would prejudice the Coal-Steel 
Treaty.96 For instance, the question arises whether the E.E.C. ex-
00 Listed in Annex x, as qualified by Annexes II-III of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. 
91 Art. Sx, E.C.S.C. Treaty. 
92 Art. 79, E.C.S.C. Treaty. Paragraph 2 of that Article obligates Member States to 
extend to each other any preferential treatment which they enjoy in their Overseas 
Territories. This provision is immaterial for our purposes since we are here concerned 
with movement of such products from the Overseas Territories to the Six. 
•• Art. 232. Author's translation from the German, since the English term used in 
the extant translation seems inadequate . 
.. Protocol Relating to the Treatment to be Applied to Products within the Compe-
tence of the European Coal and Steel Community in Respect of Algeria and the Over-
seas Departments of the French Republic . 
.. Carstens, supra note 62 at 462. 
96 As Carstens, ibid., 465-466, observes, the Protocol, supra note 94, does not change 
this. It is merely an expression of the willingness to negotiate an agreement which 
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ternal tariff applies to coal and steel products, given the fact that 
the Coal-Steel Treaty does not make provision for an external tariff. 
Since coal and steel products have been expressly excluded by the 
E.E.C. Treaty, 97 the conclusion must be, however, that the external 
tariff does not apply to coal and steel products in Algeria and the 
departments-the only territories where the E.E.C. external tariff 
applies at all. Similarly, the reduction and abolition of internal trade 
barriers between the Community and the territories, including the 
departments, does not apply to coal and steel products. Although 
this conclusion is not based on a Treaty provision expressly dealing 
with the problem, it is plainly justified since an extension of the reach 
of the E.E.C. Treaty to include coal and steel products would consti-
tute a substantial change in the Coal-Steel Treaty, and would thereby 
violate Article 232 of the E.E.C. Treaty. 
For practical purposes, then, the E.E.C. provisions on movement 
of goods in the territories do not apply to coal and steel products. 
The theoretical conclusion that it is at least conceivable that the 
two treaties complement each other, is significant, however, in re-
gard to two contingencies. 
The tariff provisions, and the quota provisions upon extension 
by the Council, share the E.E.C. Treaty's unlimited duration. In 
contrast the Coal-Steel Treaty is limited to so years (that is, it ex-
pires in the year 2002) .98 If the Coal-Steel Treaty should expire at 
that time, the prohibition of Article 232 of the E.E.C. Treaty would 
become superfluous; absent a lex specialis, the E.E.C. provisions 
would apply.99 Secondly, it has been suggested that Coal-Steel Com-
munity commercial policy will to a large extent become part of 
E.E.C. commercial policy.100 This results from the Coal-Steel 
Treaty provision that the Member States remain responsible for 
this policy except where the Treaty provides otherwise.101 While 
the Coal-Steel Treaty in fact regulates some details of commercial 
policy, no provision comparable to the E.E.C. Treaty chapter on 
commercial policy exists. When the E.E.C. institutions assume re-
sponsibility for the commercial policy of the Community-and that 
would eliminate the "problems." Up to that time, the effects of the Treaties on each 
other must be determined in accordance with what they themselves provide. 
97 Annex I, E.E.C. Treaty: List B, position 26.01; List C, positions 7307, 731o-7313, 
and 7315. 
08 Art. 97, E.C.S.C. Treaty. 
119 Carstens, supra note 62 at 463. 
100 Ibid., szo-szz. 
101 Art. 71, E. C. S.C. Treaty. 
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of Algeria and the overseas departments 102 at the end of the transi-
tional period,103 this commercial policy will include, therefore, that 
residual competence of the Member States with respect to coal and 
steel products in the departments. The Council and Commission can 
then conclude agreements with third countries affecting coal and 
steel, after consultation with the High Authority.104 
The Euratom Treaty-also, in relation to the E.E.C. Treaty, 
lex specialis 105-applies fully to all "non-European territories un-
der the jurisdiction of a Member State." 106 It thus applies to some 
very important products of the Overseas Territories, such as ura-
nium.107 To the extent that they are to be used for nuclear pur-
poses, other products, such as aluminum and manganese/08 may 
also be subject to the Euratom Treaty. In the latter case it must be 
noted that the E.E.C. Treaty is applicable until a determination is 
made that the products are intended for nuclear purposes. 
In contrast to the manner of association under the E.E.C. Treaty, 
the Euratom Treaty contains few special rules applicable only to 
the territories. This difference between the Euratom and E.E.C. 
Treaties is probably accounted for by the fact that fewer protective 
and transitional measures are necessary to integrate incipient 
atomic industries than to achieve a common market in all sectors 
of the economy. This is illustrated by the Euratom provision allow-
ing the Overseas Territories to continue to levy revenue tariffs on 
imports from the Six.109 A counterpart of the far-reaching E.E.C. 
provision 110 allowing the territories also to impose protective tariffs 
is, however, lacking in the Euratom provision. 
2. OTHER PROVISIONS: AGRICULTURE, RIGHT OF 
ESTABLISHMENT, LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICES, AND 
FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS 
a. Agriculture 
For purposes of trade among theM ember States, the Treaty con-
tains two groups of provisions concerning agriculture. First, agri-
102 Cf. art. 227 which provides that the Council must decide within two years the 
mode of application of, inter alia, the commercial policy provisions. 
103 Cf. arts. uo and II3. 
1
"" Arts. II3 and 114, E.E.C. Treaty; art. 75, E.C.S.C. Treaty. 
100 Art. 232(2), E.E.C. Treaty. 
106 Art. 198, Euratom Treaty. 
107 Annex IV, List A' Euratom Treaty. 
108 Annex IV, List B Euratom Treaty. 
109 Art. 93, Euratom Treaty. 
110 Art. 133(3), E.E.C. Treaty. 
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cultural products are included in the general movement-of-goods 
provisions; and second, a special part of the Treaty, applying to 
agricultural products specified in Annex II of the Treaty, provides 
for a common agricultural policy. This common policy is to be based 
on a common organization which will differ from product to product 
and might take the form of common rules of competition, or of 
compulsory coordination of the various existing national market 
organizations, or even of a single "European" market organization 
for the particular product. Any one of these forms may comprise 
price controls, production and marketing subsidies, stockpiling and 
other arrangements, as well as special loan and guarantee funds. 
Proposals for a common policy are under consideration by the in-
stitutions of the Community. While agricultural products are also 
included in the movement-of-goods provisions relating to the over-
seas departments and Overseas Territories the question is whether 
the special chapter on a common agricultural policy applies to them 
also. The Treaty gives an affirmative answer with regard to Algeria 
and the overseas departments, excluding only the provision concern-
ing the agricultural funds and organizations mentioned above.111 The 
provisions governing the association with the Overseas Territories 
do not mention the chapter; since the association extends only to mat-
ters expressly mentioned, 112 the application of that chapter is there-
fore precluded. Exclusion of the Overseas Territories from the com-
mon agricultural policy does not mean, however, that they cannot 
be affected by it. This is true because the provisions of the special 
chapter on common agricultural policy apply to the products speci-
fied in Annex II (including, for example, coffee, cocoa, cane sugar) 
rather than to a particular geographic area. 113 Measures taken, for 
instance, by a European marketing organization 114 or by the Mem-
ber States (such as the invocation of the safeguard clause permit-
ting, for the duration of the transitional period, the temporary sus-
pension of imports or the fixing of minimum prices on imports) 115 
may therefore affect the Overseas Territories. 
b. The Right of Establishment 116 
The right of companies and nationals of the Member States to 
establish themselves in the Overseas Territories and overseas de-
111 Art. 227. 
1
"' See language in art. 227 ( 3). 
113 Art. 38(3). Rey, supra note 66 at 52. 
114 Art. 40(2) (c). 
115 Art. 44( r). 
116 See generally, Lussan, Le Droit d'Etablissrment des Ressortissants et Societes 
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partments and vice-versa is treated in three different provisions. 
The right of establishment of nationals of the Member States in 
Algeria, the overseas departments, and Overseas Territories 117 is 
regulated by a provision in the Implementing Convention.118 It pro-
vides that the Council, acting by qualified majority vote 119 on a 
proposal of the Commission, must determine the particulars of an 
extension of the right within one year from the entry into force of 
the Convention (January I, I 9 58). The rna terial content of the 
right of establishment will be determined by the general chapter on 
the right of establishment in the Member States (Articles 52-
58); 120 it is limited, however, to an abolition of discrimination 
between the right of establishment enjoyed by nationals of the metro-
politan country of the department or Overseas Territory in that 
department or Overseas Territory and the right of establishment 
enjoyed by nationals of other Member States.121 The Council took 
the required action by issuing a Directive in November I959.121a 
One difficult question of interpretation is whether the right of estab-
lishment also includes the right of investment of capital necessary 
for establishment. A possible view is that, since the provision 
dealing with the right of establishment in the departments and 
Overseas Territories 122 refers as to substance to the general right-
of-establishment provision (Article 52) which in turn expressly 
excludes matters dealt with in the chapter concerning free move-
ment of capital, the right to invest is not included in the right 
to establish. Moreover, the free-movement-of-capital provisions 
may be extended to Algeria and the departments by the Council 
under Article 227,123 although no such provision exists with regard 
to the Overseas Territories. These facts suggest that no Treaty 
right to invest capital in the Overseas Territories exists and that 
the right of establishment could be virtually meaningless. It has 
therefore been suggested that the limitation of Article 52 should 
d'Outre-Mer dans Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, I959 REVUE nu MARCHE 
COMMUN 226; Brunner, Das Niederlassungsrecht in den assoziierten iiberseeischen 
Liindern und H oheitsgebieten, 2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 254 ( I959). 
117 Cf. Art. I6, Implementing Convention. 
118 Art. 8, Implementing Convention. 
119 Cf. Art. I48, para. 2. 
120 Art. I32(5). KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, VON DER GROEBEN AND VON 
BoECKH, editors, 2 vols. (I958) (hereinafter cited as KOMMENTAR) vol. I, 550. 
121 KoMMENTAR Vol. I, 55 I. 
121
" [I96o] J.O. I47· The Directive envisions extension of the right of establishment 
by stages according to the type of activity involved. 
122 Art. I32(5). 
123 This was done by decision of the Council, [I96o] J.O. 9I9-20. 
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not be applied to the right-of-establishment provision relating to 
the Overseas Territories and that the provision should be inter-
preted extensively to include the right to invest capital as a necessary 
concomitant to the right of establishment. 124 
The right of establishment of nationals of the Overseas Terri-
tories in Member States is not as explicitly regulated as the right of 
nationals of the Member States to establish in the Overseas Terri-
tories, and is also different from that of nationals of the depart-
ments. Article I32(5) of the Treaty provides only that 
In relations between Member States and ... the Terri-
tories, the right of establishment . . . shall be regulated 
in accordance with the provisions ... in the Chapter re-
lating to the right of establishment [Articles 52-58] .... 
The absence of a specific provision like that concerning the right of 
nationals of the Member States to establish themselves in the Over-
seas Territories has led some to conclude that no right of establish-
ment in the Member States is given to nationals of the Overseas 
Territories.125 Another possible interpretation is that as long as 
no special provision is made, the general provision of Article 
I 3 2 ( 5) applies, so that the intra-Community right of establishment 
as provided by Articles 52-58 extends to nationals of the Overseas 
Territories.126 Furthermore, it has been argued, that a right of es-
tablishment in the Member States could accrue to nationals of the 
Overseas Territories under Article 52 of the Treaty because na-
tionals of the French Territories have French citizenship and thus 
satisfy the nationality requirements of Articles 52 and 58.127 The 
latter interpretation is preferable to one denying a right of estab-
lishment of nationals of the Overseas Territories, since the object 
of the association is the furthering of the interests of the Overseas 
Territories 128 and since the policy of Article I 3 2 ( 5) seems clearly 
to indicate that reciprocity was desired in matters relating to the 
right of establishment. 
The right of establishment of nationals of Algeria and the de-
partments in the Member States, finally, is left open by the Treaty. 
Like all other matters not expressly mentioned in Article 227 ( 2), 
'"' KoMMENTAR Vol. I, 550. 
125 Cf. Lussan, supra note u6 at 227. 
128 /bid. 228, 229; KOMMENTAR Vol. I, 489. 
127 Lussan supra note u6 at 228-232. Cf., however, the impact of independence of 
many Territories on this argument. 
128 Arts. lH, paras. 2-3 and the Preamble. 
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its extension to the departments was to have been affected by the 
Council before January I, 1960. 
c. Free Movement of Workers 
This area is again left to further implementing action by the 
Council In the cases of Algeria and the overseas departments. 
In the case of the Overseas Territories, the Member States have 
only affirmed a desire that free movement of workers be achieved.129 
In contrast to the procedure envisaged for the departments, imple-
mentation will not be effected by a Community institution but by 
means of international conventions. Since bilateral conventions 
could seriously affect non-participating Member States, every con-
vention requires unanimous agreement of all Member States.130 
d. Freedom to Perform Services and Other Provisions 
The Treaty's provisions concerning services, rules of competition, 
and institutions are immediately applicable to Algeria and the over-
seas departments; all other provisions become applicable in the de-
partments upon decision of the Council. 131 None of these provisions, 
with the exception of some financial provisions to be mentioned later, 
are applicable to the Overseas Territories nor is their extension en-
visaged for a later time. This difference in treatment is explainable 
by the fact that the overseas departments, belonging structurally 
to the metropolitan country, are to become part of the Community 
subject only to those modifications which their particular economic 
situations necessitate. In contrast, association alone is envisaged be-
tween the Community and the Overseas Territories. Since the main 
aim of this association is to raise the level of economic development 
in the Overseas Territories, the trade provisions are supplemented 
by special provisions, including those noted earlier and particularly 
those concerning financial assistance to be discussed presently. Since 
this system of association is limited to five years, a closer associa-
tion is possible thereafter. However, even if a closer association 
should come about, the Treaty drafters were careful to indicate that 
it is the economic interest of the Territories which will primarily 
determine its form.132 
129 Art. 135. 
180 
HANDBUCH IA 59, 19-21. 
=Art. 227(2). Cf. also note 123 and preceding text. 
132 See the implied reference in art. 136, para. 2 to the principles of arts. 131 and 132. 
Cf. HANDBUCH IA 59. 22. 
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3· FINANCIAL PROVISIONS 
The two main reasons why France pressed for inclusion of the 
territories were her desire to avoid membership in two competing 
systems of trade preferences and her belief that she could not ex-
tend trade concessions to her European partners without receiving 
their assistance in financing economic development in the territories. 
The establishment of the Development Fund 133 was the response to 
France's position on the second point. Demands by France and Bel-
gium that the expenses of the territories be shared by the Member 
States on a pro rata basis of national income were rejected early in 
the negotiations by the other four. Similarly, it was made clear that 
any assistance given should not serve to finance "sovereignty ex-
penses" (police, administration, defense) of the powers directly in-
volved. Thirdly-and as a further safeguard against too direct in-
volvement-Germany demanded that any assistance given by a de-
velopment fund to which she would contribute should only be given 
on a project-by-project basis, and that approval of local authorities 
in the territories would be required for every project. 134 
Established along these lines, the Development Fund provides 
for a total contribution of $58 I ,2 50,000 by the Member States, of 
which Germany and France will contribute $200 million each. 
Throughout its duration (geared to the five-year duration of the 
Implementing Convention) France will be the major beneficiary, 
receiving $5 II, 2 50,000 for her affiliated territories. The projects 
to be financed fall into two categories: "economic," including "pro-
ductive and specific development projects," and "social," such as 
schools, hospitals and the prevention of soil erosion. 135 Each year 
the Council must determine by q~alified majority vote, after con-
sulting the Commission, what proportions of the amounts available 
for the year are to be allocated to the two categories.136 In 1958 
two-thirds of the available $58 million were allocated to social, and 
one-third to economic, projects.137 In 1959 the Council changed the 
133 Arts. 1-7, Implementing Convention. 
""Germany, Bundesrat, Niederschrift iiber die Sitzung des Sonderausschusses 
"Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom" vom 24. April I957, 36, 42-43. 
186 Art. 3 Implementing Convention; See generally, Wirsing, Politik und A rbeitsweise 
des Entwicklungsfonds, 2 EuRoPXISCHE \VIRTSCHAFT 229 (1959). The types of projects 
are defined in more detail in Commission Regulation No. 7, [1959) J.O. 241/ 59· 
186 
Art. 4, Implementing Convention. Annex B to the Convention sets out the amounts 
available to each metropolitan country for its territories in each of the five years of 
the association. 
,., Wirsing, supra note I 35 at 233· 
678 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
percentage allocation to allow 25-30 percent of the available funds 
to be used for social investments while 70-7 5 percent were to be 
used for economic projects.138 The qualified majority vote is based 
upon a special weighing of votes according to the size of contribu-
tion to the Fund. Thus, France and Germany, as the two largest 
contributors, command 33 votes each, Italy, Belgium, and the N eth-
er lands 1 I each, and Luxembourg I. The qualified majority neces-
sary for a decision constitutes 67 out of the 100 possible votesY9 
The country with the strongest political misgivings about the asso-
ciation, Germany, can easily prevent a vote with the support of only 
one like-minded state such as Luxembourg or the Netherlands, while 
only the votes of France, Germany, and Luxembourg are needed to 
adopt any measure.140 
After the Council has established the yearly quotas, the Com-
mission may consider project proposals which have been drawn up 
by the competent authority in the Member State together with the 
local authorities in the territories.141 The Commission may then ap-
prove "social projects." "Economic projects" must be communicated 
to the Council which may pass on them within two months by quali-
fied majority vote; if no Member State has requested the Council to 
consider the project proposal within one month, the projects are re-
garded as approved.142 In fact, several projects have already been 
approved. Among them are social and economic projects for the 
former Belgian Congo and for Ruanda-Urundi and economic proj-
ects for the disaster-stricken Malagasy Republic (formerly Mada-
gascar) .143 Participation in the work on these projects is open to 
all nationals and companies of the Member States without dis-
crimination.144 
The provisions of the Development Fund apply both to the Over-
seas Territories and to the departments.145 However, the head of 
the French delegation declared that his government intended to 
make project applications only for the Overseas Territories and not 
"'"Press Bulletin EuROPE, No. 471, item 2909, July 27, 1959· 
139 Art. 7, Implementing Convention. 
140 The qualified majority feature was also included on German insistence. Bundesrat, 
supra note 134 at 43· 
141 Art. 2, Implementing Convention. 
142 Art. 5, Implementing Convention. 
143 Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 340, item 2142, April 7, 1959; No. 388, item 2197, April 
16, 1959; and No. 408, item 2386, May 13, 1959. Cf. also, Wirsing, supra note 135 at 
234· Cf. Genehmigte Projekte des EWG-Entwicklungsfonds, 3 EUROPAISCHE WIRT-
SCHAFT 206 ( 1960). 
144 Art. 132 (4). 
115 Art. 16, Implementing Convention. 
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for the departments.146 It is also the understanding that the as-
sistance of the Fund shall not replace, but shall be complementary 
to, the assistance rendered by the metropolitan countries. 147 
As important as the Fund is for the economic development of the 
Overseas Territories, it leaves many questions unanswered. If one 
agrees with the basic political objective-that the Overseas Terri-
tories should be freed from economic dependence and should be 
assisted in achieving a level of economic development which would 
enable them both to maintain independence and to associate them-
selves with the Community as partners 148-the provisions of the 
Treaty concerning investment appear to be merely a preliminary 
step and, as such, insufficient. Early in 1959 the Commission had 
already received approximately 200 official project applications and 
was unofficially informed of several more.149 Moreover, the De-
velopment Fund, by its nature, provides funds only for public in-
vestment. It is not designed either to facilitate private investment 
or to provide funds for it. The Treaty's provisions for the free 
movement of capital have been made applicable to the departments 
(Article 227), but are not applicable to the Overseas Territories 
unless an extensive interpretation of the right of establishment 
provisions incorporates them. The same is true of the provision 150 
envisaging non-discriminatory treatment of nationals of other 
Member States in matters of financial participation in national 
companies. The provisions of the European Investment Bank, de-
signed to help finance private investments, are applicable only to 
the European territories of the Member States and therefore ex-
clude both the departments and the Overseas Territories. Excep-
tions are possible but require unanimous agreement of the Member 
States represented on the Bank's Board of Governors. 151 Some use-
146 Cf. France, Assemblee Nationale, Rapport Fait au Nom de Ia Commission des 
Affaires Etrangeres ... , No. 5266 (I957), I04. 
141 Cf. art. I, Implementing Convention which, however, is not quite clear on this 
point. This is, however, the understanding in Germany and Luxembourg. Cf. Bundesrat, 
supra note I34 at 43, and Erlduterungen der Bundesregierung, supra note 43, comment 
to art. I of Implementing Convention; Luxembourg, Chambre des Deputes, Pro jets de 
loi portant approbation du Traite instituant Ia C.E.E . ... , expose des motifs, (Nos. 
636', 637', 638',-I956-I957), 28. 
A further function of the Council included the establishment of rules for the transfer 
of contributions to, and the budgeting and administration of, funds of the Development 
Fund. Art. 6, Implementing Convention. Two regulations have already been issued. 
Regulation No. 5, [I958] J.O. 68I/58 and Provisional Regulation No. 6, id., 686/58. 
148 Cf. Luxembourg, Chambre des Deputes, Rapport de Ia Commission Speciale sur 
les Aspects Economiques et Sociaux du Traite, No. 6375C (I956-57), I5-I6. 
""Wirsing, supra note I35 at 233. 
150 Art. 221. 
151 Art. I8(I) Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank. 
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ful suggestions have already been made as to how this situation 
may be remedied.152 One category of suggestions concerns possible 
changes in territorial legislation and practice. Among them one, for 
instance, calls for abolition of discrimination against foreign ma-
jority interests by the substitution of a system of guarantees to be 
given by the companies to local authorities insuring to all a local 
supply of raw materials.153 Along the same lines it has been sug-
gested that International Charter Companies should be created, 
that is, companies constituted according to multilateral international 
conventions between the metropolitan country and third countries.154 
Another category of suggestions aims at changes in the Treaty and 
its policy of association. These suggestions are directed mainly at an 
expansion of the functions of the European Investment Bank (for 
instance, by eliminating the territorial limitation), and at the crea-
tion of a European Finance Company for investments in the Over-
seas Territories.155 Yet another category of suggestions goes beyond 
the investment needs of the territories under examination here. For 
example, it has been suggested that the Community investigate the 
possibilities of establishing a financial assistance program for un-
derdeveloped areas bordering on the associated territories in order 
to prevent assistance given the associated territories from resulting 
in undesirable political and psychological reactions in those areas.156 
All of these proposals emanate from the same important realization 
that only intelligent, generous and widely ranging assistance to the 
underdeveloped areas can create a true partnership. 
While any of these proposals would be a step in the right direc-
tion, the problem is actually much larger. The availability of in-
vestment funds-by itself a problem 157-is of little value if un-
accompanied by adequate provisions removing discrimination 
against foreign majority interests for example. 
An additional problem is posed by the variations in risk insur-
152 Cf. also Resolution of the European Assembly of Nov. 27, 1959, para. 8, [ 1959] 
].0. 1267/59 at 1268 j 59· 
153 DE LA TIRE, op. cit. JUpra note 8, 70 and 91 ff. 
'"'Ibid. 
105 These proposals were made by the Belgian Committee of the European League 
for Economic Cooperation. They were reported by Press Bulletin EUROPE, No. 409, 
item 2396, May 14, 1959-
156 Wirsing, supra note 135 at 234• 
157 Frisch indicates in SociETE o':ihuoEs ET DE DocUMENTATIONS EcONOMIQUES, IN-
DUSTRIELLES ET SocrALES, No. 683 ( 1957} that German industrialists are interested in 
principle in investing in Africa, but lack the necessary capital. The high level of Ger-
man investment is achieved primarily by self-financing, leaving little for outside (e.g. 
African) projects. 
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ance of export financing. Illustratively, a German exporter is re-
quired by government regulation to assume 30 percent of the 
risk in cases of economically conditioned losses and 20 percent of 
politically conditioned losses. The latter category includes the stop-
page of foreign currency transfers imposed by the debtor country. 
In contrast, the risk assumed for losses caused by inability to con-
vert currencies or by restrictions on the transfer of capital is only 5 
percent for Dutch exporters, I o percent for French, and I 5 percent 
for Belgian and Italian exporters. The effect of these variations-
and the inadequacy of the insurance in some respects-is that capi-
tal goods necessitating long-term financing may not be readily avail-
able for underdeveloped areas and that Belgian, German, and Italian 
exporters are at a considerable competitive disadvantage compared 
with other suppliers of the underdeveloped countries. 158 As the 
association of the territories becomes a reality, such problems will 
become more pressing. 
IV. EFFECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE ASSOCIATION 
No discussion of the territories can ignore at least three of the 
major problems which association with the E.E.C. creates. The first 
of these results from the fact that so many of the territories have, 
or will have, attained independence since the Treaty was signed in 
March I957· In a somewhat larger setting, the relationship of the 
territories to the other territories in the proposed Free Trade Area 
deserves mention. Finally, the objections raised by third countries, 
mainly the South American and Asian producers of tropical fruit, 
must be considered. 
A. FUTURE AssOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES 
The following countries must be mentioned under this heading, 
all of which give rise to substantially the same problem: (I) the 
African trusteeship territories which have gained independence, for 
example, Togo (which on April 27, I96o, became the Republic of 
Togoland) and Italian Somaliland (since July I, I96o, a part of 
the Republic of Somalia) ; ( 2) Guinea, originally covered by the 
provisions relating to French West Africa, but which has now be-
168 Cf. Anspach, Die Finanzierung der Ausfuhr in die Entwicklungsldnder, 2 
EUROPA!SCHE WIRTSCHAFT 235 ff. (1959). Cf. also, Reuss, Die Rentabi/itiit wirtschaft-
ficher Unternehmen in Ent•uJicklungsldndern, id., at 258 If. 
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come independent. Although some maintain that Guinea continues 
to be covered by the Treaty/59 it seems probable that a new associ-
ation would have to be negotiated; (3) the Republic of the Congo 
(formerly the Belgian Congo) which became independent on July I, 
I96o; (4) the three republics of the Union of Central African Re-
publics and the four of the Council of the Entente plus Gabon and 
Mauritania all of which are, or soon will be, independent; ( 5) inde-
pendent countries like Tunisia, which were invited by "Declarations 
of Intention" to associate with the E.E.C. 
Having become sovereign nations, the countries of the first four 
groups indicated above will probably no longer be bound by the 
Treaty. No provision in the Treaty envisions the situation of these 
countries, and the Member States are not in agreement as to the 
attitude to be adopted. The Community is inclined to follow a prag-
matic approach and to maintain the status quo ante until a new re-
gime of association can be elaborated. On the other hand, none of 
the Territories have apparently rejected the principle of association, 
while several have clearly and publicly indicated favorable posi-
tions.159a Where it will be necessary to negotiate or renegotiate an 
association,160 obvious problems arise. For instance, to what extent 
are the provisions of the Development Fund to apply, and to what 
extent does the inclusion of the products of these independent coun-
tries necessitate a re-examination of E.E.C. internal policy, for in-
stance agricultural policy, and of E.E.C. external policy, for instance 
the common external tariff? More importantly, to what extent does 
the association of independent areas necessitate a change in the 
institutional structure of the E.E.C.? This point was raised as early 
as I 9 57 in the Belgian Parliament.161 The type and extent of these 
institutional changes will depend on the form of association. An 
association-for instance a free trade area between the E.E.C. and 
these areas-may be characterized by no institutional changes in 
the E.E.C.; any problems could be handled on an international 
inter-institutional level. On the other hand, if the association takes 
159 Metzger, Probefall: Guinea-Assoziiet·unq auch nach Erlanqunq der Souveriinitiit, 
2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 255 ff. (1959). 
159
• XXX., La C.E.E. et les nouveaux Etats independants d'Afrique, 1960 REVUE 
DU MARCHE CoMMUN 253· Cf., also, Dale, New Nations Pose Trade Question, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. II, 1960, 8 :2. 
160 Preliminary contacts with Italian Somaliland have already been made. Press Bul-
letin EuROPE No. 484, item 2987, Aug. 26, 1959. Cf. also Resolution of the European 
Assembly of Nov. 27, 1959, paras. 4-6, [1959] ].0. 1267/59 at 1268/59· 
161 Speech by Mr. Scheyven, Chambre des Representants, Annates, Session of Nov. 
14, 1957. 7· 
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the form of adhesion 162 to the E.E.C. Treaty some changes may be 
necessary. It would seem that representatives from these areas 
would have to be seated in the European Parliamentary Assembly 
(no longer being members of the contingent of the metropolitan 
country) 163 and would have to participate in the work of the execu-
tive bodies of the Community. The latter would involve, for in-
stance, a difficult re-examination of all provisions relating to 
weighted voting. 
B. PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
PROPOSED FREE TRADE AREA 
The foregoing problems would, of course, be multiplied if the 
E.E.C. should become a part of a larger free trade area. Such an 
arrangement would presumably increase agricultural competition, 
due to the inclusion of European countries like Denmark and of 
overseas areas such as the British possessions in Africa. For instance, 
it is reported that under the present scheme of association of the 
Overseas Territories there exists a certain equilibrium in the produc-
tion and consumption of coffee in the E.E.C.; in the case of a free 
trade area there may be an excess of Ioo,ooo tons. With respect to 
cocoa, a deficit of 6 5 ,ooo tons exists presently within the E.E.C., but 
a free trade area may bring an excess of 70,000 tons.164 
Other difficulties lie in the area of investments and French trade. 
It is doubtful for instance, that the countries of a free trade area 
would be able (in the case of Switzerland because of its neutrality) 
or willing (in the case of the United Kingdom, because of her own 
overseas commitments) to participate in the financing of the devel-
opment of the E.E.C. Overseas Territories to the extent that in-
creased competition would require. Yet, if they do not, some doubt 
that France could commit herself to accept the burdens of a free 
169 The difference is mainly one of associating such an area under art. 238 or allowing 
it to adhere in a form analogous to art. 237. The latter provides only for adhesion 
by any European State. Yet, the extension of the Treaty to Algeria and the over-
seas departments of France, by art. 227 of the Treaty, is one case where the territorial 
principle is not followed. Institutional changes due to adhesion would thus become 
probable if any of the departments should gain independence but desire to maintain 
their present status in relation to the E.E.C. 
163 In 1959 the French contingent included three representatives from Algeria. Press 
Bulletin EUROPE, No. 376 Supp., April 2, 1959. For the structure and work of the As-
sembly, see Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of Emerging 
"Political Control," 13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 233 ff. (1959). 
'"'Representative Raingeard, Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne, Compte rendu 
stfno{lraphique provisoire, June 25, 1958, 9 (2d part), 162-163. 
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trade area in addition to those which her territories create.165 Fi-
nally, as M. Diori, former overseas representative in the European 
Parliamentary Assembly, pointed out, any compromise with re-
spect to the above problems has to give first priority to the political 
significance of the association of the E.E.C. territories. The Six 
have a political responsibility to support the economic, social, and 
political development of Africa and to further cooperation between 
Europe and Africa. This responsibility should not be ignored, how-
ever difficult it renders any mutually satisfactory solution to the 
free trade area problem.166 
c. THE OBJECTIONS OF THIRD COUNTRIES 
Serious objections to the association of the territories were raised 
by Latin American and Asian countries, all of which are to a large 
extent suppliers of primary products and therefore most directly 
affected by the preference extended to the territories by the E.E.C. 
Objections were also raised by Britain and Portugal because of the 
disadvantageous position in which exports from their African ter-
ritories have been placed.167 Latin America exported 35·3 percent 
of its total coffee exports to Europe in 1954-1955·168 A study of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America in-
dicates gradual gains of African products in the E.E.C. market and 
comparable Latin American losses. The impact of the E.E.C. Treaty 
may accelerate this trend with a resulting weakening of interna-
tional prices for Latin American commodities due to the character-
istic inelasticity of demand for foodstuffs and tropical products,' with 
a corresponding adverse effect on Latin American terms of trade.169 
The most recent report of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East shows the possible effect of the 
Treaty on those regions. Thus, Indonesia exports 43 percent of its 
total coffee exports to the Six; and 44 percent of the total tea exports 
of the Far East go to the Community. The Far East would also be 
affected with regard to its sugar, tobacco, and vegetable oil exports. 
165 Ibid. I6I, I64-
166 Ibid. I 58 
167 Olyslager, De Associatie der Overzeese Gebieden met de Europese Economische 
Gemeenschap, II ECONOMISCH EN SOCIAAL T!JDSCHRIFT, I at 8 ( 1957). Cf. generally, 
0LYSLAGER, DE AsSOCIATIE VON DE 0VERZEESE GEBIEDEN MET DE EUROPESE EcoNOMISCHE 
GEMEENSCHAP (1958). 
168 U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, Note by the Secretariat on the 
possible repercussions of the European Common Market on Latin American exports, 
EjCN.IZ/449, 2I (1957). 
169 Ibid. 23. 
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Japan would be affected with regard to her exports of woolen, cot-
ton, and rayon fabrics, medicines, and timber, and, in addition, would 
face stiffer competition in third marketsY0 
These effects were analyzed by a recent G.A.T.T. study.171 It 
pointed out that the external tariff of the E.E.C. on tropical prod-
ucts-while it has the effect of a protective tariff in regard to the 
products of the associated territories-is, by nature, a revenue tar-
iff since no tropical products are produced within the E.E.C. The 
result of the removal of these tariffs vis-a-vis the associated coun-
tries has a trade-diverting effect, it is argued, since it cannot dis-
place high-cost production within the E.E.C. It is further argued 
that the trade-diverting effect of the association, that is, the diver-
sion of trade away from traditional sources of supply to the as-
sociated territories, could only be countered by an increase in total 
imports from the outside, which would occur if imports from the 
associated territories increased to such an extent that they offset the 
displacement of imports from traditional sources. 
The Six have consistently adopted the latter thesis to show that 
the association will not be trade-diverting, and have argued beyond 
this that the former suppliers will indeed benefit from an increase in 
demand.172 They foresee, for instance with regard to fats and vege-
table oils, that imports from the associated countries will lower 
Community prices. Yet, since the per capita consumption of these 
products is far below that of the United States, increased demand 
for these products may be expected with an increased standard of 
living both in the Community and in the producing territories. For 
purposes of an examination of trade effects the exportable surplus, 
rather than total production, is therefore one criterion, and chang-
ing-especially increasing-patterns of consumption are another.173 
Finally, there is room for considerable doubt that the production of 
the Overseas Territories will increase appreciably as a result of the 
association and thus displace traditional imports. The solution of 
problems of soil erosion, irrigation, transport and labor will re-
quire years, perhaps decades before the exportable surplus can 
threaten to displace traditional sources of supply.174 Thus, the posi-
170 U.N. EcoNOMIC CoMMISSION FOR AsiA AND THE FAR EAST, Economic Survey of Asia 
and the Far East 1958, 42-43, 46 (1959). 
171 G.A.T.T., TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 119-121 (1958). 
179 Cf. Report of the G.A.T.T. Working Party on Tropical Products, Press Bulletin 
EuROPE, Nos. 357-362, March 9-14, 1959. 
173 U.N., supra note 170 at 43· 
170 Jantzen, Die Entwicklungspolitik in Afrika siidlich der Sahara, 2 EuROPAISCHE 
WIRTSCHAFT 251 at 252 (1959). 
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tion of the Six in the G.A.T.T. negotiations is that the association 
will not prejudice traditional imports and that, in fact, it may be 
expected that third countries will, beyond this, also benefit from an 
appreciable share of the increase in demand in the E.E.C. 
However, while they disclaim any of the disadvantageous effects 
asserted by third countries, the Six have already taken steps and 
issued policy statements which are intended to ensure that third 
countries will not suffer the feared adverse effects. To prevent 
short-term effects, the Six extended part of their first I o percent 
tariff reduction (of January I, I959) to their O.E.E.C. and 
G.A.T.T. partners, as well as to those countries which enjoy most-
favored-nation treatment.175 In formulating long-term policy, the 
Six are also obligated by the Treaty to take into account the inter-
ests of third countries,176 and the Treaty enables the Community to 
negotiate trade agreements.177 In the meantime, the E.E.C. Coun-
cil has already declared its willingness to work within G.A.T.T. to-
wards a general lowering of trade barriers. 
170 U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Report of the Committee 
on Trade, EJCN.u/497 (E/CN.u/s), 1959, 17. 
170 Arts. 18, uo, 111 (s). 
177 Art. 113. 
Annex 
European Free Trade Association 
Text of Convention and other Documents 
Approved at Stockholm on 
zoth November, 1959 * 
I.-COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT STOCKHOLM, 
20TH NOVEMBER, 1959 
On behalf of their Governments, Ministers from Austria, Den-
mark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom have today initialled at Stockholm the text of a Conven-
tion establishing the European Free Trade Association, to consist 
of the seven founding members together with any other countries 
which may accede to it. 
The purposes of the Association are economic expansion, full em-
ployment, the rational use of resources, financial stability and a 
higher standard of living. 
The Convention will establish a free market between the mem-
bers of the Association. This will be achieved by the abolition of 
tariffs and other obstacles to trade in the industrial products of 
members over a period of ten years, or earlier if so decided. Each 
country will be free to decide its own external tariffs. 
Freer trade between the participating countries will stimulate 
competition a~d economic expansion. There are provisions to en-
sure that the effects of the removal of the barriers to trade are not 
nullified by means of subsidies, practices of state undertakings, re-
strictive business practices and limitations to the establishment of 
enterprises. 
The Convention also covers agricultural goods, for which special 
provisions are made and agreements concluded so as to promote 
expansion of trade and ensure a sufficient degree of reciprocity to 
the countries whose major exports are agricultural. To the same end 
* Cmnd. 906, London. 
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there are also special rules for trade in non-processed fish and 
marine products. 
The Convention reaffirms the determination of the seven mem-
ber countries to facilitate the early establishment of a multilateral 
association for the removal of trade barriers and the promotion of 
closer economic co-operation between the members of the organisa-
tion for European Economic Co-operation, including the six mem-
bers of the European Economic Community. To this end a special 
resolution was adopted. 
As world trading nations, the countries of the European Free 
Trade Association are particularly conscious of Europe's links with 
the rest of the world. They have therefore chosen a form of eco-
nomic co-operation which, while strengthening Europe, enables them 
to take full account of the interests of other trading countries 
throughout the world, including those facing special problems of 
development. The Association is a further expression of the post-
war drive towards lower trade barriers, and reflects the principles 
which have been established by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (G.A.T.T.). The individual freedom of action of 
E.F.T.A. members in their external tariffs will allow each of them 
to participate actively in G.A.T.T. negotiations for tariff reductions. 
The Ministers were informed that the Finnish Government 
wished to discuss means by which they could participate in the ar-
rangements planned by the E.F.T.A. and warmly welcomed this 
Finnish initiative. 
The Convention establishes a Council charged with the super-
vision of the application of the Convention and the furtherance of 
its objectives. Pending ratification of the Convention the Committee 
of senior officials remains in being to ensure the closest contact be-
tween member governments on all matters of major importance 
arising out of the Association. A Preparatory Committee has been 
established to develop the institutions of E.F.T.A. 
It was agreed to seek ratification of the Convention not later than 
March 31st, 1960. 
II.-RESOL UTION 
For more than 10 years, the seven countries which are now estab-
lishing the European Free Trade Association, have co-operated 
most successfully within the framework of the O.E.E.C. both with 
the six countries which are Members of the European Economic 
Community, and with Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Turkey and re-
cently Spain. 
ANNEX 
Indeed the remarkable expansion of the European economy since 
the end of the war is due, to a large extent, to the work of the 
O.E.E.C. Its achievements have had beneficial effects far beyond 
Europe. By preparing the convertibility of currencies, the O.E.E.C. 
has created the conditions permitting its members to eliminate the 
restrictions on trade progressively also toward third countries. By 
promoting freer trade in Europe, the O.E.E.C. plays therefore an 
important role in the liberalisation of trade on a world-wide basis. 
The existence of two groups, the European Free Trade Associa-
tion and the European Economic Community, inspired by different 
but not incompatible principles, implies the risk that futher prog-
ress along these lines be hampered, if such a danger could not be 
avoided by an agreement to which all countries interested in Euro-
pean economic co-operation could subscribe. 
Such an agreement, based on the principle of reciprocity, should 
not cause any damage to the measures taken by the European Free 
Trade Association and the European Economic Community. More-
over, it should allow member States of either organisation to elimi-
nate' in common the obstacles to trade between them, and more gen-
erally, to seek to solve the problems they share. Among those, there 
is the problem of aiding the less developed countries in Europe and 
in other continents, which is one of the foremost tasks of the more 
advanced countries. 
Common action in these fields would strengthen the already exist-
ing bonds between the European countries as well as the solidarity 
arisingfrom their common destiny, even if their views on the way 
in which European integration should be achieved are not always 
identical. 
· For these reasons, the seven Governments who will sign the Con-
vention establishing the European Free Trade Association, declare 
their determination to do all in their power to avoid a new division 
in Europe. They regard their Association as a step toward an agree-
ment between all member countries of O.E.E.C. 
To this end the seven Governments are ready to initiate negotia-
tions with the members of the E.E.C. as soon as they are prepared 
to do so. Meanwhile views should be exchanged through diplomatic 
channels or in any other way, on the basis upon which such negotia-
tions may profitably be opened. 
Stockholm, November 20, 1959. 
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III.-cONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN 
FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION 
(Text as initialled by Ministers at Stockholm on 20th 
November, I 9 59) 
The Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom 
of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden, the 
Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland: 
Having regard to the Convention for European Economic Co-
operation of 16th April, 1948, which established the Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation; 
Resolved to maintain and develop the co-operation instituted 
within that Organisation; 
Determined to facilitate the early establishment of a multilateral 
association for the removal of trade barriers and the promotion of 
closer economic co-operation between the Members of the Organi-
sation for European Economic Co-operation, including the Mem-
bers of the European Economic Community; 
Having regard to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
Resolved to promote the objectives of that Agreement; 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
The Association 
I. An international organisation to be known as the European 
Free Trade Association, hereinafter referred to as "the Associa-
tion," is hereby established. 
2. The Members of the Association, hereinafter referred to as 
"Member States," shall be the States which ratify this Convention 
and such other States as may accede to it. 
3· The Area of the Association shall be the territories to which 
this Convention applies. 
4· The Institutions of the Association shall be a Council and such 
other organs as the Council may set up. 
ARTICLE 2 
Objectives 
The objectives of the Association shall be: 
(a) to promote in the Area of the Association and in each Mem-
ber State a sustained expansion of economic activity, full 
employment, increased productivity and the rational use of 
ANNEX 
resources, financial stability and continuous improvement in 
living standards, 
(b) to secure that trade between Member States takes place in 
conditions of fair competition, 
(c) to avoid significant disparity between Member States in the 
conditions of supply of raw materials produced within the 
Area of the Association, and 
(d) to contribute to the harmonious development and expansion 




1. Member States shall reduce and ultimately eliminate, in ac-
cordance with this Article, customs duties and any other charges 
with equivalent effect, except duties notified in accordance with 
Article 6 and other charges which fall within that Article, imposed 
on or in connexion with the importation of goods which are eligible 
for Area tariff treatment in accordance with Article 4· Any such 
duty or other charge is hereinafter referred to as an "import duty." 
2. (a) On and after each of the following dates, Member States 
shall not apply an import duty on any product at a level exceeding 
the percentage of the basic duty specified against that date: 
1st July, 1960 .... 
1st January, 1962 
1st July, 1963 ..... · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Ist January, 1965 ........ . 
I st January, 1966 .............. . 
Ist January, 1967 . · .. · . 
Ist January, 1968 









(b) On and after 1st January, 1970, Member States shall not 
apply any import duties. 
3· Subject to Annex A, the basic duty referred to in paragraph 2 
of this Article is, in respect of each Member State and in respect of 
any product, the import duty applied by that Member State to the 
imports of that product from other Member States on 1st January, 
1960. 
4. Each Member State declares its willingness to apply import 
duties at a level below that indicated in paragraph 2 of this Article 
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if it considers that its economic and financial position and the posi-
tion of the sector concerned so permit. 
5· The Council may at any time decide that any import duties 
shall be reduced more rapidly or eliminated earlier than is provided 
in paragraph 2 of this Article. Between rst July, 1960, and 31st 
December, 1961, the Council shall examine whether it is possible so 
to decide in respect of import duties applied on some or all goods by 
some or all of the Member States. 
ARTICLE + 
Area tariff treatment 
r. For the purposes of Articles 3 to 7, goods shall, subject to 
Annex B, be accepted as eligible for Area tariff treatment if they 
have been consigned to the territory of the importing Member State 
from the territory of another Member State and if they are of Area 
origin under any one of the following conditions: 
(a) that they have been wholly produced within the Area of the 
Association; 
(b) that they fall within a description of goods listed in the 
Process Lists which form Schedules I and II to Annex B and 
have been produced within the Area of the Association by 
the appropriate qualifying process described in those Lists; 
(c) that in the case of goods other than those listed in Schedule 
II to Annex B, they have been produced within the Area of 
the Association, and that the value of any materials im-
ported from outside the Area or of undetermined origin 
which have been used at any stage of the production of the 
goods does not exceed so percent of the export price of the 
goods. 
2. For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of para-
graph 1 of this Article, materials listed in the Basic Materials List 
which forms Schedule III to Annex B which have been used in the 
state described in that List in a process of production within the 
Area of the Association shall be deemed to contain no element im-
ported from outside the Area. 
3· Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Member State 
from accepting as eligible for Area tariff treatment any goods im-
ported from the territory of another Member State, provided that 
the like goods imported from the territory of any Member State 
are accorded the same treatment. 
4· Provisions necessary for the administration and effective ap-
plication of this Article are contained in Annex B. 
ANNEX 693 
5· The Council may decide to amend the provisions of this Arti-
cle and of Annex B. 
6. The Council shall from time to time examine in what respect 
this Convention can be amended in order to ensure the smooth 
operation of the origin rules and especially to make them simpler 
and more liberal. 
ARTICLE 5 
Deflection of trade 
1. For the purposes of this Article, trade is said to be deflected 
when 
(a) imports of a particular product into the territory of a Mem-
ber State from the territory of another Member State are . . 
mcreasmg, 
(i) as a result of the reduction or elimination in the im-
porting Member State of duties and charges on that 
product in accordance with Article 3 or 6, and 
( ii) because the duties or charges levied by the exporting 
Member State on imports of raw materials or inter-
mediate products, used in the production of the product 
in question, are significantly lower than the correspond-
ing duties or charges levied by the importing Member 
State, and 
(b) this increase in imports causes or would cause serious injury 
to production which is carried on in the territory of the im-
porting Member State. 
2. The Council shall keep under review the question of deflections 
of trade and their causes. It shall take such decisions as are necessary 
in order to deal with the causes of deflection of trade by amending 
the rules of origin in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 4 or by 
such other means as it may consider appropriate. 
3· If a deflection of trade of a particularly urgent nature occurs, 
any Member State may refer the matter to the Council. The Council 
shall take its decision as quickly as possible, and, in general, within 
one month. The Council may, by majority decision, authorise in-
terim measures to safeguard the position of the Member State in 
question. Such measures shall not continue for longer than is neces-
sary for the procedure under paragraph 2 above to take place, and 
for not more than two months, unless, in exceptional cases, the Coun-
cil, by majority decision, authorises an extension of this period by 
not more than two months. 
4· A Member State which is considering the reduction of the ef-
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fective level of its duties or charges on any product not eligible for 
Area tariff treatment shall, as far as may be practicable, notify the 
Council not less than thirty days before such reduction comes into 
effect, and shall consider any representations by other Member 
States that the reduction is likely to lead to a deflection of trade. 
Information received under this paragraph shall not be disclosed to 
any person outside the service of the Association or the Govern-
ment of any Member State. 
5. When considering changes in their duties or charges on any 
product not eligible for Area tariff treatment, Member States shall 
have due regard to the desirability of avoiding consequential de-
flections of trade. In such cases, any Member State which considers 
that trade is being deflected may refer the matter to the Council in 
accordance with Article 3 1. 
6. If, in the consideration of any complaint in accordance with 
Article 3 I, reference is made to a difference in the level of duties or 
charges on any product not eligible for Area tariff treatment, that 
difference shall be taken into account only if the Council finds by 
majority vote that there is a deflection of trade. 
7. The Council shall review from time to time the provisions of 
this Article and may decide to amend those provisions. 
ARTICLE 6 
Revenue duties and internal taxation 
I. Member States shall not 
(a) apply directly or indirectly to imported goods any fiscal 
charges in excess of those applied directly or indirectly to 
like domestic goods, nor otherwise apply such charges so as 
to afford effective protection to like domestic goods, or 
(b) apply fiscal charges to imported goods of a kind which they 
do not produce, or which they do not produce in substantial 
quantities, in such a way as to afford effective protection to 
the domestic production of goods of a different kind which 
are substitutable for the imported goods, which enter into 
direct competition with them and which do not bear directly 
or indirectly, in the country of importation, fiscal charges of 
equivalent incidence, 
and shall give effect to these obligations in the manner laid down in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. 
2. Member States shall not introduce new fiscal charges which 
are inconsistent with paragraph 1 of this Article, and shall not vary 
an existing fiscal charge in such a way as to increase, above the level 
ANNEX 
in force on the date by reference to which the basic duty is deter-
mined in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 3, any effective pro-
tective element in the fiscal charge, that is to say, the extent to which 
that charge is inconsistent with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
3· (a) In the case of any internal tax or other internal charge, 
Member States shall eliminate any effective protective element on or 
before 1st January, 1962. 
(b) In the case of any revenue duty, Member States shall either 
( i) progressively eliminate any effective protective element 
in the duty by successive reductions corresponding to 
those prescribed for import duties in Articles 3, or 
(ii) eliminate any effective protective element in the duty 
on or before 1st January, 1965. 
(c) Each Member State shall, on or before Ist July, 1960, 
notify to the Council any duty to which it will apply the provisions 
of sub-paragraph (b) ( ii) of this paragraph. 
4· Each Member State shall notify to the Council all fiscal 
charges applied by it where the rates of charge, or the conditions 
governing the imposition or collection of the charge, are not identi-
cal in relation to the imported goods and to the like domestic goods, 
as soon as the Member State applying the charge considers that the 
charge is, or has been made, consistent with sub-paragraph (a) of 
paragraph 1 of this Article. Each Member State shall, at the re-
quest of any other Member State, supply information about the ap-
plication of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. 
5. Each Member State shall notify to the Council the revenue 
duties to which it intends to apply the provisions of this Article. 
6. For the purposes of this Article: 
(a) "fiscal charges" means revenue duties, internal taxes and 
other internal charges on goods; 
(b) "revenue duties" means customs duties and other similar 
charges applied primarily for the purpose of raising reve-
nue; 
(c) "imported goods" means goods which are accepted as being 
eligible for Area tariff treatment in accordance with the pro-
visions of Article 4· 
ARTICLE 7 
Drawback 
1. Each Member State may, on and after 1st January, 1970, re-
fuse to accept as eligible for Area tariff treatment goods which bene-
fit from drawback allowed by Member States in the territory of 
696 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET 
which the goods have undergone the processes of production which 
form the basis of the claim that the goods in question are of Area 
origin. In applying this paragraph, each Member State shall accord 
the same treatment to imports from the territories of all Member 
States. 
2. Similar provisions shall apply to drawback in respect of im-
ported materials of the kinds listed in Annex D and in Annex E. 
3· Before 31st December, 1960, the Council shall decide what 
provisions are to be applied to deal with drawback in the period 
after Jist December, 1961, and before 1st January, 1970. 
4· The Council may at any time after their decision under para-
graph 3 consider whether further or different provisions are neces-
sary to deal with drawback after 3 I st December, 196 I, and may 
decide that such provisions are to be applied. 
5. For the purposes of this Article : 
(a) "drawback" means any arrangement for the refund or re-
mission, wholly or in part, of duties applicable to imported 
materials, provided that the arrangement, expressly or in 
effect, allows refund or remission if certain goods or rna 
terials are exported, but not if they are retained for home 
use; 
(b) "remission" includes exemption for materials brought into 
free ports and other places which have similar customs 
privileges; 
(c) "duties" means ( i) all charges on or in connection with im-
portation, except the fiscal charges to which Article 6 applies 
and (ii) any protective element in such fiscal charges; 
(d) "materials" and "process of production" have the meanings 
assigned to them in Rule I of Annex B. 
ARTICLE 8 
Prohibition of export duties 
I. Member States shall not introduce or increase export duties, 
and, on and after I st January, I 962, shall not apply any such duties. 
2. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any Member 
State from taking such measures as are necessary to prevent evasion, 
by means of re-export, of duties which it applies to exports to terri-
tories outside the Area of the Association. 
3· For the purposes of this Article, "export duties" means any 
duties or charges with equivalent effect, imposed on or in connection 
with the exportation of goods from the territory of any Member 
State to the territory of any other Member State. 
ANNEX 
ARTICLE 9 
Co-operation in customs administration 
Member States shall take appropriate measures, including ar-
rangements regarding administrative co-operation, to ensure that 
the provisions of Articles 3 to 7 and of Annexes A and B are effec-
tively and harmoniously applied, taking account of the need to re-
duce as far as is possible the formalities imposed on trade and of 
the need to achieve mutually satisfactory solutions of any difficulties 
arising out of the operation of those provisions. 
ARTICLE IO 
Quantitative import restrictions 
I. Member States shall not introduce or intensify quantitative 
restrictions on imports of goods from the territory of other Mem-
ber States. 
2. Member States shall eliminate such quantitative restrictions 
as soon as possible and not later than JISt December, I969. 
3· Each Member State shall relax quantitative restrictions pro-
gressively and in such a way that a reasonable rate of expansion of 
trade as a result of the application of Articles 3 and 6 is not frus-
trated and that no burdensome problems are created for the Mem-
ber State concerned in the years immediately preceding Ist January, 
I970. 
4· Each Member State shall apply the provisions of this Article 
in such a way that all other Member States are given like treatment. 
5· On Ist July, I96o, Member States shall establish for all goods 
subject to quantitative restriction global quotas of a size not less 
than 20 percent above the corresponding basic quotas. In the case of 
quotas which may be available also to States which are not Mem-
bers, the global quotas shall include, in addition to the basic quotas 
increased by not less that 20 percent, an amount not less than the 
total of the imports from such States in the calendar year I959· 
6. If a basic quota is nil or negligible, Member States shall ensure 
that the quota to be established on Ist July, I96o, is of appropriate 
size. Before or after the establishment of any such quota, any Mem-
ber State may initiate consultations about its appropriate size. 
7. On I st July, I 96 I, and on I st July in each succeeding year, 
Member States shall increase each quota established in accordance 
with paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article by not less than 20 percent 
of an amount equivalent to the basic quota as already increased pur-
suant to this Article. 
8. If any Member State considers that the application of para-
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graphs 5 to 7 of this Article to a product would cause it serious diffi-
culties, that Member State may propose to the Council alternative 
arrangements for that product. The Council may, by majority de-
cision, authorise that Member State to adopt such alternative ar-
rangements as the Council considers appropriate. 
9· Member States shall notify to the Council details of the quotas 
established in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
IO. The Council shall, not later than Jist December, I96I, and 
from time to time thereafter, review the provisions of this Article 
and the progress made by Member States in the application of its 
provisions, and may decide that further or different provisions are 
to be applied. 
I r. For the purposes of this Article: 
(a) "quantitative restrictions" means prohibitions or restric-
tions on imports from the territory of other Member States 
whether made effective through quotas, import licences or 
other measures with equivalent effect, including administra-
tive measures and requirements restricting import; 
(b) "basic quota" means any quota or the total of any quotas 
which have been established, together with the total of any 
imports which are otherwise subject to quantitative restric-
tion, in respect of goods imported from the territory of 
other Member States in the calendar year I959; or in the 
case of global quotas which are open to States which are not 
Members, the total of the imports under such quotas from 
Member States in the calendar year I959; 
(c) "global quota" means a quota under which licences or other 
authorities to import allow the holders to import any of 
the products covered by quota from all Member States and 
other States to which the quota applies. 
ARTICLE I I 
Quantitative export restrictions 
I. Member States shall not introduce or intensify prohibitions or 
restrictions on exports to other Member States, whether made ef-
fective through quotas or export licences or other measures with 
equivalent effect, and shall eliminate any such prohibitions or re-
strictions not later than 3 rst December, I96 r. 
2. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent any Member 
State from taking such measures as are necessary to prevent evasion, 
by means of re-export, of restrictions which it applies to exports to 




Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between Member States, or as a dis-
guised restriction on trade between Member States, nothing in Arti-
cles IO and I 1 shall prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
Member State of measures, 
(a) necessary to protect public morals, 
(b) necessary for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
(c) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations re-
lating to customs enforcement, or to the classification, grad-
ing or marketing of goods, or to the operation of monopolies 
by means of state enterprises or enterprises given exclusive 
or special privileges, 
(e) necessary to protect industrial property or copyrights or to 
prevent deceptive practices, 
(f) relating to gold or silver, 
(g) relating to the products of prison labour, or 
(h) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic or archaeological value. 
ARTICLE I3 
Government aids 
I. Member States shall not maintain or introduce 
(a) the forms of aid to exports of goods to other Member States 
which are described in Annex C, or 
(b) any other form of aid, the main purpose or effect of which 
is to frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or 
absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade be-
tween Member States. 
2. If the application of any form of aid by a Member State, al-
though not contrary to paragraph I of this Article, frustrates the 
benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quan-
titative restrictions on trade between Member States and provided 
that the procedure set out in paragraphs I to 3 of Article 3 I has 
been followed, the Council may, by majority decision, authorise any 
Member State to suspend to the Member State which is applying 
the aid, the application of such obligations under this Convention as 
the Council considers appropriate. 
3· The Council may decide to amend the provisions of this Arti-
cle and of Annex C. 
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ARTICLE 14 
Public undertakings 
1. Member States shall ensure the progressive elimination, dur-
ing the period from 1st July, 1960, to 3 Ist December, 1969, in the 
practices of public undertakings, of 
(a) measures the effect of which is to afford protection to do-
mestic production which would be inconsistent with this Con-
vention if achieved by means of a duty or charge with equiva-
lent effect, quantitative restriction or Government aid, or 
(b) trade discrimination on grounds of nationality in so far as 
it frustrates the benefits expected from the removal or ab-
sence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade be-
tween Member States. 
2. In so far as the provisions of Article 15 are relevant to the ac-
tivities of public undertakings, that Article shall apply to them in 
the same way as it applies to other enterprises. 
3· Member States shall ensure that new practices of the kind de-
scribed in paragraph 1 of this Article are not introduced. 
4· Where Member States do not have the necessary legal powers 
to control the activities of regional or local government authorities 
or enterprises under their control in these matters, they shall never-
theless endeavour to ensure that those authorities or enterprises 
comply with the provisions of this Article. 
5. The Council shall keep the provisions of this Article under re-
view and may decide to amend them. 
6. For the purposes of this Article, "public undertakings" means 
central, regional, or local government authorities, public enterprises 
and any other organisation by means of which a Member State, by 
law or in practice, controls or appreciably influences imports from, 
or exports to, the territory of a Member State. 
ARTICLE 15 
Restrictive business practices 
1. Member States recognise that the following practices are in-
compatible with this Convention in so far as they frustrate the bene-
fits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quantitative 
restrictions on trade between Member States: 
(a) agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of 
enterprises and concerted practices between enterprises 
which have as their object or result the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition within the Area of the 
Association; 
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(b) actions by which one or more enterprises take unfair ad-
vantage of a dominant position within the Area of the As-
sociation or a substantial part of it. 
2. If any practice of the kind described in paragraph I of this 
Article is referred to the Council in accordance with Article 3 I, the 
Council may, in any recommendation in accordance with paragraph 
3 or in any decision in accordance with paragraph 4 of that Article, 
make provision for publication of a report on the circumstances of 
the matter. 
3· (a) In the light of experience gained, the Council shall con-
sider not later than 3 I st December, I 964, and may consider at any 
time therafter, whether further or different provisions are necessary 
to deal with the effects of restrictive business practices or dominant 
enterprises on trade between Member States. 
(b) Such review shall include consideration of the following mat-
ters: 
( i) specification of the restrictive business practices or 
dominant enterprises with which the Council should 
be concerned; 
( ii) methods of securing information about restrictive 
business practices or dominant enterprises; 
(iii) procedures for investigations; 
( iv) whether the right to initiate inquiries should be con-
ferred on the Council. 
(c) The Council may decide to make the provisions found neces-
sary as a result of the review envisaged in sub-paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of this paragraph. 
ARTICLE I6 
Establishment 
I. Member States recognise that restrictions on the establish-
ment and operation of economic enterprises in their territories by 
nationals of other Member States should not be applied, through 
accord to such nationals of treatment which is less favourable than 
that accorded to their own nationals in such matters, in such a way 
as to frustrate the benefits expected from the removal or the ab-
sence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade between Mem-
ber States. 
2. Member States shall not apply new restrictions in such a way 
that they conflict with the principle set out in paragraph I of this 
Article. 
3· Member States shall notify the Council, within such period as 
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the Council may decide, of particulars of any restrictions which 
they apply in such a way that nationals of another Member State 
are accorded in their territories less favourabletreatment in respect 
of the matters set out in paragraph 1 of this Article than is accorded 
to their own nationals. 
4· The Council shall consider not later than 31st December, 
1964, and may consider at any time thereafter, whether further or 
different provisions are necessary to give effect to the principles set 
out in paragraph 1 of this Article, and may decide to make the neces-
sary provisiOns. 
5· Nothing in this Article shall prevent the adoption and enforce-
ment by a Member State of measures for the control of entry, resi-
dence, activity and departure of aliens where such measures are 
justified by reasons of public order, public health or morality, or 
national security, or for the prevention of a serious imbalance in the 
social or demographic structure of that Member State. 
6. For the purposes of this Article: 
(a) "nationals" means, in relation to a Member State, 
( i) physical persons who have the nationality of that 
Member State and 
( ii) companies and other legal persons constituted in the 
territory of that Member State in conformity with the 
law of that State and which that State regards as hav-
ing its nationality, provided that they have been 
formed for gainful purposes and that they have their 
registered office and central administration, and carry 
on substantial activity, within the Area of the Associa-
tion; 
(b) "economic enterprises" means any type of economic enter-
prise for production of or commerce in goods which are of 
Area origin, whether conducted by physical persons or 
through agencies, branches or companies or other legal per-
sons. 
ARTICLE 17 
Dumped and subsidised imports 
1. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Member State 
from taking action against dumped or subsidised imports consist-
ently with its other international obligations. 
2. Any products which have been exported from the territory of 
one Member State to the territory of another Member State and 
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have not undergone any manufacturing process since exportation 
shall, when reimported into the territory of the first Member State, 
be admitted free of quantitative restrictions and measures with 
equivalent effect. They shall also be admitted free of customs duties 
and charges with equivalent effect, except that any allowance by way 
of drawback, relief from duty or otherwise, given by reason of the 
exportation from the territory of the first Member State, may be 
recovered. 
3· If any industry in the territory of any Member State is suffer~ 
ing or is threatened with material injury as the result of the import 
of dumped or subsidised products into the territory of another 
Member State, the latter Member State shall, at the request of the 
former Member State, examine the possibility of taking such action 
as is consistent with its international obligations to remedy the in~ 
jury or prevent the threatened injury. 
ARTICLE IS 
Security exceptions 
I. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent any Member State 
from taking action which it considers necessary for the protection of 
its essential security interests, where such action 
(a) is taken to prevent the disclosure of information, 
(b) relates to trade in arms, ammunition or war materials or to 
research, development or production indispensable for de~ 
fence purposes, provided that such action does not include 
the application of import duties or the quantitative restric~ 
tion of imports except in so far as such restriction is per~ 
. mitted in accordance with Article I 2 or is authorised by de~ 
cision of the Council, 
(c) is taken to ensure that nuclear materials and equipment 
made available for peaceful purposes do not further mili~ 
tary purposes, or 
(d) is taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations. 
2. Nothing in this Conventi01i shall prevent any lVlember State 
from taking action to carry out undertakings into which that Mem~ 
ber State has entered for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security. 
ARTICLE 19 
Balance of payments difficulties 
I. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 10, any Member 
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State may, consistently with its other international obligations, in-
troduce quantitative restrictions on imports for the purpose of safe-
guarding its balance of payments. 
2. Any Member State taking measures in accordance with para-
graph I of this Article shall notify them to the Council, if possible 
before they come into force. The Council shall examine the situation 
and keep it under review and may at any time by majority vote, 
make recommendations designed to moderate any damaging effect 
of these restrictions or to assist the Member State concerned to over-
come its difficulties. If the balance of payments difficulties persist 
for more than I 8 months and the measures applied seriously dis-
turb the operation of the Association, the Council shall examine the 
situation and may, taking into account the interests of all Member 
States, by majority decision, devise special procedures to attenuate 
or compensate for the effect of such measures. 
3· A Member State which has taken measures in accordance with 
paragraph I of this Article shall have regard to its obligation to re-
sume the full application of Article IO and shall, as soon as its 
balance of payments situation improves, make proposals to the 
Council on the way in which this should be done. The Council, if 
it is not satisfied that these proposals are adequate, may, by ma-
jority vote, recommend to the Member State alternative arrange-
ments to the same end. 
ARTICLE 20 
Difficulties in particular sectors 
1. If, in the territory of a Member State, 
(a) an appreciable rise in unemployment in a particular sector 
of industry or region is caused by a substantial decrease in 
internal demand for a domestic product, and 
(b) this decrease in demand is due to an increase in imports from 
the territory of other 1\llember States as a result of the 
progressive elimination of duties, charges and quantitative 
restrictions in accordance with Articles 3, 6 and IO, 
that Member State may, notwithstanding any other provisions of 
this Convention, 
( i) limit those imports by means of quantitative restric-
tions to a rate not less than the rate of such imports 
during any period of twelve months which ended within 
twelve months of the date on which the restrictions 
come into force; the restrictions shall not be continued 
for a period longer than eighteen months, unless the 
ANNEX 
Council, by majority decision, authorises their con-
tinuance for such further period and on such conditions 
as the Council considers appropriate; and 
(ii) take such measures, either instead of or in addition to 
restriction of imports in accordance with sub-para-
graph ( i) of this paragraph, as the Council may, by 
majority decision, authorise. 
2. In applying measures in accordance with paragraph I of this 
Article, a Member State shall give like treatment to imports from 
the territory of all Member States. 
3· A Member State applying restrictions in accordance with sub-
paragraph ( i) of paragraph I of this Article shall notify them to 
the Council, if possible before they come into force. The Council 
may at any time consider those restrictions and may, by majority 
vote, make recommendations designed to moderate any damaging 
effect of those restrictions or to assist the Member State concerned 
to overcome its difficulties. 
4. If at any time after Ist July, I96o, a Member State considers 
that the application of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of Arti-
cle 3 and paragraph 3 of Article 6 to any product would lead to the 
situation described in paragraph I of this Article, it may propose to 
the Council an alternative rate of reduction of the import duty or 
protective element concerned. If the Council finds that the proposal 
is justified, it may, by majority decision, authorise that Member 
State to apply an alternative rate of reduction, provided that the 
obligations relating to the final elimination of the import duty or 
protective element in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) of para-
graph 2 of Article 3 and paragraph 3 of Article 6 are fulfilled. 
5. Before I st January, I 970, if the Council considers that some 
provision similar to those in paragraphs I to 3 of this Article will be 
required thereafter, it may decide that such provisions shall have 
effect for any period after that date. 
ARTICLE 21 
Agricultural goods 
1. In view of the special considerations affecting agriculture the 
provisions in all the foregoing Articles of this Convention, except 
Articles I and I7, shall not apply in relation to the agricultural 
goods which are listed in Annex D. The Council may decide to amend 
the provisions of this paragraph and Annex D. 
2. The special provisions which shall apply in relation to those 
agricultural goods are set out in Articles 22 to 2 5. 
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ARTICLE 22 
Agricultural policies and objective 
I. In regard to agriculture, Member States recognise that the 
policies pursued by them are designed 
(a) to promote increased productivity and the rational and eco-
nomic development of production, 
(b) to provide a reasonable degree of market stability and ade-
quate supplies to consumers at reasonable prices, and 
(c) to ensure an adequate standard of living to persons engaged 
in agriculture. 
In pursuing these policies, Member States shall have due regard to 
the interests of other Member States in the export of agricultural 
goods and shall take into consideration traditional channels of trade. 
2. Having regard to these policies, the objective of the Associa-
tion shall be to facilitate an expansion of trade which will provide 
reasonable reciprocity to Member States whose economies depend 
to a great extent on exports of agricultural goods. 
ARTICLE 23 
Agricultural agreements between Member States 
I. In pursuit of the objective set out in paragraph 2 of Article 
22 and as a foundation for their co-operation in respect of agricul-
ture, certain Member States have concluded agreements setting out 
measures to be taken, including the elimination of customs duties on 
some agricultural goods, in order to facilitate the expansion of trade 
in agricultural goods. In so far as any two or more Member States 
may at a later date conclude such agreements, they shall inform the 
other Member States before the agreements take effect. 
2. Agreements concluded in accordance with paragraph I of this 
Article, and any agreement modifying these agreements which is 
made by the parties to them, shall remain in force as long as this 
Convention. Copies of such agreements shall be transmitted im-
mediately after signature to the other Member States, and a certi-
fied copy shall be deposited with the Government of Sweden. 
3· Any provisions regarding tariffs contained in such agreements 
shall apply in favour of all other Member States, and the benefit of 
those provisions shall not, as a result of any modification, be with-
drawn from Member States without the consent of all of them. 
ARTICLE 24 
Export subsidies on agricultural goods 
I. A Member State shall not cause damage to the interests of 
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other Member States by granting directly or indirectly any subsidy 
on a product listed in Annex D which results in an increase of that 
Member State's exports of that product compared with the exports 
which that Member State had in the product in question in a recent 
representative period. 
2. It shall be the object of the Council, before 1st January, 1962, 
to establish rules for the gradual abolition of subsidised exports 
detrimental to other Member States. 
3· The exemption of an exported product from duties, taxes or 
other charges borne by the like product when destined for domestic 
consumption or the remission of such duties, taxes or other charges 
in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be 
deemed to be a subsidy for the purpose of this Article. 
ARTICLE 25 
Consultations on trade in agricultural goods 
The Council shall keep the provisions of Articles 2 1 to 2 5 under 
review, and it shall once a year consider the development of trade 
in agricultural goods within the Area of the Association. The Coun-
cil shall consider what further action shall be taken in pursuit of the 
objective set out in Article 2 2. 
ARTICLE 26 
Fish and other marine products 
1. The provisions in all the foregoing Articles of this Conven-
tion, except Articles 1 and 17, shall not apply in relation to the fish 
and other marine products which are listed in Annex E. The special 
provisions which shall apply to those fish and other marine products 
are set out in Articles 27 and 28. 
2. The Council may decide to delete products from the list con-
tained in Annex E. 
ARTICLE 27 
Objective for trade in fish and other marine products 
Having regard to the national policies of Member States and the 
special conditions prevailing in the fishing industry, the objective 
of the Association shall be to facilitate an expansion of trade in fish 
and other marine products which will provide reasonable reciprocity 
to Member States whose economies depend to a great extent on ex-
ports of those products. 
ARTICLE 28 
Trade in fish and other marine products 
The Council shall before 1st January, 1961, begin an examination 
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of arrangements relating to trade in products listed in Annex E 
having regard to the objective set out in Article 27. This examina-
tion shall be concluded before I st January, I 962. 
ARTICLE 29 
Invisible transactions and transfers 
Member States recognise the importance of invisible transactions 
and transfers for the proper functioning of the Association. They 
consider that the obligations with regard to the freedom of such 
transactions and transfers undertaken by them in other international 
organisations are sufficient at present. The Council may decide on 
such further provisions with regard to such transactions and trans-
fers as may prove desirable, having due regard to the wider inter-
national obligations of Member States. 
ARTICLE 30 
Economic and financial policies 
Member States recognise that the economic and financial policies 
of each of them affect the economies of other Member States and 
intend to pursue those policies in a manner which serves to promote 
the objectives of the Association. They shall periodically exchange 
views on all aspects of those policies. In so doing, they shall take 
into account the corresponding activities within the Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation and other international or-
ganisations. The Council may make recommendations to Member 
States on matters relating to those policies to the extent necessary 
to ensure the attainment of the objectives and the smooth operation 
of the Association. 
ARTICLE 3 I 
General consultations and complaints procedure 
1. If any Member State considers that any benefit conferred 
upon it by this Convention or any objective of the Association is 
being or may be frustrated and if no satisfactory settlement is 
reached between the Member States concerned, any of those Mem-
ber States may refer the matter to the Council. 
2. The Council shall promptly, by majority vote, make arrange-
ments for examining the matter. Such arrangements may include a 
reference to an examining committee constituted in accordance with 
Article 33· Before taking action under paragraph 3 of this Article, 
the Council shall so refer the matter at the request of any Member 
State concerned. Member States shall furnish all information which 
they can make available and shall lend their assistance to establish 
the facts. 
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3· When considering the matter, the Council shall have regard 
to whether it has been established that an obligation under the Con-
vention has not been fulfilled, and whether and to what extent any 
benefit conferred by the Convention or any objective of the Associa-
tion is being or may be frustrated. In the light of this consideration 
and of the report of any examining committee which may have been 
appointed, the Council may, by majority vote, make to any Mem-
ber State such recommendations as it considers appropriate. 
4· If a Member State does not or is unable to comply with a 
recommendation made in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Arti-
cle and the Council finds, by majority vote, that an obligation under 
this Convention has not been fulfilled, the Council may, by majority 
decision, authorise any Member State to suspend to the Member 
State which has not complied with the recommendation the applica-
tion of such obligations under this Convention as the Council con-
siders appropriate. 
S· Any Member State may, at any time while the matter is under 
consideration, request the Council to authorise, as a matter of ur-
gency, interim measures to safeguard its position. If it appears to 
the Council that the circumstances are sufficiently serious to justify 
interim action, and without prejudice to any action which it may 
subsequently take in accordance with the preceding paragraphs of 
this Article, the Council may, by majority decision, authorise a 
Member State to suspend its obligations under this Convention 




1. It shall be the responsibility of the Council 
(a) to exercise such powers and functions as are conferred upon 
it by this Convention, 
(b) to supervise the application of this Convention and keep its 
operation under review, 
(c) to consider whether further action should be taken by Mem-
ber States in order to promote the attainment of the ob-
jectives of the Association and to facilitate the establishment 
of closer links with other States, unions of States or inter-
national organisations. 
2. Each Member State shall be represented in the Council and 
shall have one vote. 
3· The Council may decide to set up such organs, committees and 
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other bodies as it considers necessary to assist it in accomplishing 
its tasks. 
4· In exercising its responsibility under paragraph I of this Arti-
cle, the Council may take decisions which shall be binding on all 
Member States and may make recommendations to Member States. 
5· Decisions and recommendations of the Council shall be made 
by unanimous vote, except in so far as this Convention provides 
otherwise. Decisions or recommendations shall be regarded as unani-
mous unless any Member State casts a negative vote. Decisions and 
recommendations which are to be made by majority vote require 
the affirmative vote of four Member States. 
6. If the number of the Member States changes, the Council may 
decide to amend the number of votes required for decisions and 
recommendations which are to be made by majority vote. 
ARTICLE 33 
Examining committees 
The Examining Committees referred to in Article 3 I shall con-
sist of persons selected for their competence and integrity, who, in 
the performance of their duties, shall neither seek nor receive in-
structions from any State, or from any authority or organisation 
other than the Association. They shall be appointed by the Council 
on such terms and conditions as it shall decide. 
ARTICLE 34 
Administrative arrangements of the Association 
The Council shall take decisions for the following purposes: 
(a) to lay down the Rules of Procedure of the Council and of 
any bodies of the Association, which may include provision 
that procedural questions may be decided by majority vote; 
(b) to make arrangements for the Secretariat services required 
by the Association; 
(c) to establish the financial arrangements necessary for the ad-
ministrative expenses of the Association, the procedure for 
establishing a budget and the apportionment of those ex-
penses between the Member States. 
ARTICLE 35 
Legal capacity, privileges and immumtles 
1. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities to be recognised 
and granted by the Member States in connection with the Associa-
tion shall be laid down in a Protocol to this Convention. 
2. The Council, acting on behalf of the Association, may con-
clude with the Government of the State in whose territory the head-
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quarters will be situated an agreement relating to the legal capacity 
and the privileges and immunities to be recognized and granted in 
connection with the Association. 
ARTICLE 36 
Relations with international organisations 
The Council, acting on behalf of the Association, shall seek to 
establish such relationships with other international organisations 
as may facilitate the attainment of the objectives of the Association. 
It shall in particular seek to establish close collaboration with the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. 
ARTICLE 37 
Obligations under other international agreements 
Nothing in this Convention shall be regarded as exempting any 
Member State from obligations which it has undertaken by virtue 
of the Convention for European Economic Co-operation, the Arti-
cles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other international agree-
ments to which it is a party. 
ARTICLE 38 
Annexes 
The Annexes to this Convention are an integral part of it and 
are the following: 
Annex A.-Basic duties. 
Annex B.-Rules regarding Area origin for tariff purposes. 
Annex C.-List of Government aids referred to in paragraph 1 
of Article 13. 
Annex D.-List of agricultural goods referred to in Article 2 I, 
paragraph I. 
Annex E.-Fish and other marine products. 
Annex F.-List of territories to which paragraph 2 of Article 
43 applies. 
Annex G.-Special arrangements for Portugal in regard to im-
port duties and quantitative export restrictions. 
ARTICLE 39 
Ratification 
This Convention shall be ratified by the signatory States. The in-
struments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of 
Sweden which shall notify all other signatory States. 
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ARTICLE 40 
Entry into force 
This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instru-
ments of ratification by all signatory States. 
ARTICLE 4I 
Accession and association 
1. Any State may accede to this Convention, provided that the 
Council decides to approve its accession, on such terms and condi-
tions as may be set out in that decision. The instrument of accession 
shall be deposited with the Government of Sweden which shall 
notify all other Member States. This Convention shall enter into 
force in relation to an acceding State on the date indicated in that 
decision._ 
2. The Council may negotiate an agreement between the Mem-
ber States and any other State, union of States or international or-
ganisation, creating an association embodying such reciprocal rights 
and obligations, common actions and special procedures as may be 
appropriate. Such an agreement shall be submitted to the Member 
States for acceptance and shall enter into force provided that it is 
accepted by all Member States. Instruments of acceptance shall be 
deposited with the Government of Sweden which shall notify all 
other Member States. 
ARTICLE 42 
Withdrawal 
Any Member State may withdraw from this Convention provided 
that it gives twelve months' notice in writing to the Government of 
Sweden which shall notify all other Member States. 
ARTICLE 43 
Territorial application 
1. In relation to Member States which are signatories, this Con-
vention shall apply to the European territories of Member States 
and the European territories for whose international relations a 
Member State is responsible, other than those listed in Annex F. 
2. This Convention shall apply to the territories listed in Annex 
F, if the Member State which is responsible for their international 
relations so declares at the time of ratification or at any time there-
after. 
3· In relation to a Member State which accedes to this Conven-
tion in accordance with paragraph I of Article 4 I, this Convention 
shall apply to the territories specified in the decision approving the 
accession of that State, 
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4· Member States recognise that certain Member States may 
wish to propose at a later date that the application of this Conven-
tion should be extended to those of their territories and the terri-
tories for whose international relations they are responsible to which 
it does not already apply, on terms and conditions then to be deter-
mined, and that arrangements creating reciprocal rights and obli-
gations in relation to those territories should be established. 
5· In that event, in order to give effect to paragraph 4, there 
shall, in due course, be consultations among all Member States. The 
Council may decide to approve the terms and conditions in accord-
ance with which the application of this Convention may be extended 
to those territories and may decide to approve the specific terms and 
conditions of such arrangements. 
6. If a territory, for whose international relations a Member 
State is responsible and to which this Convention applies, becomes 
a sovereign State, the provisions of this Convention applicable to 
that territory shall, if the new State so requests, continue to apply to 
it. The new State shall have the right to participate in the work of 
the institutions of the Association and, in agreement with the new 
State, the Council shall take the decisions necessary for adopting ar-
rangements to give effect to such participation. The Convention 
shall continue to apply to the new State on this basis either until 
its participation ceases in the same manner as that provided with 
regard to a Member State or, if its accession as a Member State is 
approved in accordance with paragraph r of Article 41, until that 
accession becomes effective. 
7· The application of this Convention to any territory pursuant 
to paragraphs 2, 3 or 5 of this Article may be terminated by the 
Member State in question provided that it gives twelve months' 
notice in writing. 
8. Declarations and notifications made in accordance with this 
Article shall be made to the Government of Sweden which shall 
notify all other Member States. 
ARTICLE 44 
Amendment 
Except where provision for modification is made elsewhere in 
this Convention, including the Annexes to it, an amendment to the 
provisions of this Convention shall be submitted to Member States 
for acceptance if it is approved by decision of the Council, and it 
shall enter into force provided it is accepted by all Member States. 
Instruments of acceptance shall be deposited with the Government 
of Sweden which shall notify all other Member States. 
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In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have 
signed the present Convention. 
Done at Stockholm the 
day of , 1959, in 
a single copy in the English and French languages, both texts being 
equally authentic, which shall be deposited with the Government 
of Sweden, by which certified copies shall be transmitted to all other 
signatory and acceding States. 
ANNEX A 
Basic duties 
I. In paragraph 3 of Article 3 and in this Annex, the import duty 
applied to imports of a product on any date means the rate of duty 
actually in force and levied on imports of that product on that date. 
Where, however, specific quantities or consignments are allowed to 
be imported under a special administrative licensing or control 
scheme at a rate of duty lower than that otherwise levied on imports 
of that product, that lower rate shall not be considered to be the 
duty applied to that product. But where a lower rate of duty is ap-
plied unconditionally without quantitative limitation to imports of a 
product by reason of the purpose for which it is imported, that rate 
shall be considered to be the duty applied to that product when im-
ported for that purpose. 
2. Where, in a Member State, the import duty on any product is 
temporarily suspended or reduced on 1st January, 1960, that Mem 
ber State may, at any time before 3 rst December, 1964, restore the 
import duty on that product, provided that 
(a) the industry within its territory has committed itself to sub-
stantial expenditure on the development of manufacture of 
the product in question before the date of signature of this 
Convention; and 
(b) the circumstances are such that it is reasonable to assume 
that competition affecting that product from other Member 
States was an essential element in the calculation of the in-
dustry in making its investment; and 
(c) either the product is included in a list which has been notified 
before the date of signature of this Convention, to the other 
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States signatory to this Convention, or the Council has au-
thorised such restoration by majority decision. 
3· A Member State may restore the import duty on a product 
otherwise than in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Annex, pro-
vided it has informed all other Member States at least one month 
before the duty is to be restored. If, however, during that time or 
later any other Member State has a practical interest in the prod-
uct, i.e., that it produces and exports that product in significant quan-
tities and so declares to the Member State which is proposing to re-
store or has restored the duty, that Member State shall not restore 
or shall remove that duty. The Council may decide, by majority 
vote, that a Member State does not have a practical interest in the 
product. 
4· From the date of restoration of a duty in accordance with 
paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 of this Annex, the duty shall not exceed 
that permitted under Article 3, on the assumption that the basic 
duty is the duty which would have been applied on 1st January, 
1960, if the duty had not been temporarily suspended or reduced on 
that date. 
S· For Denmark, the basic duty for any product shall be that 
applied to imports of that product from other Member States on 
Ist March, 1960. 
6. For Norway, the basic duty on each of the following items 
shall be the rate specified against that item or such lower rate as 
may be specified at the relevant time in Schedule XIV to the Gen-





ex 32.09 C 
69.12Ar 
ex 70.13 B 
Cigars 
Cigarettes 
Varnishes and polishes . . . . . . . 
Articles of faience, not coloured 
or decorated 
Articles of faience, coloured or 
decorated. 
Decorated glassware for table 
Rate of duty 
Norwegian 
Kroner per 





2212%, but not 
less than o.So 
2212%, but not 
less than 1.20 
zo%, but not 
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Norwegian Tariff 
number Product 
Rate of duty 
Norwegian 
Kroner per 
kg. or ad 
valorem 
and kitchen purposes less than 2.40 
ex 73· I7 B Soil-pipes . . . I 5% 
ex 73.20 
85.03 A 
Soil-pipes fittings . . . I 5% 
Galvanic dry cells weighing up I 5%, but not 
to I So grams less than o. 55 
ex 92. I I Tape-recorders I 5% 
7· For the United Kingdom, the basic duty shall be 33% percent 
ad valorem for the following products:-
Brussels nomen-
clature number 
ex 32.05 Synthetic organic dyestuffs (including pigment dye-
stuffs) other than such dyestuffs dispersed or dissolved 
in cellulose nitrate (plasticised or not); synthetic or-
ganic products of a kind used as luminophores, other 
than such products consisting of synthetic organic dye-
stuffs (including pigment dyestuffs) dispersed or dis-
solved in artificial plastic material; and products of the 
kind known as optical bleaching agents, substantive to 
the fibre. 
ex 32.09 Synthetic organic dyestuffs in forms or packings of a 
kind sold by retail. 
The provisions of this paragraph will take effect on the understand-
ing that the duty of 33 Ya percent ad valorem will be introduced not 
later than Ist July, 1960. 
8. The Council may decide to authorise a Member State to adopt 
any rate of duty as the basic duty for any product. 
9· The provisions of this Annex apply only to duties on imports 
of goods eligible for Area tariff treatment. 
ANNEX B 
Rules regarding area origin for tariff purposes 
For the purpose of determining the origin of goods under Article 
4 and for the application of that Article, the following Rules shall 
be applied. The Schedules to this Annex are in the English language 
only. 
ANNEX 
Rule I .-Interpretative Provisions 
r. "The Area" means the Area of the Association. 
2. In determining the place of production of marine products and 
goods produced therefrom, a vessel of a Member State shall be re-
garded as part of the territory of that State. In determining the 
place from which goods have been consigned, marine products taken 
from the sea or goods produced therefrom at sea shall be regarded 
as having been consigned from the territory of a Member State 
if they were taken by or produced in a vessel of a Member State and 
have been brought direct to the Area. 
3· A vessel which is registered shall be regarded as a vessel of 
the State in which it is registered and of which it flies the flag. 
4· "Materials" includes products, parts and components used 
in the production of the goods. 
5. Energy, fuel, plant, machinery and tools used in the production 
of goods within the Area, and materials used in the maintenance of 
such plant, machinery and tools, shall be regarded as wholly pro-
duced within the Area when determining the origin of those goods. 
6. "Produced" in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph I of Article 
4 and "a process of production" in paragraph 2 of that Article in-
clude the application of any operation or process, with the excep-
tion of any operation or process which consists only of one or more 
of the following: 
(a) packing, wherever the packing materials may have been 
produced; 
(b) splitting up into lots; 
(c) sorting and grading; 
(d) marking; 
(e) putting up into sets. 
7. "Producer" includes a grower and a manufacturer and also a 
person who supplies his goods otherwise than by sale to another 
person and to whose order the last process in the course of the 
manufacture of the goods is applied by that other person. 
Rule 2.-Goods wholly produced within the Area 
For the purposes of sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph I of Arti-
cle 4, the following are among the products which shall be regarded 
as wholly produced within the Area: 
(a) mineral products extracted from the ground within the 
Area; 
(b) vegetable products harvested within the Area; 
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products obtained within the Area from live animals; 
products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted within the 
Area; 
(/) marine products taken from the sea by a vessel of a Mem-
ber State; 
(g) used articles fit only for the recovery of rna terials, provided 
that they have been collected from users within the Area; 
(h) scrap and waste resulting from manufacturing operations 
within the Area; 
(i) goods produced within the Area exclusively from one or both 
of the following: 
(I) products within sub-paragraphs (a) to (h) ; 
( 2) materials containing no element imported from outside 
the Area or of undetermined origin. 
Rule ].-Application of Percentage Criterion 





Any materials which meet the conditions specified in sub-
paragraph (a) or (b) of paragraph I of that Article shall 
be regarded as containing no element imported from outside 
the Area; 
The value of any materials which can be identified as having 
been imported from outside the Area shall be their c.i.f. 
value accepted by the customs authorities on clearance for 
home use, or on temporary admission, at the time of last 
importation into the territory of the Member State where 
they were used in a process of production, less the amount 
of any transport costs incurred in transit through the terri-
tory of other Member States; 
If the value of any materials imported from outside the 
Area cannot be determined in accordance with sub-para-
graph (b) of this Rule, their value shall be the earliest 
ascertainable price paid for them in the territory of the 
Member State where they were used in a process of produc-
tion; 
(d) If the origin of any materials cannot be determined, such 
materials shall be deemed to have been imported from out-
side the Area and their value shall be the earliest ascertain-
able price paid for them in the territory of the Member 
State where they were used in a process of production; 
(e) The export price of the goods shall be the price paid or pay-
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able for them to the exporter in the territory of the Member 
State where the goods were produced, that price being ad-
justed, where necessary, to a f.o.b. or free at frontier basis 
in that territory; 
(f) The value under sub-paragraphs (b), (c) or (d) or the 
export price under sub-paragraph (e) of this Rule may be 
adjusted to correspond with the amount which would have 
been obtained on a sale in the open market between buyer 
and seller independent of each other. This amount shall also 
be taken to be the export price when the goods are not the 
subject of a sale. 
Rule 4.-Unit of Qualification 
I. Each article in a consignment shall be considered separately. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Rule: 
(a) where the Brussels Nomenclature specifies that a group, set 
or assembly of articles is to be classified within a single head-
ing, such a group, set or assembly shall be treated as one 
article; 
(b) tools, parts and accessories which are imported with an arti-
cle, and the price of which is included in that of the article or 
for which no separate charge is made, shall be considered as 
forming a whole with the article, provided that they consti-
tute the standard equipment customarily included on the 
sale of articles of that kind; 
(c) in cases not within sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), goods shall 
be treated as a single article if they are so treated for pur-
poses of assessing customs duties by the importing Member 
State. 
3. An unassembled or disassembled article which is imported in 
more than one consignment because it is not feasible for transport 
or production reasons to import it in a single consignment shall, if 
the importer so requests, be treated as one article. 
Rule s.-Segregation of materials 
I. For those products or industries where it would be impractica-
ble for the producer physically to segregate materials of similar 
character but different origin used in the production of goods, such 
segregation may be replaced by an appropriate accounting system, 
which ensures that no more goods receive Area tariff treatment than 
would have been the case if the producer had been able physically to 
segregate the materials. 
2. Any such accounting system shall conform to such conditions 
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as may be agreed upon by the Member States concerned in order to 
ensure that adequate control measures will be applied. 
Rule 6.-Treatment of mixtures 
I. In the case of mixtures, not being groups, sets or assemblies of 
separable articles dealt with under Rule 4, a Member State may re-
fuse to accept as being of Area origin any product resulting from the 
mixing together of goods which would qualify as being of Area 
origin with goods which would not so qualify, if the characteristics 
of the product as a whole are not essentially different from the char-
acteristics of the goods which have been mixed. 
2. In the case of particular products where it is, however, recog-
nised by Member States concerned to be desirable to permit mixing 
of the kind described in paragraph I of this Rule, such products 
shall be accepted as of Area origin in respect of such part thereof as 
may be shown to correspond to the quantity of goods of Area origin 
used in the mixing, subject to such conditions as may be agreed upon. 
Rule 7.-Treatment of Packing 
I. Where for purposes of assessing customs duties a Member 
State treats goods separately from their packing, it may also, in 
respect of its imports from the territory of another Member State, 
determine separately the origin of such packing. 
2. Where paragraph I of this Rule is not applied, packing shall 
be considered as forming a whole with the goods and no part of any 
packing required for their transport or storage shall be considered 
as having been imported from outside the Area, when determining 
the origin of the goods as a whole. 
J. For the purpose of paragraph 2 of this Rule, packing with 
which goods are ordinarily sold by retail shall not be regarded as 
packing required for the transport or storage of goods. 
Rule B.-Documentary Evidence 
I. A claim that goods shall be accepted as eligible for Area tariff 
treatment shall be supported by appropriate documentary evidence 
of origin and consignment. The evidence of origin shall consist of 
either-
( a) a declaration of origin completed by the last producer of the 
goods within the Area, together with a supplementary dec-
laration completed by the exporter in cases where the pro-
ducer is not himself or by his agent the exporter of the 
goods; or 
(b) a certificate given by a governmental authority or authorised 
body nominated by the exporting Member State and notified 
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to the other Member States, together with a supplementary 
declaration completed by the exporter of the goods. 
These declarations, certificates and supplementary declarations shall 
be in the form prescribed in Schedule IV to this Annex. 
2. The exporter may choose either of the forms of evidence re-
ferred to in paragraph I of this Rule. Nevertheless, the authorities 
of the country of exportation may require for certain categories of 
goods that evidence of origin shall be furnished in the form indi-
cated in sub-paragraph (b) of that paragraph. 
3· In cases where a certificate of origin is to be supplied by a 
governmental authority or an authorised body under sub-paragraph 
(b) of paragraph r of this Rule, that authority or body shall obtain 
a declaration as to the origin of the goods given by the last producer 
of the goods within the Area. The governmental authority or the 
authorised body shall satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the 
evidence provided; where necessary they shall require the produc-
tion of additional information, and shall carry out any suitable 
check. If the authorities of the importing Member State so require, 
a confidential indication of the producer of the goods shall be given. 
4· Nominations of authorised bodies for the purpose of sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph I of this Rule, may be withdrawn by 
the exporting Member State if the need arises. Each Member State 
shall retain, in regard to its imports, the right of refusing to accept 
certificates from any authorised body which is shown to have re-
peatedly issued certificates in an improper manner, but such action 
shall not be taken without adequate prior notification to the export-
ing Member State of the grounds for dissatisfaction. 
5. In cases where the Member States concerned recognise that it 
is impracticable for the producer to make the declaration of origin 
specified in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph I or in paragraph 2 of 
this Rule, the exporter may make that declaration, in such form as 
those Member States may for the purpose specify. 
Rule Q.-Ferifiration of E'vidence of Origin 
1. The importing Member State may as necessary require further 
evidence to support any declaration or certificate of origin furnished 
under Rule 8. 
2. The importing Member State shall not prevent the importer 
from taking delivery of the goods solely on the grounds that it re-
quires such further evidence, but may require security for any duty 
or other charge which may be payable. 
3· Where, under paragraph I ,of this Rule, a Member State has 
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required further evidence to be furnished, those concerned in the 
territory of another Member State shall be free to produce it to a 
governmental authority or an authorised body of the latter State, 
who shall, after thorough verification of the evidence, furnish an 
appropriate report to the importing Member State. 
4· Where it is necessary to do so by reason of national legislation, 
a Member State may prescribe that requests by the authorities of 
importing Member States for further evidence from those con-
cerned i11 its territory shall be addressed to a specified governmental 
authority, who shall after thorough verification of the evidence 
furnish an appropriate report to the importing Member State. 
5· If the importing Member State wishes an investigation to be 
made into the accuracy of the evidence which it has received, it may 
make a request to that effect to the other Member State or States 
concerned. 
6. Information obtained under the provisions of this Rule by the 
importing Member State shall be treated as confidential. 
Rule Io.-Sanctions 
I. Member States undertake to introduce legislation, making 
such provision as may be necessary for penalties against persons 
who, in their territory, furnish or cause to be furnished a document 
which is untrue in a material particular in support of a claim in 
another Member State that goods should be accepted as eligible for 
Area tariff treatment. The penalties applicable shall be similar to 
those applicable in cases of untrue declarations in regard to pay-
ment of duty on imports. 
2. A Member State may deal with the offence out of court if it 
can be more appropriately dealt with by a compromise penalty or 
similar administrative procedure. 
3· A Member State shall be under no obligation to institute or 
continue court proceedings, or action under paragraph 2 of this 
Rule, 
(a) if it has not been requested to do so by the importing Mem-
ber State to which the untrue claim was made; or 
(b) if, on the evidence available, the proceedings would not be 
justified. 
SCHEDULE I 
List of qualifying processes with alternative percentage 
criterion 
SCHEDULE II 




Basic materials list 
SCHEDULE IV 
Forms of documentary evidence of ongm 
[These Schedules will be published as Cmnd. 906-I] 
ANNEX C 
List of Government aids referred to m paragraph I of 
Article 13 
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(a) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which 
involve a bonus on exports or re-exports. 
(b) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to ex-
porters. 
(c) The remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct 
taxes or social welfare charges on industrial or commercial enter-
pnses. 
(d) The remission or repayment, in respect of exported goods, 
of indirect taxes, whether levied at one or several stages, or of 
charges in connection with importation, to an amount exceeding the 
amount paid on the same product if sold for internal consumption. 
(e) In respect of deliveries by governments or governmental 
agencies of imported raw materials for export business on different 
terms than for domestic business, the charging of prices below 
world prices. 
(f) In respect of government export credit guarantees, the 
charging of premiums at rates which are manifestly inadequate to 
cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the credit insurance 
institutions. 
(g) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled 
by governments) of export credits at rates below those which they 
have to pay in order to obtain the funds so employed. 
(h) The government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by 
exporters in obtaining credit. 
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ANNEX D 
















Chapter I I 
Chapter I2 
Description of Goods 
Live animals 
Meat and edible meat offals except whalemeat * (ex 
02.04) 
Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey 
Guts, bladders and stomachs of animals (other than 
fish), whole and pieces thereof 
Animal products not elsewhere specified or included 
except blood powder, blood plasma and salted fish 
roes unfit for human consumption; dead animals 
of Chapter I or Chapter 3, unfit for human con-
sumption 
Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the 
like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage 
Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of melons or citrus fruit 
Coffee, tea, mate and spices except mate ( 09.03) 
Cereals 
Products of the milling industry; malt and starches; 
gluten; inulin 
I 2.01 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken 
- I 2.02 Flours or meals of oil seeds or oleaginous fruit, non-
defatted (excluding mustard flour) 
- I2.03 Seeds, fruit and spores, of a kind used for sowing 
I 2.04 Sugar beet, whole or sliced, fresh, dried or pow-
dered; sugar cane 
I 2.0 5 Chicory roots, fresh or dried, whole or cut, un-
roasted 
12.06 Hop cones and lupulin 
ex I 2.07 Basil, borage, mint (excluding dried peppermint and 
pennyroyal), rosemary and sage 
*Annex E. 
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- 12.08 Locust beans, fresh or dried, whether or not kibbled 
or ground, but not further prepared; fruit kernals 
and other vegetable products of a kind used pri-
marily for human food, not falling within any 
other heading 
I 2.09 Cereal straw and husks, unprepared, or chopped but 
not otherwise prepared 
I2.IO Mangolds, swedes, fodder roots; hay, lucerne, 
clover, sainfoin, forage kale, lupines, vetches and 
similar forage products 
Chapter IJ 
ex IJ.OJ 
















Lard and other rendered pig fat; rendered poultry 
fat 
Unrendered fats of bovine cattle, sheep or goats; 
tallow (including "premier jus") produced from 
those fats 
Lard stearin, oleostearin and tallow stearin; lard 
oil, oleo-oil and tallow oil, not emulsified or mixed 
or prepared in any way 
Other animal oils and fats (including neat's-foot oil 
and fats from bones or waste) 
Fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude, refined or 
purified 
Animal or vegetable fats and oils, hydrogenated, 
whether or not refined, but not further prepared, 
except those wholly of fish and marine mammals 
Margarine, imitation lard and other prepared edible 
fats 
Sausages and the like of meat, meat offal or animal 
blood 
Other prepared or preserved meat or meat offal 
Meat extracts and meat juices, except whalemeat 
extract* 
Beet sugar and cane sugar, solid 
Other sugars; sugar syrups; artificial honey 
(whether or not mixed with natural honey) ; 
caramel 
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17.03 Molasses, whether or not decolourised 
ex 17.04 Fondant, pastes, creams and similar intermediate 
products, in bulk, with an added sweetening mat-
ter content of 8o percent or more 
- 17.05 Flavoured or coloured sugars, syrups and molasses, 
but not including fruit juices containing added 











ex 2 r.o6 
ex 21.07 
Description of Goods 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted 
Cocoa shells, husks, skins and waste 
Preparations of flour, starch or malt extract, of a 
kind used as infant food or for dietetic or cu1inary 
purposes, containing less than 50 percent by 
weight of cocoa 
Macaroni, spaghetti and similar products 
Tapioca and sago; tapioca and sago substitutes ob-
tained from potato or other starches 
Bread and ordinary bakers' wares except ships' bis-
cuits, crumbs and rusks 
Pastry and other fine bakers' wares, whether or not 
containing cocoa in any proportion, except bis-
cuits, wafers, rusks, "slab-cake," "sand-cake" and 
"Danish pastry" 
Preparations of vegetables, fruit or other parts of 
plants except tomato pulp or paste in airtight con-
tainers with a dry weight content of not less than 
25 percent tomato, wholly of tomato and water, 
with or without salt or other preserving, season-
ing or flavouring ingredients (ex 20.02) 
Pressed yeast 
Food preparations not elsevvhere specified or in-
cluded, with a substantial content of fats, eggs, 

















Grape must, in fermentation or with fermentation 
arrested otherwise than by the addition of alcohol 
Wine of fresh grapes; grape must with fermentation 
arrested by the addition of alcohol 
Vermouths, and other wines of fresh grapes fla-
voured with aromatic extracts 
Other fermented beverages (for example cider, 
perry and mead) 
Ethyl alcohol, undenatured, with an alcohol content 
of less than So degrees; spirituous beverages ex-
cept the following: whisky and other spirits dis-
tilled from cereals; rum and other spirits distilled 
from molasses; aquavit, genever, gin, imitation 
rum and vodka; alcoholic beverages based on the 
foregoing spirts; wine brandy and fig brandy; 
liqueurs and cordials; compound alcoholic prepar-
ations (known as "concentrated extracts") for 
the manufacture of beverages 
Vinegar and substitutes for vinegar 
Bran, sharps and other residues derived from the 
sifting, milling or working of cereals or of legu-
minous vegetables 
Beet pulp, bagasse and other waste of sugar manu-
facture; brewing and distilling dregs and waste; 
residues of starch manufacture and similar resi-
dues 
Oil-cake and other residues (except dregs) resulting 
from the extraction of vegetable oils 
Vegetable products of a kind used for animal food, 
not elsewhere specified or included, except sea-
weed meal 
Sweetened forage and other preparations of a kind 
used in animal feeding, except fish solubles 
- 24.0 I Unmanufactured tobacco; tobacco refuse 
Chapter 35 
ex 35.01 Casein, caseinates and other casein derivatives 







Fish and other marine products 
Description of Goods 
Whale meat 
Fish, fresh (live or dead) chilled or frozen; except 
frozen fillets 
03.02 Fish, salted, dried or smoked 
ex 03.03 Crustaceans and molluscs; except frozen peeled 
prawns other than Dublin Bay prawns 
ex I 6.03 Whale meat extract 
ANNEX F 







Special arrangements for Portugal in regard to import 
duties and quantitative export restrictions 
I. Special arrangements in regard to the reduction and elimina-
tion of import duties on certain products imported into Portuguese 
territory covered by the Convention, and in regard to the applica-




2. The provisions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of this Annex shall be 
substituted for paragraph 2 of Article 3 in relation to any products 
of which there is production in Portuguese territory covered by the 
Convention on rst January, I960, and which are not referred to in 
paragraph 3 of this Annex. 
3.- (a) The products excepted from paragraph 2 of this Annex 
are 
( i) goods the export of which to foreign countries 
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amounts to 15 percent or more of the production 
in Portuguese territory covered by the Convention 
on the average of the three years ended 31st De-
cember, 1958; or 
( ii) other goods notified by Portugal, even though the 
industries concerned are not exporting industries 
covered by sub-paragraph ( i) of this paragraph. 
(b) Before 1st July, 1960, Portugal shall notify to the Council 
the products to which sub-paragraphs ( i) and ( ii) of this paragraph 
will apply. 
4.-(a) On and after each of the following dates Portugal shall 
not apply an import duty on any product referred to in paragraph 2 
of this Annex at a level exceeding the percentage of the basic duty 
specified against that date: 
Ist July, 1960 So 
Ist January, 1965 ............... 70 
Ist January, 1967 6o 
Ist January, 1970 50 
(b) The Council shall decide before 1st January, I 970, the time-
table for the progressive reduction of import duties on such products 
which remain after that date, provided that those duties shall be 
eliminated before 1st January, 1980. 
5. If on the average of the three years ending 31st December, 
1959, or of any subsequent three years before Ist January, 1970, 
exports of any product to foreign countries amount to 1 5 percent or 
more of production in Portuguese territory covered by the Con-
vention, and provided that this level of exports is not due to excep-
tional circumstances, the elimination of the remaining duty on such 
products shall be achieved by annual reductions of 10 percent of the 
basic duty, unless the Council decides otherwise. 
6.-(a) Portugal may, at any time before Ist July, 1972, in-
crease the import duty on a product or establish a new import duty 
on a product not then produced in significant quantities in Portu-
guese territory covered by the Convention, provided that the import 
duty so applied 
(i) is necessary to help to promote the development 
of a specific production; and 
( ii) is not on an ad valorem basis higher than the 
normal level of customs duties applied in the most 
favoured nation tariff of Portugal at that time to 
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. similar products produced in Portuguese territory 
covered by the Convention. 
(b) Portugal shall notify to the Council any duty to be applied 
in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph not less 
than 30 days before its introduction. If any Member State so re-
quests, the Council shall examine whether the conditions in that para-
graph are fulfilled. 
(c) Portugal shall, before 1st January, 1980, eliminate import 
duties applied in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) of this para-
graph. Such duties shall be reduced at an even and progressive rate. 
Portugal shall notify to the Council the programme of reduction to 
be applied. The Council shall, at the request of any Member State, 
examine the programme notified, and may decide to modify it. 
II 
Quantitative export restrictions 
7. The provisions of Article II shall not prevent Portugal from 
applying quantitative restrictions on exports of an exhaustible min-
ing product if, taking into account the quantities of the product avail-
able, the supplies necessary for domestic industries would be en-
dangered by the export of such a product to the territories of Mem-
ber States. Portugal, if it applies restrictions in accordance with this 
paragraph, shall notify them to the Council, if possible before they 
come into force, and shall enter into consultations with any Member 
State concerned. 
IV.-PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN FREE 
TRADE ASSOCIATION TO THE PRINCIPALITY OF 
LIECHTENSTEIN 
The Signatory States of the Convention establishing the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association and the Principality of Liechtenstein, 
Considering that the Principality of Liechtenstein forms a cus-
toms union with Switzerland pursuant to the Treaty of 29th March, 
1923, and that according to that Treaty not all the provisions of 
the Convention can without further authority be applied to Liechten-
stein, and 
Considering that the Principality of Liechtenstein has expressed 
the wish that all the provisions of the Convention should be applied 
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to it, and, to this end, in so far as this is necessary, proposes to give 
special powers to Switzerland, 
Have agreed as follows: 
I. The Convention shall apply to the Principality of Liechten-
stein as long as it forms a customs union with Switzerland and 
Switzerland is a Member of the Association. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the Principality of Liech-
tenstein shall be represented by Switzerland. 
3· This Protocol shall be ratified by the signatory States. The 
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Govern-
ment of Sweden which shall notify all other signatory States. 
4· This Protocol shall enter into force on the deposit of instru-
ments of ratification by all signatory States. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised thereto, have 
signed the present Protocol. 
Done at Stockholm, the day of , 1959, in 
a single copy in the English and French languages, both texts being 
equally authentic which shall be deposited with the Government of 
Sweden, by which certified copies shall be transmitted to all other 
signatory and acceding States. 
For the Republic of Austria: 
For the Kingdom of Denmark: 
For the Principality of Liechtenstein: 
For the Kingdom of Norway: 
For the Portuguese Republic: 
For the Kingdom of Sweden: 
For the Swiss Confederation: 
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 
V.-NOTE ON PREPARATORY COMMITTEE 
When Ministers from Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom met in Stockholm on 
19th and zoth November, 1959, to approve the Convention estab-
lishing a European Free Trade Association, they decided to set up a 
Preparatory Committee to deal, before the entry into force of the 
Convention, with the following matters: 
( 1 ) drafting of rules of procedure of the Council; 
( 2) proposals concerning arrangements for the secretariat serv-
ices of the Association, including the Staff regulations; 
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( 3) drafting of regulations on financial arrangements necessary 
for the administrative expenses of the Association, including 
the procedure for establishing a budget and the apportion-
ment of expenses between the Member States; 
( 4) a draft protocol on the legal capacity, privileges and immu-
nities to be granted by the Member States in connection with 
the Association; 
( 5) such other questions in connection with preparations for the 
establishment of the Association, as the signatory states may 
agree. 
Stockholm, 20th November, 19 59· 
